The Expected Costs of Increased Disclosure. Firm- and Industry-specific Forces

Exposé Écrit pour un Séminaire / Cours , 2020 , 26 Pages , Note: 1.0

Gestion d'entreprise - Comptabilité, Fiscalité

A series of financial crises and corporate scandals gave rise to increasing concerns about prevailing models of corporate governance and disclosure and stimulated financial disclosure and reporting regulation. As a result, there has been considerably more interest in documenting the benefits of increased disclosure than its costs. Accordingly, numerous papers purport to provide evidence of capital market benefits through incremental disclosure.

At the same time, firms refrain from voluntarily committing to increased disclosure, implying that there must be a trade-off between associated benefits and costs. Consequently, critics contend that the capital market benefits are inconclusive. Instead, increased disclosure may result in adverse capital market effects through increasing information asymmetry. Moreover, critics predict that increased disclosure imposes further costs on the firm.

The purpose of this seminar thesis is to review existing literature on these expected costs of increased disclosure. Thereby, I focus on controversies regarding the heavily debated capital market effects as well as on specific forces that determine proprietary and litigation costs associated with increased disclosure. While a firm’s disclosure choices likely are a joint outcome of market forces and incentives provided by regulation, the seminar thesis is limited to voluntary disclosure choices as a starting point for possible disclosure regulation.

The remainder of the seminar thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the capital market effects of voluntary disclosure through its impact on information asymmetry. Section 3 discusses the ambiguous impact of voluntary disclosure on litigation and proprietary costs. Section 4 concludes the seminar thesis.

Contents

Contents

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. The Capital Market Effects of Increased Disclosure
2.1. Ambiguous Predictions about the Capital Market Effects: Information Asymmetry as Link between Public Disclosure and Capital Market Outcomes
2.1.1. The Effect of Increased Disclosure on Information Asymmetry: A Complementary versus Substitutive Relationship between Private and Public Information
2.1.2. The Effect of Information Asymmetry on Capital Market Outcomes
2.2. Empirical Evidence on the Capital Market Effects
2.2.1. Reduction of Information Asymmetry through Increased Disclosure
2.2.2. Capital Market Benefits through Voluntary Disclosure
2.2.3. Conflicting Evidence and Reservations about Empirical Studies Implying Capital Market Benefits

3. The Ambiguity of Expected Cost of Disclosure
3.1. Litigation Costs: Dependence on Disclosure Horizon and Tone
3.1.1. Theoretical Predictions: Preemption Effect versus Chilling Effect
3.1.2. Preemption Effect: Reduction of Litigation Costs through Increased Disclosure
3.1.3. Chilling Effect: Rise of Litigation Costs through Increased Disclosure
3.2. Proprietary Costs: Dependence on the Nature of Competition
3.2.1. Limitations of Studies Utilizing Industry Concentration-based Measures
3.2.2. Linking the Nature of Competition to Proprietary Costs
3.2.2.1. Competition from Market Incumbents versus Competition from New Entrants
3.2.2.2. Difficulties Identifying the Nature of Competition
3.2.2.3. Establishing a Link between the Nature of Competition and Proprietary Costs
3.2.3. Additional Forces Impeding a Distinct Link between Disclosure and Proprietary Costs

4. Conclusion

References

Statutory Declaration (in German Language)

• Université: Mannheim University of Applied Sciences
• Note: 1.0
• Auteur: Simon Kröger (Auteur)
• Année de publication: 2020
• Pages: 26
• N° de catalogue: V900919
• ISBN (ebook): 9783346219763
• ISBN (Livre): 9783346219770
• Langue: anglais
• mots-clé: costs, disclosure, expected, firm-, forces, increased, industry-specific