This thesis aims at pointing out that currently in Germany a multidimensional form of exclusion of asylum seekers is taking place. On the one hand, this exclusion exists by using right-wing populist rhetoric in political discourse (first dimension). On the other, there are legislative provisions in the German asylum system which impede an adequate social inclusion of many asylum seekers with a lasting effect (second dimension). These exclusion mechanisms are of particular concern to "illegalized" migrants.
In this context, three hypotheses will be examined. The first hypothesis is: "Asylum seekers in Germany are systematically marginalized and stigmatized in political discourse by the right-wing populist rhetoric by political players such as Pegida, AfD, and CSU." The second hypothesis is: "Because of the different types of residence within the German asylum system and the related legal consequences, illegalized and "tolerated" asylum seekers are socially marginalized." The third hypothesis is: "An inclusive asylum policy can help overcome the social marginalization and stigmatization of illegalized and "tolerated" refugees."
Table of content
1. Introduction
1.1 Methodology
1.2 Relevance and current state of research
2. Elias and Scotson's "established – outsiders figuration"
2.1 Power relationships
2.2 Established - outsiders relations
2.3 Sources of power
2.4 Stigmatization as an instrument of power
2.5 Criticism
3. Marginalization and stigmatization of asylum seekers in political discourse
3.1 Right-wing populism
3.2 Pegida
3.3 Alternative für Deutschland
3.4 Christlich-Soziale Union
4. Discrimination by law?
4.1 Institutional discrimination
4.2 The types of residence in the German asylum system
4.3 Marginalization by law?
5. The concept of inclusion
5.1 Inclusion vs. exclusion
5.2 Elements of inclusive asylum policies – an approach
6. Conclusion
7. References
1. Introduction
According to the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, currently almost 60 million people throughout the world have had to flee their homes1 - figures that compare only to the numbers of refugees during World War II. They have fled from war, persecution, or other forms of suffering and hardship. Therefore, they are in need of protection and care. The largest group of refugees comes from Syria, a country which has been suffering from civil war for several years. An enormous influx of refugees is counted also from Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, many people flee from states of the Western Balkans: Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and Macedonia. Nevertheless, most people remain in their countries of origin or flee to the neighboring states. Therefore, the bordering countries bear the greatest burden of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq: Millions have fled to Turkey and Lebanon. Europe, too, is currently facing an unprecedented influx of people seeking asylum. Germany and Sweden are particularly popular destinations because of their flourishing economies and functioning social systems. Germany alone has registered 425,000 asylum applications from the beginning of January until the end of November 2015. Approximately 400,000 more people are currently [insert date] waiting to file their applications. How have politics and society reacted to this new situation? At first glance, the picture looks rather positive: Representatives of (almost) all political parties advocated solidarity (and still do) with refugees and called for appropriate measures to support people in need. Furthermore, a large number of persons are committed to helping refugees on a voluntary basis. Also Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) has officially declared: "I say again, we can do it and we will do it!"2 The international press reacted enthusiastically to such developments. Germany was perceived as a country with a "welcome culture." A country that, in humanistic manner, opens its arms to people in need and does not want to stand by in an idle way as many people suffer. As positive as these developments might seem, they represent only one part of the current reality. The officially cultivated German "welcome culture" meets significant resistance all over Germany. Thus, Germany is facing an unprecedented dimension of radical right-wing attacks. Already in October 2015, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) spoke of approximately 580 violent attacks against refugee centers.3 Furthermore, parties such as "CSU" and "AfD" call for limiting the influx of asylum seeking persons in a right-wing populist manner and proclaim a significantly protectionist orientation of the German asylum policy. Also outside of the political party landscape, resistance against the migration to Germany has formed in political associations such as "Pegida" (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident). On closer inspection, the Federal Government's policy also seems to contradict the official "welcome culture." Besides increasing the financial resources by one billion euros, the Federal Government approved a series of heavily criticized measures relating to asylum legislation. Thus on 13 September 2015, the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and the related suspension of the Schengen Agreement was announced. Furthermore on 29 September 2015, the Federal Cabinet adopted a legislative package with significant changes in the asylum law. Changes in the Law on Asylum Procedure, the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, etc. are supposed to facilitate the "Rückführungen vollziehbarer Ausreisepflichtiger" and to eliminate "Fehlanreize, die zu einem weiteren Anstieg ungerechtfertigter Asylanträge führen können."4 Such developments suggest that the beloved "welcome culture" stands facing a culture of rejection and exclusion of asylum seekers. This thesis aims at pointing out that currently in Germany a multidimensional form of exclusion of asylum seekers is taking place. On the one hand, this exclusion exists by using right-wing populist rhetoric in political discourse (first dimension). On the other, there are legislative provisions in the German asylum system which impede an adequate social inclusion of many asylum seekers with a lasting effect (second dimension). These exclusion mechanisms are of particular concern to "illegalized" migrants.
