Coercive interrogation as a form of torture is universally condemned, and no country publicly supports it, yet states are applying it in practice. This shows that governments are aware of its illegality but still apply it in their governmental systems because they believe in its effectiveness. This application is done either in a secretive, illegal way, or in a public, legal way, caused by law gaps allowing states to interpret relevant laws to their advantage.
Accordingly, the problem faced is not with the criminalization or illegality of coercive interrogation, but rather with the way it has been criminalized and enforced; therefore, a deep study of the relevant Lebanese laws, whether international or national, is necessary to ensure full applicability and to prevent governmental circumventing of the law as much as possible. The current research aims to identify the challenges faced by Lebanon with regard to legal and enforcement implementation of coercive interrogation, identify major causes, and propose effective mechanisms to fight torture in Lebanon in light of the present situation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF PICTURES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: LAWS REGULATING COERCIVE INTERROGATION
I. The International Law Against Coercive Interrogation
A. Coercive Interrogation and Torture: Two Concepts Overlapping
B. The Issue of Distinguishing Permissible Interrogation Techniques from Illegal Ones
1) The Absolute Impermissibility of Using Coercive Interrogations
a) On Legal Grounds
b) On Deontological Grounds
c) On Rule-Consequentialist Grounds
2) The Permissibility of Using Coercive Interrogation
a) On Act-Consequentialist Grounds
b) On Threshold Deontological Grounds
C. Binding on Lebanon
II. The Lebanese National Law against Coercive Interrogation
A. Assessing Compliance with Lebanon’s International Obligations and Highlighting the Gaps
1) Compliance with Article 1 of the Convention and Gaps
a) Types of Violence
b) Types of Actors
c) The Purpose
d) Mens Rea
2) Compliance with Article 2 of the Convention and Gaps
3) Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention and Gaps
a) Types of Offenses
b) Attempts to Commit Torture
c) Participation in Torture
B. Law and Practice in Lebanon: Two Contradictory Concepts
1) Coercive Interrogation as a Style, Rather Than an Accident
a) The Techniques Used During Investigations
b) How Police Overcome the Suspect’s Rights
c) Factors Influencing the Limited Judicial Decision Making
2) State Courts and Lebanese Judicial Interpretation
a) Military Courts and Ordinary Courts: Overlapping Jurisdictions
b) Coerced Confessions’ Evidence in Courts
c) Judge’s Discretion to Reduce a Criminal Sentence
CHAPTER TWO: ATTEMPTS AND PROPOSALS TO ALIGN LEBANESE LAW WITH LEBANON’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
I. Various Attempts in Many Fields
A. The New Modification of the Law in 2017
B. Interactive Social Media Intervention to Highlight Violations
C. Establishment of Special Committees to Follow Up on Violations
II. Future Prospects Toward the Reform of Interrogation Practices
A. Proposals Extracted from Leading Authorities
1) Mechanisms Established by Treaties
2) Proposals Made by the Committee against Torture
B. Proposals Made by NGOs, Academics, and Practitioners
C. Proposals Based on Comparative Study
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acknowledgements
Finishing this thesis would not have been possible without the help and support from many people. First, I would like to thank Prof. Frank Emmert for his continuous help and advice. I was so lucky to have been supervised by an experienced professor both in the field of law and in the skill of writing. Warm thanks are due to him for all of his help and support, as he pulled me through the most difficult times of analyzing and getting my research on the right track, as well as helped direct the present thesis.
Second, I would like to thank the helpful staff of Robert H. McKinney School of Law, especially Boyet Caparas, for guiding me through the first couple of months.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their humble opinions on the topic and their infinite support throughout the thesis process.
PREFACE
Torture is found everywhere in the world, and, like any other type of crime, it is impossible to control all acts of torture. It is, however, possible to prevent and reduce it as much as possible. From a human perspective, it is quite difficult to accept that people are subjected to torture, and each individual shall work towards preventing torture according to their field. As a law student, a step towards preventing torture is to engage in a deep study of the relevant laws, finding their gaps, and proposing solutions; conducting this research is the best way to achieve this goal.
Coercive interrogation is the main subject of this research, since this type of torture is not merely conducted by ordinary citizens, but by state officials. Thus, a greater responsibility to avoid committing torture must be taken.
Completing this thesis was a challenge, since the topic is related to practice, rather than just theory. In addition, this subject is not public friendly, so citing real cases and evaluating them using related laws was rather challenging. Working on this master’s thesis has additionally granted me the opportunity to work on various aspects of my personal development; for example, managing the thesis deadlines has helped improve my planning capabilities, and writing the thesis while completing unrelated tasks helped improve my multi-tasking and managing skills.
COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS IN LEBANON:
LAWS REGULATING THE GAP BETWEEN WRITTEN LAW AND PRACTICED LAW AND PROPOSALS
Abstract
Coercive interrogation as a form of torture is universally condemned, and no country publicly supports it, yet states are applying it in practice. This shows that governments are aware of its illegality but still apply it in their governmental systems because they believe in its effectiveness. This application is done either in a secretive, illegal way, or in a public, legal way, caused by law gaps allowing states to interpret relevant laws to their advantage.
Accordingly, the problem faced is not with the criminalization or illegality of coercive interrogation, but rather with the way it has been criminalized and enforced; therefore, a deep study of the relevant Lebanese laws, whether international or national, is necessary to ensure full applicability and to prevent governmental circumventing of the law as much as possible. The current research aims to identify the challenges faced by Lebanon with regard to legal and enforcement implementation of coercive interrogation, identify major causes, and propose effective mechanisms to fight torture in Lebanon in light of the present situation.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure1: Prohibition of Coercive Interrogations in the 'Ticking Bomb Scenario'
Figure 2: Public View on Using Coercive Interrogations
Figure 3: Public View on the Characteristic of Using Coercive Interrogations
Figure 4: Types of Torture Identified in 2011-2012
Figure 5: Model of Factors Affecting the Evidence of Torture
LIST OF PICTURES
Picture 1: Al Farrouj
Picture 2: Suspension/ Balanco
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APT Association for the Prevention of Torture
CAT UN Committee against Torture
CC Lebanese Criminal Code
CCP Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure
CLDH Lebanese Center for Human Rights
CPC Lebanese Criminal Procedural Code
ISF Internal Security Forces
MJA Lebanese Military Justice Act
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NHRI National Human Rights Institute
PSF Public Security Forces
State Report Lebanese Initial Report to the CAT - 2016
The Convention United Nations Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
I. INTRODUCTION
Long ago over was the era of citizens and slaves being distinguished from one another in that citizens were not subjected to torture, while slaves, considered to be objects, were subjected to anything their owners wanted—starting with punishment, passing through torture, and finishing with death.
For centuries, the unequivocal position of the civilized world has been that torture is an abomination and one of the worst violations imaginable of human dignity and moral decency. However, a great deal of discussion was prompted about the use of torture as a means of extracting information in exceptional circumstances and how to handle the so-called ‘ticking-bomb’ scenario. Although I argue that the threshold to justify torture is difficult to meet, this paper presents a new perspective on the justification of torture—the ‘precedent theory’—in which torture may be justified in a 1 to 1 ratio if restricted conditions are fulfilled. However, this does not change the fact that many international agreements prohibit the use of torture under any circumstance, and each State Party to such agreements has the duty to ensure that its national law is in line with international obligations. Lebanon, for instance, has ratified many treaties and has recently taken measures with regard to coercive interrogation, such as recognizing a new law specifically defining and criminalizing coercive interrogation, to ensure that Lebanese law is in line with Lebanon’s international obligations.
This paper is limited to torture used during interrogations to extract confessions in Lebanon and demonstrates that, although the use of coercive interrogation in Lebanon violates international and national law, these techniques are still used by state officials. Therefore, a deep look into the situation in Lebanon is necessary, and relevant measures must be taken.
For best outcome of this study, a deep analysis of the coercive interrogation laws recently integrated in the Lebanese legal system is conducted to assess compliance with international law and to highlight gaps. The paper clearly demonstrates that the recent law contained many gaps that should have been considered, not for the sake of effectivity, but merely for future reforms due to the second consideration’s nature of these gaps, and that the new law is a necessary and sufficient step to combat torture if applied well. Nevertheless, the broad gap between written and practiced law in Lebanon clearly illustrates the problem of enforcement. The reasons vary depending on the context and can include officers’ poor basic knowledge of the law and training, a lack of willingness to abide by the law, an institutional culture inherited from preceding authoritarians leading to great expertise in overcoming the suspect’s rights and escaping prosecutions, and the political situation in Lebanon causing a conflict of interest.
Considering this reality, I acknowledge the importance and necessity of criminalizing torture under Lebanese national law, especially after several recommendations, requests, and pressures from the international community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil societies. However, I find it insufficient to end torture. Therefore, this paper presents suggestions tailored specifically to the situation in Lebanon based on objective data and concrete evidence.
CHAPTER ONE: LAWS REGULATING COERCIVE INTERROGATION
For centuries, the explicit position of the civilized world has been that torture is one of the worst violations of human dignity. The prohibition against torture is well established under both international law (I) and national law (II). However, this prohibition has been subject to many different debates, on both international and national level, as discussed in detail in the following sections.
I. The International Law Against Coercive Interrogation
As far as international law is concerned, official torture can never be justified. It is not only prohibited by many agreements1 but also prohibited as customary international law ‘jus cogens’. This section discusses the most controversial debates on coercive interrogation in regard to its overlap with torture (A) and the issue of distinguishing permissible techniques from illegal ones (B), as well as to what extent the international law is binding to Lebanon (C).
A. Coercive Interrogation and Torture: Two Concepts Overlapping
In the majority of the discussed articles, the term ‘coercive interrogation’ has generally been abandoned and replaced with the term ‘torture’, as well as subjected to its regulations; therefore it is important to highlight the overlap of these two terms.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘coercion’ as “compulsion by physical force or threat of physical force”2 and ‘interrogation’ as “the formal or systematic questioning by the police, usu. of a person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime”3, while the most widely accepted functional definition of torture can be found under article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘the Convention’ hereinafter) as follows: “Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession…”.
