I. Prior attempts at sub-dividing aesthetic concepts
II. Some preliminary questions:
1. How do we use the term “Art”?
2. What is the difference between “Art Object” and “Aesthetic Object”?
3. If the “aesthetic” and “artistic” value of an artifact are not the same, what is their relevancy for original works OF of art and their perfect copies?
4. Can Art in spite of its dependency on the “Art World” and on its recipients, contain generally valid meaning?
III. The central concepts “aesthetic - artistic - beautiful”
IV. Intersections of the central concepts
V. The nomenclature of Aesthetic Qualities, Experiences, and Objects
VI. Summary in the form of suggestions
(In: Acta Humanistica, Humanities S. No. 26, March 1999, 203-222)
Inhalt
I. Prior Attempts at Sub-Dividing Aesthetic Concepts
II. Some Preliminary Questions:
1. How Do We Use the Term “Art”?
2. What Is The Difference Between “Art Object” and “Aesthetic Object”?
3. If the “aesthetic” and “artistic” value of an artifact are not the same, what is their relevancy for original works of art and their perfect copies?
4. Can Art - In Spite Of Its Dependency On The “Art World” and On Its Recipients - Contain Generally Valid Meaning?
III. The Central Concepts “aesthetic - artistic - beautiful”
IV. Intersections Of the Central Concepts
V. The Nomenclature Of Aesthetic Qualities, Experiences, And Objects
VI. Summary In The Form Of Suggestions
I. Prior Attempts at Sub-Dividing Aesthetic Concepts
Modifying an important essay by Frank Sibley[i], we could differentiate the following groups amongst the wide range of concepts occasionally used for the description of works of art (see diagram 1):
1. Terms which denote the aesthetic quality of an object (usually of a work of art), and (2) such concepts which seemingly name a quality of the object but in reality, however, only name our response to the latter, e.g., “magnificent”, “moving” or “overpowering”. What is magnificent about the observed object, why and how it overpowers, is not stated. - Within the first group (1), we can discern two kinds of concepts, those which expressly relate to the aesthetic character of the work of art (1.1) and those which don’t (1.2), e.g., “well preserved”, “washed out”, “bleached” etc. Again, within the first of the latter two groups (1.1) there are terms, which describe and/or evaluate qualities of the artwork (1.1.1) and others, which only evaluate (1.1.2), especially the pairs of opposites “beautiful-ugly”, “good-bad”, and “tasteful-tasteless”. Within the first of these two groups (1.1.1), we find again two sub-groups, firstly the “aesthetic descriptives” in the narrow sense of the word (1.1.1.1) which differentiate qualities which are only discernible for sensitive recipients, and descriptives which can be verified by everyone (1.1.1.2), e.g., that a painting is “dominated by blue tones” or a sonata “consists of four movements” or a play “contains many short scenes”. The truly “aesthetic” descriptions (1.1.1.1) can either be exclusively applied with a truly aesthetic meaning (1.1.1.1.1), e.g., “graceful”, “elegant” or “sublime”, or they can have a double function, meaning they can be used with a non-aesthetic and an aesthetic, quasi-metaphorical meaning (1.1.1.1.2), e.g., terms like “unified”, “dynamic”, or “balanced”. The terms in group 1.1.1.1.1 we could name “truly and exclusively aesthetic” qualities.
Diagram 1: Modification and augmentation of Sibley’s System Concepts used for the description of art:
1. truly applying to an object 2. only seemingly denoting a quality of an object, in reality expressing our reaction to it (e.g. “overpowering”,
“moving”)
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
1.1 expressly applied to the aesthetic impact of a work 1.2 not relating to aesthetic characteraesthetic
of art of the work (e.g., “well preserved”)
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
1.1.1 describing and evaluating 1.1.2 only evaluating (e.g., “beautiful - ugly”,
“good - bad”, “tasteful - tasteless”)
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
1.1.1.1 demonstrable only for aesthetically sensitive 1.1.1.2 qualities verifiable by anyone aesthetically
Recipients (e.g., “predominantly in blue tones” or sonata “in four movements”)
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
1.1.1.1.1 exclusively exclusively aesthetical apprication 1.1.1.1.2 double-function: non-aestheticaesthetical
(e.g., “elegant”, “graceful”) and aesthetic(quasi-mataphoric) use(e.g., “Unified”,
“dynamic”, “balanced”)
Sibley is concentrating on clarifying the logical status of our group 1.1.1 and its sub-groups (“We cannot prove with arguments that something is graceful” etc.) and does not seem to consider the groups 1.1.2 and 2 worthy of a discussion.