In this context, three hypotheses will be examined. The first hypothesis is: "Asylum seekers in Germany are systematically marginalized and stigmatized in political discourse by the right-wing populist rhetoric by political players such as Pegida, AfD, and CSU." The second hypothesis is: "Because of the different types of residence within the German asylum system and the related legal consequences, illegalized and "tolerated" asylum seekers are socially marginalized." The third hypothesis is: "An inclusive asylum policy can help overcome the social marginalization and stigmatization of illegalized and "tolerated" refugees." In the following, the methodology applied by the author will be explained.
1.1 Methodology
In order to approach the aspect of marginalization of refugees theoretically, the author draws on the "established-outsiders figuration" developed by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson. In their study, Elias and Scotson have analyzed which mechanisms are used by social groups to marginalize and stigmatize alleged "others." The theory is described in section 2. Besides disclosing different theoretical components, the author also has a critical look at the presented topic.
In section 3, the "established-outsiders figuration" is applied to the social reality, i.e. the political discourse. In order to take into account the first hypothesis, the definition and components of right-wing populism are outlined in section 3.1. In the next step, examples will show that political players such as Pegida (3.2), AfD (3.3), and CSU (3.4) make use of the mechanisms described by Elias and Scotson in the form of right-wing populist rhetoric in order to marginalize and stigmatize asylum seekers in political discourse. Pegida, AfD, and CSU were selected for analysis because these players attracted the attention by using explicitly right-wing populist rhetoric and have subsequently been criticized. The author is aware of the fact that the presentation of the problem in an exemplary manner does not lead to a representative image. However, this section does not aim to provide a discourse analysis, but it only aims at showing that the used players make use of this form of rhetoric. This purpose can be achieved with examples. In this way it is also possible to test the first hypothesis.
As Elias and Scotson mainly deal with forms of marginalization created in face-to-face relationships in their study, section 4 focuses on institutionalized forms of exclusion. On this account, several explanatory approaches of "institutional discrimination" such as interest theory, the theory of internal colonialism, and the approach of institutional racism are introduced in section 4.1. Section 4.2 provides descriptions of the different types of residence within the German asylum law and the related rights for the persons concerned. This information is necessary to then, in a next step (section 4.3), be able to elaborate aspects in the asylum legislation contributing to the social marginalization of illegalized and "tolerated" refugees. The presented evidence suggests that the second hypothesis can be verified.
In order to take into account the third hypothesis, the concept of inclusion is dealt with in section 5. In order to determine the components of inclusion, first a delimitation to exclusion is made in section 5.1. On this basis, section 5.2 presents a series of measures for an inclusive form of asylum legislation which could lead to overcoming the previously reclaimed marginalization and stigmatization. This allows to verify the third hypothesis.
Section 6 summarizes the findings in the form of a conclusion, furthermore offering an outlook to possible future developments.
1.2 Relevance and current state of research
The work of the sociologist Norbert Elias, born in Wroclaw in 1897, generally is associated with the "sociology of knowledge" and "civilization theory." Therefore, his works, at first glance, seem inappropriate for the purpose of this work. On closer inspection, however, a different picture emerges. The study "established and outsiders" can rightly be allocated in the "sociology of social inequality." Nevertheless, Elias' work has been given hardly any consideration to this day in the sociology of social inequality and social structure analysis. However, the figuration developed by Elias is increasingly used to "Benachteiligungsverhältnisse zu veranschaulichen und zu erklären, die sich nicht mit den üblichen Kategorien wie Milieu, Schicht oder Lage fassen lassen (…)."5 Elias' loosely composed figuration model suggest a link between his model and other models of thought to illustrate highly complex social processes. Thus for example Hans-Peter Waldhoff linked Elias' concepts with aspects of civilization sociology and sociology of knowledge. The established-outsiders figuration has long been introduced to migration sociology, thus gaining relevance for the present work. Also worth mentioning as an author in this context is Annette Treibel. Treibel shows that ethnic and cultural arguments are used to push immigrants into inferior social positions. However, such explanatory approaches neglect institutionalized forms of exclusion; in this case: the exclusion of persons due to existing legal regulations. By linking Elias' figuration with theoretical concepts of "institutional discrimination," this thesis aims at helping fill this research gap.
The concept of "right-wing populism" has been part of research in political sciences for many years. As a reaction to the social, economic, and political changes in the Seventies, first in Denmark and Norway new political right-wing parties were born, trying to win people affected by the changes. While they first were considered as short-term phenomena, they managed to take root in an increasing number of countries: In Austria, the FPÖ swung to a right-wing populist course; at the beginning of the 1990s, the SVP followed in Switzerland. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, numerous populist parties arose on the right edge of the political spectrum also in Eastern Europe, which often tended to be short-lived, but never entirely vanished into thin air. With the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, right-wing populism also reached the Netherlands, previously considered enlightened, liberal-minded and modern and thus "resistant." While initially the focus of right-wing populist parties was mainly on euroscepticism and general xenophobia, after the 9-11 attacks, especially the Western European right-wing populists discovered anti-Islamism, making European Muslims the bogeyman. In this way, exclusion helped right-wing populism create a common identity among very different people who had lost their connection to their original milieus through transformation processes. The situation is similar in Eastern Europe, where the collapse of the socialist systems led to fundamental changes in society that concerned the entire population.6
The aspect of "institutional discrimination" has its origin in the USA of the 60s. The focus of theoretical and empirical research now shifted to the inequality in the allocation of socially sought-after commodities coming from social institutions. In this context, three central lines of explanation for the aspect of discrimination came up, namely the interest theory, the theory of internal colonialism and the institutional racism approach. All lines of explanation share the focus of the organizational and social context instead of simply considering direct human relationships for explaining discriminatory behavior. Up to date, several studies have been published on all lines of explanation, offering the author a vast selection of primary texts.