In a careful examination of these definitions, the distinction between one and the other does not seem clear, but the doctrine and the jurisprudence played an essential role in this regard. The doctrine set a standard for differentiation that relates to severity: the pain inflicted through torture is severe, while the pain inflicted through the use of coercive interrogation is moderate4. Consequently, mild coercive interrogations do not qualify as legal torture, and when torture is not used for the purpose of extracting a confession, it is not considered coercive interrogation.
In practice, it is not simple to make this distinction, as it requires determination of the severity of the pain, which is subjective. Thus, the European Court of Human Rights considered that certain techniques that involve physical discomfort or pain, while constituting inhumane and degrading treatment, do not constitute torture, such as protracted standing against the wall on tip toes, exposing a suspect to loud noise, or putting hoods on the suspect during detention5. Other practices that, according to some, may constitute torture include confinement for an extended period of time, dousing in ice cold water, playing loud music, and mental suffering inflicted on a person (such as threats execution or mock execution rituals)6. Although the criteria sound clear, classification remains subject to one’s discretion, as evidenced by the fact that exposing a person to loud music was considered torture to some, and merely inhumane or degrading treatment to others. Moreover, a research article published in Psychological Science concluded that people cannot appreciate the severity of interrogation practices they themselves are not experiencing, calling at the end for a more restrictive legal standard for evaluating the ethicality of interrogation techniques7. Although this study affirms the relativity and the difficulty of determining the severity of the interrogation, its calling for a more legal restrictive standard to evaluate the ethicality of interrogation techniques drives us to question the ethicality of those acts merely constituting coercive interrogation without amounting to torture. In such cases, the act’s unethical nature inevitably remains but torture’s legal provisions cease to function and its international protection falls. In other words, actions falling short of ‘torture' can still be cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This is also in line with article 16 of the Convention8.
Nevertheless, the interest of this paper lies in the overlapping area of these two concepts: coercive interrogation that (by virtue of its severity) counts as torture. Henceforth, ‘coercive interrogation’ is used to denote this subset.
B. The Issue of Distinguishing Permissible Interrogation Techniques from Illegal Ones
In a crowded public discussion about coercive interrogation in which attendants are asked whether they support it, it is likely that 99% of the attendants (assuming a mere contrarian is present) would call for an absolute prohibition of torture during interrogation; however, later proposing the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ would create doubt, for some, about this absolute prohibition.
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
Figure 2 Prohibition of Coercive Interrogations in the 'Ticking Bomb Scenario'9
The Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) described this tactic as operating by manipulating the reactions of the audience10. Although this tactic evokes sympathy for the torturer and hatred towards the torture victim, it is worth discussing. Whether an individual believes torture is justifiable usually depends on the underlying theory to which he or she subscribes. Like many others, I argue that coercive interrogation must be kept illegal but permitted in certain circumstances, but what is new about my view is the new perspective set to allow torture in certain cases and the motives for considering it permissible, rather than merely morally justifiable, as well as the delimitation of the conditions so as to avoid any slippery slope. In this regard, I outline some standard positions on coercive interrogation, offering brief remarks for each.
1) The Absolute Impermissibility of Using Coercive Interrogations
a) On Legal Grounds
Many international agreements prohibit the use of torture under any circumstance, including article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights11, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights12, and article 1 of the Convention13. Moreover, prohibition against torture was considered, for many, among those jus cogens norms (along with crimes against humanity, genocide, rape, hijacking, and terrorism) that can never be justified14.
Article 2 of the Convention affirmed a universal ban against torture and stated that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”15. This includes “any threat of terrorist acts or violent crime, as well as armed conflict, international or non-international”16. Consequently, international treaties and human rights laws never advocate the use of torture, no matter the circumstances or how sizeable the proportion of people that would advocate for its use. While I am neither denying the grave nature of coercive interrogation nor praising it, I suggest that the law should have a typical or baseline regulatory strategy for coping with grave evils that sometimes produce greater goods. After all, it is impossible for the law to cover all situations, and it is the duty of scholars, professors, and practitioners to analyze the laws, highlight the gaps, and propose amendments where necessary.
b) On Deontological Grounds
From an absolutist deontological point of view, coercive interrogations are impermissible due to their violation of human dignity and autonomy. This position denies that there can ever be a justified violation of rights, even to prevent serious harm. This theory has many followers because of its aim to obey personal autonomy17, and has many opponents because it seems shortsighted and impractical for some18, as well as denies the inevitability of existing situations in which such violation of rights may be justifiable for others19. I completely agree with these counter theory arguments and add that this theory is paradoxical, since it simultaneously assures and denies human dignity. In other words, in the ticking bomb scenario, this theory calls for the protection of the detainee (by protecting him or her against any coercive techniques) while denying protection for the third parties whose lives are at stake (by refusing to apply coercive techniques to extract the confession necessary to save them).
Supporting the absolute prohibition of torture, the APT prepared a text defusing the ticking bomb scenario based on a consultation of expert individuals and organizations, with the sole intention of always saying no to torture. This research debunked all of the assumptions of the ticking bomb scenario without offering much argument as to why torture does not work; rather, it mainly focuses on proving that these assumptions can hardly be met, such as considering that torturers are unlikely to have such a degree of certainty that the person they are holding is a perpetrator or even has relevant information20, or considering that it is impossible that the torturer knows everything about the plot aside from the key piece of information that the victim knows21. While these arguments (or ‘second thoughts’) make sense, they are not enough to debunk the ticking bomb scenario, because genuinely exposing the ticking bomb scenario starts from the idea that all of the assumptions are met; otherwise, there is no need to apply torture.
One of the few arguments presented to genuinely debunk the ticking bomb scenario opposes the assumption that “torturing the person will obtain the information in time to prevent the attack”, stating that “The perpetrator would be able both to stop the torture and to misdirect authorities long enough for the bomb to go off, in which case torture is not likely to be an effective means of preventing the attack… The types of persons who would plan and execute such an attack are the very ones most likely to have been trained to withstand torture until it is too late anyway”22. However, first, people who are trained to withhold information while subjected to torture would certainly surpass other means, such as interrogation tactics where no torture is used, and resist talking. Second, at this stage it is safe to assume that no other means is available; therefore, not seeking torture would be ineffective, while applying torture could be effective. Saying that an act is necessary to prevent some harm merely means that there is no other alternative for preventing it, and when such threshold exists, it is irrelevant whether the said act is a long shot or a guaranteed success; therefore, why not take the risk? Moreover, using torture has been effective in exceptional cases, such as the ones that enabled the Filipino authorities to extract a confession and prevent the hijacking and destruction of eleven airliners23. It is not guaranteed that torture would prevent an attack, but in situations in which avoiding it would be useless, it is undeniably better to apply it. I further explain my view of the ‘precedence theory’ in the following sections.
c) On Rule-Consequentialist Grounds
The rule consequentialist agrees that there are cases in which coercive interrogations would be justified from an ex post perspective, but such cases must be impermissible because they will do more harm than good from an ex ante perspective. Although this view rejects the justification of coercive interrogation on second-order considerations, it at least recognizes cases in which coercive interrogation would be justified.
One of the famous arguments presented from a rule-consequentialist view is the ‘slippery slope’, which implies that, once coercive interrogation is allowed, it cannot be stopped; as a result, torture becomes arbitrary and unpunished, widespread and systematic, or both24. In this regard, Mordechai Kemnitzer argued that once the police justifiably use coercive interrogation, they will start using it against petty criminals and innocent bystanders that are thought to be withholding information about a crime they witnessed25. Eric Posner and Adriane Vermeule refuted this argument by proposing that the same argument could be made about police shootings in that, if the government allows the police to shoot people, they will be morally corrupted26. However, while this refutation calls for the acceptance of coercive interrogation in necessary cases by analogy to police shootings, it does not discuss whether justifying coercive interrogation leads to a ‘slippery slope’.
I agree with Kremnitzer’s statement but disagree with the motives. In other words, the nations that allow these techniques, even in narrow cases, use them in nearly every case, which is unfortunately the case in Lebanon (as I discuss later in this paper). However, I do not agree that the reason behind the slippery slope is the justification of coercive interrogation, and, like Adam Raviv stated, it seems strange to argue that people’s moral compasses will truly be damaged if torture is prohibited 99.99% of the time, rather than 100%27. Moreover, I argue that the main reason is not allowing torture 0.01% of the time, but rather a corruption in the system resulting from both non-censorship and non-prosecution; otherwise, each justification recognized by the law would be considered a slippery slope. In a regime in which the law is well applied and well enforced, each violation would be punished, and it would be rare to find cases in which the law is violated. Moreover, the techniques for which I am calling for justification are means used by officials, and when those officials are well trained and well aware of their use, few violations will occur. Therefore, introducing possible justifications for coercive interrogation is not considered to have a slippery slope effect, and no evidence was presented in this regard. The State can accord great respect for human rights while still acknowledging that it can be necessary to hurt people to protect the public.
Thus far, I have disregarded claims of the absolute impermissibility of using coercive interrogation, arguing that it is sometimes necessary to hurt people to protect the public. In the next section, I further highlight my view on the permissibility of these techniques while outlining supporting positions and offering brief remarks on each.