Karl Svoboda[ii], on the other hand, wishes to acknowledge “only one truly and purely aesthetic category, the beautiful and the ugly”, precisely those categories (1.1.2), which Sibley ignores. “The graceful constitutes a part of the Beautiful, and the other values -- the Sublime, the Base, the Tragic, the Comical, the Innovative, the Naive, the Artificial, the Realistic, the Idealistic, the Serious, the Baroque, the Classical, the Mysterious, and the Transparent -- are not categories or basic concepts, but rather styles of art, artistic convictions, or other values ... one cannot force them into a system.”
Other authors, e.g. Max Dessoir[iii], differentiate within the aesthetic experience a limited number of aesthetic responses, e.g., Beautiful - Ugly, Base - Sublime, Comical - Tragical.
To my knowledge, Wolfhart Henckmann[iv] attempted the most comprehensive configuration of aesthetic concepts in our time. He arranged many terms within an “open, functional system” which does not claim to be strictly systematic and is “subjugated to changes caused by interior and exterior factors” because it is “sociologically and historically conditioned”. Henckmann assumes that “aesthetic experience is constituted as a special relationship between subject and object” and therefore he posits “three rows of categories in which the subject, the object or the special relationship between those two determine the character of the individual categories”. These three rows of concepts are further subdivided “according to the ontic quality of the three determinants of aesthetic experience”: the “subject aspect” according to psychic functions like sense perception, imaginative power, emotion etc., the “object aspect” according to “material qualities, basic structures of genres or art styles”, the “relationship aspect“ according to “differences in the dynamics of aesthetic experience”, its “narrowness, width or height”. - This compilation embraces those terms discussed by Sibley as well as those excluded by Svoboda.
Henckmann also sketches the character of the “Aesthetic”, “a concept of the aesthetic which permits dividing aesthetic categories into various groups”. For that purpose, he relies on older definitions, following mainly Hamann’s[v] keywords “isolation”, “concentration”, and “intensification”. - He does not discuss the concept of the “Artistic”.
II. Some Preliminary Questions:
In order to understand the relationship between the concepts of “the Artistic” and “the Aesthetic”, we have to ask ourselves some preliminary questions.
1. How Do We Use The Term “Art”?
The oldest and widest meaning derives from the Latin term “ars, artes” and resembles the English “skill” or the German “Können”, as in “the skill of baking bread”. Until the Romantic period, the “art of writing poems” was understood in a similar way (e.g., by the “Meistersänger”) and so was the art of producing music and architecture. Also the “Liberal Arts” (“Artes liberales”) at the universities have nothing to do with our new and subjective concept of art. The connotation was a tradition of rules, which have to be mastered. In Asia, this understanding was valid until the beginning of the influence of the Western striving for originality and innovation at any price. In the traditional arts (e.g., in Japanese Noh and Kabuki) it is still the rule. The breaking of rules by genius, which Western “Deviation Aesthetics” in particular has ranked as its highest value, is even in the West no older than the Renaissance. [vi]
Also relatively new is the differentiation between so-called “high” art and merely “applied”, “decorative” or “entertaining” arts. The latter are not expected to be original to the same degree. All of these differentiations relate mainly to art objects and not to aesthetic objects, the former being the material basis for the latter.