Since the ratification of the UN Disability Rights Convention by the Bundestag in 2009 at the latest, the concept of inclusion has been controversially discussed in Germany. The debate on inclusion refers, however, mainly to the pedagogical sphere, i.e. the inclusion of persons with support needs in all parts of the German educational system. This debate is accompanied by a wide range of studies, scientific articles, etc. Beyond these discussions, the concept has long since taken its place in systems theory. In this context, education is only a part of inclusion. Important representatives are for example Niklas Luhmann, Pierre Bourdieu, Armin Nassehi, and Rudolf Stichweh. In this thesis, the concept of inclusion is to be used in the sense of the systems theory.
2. Elias and Scotson's "established – outsiders figuration"
2.1 Power relationships
In the year 1964, Elias together with John L. Scotson published a study with the title "established and outsiders." Elias himself associated this work with the sociology of social inequality, why it stands out significantly from his other publications. In the 1990 amendment with the title "Further Facets of Established-Outsider Relationships," the author underlines that "eine spezifische Form sozialer Ungleichheit (…) [was] im Mittelpunkt dieses Buches7." Here he describes the relationships of inequality as "established-outsiders figuration." "Figuration" stands for a mobile mesh of relations of persons who are interdependent of each other.8
Elias explains that the power to stigmatize others can become a source of inequality. He has no doubt that inequalities always must be considered as the consequence of an unequal distribution of power. This aspect is to be regarded as the common characteristic of all forms of social inequality. Differences exist only in the form of the sources of power and the means of enforcing power. "Power" itself, according to Elias, is a normal part of any kind of human relationship. This is true both for direct human contacts, for example among friends, i.e. on the micro level, and for social institutions or the relationships between states (macro level). If we consider power relationships in social relationships, for Elias, the capacity of adjusting social relationships according to one's own goals and purposes is central. Of course, resources as for example money can act as a supporting instrument of power. But only the usage of the respective resources in the previously described sense and not only their possession turn them into instruments of power.
Eva Barlösius uses "Potlatch," an indigenous feast of gift-giving, as an example for illustration. Schroeter calls the "Potlatch" an "ethnological prototype of reciprocity."9 This ritual was held predominantly in so-called archaic societies. In 1968, Marcel Mauss identified fundamental components of the gift exchange in his essay "Die Gabe." The "Potlatch" was part of a festive ceremony which served to shower rivaling clans and tribes with gifts in order to obligate or to humiliate the adversary. The presentee was not allowed to refuse the gift. Thus the obligation arose of giving back more than what they received. A dilemma: Either the presentees declared themselves to be defeated and refrained from overtrumping the given gift, or they took on the challenge. This shows clearly that the exchange of gifts by no means served for fraternization, but was dominated by the "principle of rivalry and antagonism10." Potlatch thus was a trial of strength in Norbert Elias' sense. Goods were used to force the rival to give gifts or to form and adjust social relationships according to their own ideas.
2.2 Established-outsiders relationships
The basis for the book "established and outsiders" is an empirical analysis made by Elias together with his colleague and student John L. Scotson between 1958 ans 1960 in an English suburb. The suburban settlement, called "Winston Parva" by the authors, represented a typical workers' settlement where "traditionelle, dörfliche Strukturen, wie enge Nachbarschaftsverhältnisse, damit verbundene hohe soziale Kontrolle aber auch gegenseitige Solidarität überlebt hatten."11 The construction of a new settlement behind local railway tracks and the related influx of workers from other English regions disrupted significantly the alleged suburban idyll at the end of the 1930ies. Although the people moving in (group 2) worked in the same factories as the locals (group 1) and thus also belonged to the group of industrial workers, the relationship of both districts was characterized by distance and rejection. Even worse: The new residents were considered dirty, criminal, and compulsive. The first group avoided any contact with the "newcomers" and furthermore denied them any form of exertion of influence on important functions and positions within the community. Group 1 managed to enforce this with a lasting effect, although both groups did not differ from each other from a sociostructural perspective, i.e. in education, income, profession, etc. The only really significant difference between both districts was the fact that the residents "des einen Alteingesessene waren und schon seit Generationen in Nachbarschaft lebten, während die des anderen (…) Zugezogene waren, die noch nicht so lange nebeneinander wohnten."12 Particularly noteworthy for the authors was the fact that the "outsiders" in the end even accepted the stigmatization by the "established" and in many cases even behaved according to the group stigmata. So the long-established not only succeeded in labeling the newly arrived as inferior, but, moreover, in instilling into them to a certain extent the feeling of inferiority.13 This is the point where Elias and Scotson start. They were interested in showing which instruments of power the "established" could draw on in order to stigmatize the "outsiders" and to claim a higher status for themselves. According to Elias all those are "established," "die aufgrund einer zu ihren Gunsten verschobenen Machtbalance andere erfolgreich als Außenseiter und ihnen so eine nachhaltige Position zuweisen können, ohne dass diese in der Lage sind, sich gegen diese Behandlung zu wehren."14 The described power imbalance results thus from one group successfully increasing their collective self-esteem at the expense of the "others" by ascribing negative or "inferior" characteristics to the "others." In other words: only because of the stigmatization, the newly-arrived got into an allegedly worse position. Elias represents the example used here even as a "universal human topic": "Fast alle Menschengruppen, so scheint es, neigen dazu, bestimmte andere Gruppen als Menschen von geringerem Wert als sie selbst wahrzunehmen.15 " Without doubt, this claim by Elias has a provocative character because it vigorously contradicts the oftentimes postulated concepts of equality. Inequalities between people mostly are explained through ethnic or cultural differences, religious particularities or gender-specific differences. According to Elias, though, all the lines of argument follow the same pattern: "Andersartigkeit, egal worin diese besteht, wird als minderwertig angesehen.16 " A power advantage is required for making the depreciation of entire groups of people socially respectable and to generate broad acceptance. Thus it is a question of power to decide which human characteristics are seen as superior or as inferior respectively. But which sources of power can social groups rely on in order to label other groups with a lasting effect as inferior?