2) The Permissibility of Using Coercive Interrogation
a) On Act-Consequentialist Grounds
A rule-consequentialist asks which rules about coercive interrogation will produce the greatest net benefits28. The act-consequentialist, in contrast, argues that torture may be acceptable or even mandated if society receives a net benefit that outweighs the harm of torture29. In this regard, the same question posed by Posner and Vermeule shall be asked: why only those circumstances? According to them, the obvious alternative is to say that the harm prevented must simply be greater than the harm inflicted, and the permissible ratio is 1 to 130. They mainly build their argument around the statement that coercive interrogations are not special and the law must treat them similarly to police shootings, wartime killings, preventive detentions, and other serious harms31. Although I agree with their finding regarding the 1 to 1 ratio, I disagree with the grounds. Coercive interrogations are indeed special and differ from other serious harms. Henry Shue’s famous argument against the moral permissibility of torture is that it violates the “prohibition against assault upon the defenseless”, which is what makes it worse than killing from a dignity and autonomy standpoint32. I do not mention this statement to illustrate that I am against the moral permissibility of torture, but rather to demonstrate that killing and torturing are not the same. However, Posner and Vermeule’s argument was shielded against Shue’s, and they added that killing enemies or armed criminals is worse than torture, since killing “utterly extinguishes the victim and forever denies him any future possibility of exercising autonomy or enjoying human dignity33 ”, but this argument emphasizes the difference between killing and torture, regardless of which is worse. Moreover, if the two are different, then why treat them the same by analogy?
However, I highlight some further differences: first, the pain inflicted through torture is continuous and greater than that inflicted through killing, which is usually immediate. Second, police shootings to avoid an imminent threat will definitely prevent the attack (particularly by killing a shooter), while torturing to extract the confession may or may not be effective, as tolerance to torture is relative.
After having illustrated that these two concepts are different, the question remains: on which grounds are coercive interrogations considered justified on a 1 to 1 ratio? In my view, coercive techniques are permitted on the ‘precedence theory’. In other words, consider a situation in which X (a professional kidnapper with a criminal history known for kidnapping and killing people) kidnaps Y and is later captured by the authorities before having released Y, and the authorities find videotapes showing that the victim is in an unknown place and his or her life is in danger. Moreover, all means of interrogation have failed to prompt the kidnapper to disclose the place of the victim. In this situation, the authorities would be allowed to torture X to save Y’s life. This is because the protection of Y’s life is worth more than X’s right to dignity and fair trial, since Y is assumed innocent, X violated Y’s rights, and X is refusing to cooperate and disclose the information needed to save Y’s life. The authorities are faced with two options (assuming all other intelligence-gathering methods of interrogation have failed and all facts are substantive): either respect X’s human dignity and autonomy or violate X’s latter rights by torturing him for a chance to save Y. Whichever option they choose, they are violating one’s rights, either by refusing to apply coercive techniques or by applying them; therefore, they must respect the rights of the person worthy of protection. The same also applies to ticking bomb scenarios.
On the other hand, this ‘precedence theory’ calls for the full protection of innocent people. A good question would be a situation in which the killing of one innocent person would save the lives of many others, a topic well addressed in the literature34. This may include, for example, torturing a child who has no relevant information, but whose torture in the presence of the perpetrator is the only thing that can get the perpetrator to talk. Applying the above theory, torture would not be permissible, since the child is worthy of protection just like any other; a possible alternative, then, would be to apply moral torture to the perpetrator (like threatening to harm the child or others). This way, the child would not be tortured, but the perpetrator would be tortured morally. The risk cannot ever be taken against innocent people, because if the torture is ineffective, then the cost would exceed the benefits; on the other hand, in torturing the perpetrator, the cost would never be higher, even if the torture is ineffective, since third parties are worthy of protection.
In addition, the moral philosophers rejecting the act-consequentialist theory worry about the decision makers that will assess whether coercive interrogations are justified and consider that, if the costs are high because of unavoidable error, then a flat ban on coercive interrogations would be justified35. However, it is indeed a difficult task to limit a set of conditions under which coercive interrogations would be justifiable. Laws cannot cover all situations, and courts typically appreciate ex post whether the conditions of the exception are fulfilled (e.g., last resort, necessity, check the perpetrator’s doubtless identity, etc.) and apply the necessary measures accordingly. Thus, officials must be subjected to a professional official training and shall never exercise coercive techniques according to their sole discretion, but rather shall always be supervised before and while applying these techniques (if used as a last resort, less discomforting techniques should precede harsher ones). Moreover, harsh sanctions could be applied against officers that abusively used coercive interrogation.
b) On Threshold Deontological Grounds
Charles Fried argues, as have many others, that it is permissible to kill an innocent person to save a whole nation from annihilation36. This viewpoint is quite similar to act-consequentialism, but threshold deontologists are generally much stricter in regard to when torture is permitted37. In other words, torture may be morally correct to a consequentialist, whereas a threshold deontologist would only find torture morally permissible. In this regard, Maria F. Blanc considered that the violation of one’s rights to preserve the rights of many others may be justifiable, but is never legitimate; she mainly focuses on the justice and states that it is difficult to separate legitimacy from justice or to assume something legitimate without presenting some degree of moral correctness38. On the other hand, Amos N. Guiorra defends the idea that there are some cases in which coercive interrogations could be lawfully implemented if they are constitutionally limited, congressionally overseen, and judicially reviewed39. However, I call for legitimization of coercive techniques in the specific cases defined in the law ex ante (where all the required conditions are fulfilled), because, when these techniques result from the application of the law, they will become morally correct. Justice will then be achieved, according to Blanc’s statement. Further, we shall not keep the legitimization for an ex post view, as Guiorra stated, since this would go against the core values of any liberal society.
One additional reason coercive interrogations, when occurring under certain circumstances, shall be legal is related to self-defense, since legal acts cannot be opposed by self-defense (in case all self-defense conditions are fulfilled), though justified acts can. In other words, in the case of a legal coercive interrogation, the person subjected to torture, in case he is able to exercise self-defense against acts of torture by officials, cannot trigger self-defense, since there is no infringement. On the other hand, in the case of justification with no legalization, he can use self-defense against the official, because the act of torture, while justified, is still illegal.
Moreover, when the act is justified, the civil liability of the perpetrator remains, and while he will not be liable for punishment, he will be responsible for the civil compensation of the victim. In case of legalization, however, the act will not be regarded as an offense and no liability will be held, whether criminal or civil. This is further explained in the upcoming section related to Lebanese law.
In summary, both sides of the permissibility and illegality debate have merit. I argue that the law shall ban torture in all but a limited number of necessary cases in which all of the above assumptions are simultaneously present: 1) a specific planned attack is known to exist (whether against a large number of people or against one), 2) the person in custody is a perpetrator of the attack and has information that will prevent said attack, 3) no other means or actions exist that could obtain the information in time. Though these situations are rare, and perhaps nearly impossible, it is important to cover them in the law for the immunity of the officers in case the conditions are met; otherwise, the decision to torture would only be made by a heroic and bold officer. It therefore makes sense to integrate the justifications into the law, rather than gambling on the officer’s nobility.
The questions remain: Where is Lebanon in all the above? Are they bound by international law? If yes, which view did they adopt? Are they taking measures to stay in line with their international obligations?
C. Binding on Lebanon
Lebanon has ratified many international treaties against torture and committed before the international and Arabic community to fight torture and to take measures to enforce them. Accordingly, Lebanon ratified the Convention on October 5th, 2000. As a party to the Convention, Lebanon is required to take effective measures to prevent torture40, ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law, deliver appropriate penalties, and prevent other acts of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. Moreover, according to Kelsen’s41 pure theory of law and the determination of the hierarchy of norms in article 2 of the Lebanese Civil Procedural Code (CCP), which stipulates that “the courts must adhere to the principle of hierarchy. When the provisions of international treaties conflict with the provisions of the ordinary law, they shall apply the first before the second”, when Lebanese national rules contradict an international rule, Lebanese courts must apply the international norm without declaring the ordinary rules void42.
Although Lebanon has ratified many international agreements related generally to human rights and specifically to torture, the country is still far from fulfilling its international obligations, and coercive interrogation is still widely applied regardless of its necessity.
I argue, like the majority of Lebanese people, that Lebanon is far from fulfilling its international obligations, and the reason is not only related to legal measures, but also to enforcement mechanisms due the gap between the written law and the practiced law, which is further discussed in the following section.
II. The Lebanese National Law against Coercive Interrogation
Before exposing the gap between the written and practiced law, it is essential to study the written law in detail and highlight its gaps, because, as Louis D. Brandeis stated, “If we desire respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable”. This famous legal quote calls nations to implement respectable laws before asking for enforcement. The respectability of Lebanese national law against coercive interrogation is related essentially to its compliance and gaps.
This section discusses Lebanese laws related to coercive interrogation while assessing the compliance with Lebanon’s international obligations and highlighting the gaps found both under Lebanese national law and international law (A), in addition to comparing the law with the practice in Lebanon (B).
A. Assessing Compliance with Lebanon’s International Obligations and Highlighting the Gaps
Although compliance is not merely related to effective legislative measures43, taking these measures is a requirement for effective enforcement. This section only discusses legislative measures related to provisions concerned with the definition of coercive interrogation, exceptional circumstances, attempts, and participation.
The amendment of 201744 made Lebanon’s new definition of the offenses consistent with the definition in the Convention and, as a consequence, contained all of the Convention gaps. Therefore, compliance is assessed mainly with articles 1, 2, and 4 of the Convention, and relevant gaps are highlighted.
1) Compliance with Article 1 of the Convention and Gaps
Article 1 of the Convention defines torture used to extract confessions and refers essentially to the types of violence (a), actors (b), the purpose (c), and the mens rea (d) related to the crime. On the other hand, article 401 of the Lebanese Criminal Code (CC) criminalized coercive interrogations and reintegrated similar provisions.
a) Types of Violence
With regard to types of violence, article 1 of the Convention refers to severe ‘physical or mental’ pain or suffering, and the new article 401 CC refers also to ‘mental and physical’ pain as types of violence inflicted. This is not the first text accrediting mental pain in Lebanese law, as this pain was recognized with other crimes, such as slander. However, article 401 CC was the first to recognize mental pain in crimes of torture, because it was previously believed that the pain in death and torture was always physical45. This new designation under Lebanese law of mental pain in torture, and particularly in coercive interrogations, is vital, since many psychological methods are being used in detention, including insults, humiliation, threats, intimidation, and seeing a relative being tortured46.