2. What Is The Difference Between “Art Object” and “Aesthetic Object”?
According to Ingarden[vii], the former is simply an object produced (or selected) within the conventions of a cultural tradition (and in the West often in partial contradiction to them) intended to be experienced aesthetically. This aesthetic experience may or may not actually occur. If it does occur, then the Art Object (artifact) becomes an Aesthetic Object within the experience of the recipient. Since the artifact is only (and can only be) an “intentional object” with many “spots of indeterminacy” (no poet can tell, no painter can paint everything), the recipient is challenged in each act of art appreciation to fill in, or “concretize”, these spots of indeterminacy. S/he does that with the help of experience and imagination. This is a “quasi-creative” act (though not completely free) and therefore enjoyable. But, since each recipient has a different “horizon of expectation” (Jauß[viii] ), one recipient’s aesthetic object will not completely resemble another’s, even though both have the same artifact as a material basis (no two viewers in a museum see exactly the same painting).
The aesthetic object does not even have to be based on an artifact. Natural objects (trees, landscapes, human beings) can be experienced aesthetically. Even utilitarian objects, e.g. ceramics, weaving, and religious symbols, can be elevated to the status of “art”. This is usually done by various institutions (museums, critics, dealers), which Danto[ix] called the “art world”. After such objects have been declared to be “art” by the art world, they do not depend on the appreciation of the individual recipient any longer. Only if the art world changes its criteria for evaluation, can objects, which have been assessed as “art” be devalued (e.g., as “Kitsch”).
But it is only partially true that cultural institutions are establishing “Art Objects” and “Aesthetic Objects” by individuals, since the aesthetic sensibility of individuals is also (at least partially) shaped by cultural influences. In our time, in which recipients have to a high degree lost generally accepted standards for the validation of art works, there is a tendency to allow artists (and their promoters) to declare anything they chose to be “art”. This is a sociological phenomenon. This softening of norms, which can be observed everywhere, can be celebrated as newly won freedom, or it can be deplored as a symptom of decadence.
Supporters of artistic norms will try to found them ontologically. They will try to show for various forms of art that certain stylistic elements (and their technical realization) are especially qualified for the achievement of certain aesthetic experiences. Without denying this, we can ask why, especially, this or that aesthetic experience is desirable, and we are referred back to societal or cultural determinants.
[...]
[i] „Aesthetic Concepts“ in: The Philosophical Review (1950) 421-450.
[ii] „Über die sogenannten ästhetischen Kategorien“ in: Jahrbuch für Ästhetik VII (1962) 7-27.
[iii] Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (Stuttgart 1906) S. 196ff.
[iv] „Über die Problematik der ästhetischen Kategorien“ in: Zeitschrift für Ästhetik 28/2 (1983) 169-182; comp. also my article: „“,Camp` und `Kitsch`. Neue Konzepte der internationalen Ästhetik” in: Doitsu Bungaku 86 (Tokyo Spring 1991) 148-196.
[v] Richard Hamann: Ästhetik. (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1911, 2.Aufl. 1919) S. 22ffr.
[vi] David Novitz (in: „Art by Another Name“, Brit. Journal of Aesthetics 38/1, 1998, 20) views the art concept as socially determined: “The word `art`, I want to argue, is […] socially imbued, and it is this, I will show, that makes the identification of art across cultures a delicate and complex task that is much more prone to error than art critics and anthropologists sometimes suppose.” And later: “According to M.H. Abrams, for instance, there were no `works of art` in our sense until about the seventeenth century, so that what we now see and understand as art was not so understood by Europeans much before that time.”
[vii] Roman Ingarden: Das literarische Kunstwerk. 1931, 3. Aufl. 1965; engl. Transl. By George G. Grabowicz: The Literary Work of Art. 1973; Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks. (1937 in Polish) 1968; Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst. 1962; Erlebnis, Kunstwerk und Wert. 1969; „Artistic and Aesthetic Values“ in: British Journal of Aesthetics 4 (1964) 198-213.
[viii] See note 13.
[ix] Arthur Coleman Danto: „The Art World“ in: Journal of Philosophy (Oct. 1964) 571-584; The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press 1981.
- Citation du texte
- Dr. Wolfgang Ruttkowski (Auteur), 1999, Central concepts of aesthetics - a proposal for their application, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/7666
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