2.3 Sources of power
In what ways do some social groups succeed in finding reasons for their feeling of superiority or how can a collective feeling or a common shared canon of values be produced and bindingly enforced? For Elias and Scotson, especially two sources of power are of crucial importance. On the one hand, the degree of inner cohesion of groups is decisive. On the other, the ability of exercising social control plays a central role. "Beide – Kohäsion und Kontrolle – befördern die Gruppenintegration und den Organisationsgrad.17 " Indeed, both factors represent logically comprehensible resources: The higher the degree of inner cohesion and the higher the degree of internal control, the easier it becomes to increase the conflict ability and to bundle forces. On the other hand, it is particularly difficult for a social grouping with a low degree of inner cohesion to defend themselves against the devaluation by an "established" group. Such cases often lack the ability of formulating and pooling common interest. In the next step it is not possible to develop a positive form of intellectual identity in order to strengthen the inner cohesion. Such events of course are part of the social basis knowledge and have not been discovered by Norbert Elias. What the "established – outsiders figuration" shows very clearly is that a "kollektiv gesteigertes Selbstwertgefühl, wenn man so will, eine ähnliche ideelle Ausrichtung"18 can contribute to increasing the group cohesion. In turn, such a form of collective identification requires or forces an increase of the intragroup social control, as the jointly formulated norms must be maintained. A common canon of values or a collective identity allow even more for the devaluation of the "outsiders." The "established" can accuse the "outsiders" not to obey to the collectively agreed norms and not to live up to the highly praised collective identity. Elias speaks of the development of a mechanism which allows the formation of a "we-group" and degrades outsiders to a "they-group." "Überall sind das Gruppencharisma, das man sich selbst, und die Gruppenschande, die man Außenseitern zuweist, komplementär."19
Even if "established" groups seem to be able to centralize and take on all the power, it must also be mentioned here that the "established – outsiders figuration" can only then be maintained permanently, if the "established" succeed in a sustainable way to uphold the jointly formulated canon of values thanks to internal control. If they do not succeed, the balance of power shifts towards the "outsiders." Barlösius writes: "(…) Die stetige Inspektion der eigenen Gruppenangehörigen (fördert) eine Angleichung der Wahrnehmungen und Bewertungen, ja des gesamten Lebensstils. Dadurch wird die Chance vergrößert, bevorzugte soziale Positionen mit einem hohen Machtgehalt für die eigenen Gruppenmitglieder zu reservieren. Diese Privilegien wiederum festigen den internen Zusammenhalt."20
2.4 Stigmatization as an instrument of power
The superiority propagated by the "established" with respect to the "outsiders" can be based on the most diverse instruments of power. For Elias, the ability of more powerful groups to stigmatize less powerful groups represents a particularly useful and efficient instrument of power. In this context, he deliberately speaks of stigmatization and not of stigma to point out that stigmatization is not only triggered by any external characteristic. In his opinion, it rather is a process of social nature, where a less powerful group is "eine Gruppenschande aufgedrückt und ihnen der Glaube an die menschliche Höherwertigkeit der Stärkeren aufgedrängt wird."21
In order to make Elias' ideas on stigmatization more tangible, it is worth considering another scientific work on this topic. In 1963, Erving Goffman published one of the most influential works on the topic "stigma." According to Goffman all those are affected by stigmatization whose behavior patterns are in an undesired way different from what is socially accepted.22 More precisely, Goffman distinguishes between three forms of stigma: "Abominations of the body," i.e. deformations of the body, as well as "blemishes of individual character," e.g. crime, and "tribal stigma" as national or religious characteristics.23 According to Goffman, attributes which the individual "could in fact be proved to possess," give rise to stigmatization.24 Barlösius writes: "Insofern haben für Goffman Stigmata eine substanzielle bzw. objektivistische Basis: Sie benennen überprüfbares Anderssein. Der Maßstab dafür leitet sich von der gesellschaftlich gebräuchlichen Unterscheidung in Normalität und Abweichung her und greift somit auf einen gesellschaftlichen Grundkonsens zurück.25 " In general terms, stigma can thus be understood as an instrument to maintain the existing social order.