Recently, during his detention in November 2017, the well-known actor exonerated of spying for Israel, Ziad Itani, was subjected to many forms of psychological torture. Itani told Human Rights Watch that interrogators “threatened to rape him and threatened his family with physical violence and legal charges” during his arrest, and since details of the investigations were leaked to the media within a day of his arrest, Itani added that “interrogators used the damage to his reputation to put additional pressure on him to confess”47. It seems that Lebanese interrogators exploited Itani’s reputation and violated the confidentiality of the investigations just to achieve their ultimate goal of obtaining a confession. This illustrates that coercive interrogation has become a quotidian art, and interrogators are creative in determining the best methods of torture according to the victim’s status.
Another reason this new designation is vital is related to the negative effects of psychological torture, which have been widely documented48, and Professor Peter Kooijmans delivered a statement in which he merged the effects of physical and psychological torture with the disintegration of the personality49. Likewise, Itani stated that psychological torture is worse than physical torture.
Therefore, this new designation of mental torture under Lebanese law is necessary to avoid bypassing the law by using legal psychological techniques to obtain confessions.
b) Types of Actors
With regard to types of actors, article 1 of the Convention refers to pain inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a “public official or other person acting in an official capacity”. Article 401 CC refers to the same actors.
Two observations can be concluded from the above: the first is related to the exclusiveness of public officials; what about coercive techniques used by non-officials? To illustrate, the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) mentioned that “unlawful arrests and torture by non-state actors, such as militias affiliated to Hezbollah and other armed militias” took place in a secret location in pre-trial detention50. To determine whether these unlawful acts fall within the scope of the Convention, one shall define the meaning of public officials. The working group drafting the Convention refrained from providing a definition for public official, and it is the jurisprudence of the CAT that made it clear that ‘public official’, in principle, refers to de jure government control, whereas de facto control will be recognized in the absence of de jure control51. Therefore, and according to articles 4 and 5 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, acts committed by Hezbollah cannot be attributed to Lebanon as de jure organs, which require a formal incorporation into the Lebanon’s structure, nor as persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, which require an empowerment by virtue of the law of the state, i.e. Lebanon52, and as a consequence cannot be considered ‘public officials’. Moreover, article 1 of the Convention cannot be applied to Hezbollah’s previously mentioned unlawful acts, and Lebanon cannot be responsible for their acts.
However, this state responsibility under article 1 increases when such acts are inflicted by the consent or acquiescence of public officials, and this is our second observation with regard to types of actors. The CAT clarified the notion of ‘consent’ or ‘acquiescence’ under its general comment No. 2. It appears that consent or acquiescence is equated with failure of due diligence to prevent, investigate, or punish acts of torture or ill-treatment committed by non-state or private actors. The issue here is whether the term ‘acquiescence’ includes the case in which the public official is not aware of the crime, but it was among his official duties to know. Professor Rita Eid concluded that ‘consent’ or ‘acquiescence’ requires knowledge; otherwise, the public official cannot show approval. However, in the case that he had doubts about torture being applied and failed to take measures to prevent it, he would be considered to have committed a gross negligence amounting to direct intent53. I disagree with Eid and argue that acquiescence does not only include cases in which the ‘public official’ has doubts about torture being applied, but also includes cases in which the latter does not know about the crime and it was among his duties to know. This is because, first, the negative incident (the ignorance of the public official of the crime) is difficult and perhaps nearly impossible to prove; second, it was among his duties to know; and third, this failure has serious consequences on people’s fundamental rights and shall be interpreted strictly.
Therefore, when actors are non-officials or individuals, article 1 cannot be applied except when the acts are inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, and this applies even in cases in which the official did not know about the crime, but it was among his duties to know as previously defined. However, this does not negate the fact that the acts committed by the perpetrator, whether a ‘public official’ or by another ‘with the consent or acquiescence of the public official’, shall be inflicted ‘intentionally’, an element that is discussed further in part d.
c) The Purpose
With regard to purpose, article 1 of the Convention refers to the purposes for which the act must be inflicted in order to be prohibited. These include extraction of confession, obtaining information from a victim or third party, punishment, intimidation, coercion, and discrimination. A similar approach is followed in article 401 CC, where the same purposes are mentioned. The issue here arises from the phrase ‘for such purposes as’, used in both articles 1 and 401. This phrase leaves one to think that any other reason may lead to infliction of torture. Although this list is meant to be indicative, rather than exhaustive, as concluded from the word ‘such’, many authors have considered that not every purpose is sufficient to constitute torture, but “only a purpose which has something in common with the purposes expressly listed”54. However, since this expression leaves an open interpretation of infliction of torture, it helps cover more cases of torture, and this illustrative character remains beneficial, facilitating the criminalization of nearly every act of torture.
d) Mens Rea
With regard to mens rea, article 1 of the Convention and article 401 CC both describe torture as an act which is ‘intentionally’ inflicted. Two issues are present here: the first is whether negligent infliction of pain may amount to torture, and the second is whether the intent required is mere ‘general intent’ or ‘specific intent’.
With regard to the first issue, I consider whether a forgotten Lebanese detainee who suffers severe pain due to lack of food is considered a victim of torture under article 1 of the Convention. The CAT emphasized that the element of ‘intent’ referred to in article 1 is key to the international concept of torture55, and negligence is not sufficient to qualify an act as torture56. Kidus Meskele, an LL.M in Human Rights Law, considered that achieving the given purpose of torture is impossible without acting or omitting deliberately, and an act of negligence therefore does not amount to torture57. In the same meaning, Eid considered that it is clear from the text that the legislator’s intention turned towards making the it ‘intentionally’. However, I agree with these views and add that the negligence, as one of the mental elements of the crime, is the exception and cannot be applied if the text is not explicit about it58. Nevertheless, although the forgotten Lebanese detainee cannot, due to the lack of ‘intent’, be considered a victim of torture under article 1 or article 401, he will remain a victim of serious human rights violation.
With regard to the second issue, it is necessary to determine the type of intent to apply the relevant rules. ‘General intent’ is the case when the will of the perpetrator is directed towards the actus reus59, whereas ‘special intent’ is a psychological state related to a specific consequence or a bad motive unrelated to the actus reus60. ‘Special intent’ can be inferred from the provision’s content; therefore, the presence of ‘special intent’ can be concluded from article 1 and article 401, since the severe pain has to be inflicted for specific purposes, and committing torture for any other purpose not covered by the mentioned articles will not suffice to claim protection. To illustrate, both articles denote that their protection does not include “pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”, and it can therefore be concluded that not every pain is a violation of article 401, but only that inflicted for specific purposes. In this regard, Lebanese Criminal Appeal Court dismissed a similar case and considered that the elements of article 453 CC61 were not fulfilled, despite harm being inflicted, since the ‘special intent’ to cause harm was not satisfied62.
Therefore, it can be concluded by analogy that, when Lebanese Courts are faced with cases in which coercive interrogations are exercised without the intent to inflict severe pain for the purposes expressly stated or for purposes that have something in common with the ones expressly stated, they will dismiss the case. However, it is difficult to find cases in which coercive interrogations are applied without the ‘special intent’ to inflict severe harm, yet this ‘special intent’ is not easily proved because it is related to one’s intentions, which are not always easy to reveal.
2) Compliance with Article 2 of the Convention and Gaps
Article 2 of the Convention states that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever … may be invoked as a justification of torture. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification”. As for Lebanese law, the amended article 185 CC states similarly that no exceptional circumstances shall be invoked with regard to coercive interrogations and mentions necessity defense, order from a superior, and internal political instability. The legal absolute impermissibility is discussed in detail in section B. I argued that torture shall be justified under certain circumstances and discussed my view in detail with regard to necessity defense 63 .
With regard to other exceptional circumstances, I believe that they should also be reconsidered. The illustrative list of exceptional circumstances cited in article 185 CC leaves many questions: What about the person that exercises torture under moral or physical compulsion, or the subordinate that is unable to discuss the legitimacy of the order? What about the violation of the duty of obedience? Are all exceptional circumstances covered even though they are not mentioned expressly?
Moral and physical compulsion are considered to be justifications under Lebanese law when the conditions of article 227 CC, unpredictability and irresistibility, are fulfilled, and according to article 185 CC, they cannot be raised as justifications for coercive interrogation. When the latter is applied, the person being tortured to confess is protected, while the person being forced to torture another to confess is not (both are subjected to some kind of torture, whether physical or mental). However, this seems contradictory. One may argue that the person subjected to compulsion may start an action for compulsive behavior and receive compensation; although this is true, it does not mean that he shall be criminally liable for torturing. The only person that shall be responsible, criminally and civilly, for both acts is the one that imposed compulsive behavior, because he is responsible for the torture64.
In the same context, a Lebanese criminal judge issued a decision related to a crime committed by a subordinate executing his superior’s order without being able to discuss its legitimacy, which leads to the second question. In this decision, a new type of perpetrator was recognized: the ‘mental perpetrator’. This is a superior that uses his strict authority and subordination over the subordinate, who becomes unable to refuse or discuss the legitimacy of the acts ordered and commits them without willingness65. In such scenarios, the subordinate will not be liable, and the same shall be applied to coercive interrogation.
The reason behind the ‘mental perpetrator’ might be the duty of obedience, which leads to the third question. This duty is recognized in the Lebanese Military Justice Act (MJA), and, if not respected, subordinates will be punished with six months to two years of imprisonment66. Therefore, when the superior orders the subordinate to use force during interrogation, the subordinate will be faced with two duties presented in contradictory texts: the duty to obey his subordinate and execute his order, and the duty to disobey his subordinate’s order and refuse to use torture. Essentially, if the subordinate executes the order, he will be criminalized according to articles 401 and 185 CC, and if he refuses, he will be criminalized according to article 152 MJA. Either way, the subordinate will be criminalized and I guess no one wishes to be in the place of the officer receiving the order.
In sum, though the amendment aligned Lebanese law with the Convention, it is unclear, it triggers many questions and unfair possibilities, and it creates an incompatibility with other Lebanese texts. The legislator was not precise in amending the article, and it seems as though he did it solely to demonstrate that he is in line with international obligations without considering the possible gaps and its effectiveness in practice.
3) Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention and Gaps
Article 4 of the Convention calls for the criminalization of all acts of torture, as well as the appropriate punishment for acts of torture, attempts to commit torture, and acts constituting complicity or participation in torture. Article 401 CC covers criminalization and the appropriate punishments but does not mention attempts and participation in torture, though they were mentioned in the general Lebanese rule which are studied in this Part to assess compliance.
a) Types of Offenses
Article 4 of the Convention states that “State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law” and “shall make these offenses punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature”. Article 401 CC relates directly to the criminalization of coercive interrogation and determines its penalties according to the consequences of the act. These penalties range from one year imprisonment to 20 years fixed-term extended imprisonment, depending on whether the act led to malfunction, injury, temporary or permanent physical or mental disability, death, or to none of the above. I hold that Lebanese law has been in perfect alignment with the Convention in regard to the criminalization of coercive interrogation and the categorization of the punishment according to the consequences, but this categorization is not in line with other related Lebanese texts. For instance, article 547 CC determines the penalty range for intentional unlawful killing as between 15 and 20 years of hard labor. Although both penalties (fixed-term extended imprisonment and fixed-term hard labor) are penalties of felony, which belongs to the same type of crime, hard labor is more severe than extended imprisonment in regard to the degree of the penalty67. Consequently, it can be noted that the minimum range in unlawful killing is higher and more severe than the one in coercive interrogations leading to death which is 10 years. I do not find it fair to penalize a torturer-killer with a less severe punishment than a killer; rather, the torture-killer shall be penalized with a more severe penalty, since his acts consisted of both torture and death. One may argue that the torturer may not have the intention to kill, and the unlawful killing resulting from coercive interrogation was therefore involuntary, and the penalty stated in article 547 CC cannot be compared to the one stated in article 401 CC, since article 547 CC requires intent. Still, it is rather difficult to attest the unintentional character of killing, especially when harsh techniques are used. Moreover, though article 547 CC cannot be compared to article 401 CC, article 550 CC, which states that the minimum range of unintentional killing resulting from torture is 5 years of hard labor, can, and the penalty stated in article 550 CC is more severe than that stated in article 401 CC. In this case, it seems that the latter articles are in harmony concerning the duration range of the fixed term but are not in line with regard to the nature of the penalty, which shall be, in both crimes, hard labor.
b) Attempts to Commit Torture
Article 4 of the Convention sets an obligation for State Parties to ensure that the attempt to commit torture is an offense under their criminal law. The attempt of coercive interrogations was not specifically mentioned in article 401 CC or any other article, and general rules shall therefore apply when determining whether the attempt in this case is an offense under Lebanese law. In the absence of a specific text criminalizing the attempt to commit coercive interrogation, the attempt will be considered an offense if the act constitutes felony; otherwise, a specific text to criminalize it is required. Lebanese law has taken the grave nature of the punishment as a criterion to determine the nature of the offense, whether felony, misdemeanor, or contravention68. The punishment stated in article 401 (b)(1) CC, “A minimum of one year and maximum of three years in jail”, reflects the misdemeanor’s nature of the offense69, while the punishments stated in article 401 (b)(2)(3)(4), “A minimum of 3 years and maximum of 20 years fixed-term extended imprisonment”, reflect the felony’s nature of the offense70. Therefore, the attempt to commit coercive interrogations not leading to death, permanent or temporary moral or physical injury, or malfunction is not an offense under Lebanese law because it is a misdemeanor, and no specific text criminalizing it exists. However, although some argue that even if no special text exists, attempt covers misdemeanors, since criminal attempt is considered by nature to be a common system including felonies and misdemeanors71, the Lebanese Supreme Court holds that the attempt to commit a misdemeanor will not be considered an offense if no specific text explicitly criminalizes the attempt to commit it72. I agree with the Supreme Court’s view, since article 202 CC explicitly states not to criminalize attempt in a misdemeanor if no explicit text says to, due to the minor seriousness of the acts.
However, it is difficult to assess whether the acts are aimed directly towards completing the crime in coercive interrogations. There are no cases issued from Lebanese courts concerning the attempt to commit coercive interrogation, but citing other attempt cases will help determine, by analogy, the acts constituting substantial steps. The Lebanese Supreme Court states that the acts of wearing a woman’s uniform, transporting a gun, and walking in the claimant’s neighborhood with the intention to kill do not amount to substantial steps, but merely constitute preparatory acts that are not punishable73. By analogy, a police officer walking to the investigation room with the intent and the relevant utile to exercise violent practices to extract a confession will not be criminally liable.
In an opposite view the Supreme Court considered that the material acts that show clear intent to commit a specific crime are considered substantial steps74. In this view, each material act illustrating a certain intent to commit coercive interrogation constitutes an attempt, and, accordingly, the police officer’s act of walking towards the investigation room with the relevant utile to exercise violent practices will constitute a substantial step to commit torture. I agree with this decision and argue that holding the relevant utile while entering the interrogation room or a room arranged for torturing, or carrying out any other material act showing clear intent to commit coercive interrogation is enough to be considered a substantive step, especially because it is not common for a police officer to hold such utile while entering a room to investigate when the defendant is already handcuffed. Moreover, the act of preparing the relevant utile affects the person being interrogated, even if not used, and constitutes mental torture. In other words, any act aimed directly toward the commission of torture leading to the abuse of the victim, even mentally, shall be enough to constitute the attempt to commit the crime75.
It is important to note that merely approving the act of torture expressly or by implication constitutes the crime of torture and is not an attempt, since article 401 CC expressly states the approval in addition to the indictment when defining torture, meaning that the penalties enumerated are applied to the mere approval of the crime. However, the penalties enumerated distinguish between the consequences of the act (leading to death, injury, etc.) and are applied accordingly, whereas mere approval has no varying consequences if not translated into actual acts. The criteria to determine the penalty in such cases thus remain unclear and will lead to different views in future decisions when courts are faced with similar cases.
c) Participation in Torture
Article 4 of the Convention sets an obligation for State Parties to ensure that the act which constitutes complicity or participation to commit torture is an offense under its criminal law. Article 401 CC covers acts of torture committed, induced, or accepted by “an official or any person acting in an official capacity” and does not mention other criminal actors, which prompts the question: why stipulate only instigators without mentioning other criminal actors as accomplices, aiders, and accessories; does this mean that non-official capacities are not included? Why stipulate the instigator in the text if the general provisions are applicable? Why are only official instigators among criminal contributors criminally liable?
Excluding non-officials from article 401 CC indicates that the legislator’s intent was directed towards linking criminal participation to only the official nature of the officer, but what if the accomplice were a non-official person – would he be punished according to article 401 or other texts? Lebanese Supreme Court, in a similar case, considered the acts of non-officials facilitating the crime of ‘official document counterfeiting’, which violates article 459 CC (requiring an official capacity), as constituting the felony of aiding in accordance with articles 219 and 459 CC76. Applying the same by analogy, article 401 CC will be applied to non-official contributors as long as the crime was perpetrated by “an official capacity or a person acting in an official capacity”. In addition, Professor Eid considered that all criminal participants shall be included in article 401 CC, whether officials or non-officials, because it is illogical to apply different texts to contributors to the same offense77. In addition, criminal participation is linked to one specific offense78, and if other criminal actors were meant to be official actors, they would have been included in article 1 of the Convention like the instigator. Therefore, neither the Convention nor article 401 requires official capacity in coercive interrogations’ contributors; the only ones requiring official capacity are the perpetrator and the instigator.
This leads to the second question: why is official capacity explicitly required of the instigator, and why is the instigator treated differently than the other accomplices? Does this mean that non-official instigators are not criminalized under the related articles? It seems that both instigators can be punished under the previously mentioned articles, depending on the circumstances. If the instigator were an official, article 401 CC would be applied, and he would be punished as a main actor according to article 401 CC and subjected to the same penalties as the perpetrator, regardless of commission of the crime. If the instigator were a non-official, article 401 CC would not apply directly unless the conditions of article 401 CC were fulfilled, i.e. the crime is committed by an official capacity, and he would be punished according to general rules (articles 217 and 218 CC) as a contributor to the crime, just like other contributors. The difference lies within the penalty, and I argue that the legislator made this distinction between officials and non-officials to criminalize the official instigator of this crime with the same penalty as the perpetrator when the crime is not committed, therefore closing the door before him to benefit from the general rules, which grant him a less severe penalty in case the crime is not committed79. This distinction is quite accurate and important, since officials instigators must be subjected to more severe penalties than non-officials because of their position and duty to apply the law correctly.
At the end of this section, it is clear that the amendment of 2017 aligned the definition of coercive interrogation under Lebanese law with the Convention. This was a positive step to fight torture in Lebanon, but it was not enough, as I illustrate in the next section. Further, although the use of coercive interrogation in Lebanon violates international and national law, state officials still use these techniques.
B. Law and Practice in Lebanon: Two Contradictory Concepts
If ‘unenforced law’ is a penalized crime under Lebanese jurisdictions, Lebanon would be in violation, but this violation, just like coercive interrogation’s violations, will be also ignored by law enforcement. In other words, when legal texts concerning coercive interrogations are compared with their applicability, different outcomes are found.
This section exposes the true situation in Lebanon and states how and why the law and practice in Lebanon are two contradictory concepts. In short, the two main reasons are the lack of investigation and lack of prosecution, either because coercive interrogation is becoming a style (1) or because the Lebanese courts are failing to play an essential role in prosecuting and interpreting (2).
1) Coercive Interrogation as a Style, Rather Than an Accident
“Torture in Lebanon is a pervasive practice that is routinely used by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies”, a UN report concluded80. The publicly available Amnesty International annual reports from 1995-2017 illustrate clear cases of torture by Lebanese Security forces over many years81. The real danger is not only in using coercive interrogation, but is in the continuity and the increase of such a practice, especially since this technique is becoming more public and well known.