For Elias, the processes of stigmatization are part of the power fulfillment. On the other hand, he understands particularities that refer to stigmata as social constructions. Of particular importance is the question under which social conditions one group can imprint a group shame on another group in oder to emphasize and enforce the own "superiority." This, too, for Elias is first and foremost a question of power. "Eine Gruppe vermag eine andere nur so lange wirksam zu stigmatisieren, wie sie sicher in Machtpositionen sitzt, zu denen die stigmatisierte Gruppe keinen Zugang hat.26 " Although a stigmatization originally is nothing but a social prejudice, it is reified in the eyes of the stigmatizing. External features such as origin, color of the skin, sex and gender, sexual practices, religious convictions, etc. are given as reasons for stigmatization. Thus it becomes possible to objectively prove a stigma. According to Elias, more powerful groups in power struggles make use of the instrument of stigmatization in order to reinforce their own supremacy. In order to confer a certain level of probative value to social prejudices, these are often attributed a material character. "Stigmatisierung drückt eine soziale Beziehung aus und leitet sich nicht von substanziellen Eigenschaften des Stigmatisierten her.27 " In the social reality, countless examples for stigmatizing names can be found: Foreigner, nigger, wog, kike, dyke, faggot, etc. (beaney, cholo,..)
While Elias considers the stigmatization as a particularly efficient instrument of power, it nevertheless is only one of many sources of power. In particular, Elias speaks of the "polymorphen Charakter der Machtquellen."28 Even though the final stabilization of the "established-outsiders figuration" requires more instruments of power, the degradation of one group by another (in the form of stigmatization) represents "an arm that should not be underestimated in the tensions and conflicts of a power balance29." This point particularly applies in the case of the community analyzed by Elias and Scotson, because the inhabitants differ hardly or not at all in social and economic terms.
2.5 Criticism
According to the author, there are two points of Elias and Scotson's established-outsiders figuration that are particularly worthy of criticism: first, the power theoretical conception of the authors and second, the concept of figuration.
Following Elias' thoughts, then all forms of inequality are based on differences in the distribution of power. However, the question why human relationships must be understood as power relationships remains largely unanswered and his explanations remain too imprecise. Following this way of thought, each fight for social equality or justice, even each kind of human communication had to be understood as a mere fight for power. The possibility of negotiating aspects of social equality or justice in the social consensus, free from any ambitions to power, seems not to exist for Elias. Barlösius writes: "Durch diese ausschließlich machttheoretische Konzeption von Ungleichheit geraten gesellschaftliche Strategien, für alle Bürger geltende Gleichheitsgrundsätze zu schaffen und durchzusetzen – z.B. Staatsbürgerschaft, Menschenrechte, Systeme soziale Absicherung – nur als Ergebnis von Machtkämpfen in den Blick."30
With regard to the concept of "figuration," particularly one point of criticism is to be stressed: This concept hardly succeeds in grasping the possibly most important feature of social inequalities in modern societies. "Figuration" as a mesh of relations of persons who relate in interdependence with each other averts the gaze too much from the fact that inequalities in modern societies mostly are not the result of actions within face-to-face relationships. Inequalities in the educational system, in healthcare, or in the asylum policy are rather of institutional nature and are accepted by a broad social mass. Even more, they are acknowledged as legitimate. Such facts can only be insufficiently captured or not at all by the concept of "figuration."
3. Marginalization and stigmatization of asylum seekers in political discourse
In 1987, Elias published "The Society of Individuals," specifying another field of application for the "established-outsiders figuration":
"Gegenwärtig treten bürgerliche und Arbeiterschichten zusammen als etablierte Wir-Gruppen der Nationalstaaten einer neuen Außenseiterwelle von Zuwanderern, vor allem von Gastarbeitergruppen, entgegen. Wie auf den vorangegangenen Stufen werden auch hier die Außenseiter nicht in die Wir-Identität mit einbezogen. Die Etablierten erleben auch in diesem Falle die Außenseiter in der dritten Person."31
With regard to the hypotheses outlined in the introduction, the theoretical considerations by Elias and Scotson are applied to the now particularly current situation of asylum seekers in Germany. More precisely, special attention is paid to the group of the refugees. They are to be represented in the sense of the "established-outsiders figuration" as "outsiders." In this context the question arises which groupings can be listed on the "established" side. It quickly becomes clear that modern societies, because of processes of individualization and differentiation, cannot be considered as "groups" with a high degree of inner cohesion or social control. As the group of asylum seekers logically consists of persons with a migratory background, it makes sense to consider those groupings as "established" which make use of right-wing populist rhetoric. The author has made this choice based on the fact that right-wing populist rhetoric is explicitly directed against alleged "others," thus also against asylum seekers. A brief explanation follows in order to be able to grasp the concept of right-wing populism including its several components.