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Figure 2 Public View on Using Coercive Interrogations Figure 3 Public View on the Characteristic of Using Coercive Interrogations
This public use begs the question of how police are overcoming the law and escaping prosecution. The simple answer is that they are becoming expert in circumventing the law and sometimes because the law is protecting them.
This section presents why coercive interrogations are considered a style in Lebanon, and not just an accident, by exposing the techniques used during investigations (a), the ways police are overcoming the suspect’s rights (b), and the reason behind the low number of justice cases (c).
a) The Techniques Used During Investigations
A report by the Lebanese Franco movement, Support for Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily (SOLIDA), explains that there is a clear tactic established for the best outcome of torture in the Ministry of Defense. The plan consists of two groups of interrogators: the ‘active’, who beat, insult, and torture, and the ‘passive’, who ask the victim to agree to a certain set of facts without using any brutality. The victim alternates between the two groups until he or she agrees to the facts82. This tactic is still used today, according to victim reports83. The methods that were reported to have been used the most during interrogations were beatings, suspension, electric shocks, al-farrouj, sexual violence and prolonged administrative detention84.
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Figure 4 Types of Torture Identified in 2011-2012
These brutal techniques are used for nearly every kind of crime, and not only for crimes discussed to be permissible under international law, which makes them a style. This style demonstrates a lack of culture, ethics, and education among interrogators, though interrogators must act as an example for others; it also indicates that inexperienced and useless interrogators exist, because these techniques call for extracting a specific confession, regardless of its accuracy. This will also result in a deficiency in intelligence gathering, since interrogators are searching for a specific confession (which could turn out to be false), rather than useful facts leading to the truth. Moreover, the style in using these techniques makes it acceptable and normal for interrogators to use harsh techniques after confessions as a punishment, rather than for the sole purpose of extracting a confession86.
b) How Police Overcome the Suspect’s Rights
In this section, I illustrate how police overcome the suspect’s rights after subjecting him to torture. In practice, the arrested person claims before the investigative and arbitration judges that he was subjected to torture during the preliminary investigation, which then leads to investigations. One of the most effective measures implemented in article 42 of the Lebanese Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) to investigate torture is the appointment of a forensic doctor for the arrested person to prove moral and physical damage. This appointment is requested either by the arrested, by his lawyer, or by any member of his family, and if any doubts exist, members of the judicial police accused of committing torture will be called for testimony.
These measures are vital in discovering torture, but why aren’t they working in Lebanon? The Lebanese Initial Report to the CAT - 201687 (State Report hereinafter) states that these measures were taken, but they in fact were not. To start with the request of appointing a forensic doctor, interrogators are denying access of the arrested to his or her lawyer or family before the first court session. In cases in which this right is granted, they would not let the arrested meet with them privately; rather, a state authority would be present88. Therefore, a first way to overcome the suspect’s right to request a doctor’s appointment is denial to meet with a lawyer and family, and it is clear that the arrested will not be able to request a doctor at this stage.
The second tactic is to keep the detained in custody until torture traces are erased. To discuss the following tactics as objectively as possible, I conducted an interview with a current interrogator who was not informed of the purpose of the research89. He confirmed that the security services in Lebanon do not respect the duration of custody90, which makes physical torture difficult to document, even during the first court session and after the doctor’s appointment91. In this regard, Itani recalled one of the men speaking on the phone, saying “we can’t hand him over yet, there are marks on him92 ”. Moreover, the Lebanese State acknowledged in its initial report that “the perpetrators have full experience in committing acts of severity that do not result in any apparent physical effect93 ”. However, this tactic does not always work, and marks sometimes persist on the body. Doctors’ reports confirm this despite the fact that, most of the time, reports take place under the watch of investigation services, which makes the truth difficult to document94.
If the detainee is lucky and the doctors confirm he was being subjected to torture, the members of the judicial police accused of torture will be called for testimony. However, interrogators have discovered tactics to escape punishment in these cases as well. This tactic is implemented by the interrogator during the interview and is used before the courts, and consists of a prior agreement between the charged interrogators. This agreement holds that, in case they are called to court, they will submit statements defending each other and denying that any form of torture was used against the arrested. For instance, two Lebanese interrogators charged with using coercive interrogation stated under sworn testimony before the court that the confession was free from any use of force95. Unfortunately, the sworn testimony is becoming a means of escape for interrogators and a method used by perpetrators to escape punishment, instead of being a method used by courts as evidence against the perpetrators.
However, these are only the released and known tactics; there are surely many other tactics that are kept secret and remain unknown, and interrogators are getting better each day at overcoming torture investigations and prosecution. In the next section, I further discuss the factors that play an essential role in making torture a style in Lebanon.
c) Factors Influencing the Limited Judicial Decision Making
Considering the enormous number of coercive interrogations being applied as a style in Lebanon, one would think that the courts are overwhelmed with related cases. However, while there are indeed many decisions issued from Lebanese courts pointing out coercive interrogations, only one bold, unique decision issued in 2007 condemned an internal security force associate for using torture during interrogations against an Egyptian worker in 2004. Another reference shall be made in this context, which was referred to in the State Report: a verdict issued by the Criminal Court in Mount Lebanon, presided by Judge Joseph Ghamroun and Judges Khaled Hammoud and Nahida Khaddaj, who condemned the judicial officer who caused the death of a person in the Bureau of Investigation in the Anti-narcotics department as a result of beatings and torture. However, the State Report failed to add that the judicial officer was released and declared innocent by the Supreme Court96. Therefore, there has officially been one single Lebanese decision condemning a police officer for using coercive interrogation.
Many factors have played a role in the limited judicial decision making, as mentioned in a book written by a Lebanese professor and judicial police officer97. The two main factors are the fear of torture victims suing officers and the deficiency in public prosecution cases against defendants. Victims are usually afraid to sue officers because they fear later revenge and feel powerless; in addition, officials warn and threaten to harm the victims or their families. The other factor is the lack of cases presented by the public prosecution, either due to their unawareness or to their collusion. Many cases have pointed to coercive interrogations and dealt with the confessions extracted under torture (as discussed in the coming sections) without being referred to the public prosecution for investigation and prosecution98, noting that after confirming that torture occurred, or even in serious doubt, the judge refers all papers to the General Prosecution to complete the procedures and bring suit against members who have committed torture99. The Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH) established statistics in 2009 and 2010 illustrating that, in practice, investigative judges do not consider torture allegations (50% of the cases), pretend not to hear the detainee (37.5% of the cases), or even threaten that the detainee will be tortured again (12.5% of the cases).
However, few cases were referred for investigation, such as the presumptive decision issued from the First Military Investigative Judge100 and that issued from the Investigative Judge in Beqaa101. The State Report has stated “there is no official census of the number of cases in which provisions and penalties imposed on torturers were applied”102 but mentioned only the referral of the Military Investigative Judge to prosecution, which prompts the question of why it was done or mentioned in the first place. The referral was done because of the leaked video footage of Roumieh prisoners subjected to torture that was addressed by CLDH in a press release on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2015). One can only wonder whether the mobilization of social media is needed to have perpetrators prosecuted.
2) State Courts and Lebanese Judicial Interpretation
Judicial work is the most effective means to cope with human rights violations, particularly national judicial ones, due to the fact that international trial is not always admissible, and the possibility to try before national courts can be a limitation to an international review.
Lebanese courts have played an essential role in dealing with coercive interrogations mainly with regard to admissibility of confessions (b) and the discretion in sentencing term (c), but this collaboration was not effective. Before discussing these issues, it is essential to determine the court’s jurisdiction with regard to these crimes (a) since it was subject to debate.
a) Military Courts and Ordinary Courts: Overlapping Jurisdictions
In principal, military courts103 are competent to deal with lawsuits related to crimes committed against Internal Security Forces (ISF) or Public Security Forces (PSF)104 and to try these actors regardless of nationality or the type of crime committed105. However, the competence of the military courts with regard to crimes committed by or against ISF and PSF in the course of their employment has been determined in detail in legislative decree No. 110 of June 30, 1977, which stipulated that ordinary courts, rather than military courts, are competent when crimes are committed during ordinary and non-military interrogations106. Thus, ordinary criminal courts are concerned with the crime of ordinary coercive interrogation exercised within the ordinary courts, while the military courts are concerned with coercive interrogation exercised within military courts. Accordingly, the single criminal judge in Beirut, Hani Abed El-Meneem Al-Hajjar, affiliated with the ordinary criminal courts, issued the unique judgement previously mentioned for using enhanced techniques during interrogations held within ordinary criminal courts without raising the jurisdiction issue.
The State Report did not provide examples of cases applied in Lebanon and related to the jurisdiction of the Lebanese judiciary over crimes of torture, stating that there is a lack of data in this regard107. There is indeed a lack of data, and even the cases pointing out coercive interrogations never discussed the courts’ jurisdictions. The vast majority of the decisions were issued from ordinary courts, rather than military.
This distinction is highly important, not only for determining the competent court, but also because the military courts, as exceptional courts, and the prevalent practices within their structures, do not adhere to international standards and pose a direct threat to the independence of the judiciary108. Therefore, ordinary criminal courts shall be competent to review any coercive interrogation case, whether committed within ordinary or military courts.
In the next sections, I discuss how courts dealt with coercive interrogations concerning evidence (b) and discretion power (c).
b) Coerced Confessions’ Evidence in Courts
Article 15 of the Convention sets a duty for each State Party to ensure “that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings”, and article 47 CCP pointed out, in the same regard, that the confession extracted under torture shall be considered void and contrary to the basic guarantees recognized for persons deprived of liberty. However, there are contradictory applications in practice.
The Indictment Chamber considered the coerced defendants’ testimonies valid, holding that even a confession made under torture should not be void and without effect, and criminal courts shall assess its validity, especially when other evidence affirms its content109.