3.1 Right-wing populism
In 2010, Tim Spier, a political scientist, analyzed the electorate of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. In his publication, he pointed out a central prerequisite in dealing with the concept of "right-wing populism." "Bevor man sich der Frage zuwendet, ob die Verbindung mit rechten Inhalten im Falle rechtspopulistischer Parteien das Kriterium einer kohärenten Ideologie erfüllt, scheint es sinnvoll zu sein, sich zunächst dem generellen Phänomen des Populismus zuzuwenden."32 Spier lists four central features of the concept of populism. Firstly, there is the appeal to allegedly homogeneous "People," the "man on the street." Closely associated with this is, for Spier, also the central agitation against possibly imagined concepts of an enemy. Following Pelinka, we can distinguish between two dimensions of enemies. On the one hand, there is the vertical dimension which manifests itself particularly in the form of resentments against established elites. On the other, there is the horizontal dimension, the resentments against population groups which are not perceived as part of the "People." An apparent opposition is created between a "we-group" (People) and "the others." At this point, the reference to Elias' theory becomes particularly clear. Spier lists the phenomenon of charismatic leadership as a further central feature of populism. These are persons who build themselves up as the representatives of the "People" and want to give the impression to perfectly understand what "the people on the street"33 desire. Very often, populists romantically over-inflate the "People," i.e. they are attributed a range of positive features: "Es ist einfach, ehrlich und vernünftig, arbeitet hart und lebt grundanständig.34 " The movement character of populist formation eventually represents the last feature of the concept of populism according to Spier. That means that populist formations present themselves as an "anti-party party" in elections. This is closely entwined with the above mentioned resentments against established elites and their "frontline position against the political establishment," which the established parties of the respective system adhere to without doubt. In this context, populist parties often avoid the self-designation as a party and call themselves alliance, league, list, front, movement, or alternative.
With the help of the four previously mentioned central points of populism, Spier eventually develops his working definition of right-wing populism: "Die hier in zwei Schritten entworfene Arbeitsdefinition des Begriffs "Rechtspopulismus" (...) umfasst sieben Merkmale: Die vier formalen Merkmale eines populistischen Politikstils, namentlich der Appell an das "Volk," die Agitation gegen vertikale und horizontale Feindbilder, das Phänomen charismatischer Führerschaft sowie der Bewegungscharakter populistischer Formationen, und die drei Ideologeme Nationalismus, Xenophobie und Autoritarismus, die den Politikstil inhaltlich qualifizieren."35
With the help of the above definition and the components contained therein, it is possible in a next step to provide real examples for right-wing populist rhetoric. Because of the abundance of the events, this can only be shown in an exemplary way and in excerpts. Nevertheless it enables the reader to get an impression of the public reality. This serves the purpose of pointing out that political associations and political parties make use of this kind of rhetoric in the current debate. For each of the above mentioned players, examples will be given in the following remarks. In concrete terms, Pegida, AfD, and CSU are examined in greater detail. This choice was made because the mentioned players attracted considerable attention with their explicit right-wing populist rhetoric in the current refugee debate and are still the target of criticism. It will be demonstrated on an exemplary basis that the mentioned players use right-wing populist rhetoric in order to create a collective feeling or a commonly shared canon of values (see Elias), to enforce and maintain it, and to push certain groupings (in this case refugees) in a durable outsider position and to stigmatize them by ascribing them negative "character traits." Both public statements as well as position papers and posters by the selected players will be examined.
3.1 Pegida
First, the political associations: The organizers of Pegida e.V. (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) described the founding of the association at the beginning of October 2014 as a reaction to the riots in Hamburg and Celle. There, Kurds and Salafists fought street battles against each other. What triggered the conflict were fights for the Syrian city of Kobane. Within only a few weeks, the number of participants increased from initially hundreds to more than 20,000 who met every Monday in Dresden. It rapidly became clear that among the demonstrators, members of HOGESA (Hooligans against Salafists) and supporters of right-wing parties and groupings were detected. Thus it was not a surprise that soon there was talk about "mass immigration" and "floods of refugees." Pegida announced that 95 % of all asylum seekers were so-called "economic refugees" who seek asylum only because of the social benefits, thus planning to take advantage of the German social welfare system.36 This is a clear attempt of stigmatization in Elias' sense. Social prejudices are "materialized" in the form of behavior patterns by assigning "features" such as a migration background. At this point, the image of the indolent, "parasitic" "foreigner" is served.
The demonstrations spread to other cities, such as Düsseldorf (Dügida), Frankfurt (Fragida), or Saarbrücken (Saargida); nonetheless it seams significantly easier for them to mobilize people in Eastern Germany.