The Supreme Court held another view and considered, in many decisions, the confession extracted under torture as null and void, according to article 47 CCP. The Court also dismissed the case, since no other evidence existed against the defendant aside from the coerced confession110.
In contrast, CLDH, in its shadow report, referred to the case of Nehmeh el Hajj as “a blatant illustration of violation of the right of the detainee to see his confession cancelled in case of serious allegations” and considered in this case that Hajj was sentenced to the death penalty on July 9th, 2004 at Baabda tribunal, where the basis of the condemnation was simply his initial statements, which were allegedly made under torture111. However, the Supreme Court, which sentenced Hajj to death again, based its decision on other evidence, rather than just the coerced confession, such as the exact match of the defendant’s testimonies (Hajj & Ribah), which stated the exact planning, strangulation, incendiary, doping, etc. and traces found on the crime scene112.
In other cases, coerced confessions were considered void and null, but other evidence was taken into consideration113. I agree with this view and argue that it is both practical and legal. Although using coercive interrogation is certainly unlawful and shall be banned, its use against the defendant does not justify his crime. Therefore, if other evidence exists, the coerced confession shall be deemed null and void, but the perpetrator should be sentenced based on other valid evidence, rather than solely on the coerced one. On the other hand, using coercive interrogation against a perpetrator also does not justify the act of the officer who used it to extract the confession, even if it was useful and in line with the truth; therefore, his alleged acts shall be punished in accordance with Lebanese law. This analysis also underlines the ineffectiveness of coercive interrogations which are always void and null, and no crime will ever be proved or punished if no valid evidence exists. However, the previously mentioned decisions which nullified the coerced confessions remain flawed, not due to dismissing the case or reposing on other valid evidence, but because they failed to refer the papers to the public prosecution for investigation.
In other cases, the Supreme Court refused to assess the validity of the investigations, citing the ‘defects correction’ theory, which considers that no one can evoke the validity of the investigations before the Supreme Court or the Criminal Court after the Indictment Chamber’s decision has become irrevocable, since this decision erases all investigation defects, including coercive interrogations114. This consideration is accepting, confirming, and ratifying the abnormal. The Lebanese jurisprudence is indeed stable as to the effect of the Indictment Chamber’s decision to erase all investigations’ defects, but this consideration was never meant to be applied to coercive interrogations, but rather to procedural material defects such as failure to implement the public prosecutor’s signal to address the Syrian Interpol115, mentioning facts not included in the investigations to prove ownership of the fulminant house116, or rejecting a request to hear a witness117. However, coercive interrogations are not simple procedural material flaws; they are serious crimes violating human rights, and the Supreme Court’s main role is to interpret the law properly and ensure that it is not violated by the lowest courts and not affirming a lowest court’s defected decision. Applying a recognized rule related to material procedural defects to facts related to human rights violations is improper and wrong, and both the Supreme Court and Criminal Court shall always assess whether interrogations were coerced and take the appropriate measures.
c) Judge’s Discretion to Reduce a Criminal Sentence
At this stage, it is assumed that coercive interrogations were investigated, conditions of article 401 CC were fulfilled, and the judge condemned the perpetrator and shall apply the proper penalty. The proper penalty is the one proposed in article 401 CC according to the consequences. However, the judge has the ability to alter that specific sentence at his or her discretion for certain reasons such as good behavior, non-precedents, age, social situation, etc.118. In this regard, Judge Al Hajjar issued a verdict on March 8th, 2007 condemning a public officer for using coercive techniques during interrogations against an Egyptian worker according to the old article 401 CC119, with a one year imprisonment based on the doctor’s report, which stated that the physical harm resulted from continuous violence and severe beatings at different time points. The doctor further confirmed that the method used was ‘Al Farrouj’, but the Judge substituted the imprisonment with a fine of 200 dollars and ordered him to pay a compensation to the victim of 400 dollars120. The Appeal Court upheld the condemnation on March 14th, 2013, but set aside the penalty and substituted the criminal sentence with a fine of 266 dollars.
Legally speaking, the law was not violated, since article 254 CC grants the judge the ability to completely exchange a misdemeanor’s penalty with a fine. Realistically speaking, however, coercive interrogations, especially harsh and continuous ones, as in this case, shall never be punished with a mere fine, and the judge’s ability to reduce the criminal sentence shall be strictly and wisely used in this matter. Despite the outcome, this judgement remains significant, since it recognized the use of coercive techniques explicitly used during interrogations, as well as the methods used, such as beatings and ‘Al – Farrouj’, and took a step no one else dared to.
CHAPTER TWO: ATTEMPTS AND PROPOSALS TO ALIGN LEBANESE LAW WITH LEBANON’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Having a good law is an important step in making it respectable, but enforcing it is best for its effectiveness. While examining the practice of coercive interrogations in Lebanon, an immense gap was revealed between the law and the practice, and although the definition of torture is in line with the Convention, state officials still use harsh techniques. Therefore, relevant measures must be taken.
This section focuses on the various attempts in Lebanon to combat the use of coercive interrogations, while assessing the role of each in preventing them (I) and the future prospects toward the reform of interrogation practice in Lebanon (II).
I. Various Attempts in Many Fields
After many years of using coercive interrogation, many attempts were made to prevent it, including modifying the law (A), highlighting the violations via social media (B), and the establishment of special committees to follow up on violations (C). Although these attempts played an effective role in preventing coercive interrogations, they were not enough, and they failed to entirely prevent torture for various reasons, as discussed in detail below.
A. The New Modification of the Law in 2017
The Lebanese Parliament passed law number (65) on September 19th, 2017, criminalizing torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, which came into effect on October 26th, 2017 after being published in the official gazette. This was not a simple step, but rather a highly important one, since various attempts were made through the years by national and international human rights organizations, and much pressure was put on Lebanese authorities before the law was passed, to address the alleged crimes and to fully comply with the Convention.
This law was described as a positive step for criminalizing extracting confession through violence, broadening the definition of torture, absolutely prohibiting torture, imposing stricter sentences, and establishing procedures for investigating torture121. However, this law was not enough and was not well implemented, since complaints of torture leading to death in custody were raised, after its entry into force, against the Lebanese Armed Forces. Further, despite clear evidence of torture, military courts failed to ensure accountability122. In this regard, Sahar Mansour, Amnesty International’s Lebanon researcher, stated that “without proper implementation of the law, Lebanon’s efforts to combat torture are reduced to a mere window-dressing exercise leaving many still at risk of torture and other ill-treatment”123. Among other things, it was argued that the law criminalized torture only in specific situations, failed to comply with the proposed draft124 concerning the officer’s immunity for obtaining prior authorization before prosecuting him125, introduced a statute of limitation for prosecuting torture126 which violated the CAT recommendations127, lacked clear clauses banning the military court from looking into allegations of torture, and did not cover the gaps related to the suspects’ procedural rights at the primary interrogation level.
Despite all of the revealed gaps, as discussed previously in this paper128, this new law is a new tool for combatting torture, but impunity for torture is widespread in Lebanon. Therefore, the real test will be whether prosecutors use it to bring justice for victims, and although modifying the law was an incomplete step, it was a positive one and a requirement to prevent torture that needs to be supplemented with other measures.
B. Interactive Social Media Intervention to Highlight Violations
Another attempt to prevent torture was the interactive intervention of social media. This intervention took many forms. Many news articles presented cases of torture, calls for Lebanese authorities to take specific steps, and critical thinking questions as to the situation in Lebanon. For instance, many articles were published by news websites129 and Human Rights Watch news release130, highlighting methods used, as well as cases and testimonies of victims. This practice of torture was also reported in annual reports of human rights institutions like Alef131, Alkarama132, CLDH133 and Amnesty International134. Further, public videos135 and press releases136 reported records of human rights violations, and during reporting periods, CLDH was active daily on several social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram137.
However, this intervention has played an insignificant role in limited cases, like the previously mentioned case of leaked video footage of Roumieh prisoners, which led to the Military Investigative Judge’s referral after a press release138. Even with the clear videos and the referral, State Prosecutor Samir Hammoud stated that investigations revealed that the crime was “motivated by personal reasons and does not, in any way, represent a systematic security practice or policing methodology”, excluding the use of these documented harsh techniques for interrogation purposes. An additional example of the role of social media intervention is the civil case filed by Itani against the people who were accused of torturing him, which was referred from the military courts to the ordinary courts after important social media intervention139. Social media has also played a negative role in some cases and was recently used in Itani’s case as a form of psychological torture, which ruined his reputation as a Lebanese artist in effort to force him to confess to a crime he did not commit140.
Despite the great intervention of social media for a constant time, especially in documenting torture cases, it has certainly failed to highlight all violations, since interrogators are becoming experts in hiding traces and dealing with victims under the lights. It was also ineffective in combating torture in Lebanon, since no decrease in coercive interrogation cases was reported since. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that it played a major role in highlighting and recognizing the use of coercive interrogation, even in few cases compared to reality, and gave the public an idea of how interrogations are being used and how bad they are141. This has acted as a wakeup call for future officers to not use the same process and to make the interrogation room a better, safer, and more effective place for justice.
C. Establishment of Special Committees to Follow Up on Violations
Another attempt was the establishment of special committees to follow up on violations. The ISF, a Lebanese law enforcement agency, has committed to taking measures to prevent torture. It established a human rights department in 2008142 with the aim to spread human rights within the office while organizing trainings, workshops, and education programs for police officers, to instruct them on how to apply interrogations effectively and to avoid using harsh techniques, as well as to create a special committee to follow up on torture during interrogations and in prisons. This special committee was established in 2014143 within the ISF department with the aim to reduce acts of torture and to punish perpetrators. Accordingly, when a torture victim is identified, a report is sent to the committee, which is assigned to follow up on the allegation. However, although 11 years have passed since the creation of the department, it is hardly working due to the lack of potential (such as equipment, mechanisms, and offices)144. It has also been noted that the ISF committee failed to adopt a victim-friendly complaint mechanism, is unwilling to transparently report on followed cases, and is unable to react to pervasive torture145. In addition, the ISF failed to properly investigate and report cases of torture due to many factors, such as the boundaries caused by political intervention, limitations, length of trials, the difficulty to prove torture traces, and the collusion of police officers to escape prosecution. On the other hand, the ISF failed to demonstrate commitment and cooperation when they rejected a training organized by Ajem and UNDP for the committee members, the goal of which was to stop using torture as a tool to extract confessions and to gain a better understanding of the law and its implementation146. Moreover, other law enforcement agencies that are mainly responsible for the acts of torture failed to take measures and establish committees to prevent this torture, such as the Lebanese army. All of these reasons demonstrate the failure of the attempt to combat torture.