In December 2014, the organization published a position paper containing 19 points.37 One demand included therein is: "PEGIDA ist FÜR die Aufnahme des Rechtes auf und die Pflicht zur Integration ins Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.38 " Here, the apparent wish is expressed to enforce the German constitution as the obligatory canon of values to which there is no alternative for all groupings living in Germany. Another call is: "PEGIDA ist FÜR die Erhaltung und den Schutz unserer christlich-jüdisch geprägten Abendlandkultur!39 " With this call, it is first alleged that there is such a thing as a comprehensive "Occidental" culture. Furthermore, the call is to suggest that precisely this culture is jeopardized by the immigration of people from countries modeled by Islam. The use of the personal pronoun "us" furthermore shows the desire to create a collective feeling for "Germans" - a clear example of the "we-group" outlined by Elias. The concept of "Occidental culture" is to be constructed as a "canon of values" in Elias' sense, serving for the segregation and exclusion of persons who do "not meet" the allegedly existent collective norms.
Another call is: "PEGIDA ist FÜR eine Null-Toleranz Politik gegenüber straffällig gewordenen Asylbewerbern und Migranten!40 " The distinction between German citizens who committed a criminal offense and asylum seekers who committed a criminal offense is a further example for the intended creation of a opposition between an established "we-group" (Germans) and an outside "they-group" (asylum seekers). Furthermore, very clearly the attempt is made to imprint a "group shame" onto asylum seekers by ascribing allegedly negative behavior patterns (lazy, greedy, criminal). The "group shame" in this case is the image of the non-adaptable "foreigner" who is not conform with the collectively agreed values of the established. So, this is clearly an act of stigmatization.
Barely one year after the foundation of Pegida, the organization presents itself not only as xenophobic, but openly right-wing. On a demonstration in Dresden, Pegida front woman Tatjana Festerling in October 2015 called the influx of refugees and asylum seekers a "rush of the invaders." Physical assaults targeting representatives of the press and counterdemonstrators occurred on other demonstrations. Furthermore, gallows were presented with the inscription "reserved for Angela Merkel and Sigmar Gabriel," speakers as Geert Wilders conjured up fears and danger because of Islam, other such as Akif Pirinçci regretted the absence of concentration camps.41 Countless further examples could be listed here, but the intent is to show further representatives of this rhetoric besides Pegida.
3.2 Alternative für Deutschland
Now let us move on to the political parties: the "Alternative für Deutschland" (AfD). First, the party's program for the European Elections 2014 is examined in more detail. In the last paragraph of the European Elections program, the AfD, already in the title, calls for "Courage [to stand up] for Germany." In their words: "Die AfD wird ihre parlamentarischen Frage- und Informationsrechte nutzen, um die deutschen Bürger rechtzeitig und angemessen vor den neuesten Entwicklungen zu warnen.42 " The following sentence states: "Die AfD wird die deutschen Wähler aufrütteln angesichts des drohenden Verlusts unserer Souveränität an ein unausgegorenes Konstrukt der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa.43 " This example clearly shows an appeal to the "German voters." Even more: By using the wording "our sovereignty," an allegedly homogeneous construct is conjured up: the construct of the "German People."
In January 2015, the AfD federal vice chair Alexander Gauland triggered bad sentiment in an interview with the Berliner Tagesspiegel, where he called for a "zero immigration" policy for persons from the Middle East: "Wir sollten eine Einwanderung von Menschen, die unserer kulturellen Tradition völlig fremd sind, nicht weiter fördern, ja, wir sollten sie verhindern (…) Es gibt kulturelle Traditionen, die es sehr schwer haben, sich hier zu integrieren. Von dieser kulturellen Tradition möchte ich keine weitere Zuwanderung."44 This is an unequivocal example of underlining a "German" canon of values or a tradition ("our cultural tradition"). In the next step, Gauland makes the attempt to use this canon of values to blame "outsiders" (in this case asylum seekers) not to obey to the collectively agreed norms and not to meet the highly praised collective identity.
For the European Elections, the AfD furthermore used a poster they already had in a series of previous election campaigns. The background of the poster shows a German flag, paired with the slogan "Courage [to stand up] for Germany,"45 hinting at the allegedly disturbed relationship of many German citizens to national pride. Closely connected is the call for a "healthy" patriotism after the return to the national pride. Here, too, a clear attempt is made to create a form of collective identity.
Against the background of the announced "Autumn Offensive" in September 2015, the AfD federal board published a position paper on the current refugee situation entitled "Bringing the asylum chaos under control, with courage [to stand for] Germany!" Therein they called for reintroducing border controls, suspending the right to asylum, expanding the list of safe countries of origin, and for granting services for asylum seekers exclusively as noncash benefits. In addition to these clearly right-wing nationalist and protectionist calls, the wording also points to several examples for the topic discussed here. Page one indicates that: "Asylgesuche an unseren Grenzen werden abgewiesen und eine Einreise abgelehnt.46 " The use of the personal pronoun "our" gives a hint that in this case an attempt is made to create a collective construct, a collective identity with the objective of delimitation. The result of this strategy again is the classification of the social reality in a "we-group" ("Germans") and a "they-group" (asylum seekers).
[...]
1 UNHCR (2015): Mid Year Trends 2015, URL: http://www.unhcr.de/service/zahlen-und-statistiken.html, accessed: 01.14.2015.
2 Monath, Hans (2015): Angela Merkel rechtfertigt Flüchtlingspolitik, in: Tagesspiegel-Online, 09.15.2015, URL: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/angela-merkel-rechtfertigt-fluechtlingspolitik-dann-ist-das-nicht- mein-land/12325248.html, accessed: 12.29.2015.
3 Not specified (2015): BKA warns against xenophobic violence, in: Focus-Online, 10.23.2015, URL: http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/migration-bka-warnt-vor-fremdenfeindlicher-gewalt_id_5030281.html, accessed: 01.11.2015.
4 German Federal Government (2015): Draft Act amending the Law on Asylum Procedure, the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act and further laws, 14 September 2015, URL: http://www.fluechtlingsinfo-berlin.de/fr/pdf/AsylverfBeschleunigungsGE_210915.pdf, accessed: 12.29.2015.
5 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, P.71.
6 Cf. Henk, Maria (2015): Die Renaissance des Rechtspopulismus in Europa, Hamburg, p.15 f.
7 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.57.
8 Cf. Elias, Norbert (1988): Die Gesellschaft der Individuen, Frankfurt am Main, p. 26 f.
9 Flore, Johanna (2014): Weiterbildung und Mitarbeiterbindung. Eine Untersuchung im Kontext Kurzarbeit, München, p.50.
10 Mauss, Marcel (1978): Die Gabe. Form und Funktion des Austauschs in archaischen Gesellschaften, in: Mauss, Marcel, Soziologie und Anthropologie, vol. 2, Frankfurt am Main, p. 17.
11 Hansen, Georg (2008): Integration und Segregation, Münster, p.68.
12 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.63.
13 Elias, Norbert (1986): Wandlungen der Machtbalance zwischen den Geschlechtern. Eine prozeßsoziologische Untersuchung am Beispiel des antiken Römerstaats, in: KZfSS, Jg 38, München, p.10.
14 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.64.
15 Elias, Norbert (1986): Wandlungen der Machtbalance zwischen den Geschlechtern. Eine prozeßsoziologische Untersuchung am Beispiel des antiken Römerstaats, in: KZfSS, Jg 38, München, p.292.
16 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.65.
17 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.66.
18 Ibid., p.67.
19 Ibid., p.67.
20 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.67.
21 Ibid., p.67.
22 Goffman, Erving (1963): Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York, p.9.
23 Ibid., p.12 f.
24 Ibid., p.10.
25 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.69.
26 Otterbach, Markus (1997): Gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Minderheiten: bevölkerungswissenschaftlicher Diskurs und politische Instrumentalisierung, Opladen, p.235.
27 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.70.
28 Hormel, Ulrike (2006): Diskriminierung in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft, Wiesbaden, p. 166.
29 Elias, Norbert / Scotson, John L. (2002): Established and outsiders, London, p. 19.
30 Barlösius, Eva (2004): Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden, p.78.
31 Elias, Norbert (1987): Involvement and Detachment. New York, p. 276.
32 Spier, Tim (2010): Modernisierungsverlierer? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer Parteien in Westeuropa, Wiesbaden, p.19.
33 Ibid., p.20.
34 Ibid., p.20.
35 Ibid. p. 25.
36 Cf. Locke, Stefan (2014): Die Sorgen der 99,9 Prozent, in: FAZ-Online, 12.16.2014, URL: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/pegida-demonstrationen-die-sorgen-der-99-9-prozent- 13323567.html, accessed: 11.14.2015.
37 Cf. Geiges, Lars (2015): Pegida: Die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft?, Bielefeld, p. 2 ff.
38 Pegida (2014): Positionspapier der Pegida, URL: http://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp- content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf, accessed: 11.12.2015.
39 Ibid., accessed: 11.12.2015.
40 Ibid., accessed: 11.12.2015.
41 not specified (2015): Pegida-Anhänger errichten Galgen für Merkel und Gabriel, in: Zeit-Online, 10.13.2015, URL:http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-10/dresden-pegida-galgen-attrappe-demonstration, accessed: 11.13.2015.
42 Alternative für Deutschland (2014): Mut zu Deutschland. Für ein Europa der Vielfalt, URL: http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Europaprogramm-der-AfD.pdf, accessed: 11.13.2015, P.25.
43 Ibid., p.25.
44 Haselberger, Stephan (2015): AfD-Vize will Zuzug aus Nahost stoppen, in: Tagesspiegel-Online, 01.28.2015, URL: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/alexander-gauland-zu-islam-und-pegida-afd-vize-will-zuzug-aus- nahost-stoppen/11289968.html, accessed: 11.13.2015.
45 Alternative für Deutschland (2015): Wahlplakate, URL: http://www.alternativefuer.de/europawahl/wahlkampf-wahlkampagne/, accessed: 11.13.2015.
46 Alternative für Deutschland (2015): Mit Mut zu Deutschland das Asylchaos unter Kontrolle bringen! , URL: http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Asylpapier-zum-Flyer.pdf, accessed: 11.13.2015. p.1.
- Quote paper
- Mathis Diemer (Author), 2015, More inclusive asylum policies in Germany? Norbert Elias and the tolerated refugees, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/942845
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