Another committee was established in 2016 as a national preventive mechanism for the prevention of torture147. This committee will have the authority to conduct regular unexpected visits to places of detention, issue recommendations for the improvement of detainees’ treatment, and investigate the use of torture. This establishment was welcomed by many and classified as a positive step toward advancing human rights and eradicating the use of torture in Lebanon, since it puts Lebanon in compliance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention, which was ratified on December 22nd, 2008 and is an independent National Human Rights Institution (NHRI)148. However, Lebanon has failed to complete the selection process for the appointment of the members of the NHRI, which is responsible for appointing the National Committee, as no independent budget has been allocated and experts believe that the independent budget will be discussed only after the appointment of a new government149. Alef further stated that a lack of political will to prevent torture in Lebanon is highlighted in the countless delays and government inaction150. Moreover, regarding the 10 appointed members, Alkarama stated that the selection process lacked transparency, since the full list of candidates and their resumes were never made public, despite repeated requests from civil society organizations151.
This establishment of NHRI would have been highly effective in combatting torture if the Lebanese government were genuinely ready to cooperate. Unenforced laws clearly illustrate Lebanon’s failure to cooperate, and the committee’s work will be a difficult task due to political interference and pressures, not to mention the appointment of the members by political parties. I argue that this eagerness to establish the National Committee does not demonstrate any willingness to cooperate and was simply due to the upcoming appearance before the CAT.
II. Future Prospects Toward the Reform of Interrogation Practices
In light of the recent high-profile wrongful practice and the failure of many attempts to combat torture in Lebanon, the time is ripe for a true collaborative effort toward the reform of interrogation practices in Lebanon. This section discusses proposals extracted from leading authorities (A), those made by NGOs, academics, and practitioners (B), and others made from a comparative study in States dealing with the same issues (C). This section is limited to proposals made with regard to law enforcement mechanisms, and not laws, since a deep study of the current laws was already tackled in detail in the previous sections.
A. Proposals Extracted from Leading Authorities
Lebanon has ratified many treaties to protect the rights of people from acts of torture152. These treaties bind Lebanon and provide mechanisms for their application, as well as establish committees to monitor whether the obligations they institute are respected to ensure best enforcement. This part is limited to proposals extracted from the Convention, since all other ratified treaties, such as ACHPR and ICCPR, provide the same mechanisms.
1) Mechanisms Established by Treaties
The following principal recommendations are adopted by the Convention:
In addition to the reports State Parties are required to submit to the CAT on the measures they are taking to implement the commitments assumed under the Convention, article 20 of the Convention empowers the CAT to inquire into allegations of the systematic practice of torture in State Parties, and consequently to designate one or more of its members to carry out the confidential inquiry. Indeed, a special inquiry in Lebanon was conducted in accordance with article 20 of the Convention and began in May 2012, ending in November 2013. Information was gathered from authorities, NGOs, and victims on the specific case in Lebanon, and, at the end of the inquiry, the committee reached many conclusions. They urged Lebanon to implement specific recommendations (like reaffirming the absolute prohibition on torture, completing the process of establishing the NHRI, submitting the initial report, reestablishing the full authority of the State in Roumieh Prison B building, etc.), and most of the urged recommendations were taken into consideration by Lebanon (like amending the law), even if not actually effective. They were not left unnoticed, which is a positive step, even if not a complete one, which illustrates its importance in taking measures to prevent torture. In addition, I believe this measure will be effective in Lebanon, since independent bodies (free from limitations and political pressure) are the ones needed for investigating torture in Lebanon, as Lebanon is highly concerned about its reputation before the international community. This concern is clear from the reply of Lebanon to the committee’s findings and conclusions on January 29th, 2014, in which Lebanon tried to negate the use of coercive interrogations in Lebanese detention centers. Lebanon illustrated a good image of Lebanese practice with regard to torture, despite all of the information gathered by the committee, by displaying its astonishment at the committee’s conclusions and considering that the information provided by Lebanese authorities was treated with skepticism, while the information of NGOs and civil society was accepted as trustworthy, and that the conclusions were made based on statements and testimonies that had not been yet subjected to any close scientific or legal examination153. This concern is also clear from the State Report and the attempt to establish the NHRI previously discussed154, in which Lebanon was also negating all use of coercive interrogations to maintain a neat image before the international community. Therefore, an independent inquiry conducted by CAT members would make Lebanon aware of its exposition before the international community and may be a good way to decrease torture and to take measures to prevent it as it did in 2013.
Another alternative is the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, the competence of whom extends to all member States of the UN155 and who is appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to study cases of violation or the situation in certain countries and make pertinent recommendations156. On the basis of individual information and government and non-government sources, the Special Rapporteur sends communications to governments, adopts the urgent action procedure in certain cases, and may visit the country to gather information on cases within his province and find suitable measures to avoid a repetition and to effect improvements with the agreement of the government concerned157. I think this Special Rapporteur’s appointment would be effective in Lebanon and an excellent means to help combat torture, since this person specifically observes the situation in Lebanon and makes recommendations tailored to the needs of Lebanon, rather than general recommendations suited for every country, like CAT recommendations on the State Report (which are discussed next), which were general and not tailored to Lebanon’s specific situation.
2) Proposals Made by the Committee against Torture
On May 8th, 2017, the CAT adopted concluding observations, including recommendations based on the State Report. Unfortunately, the recommendations were not tailored to the specific Lebanese situation like the recommendations given by the committee that conducted the special inquiry in 2012-13, where specific problems in specific detention centers and victim cases were mentioned. The recommendations of the CAT were essentially calling Lebanon to ensure the absolute prohibition of torture, ensure that all instances of torture are investigated and that the perpetrators are prosecuted and punished if found guilty, ensure that no one is held in secret detention, complete the selection of the members of the NHRI, ensure that measures are taken to guarantee that coerced confessions or statements are inadmissible both in law and in practice, etc.158, but it did not provide measures and genuine recommendations as to how to ensure all of the above. This could include examples of measures to ensure all instances are investigated in a situation in which political pressure and chaos exist or how to complete the selection of the members in the presence of the challenges and conflicts of interest faced by Lebanon, especially since the problem in Lebanon is related to practice, rather than just to laws. Moreover, it is has always been obvious that Lebanon shall ensure all of these measures, but what was expected from the CAT is providing more personalized keys for Lebanon’s situation for a more effective outcome.
However, among all presented recommendations, a good one was calling for video and audio recording of the interrogations and holding such recordings in a secure facility available to investigators, detainees, and lawyers159. This alternative may prevent torture in specific places in which video and audio recordings exist, but it may not entirely avoid torture that could still occur in secret detention centers and may not prevent the interrogators from finding other ways to prevent being captured, such as hiding tapes and other forms of evidence, especially since these are experienced and expert officials.
B. Proposals Made by NGOs, Academics, and Practitioners
In a coalition between several NGOs160, a report containing several recommendations was submitted to the CAT in the context of the State Report161. The recommendations were similar to the ones presented by the CAT (ensuring laws are amended to stay in line with Lebanon’s international obligations, ensuring the establishment of an independent mechanism and institutions to ensure protection of victims, ensuring training is provided for law enforcement officials on the prohibition of torture, etc.), and the same notes are therefore conferred. All of the recommendations presented are required to prevent torture, but they are not enough and are not specifically tailored to Lebanon.
One alternative worth discussing was recently presented by Professor Eid, in which she called for a judicial body independent of the prosecution judiciary (containing public prosecutions), the examining judiciary (containing investigative judges), and the judgement judiciary, that is closer to the examining judiciary’s role (examining, investigating, and interrogating) and aims exclusively to monitor detainees’ conditions in a continuous manner, at least twice a week. This body would be granted the power to visit places of detention or to call up anyone to inspect his or her situation, and if any doubt is raised with regard to being subjected to torture, the judge would directly appoint a doctor and transfer the papers to the examining judiciary and would bring suit against perpetrators162. In this way, torture cases would not depend on the Public Prosecutor’s decision to initiate the public prosecution. Although this proposal is a suitable alternative and is perfectly tailored to Lebanon’s situation, it would currently be difficult to implement, as it requires a significant number of judges to take part in the new suggested judicial body. This would be rather difficult to provide without delaying justice due to the low number of judges compared to the large number of suits pending into courts. This large number of pending cases may have been the reason for previously preventing the Appeals Court Prosecutor, the Public Financial Prosecutor, the Investigative Judge, and the Single Criminal Judge from examining the situation of persons held in detention centers and prisons in their respective areas of jurisdiction once a month, according to article 402 CPC, and though once a month is not enough to prevent torture, it would have played a positive role in doing so. Therefore, establishing an independent judicial body would be a positive step in preventing torture, but it is currently difficult to implement due to the previously mentioned reasons. However, working towards implementing this measure by organizing magistrate contests more often to appoint and train more Lebanese judges would be a good and effective way to prevent torture in the future by monitoring future inflicted acts and controlling the situation in Lebanon.
Nevertheless, not many proposals have been made regarding the current situation in Lebanon, since all previous proposals given by activists were seeking the amendment of the law to ensure that coercive interrogation is considered an independent offense under Lebanese law and that its definition is in line with the Convention. Now, after the law was amended in 2017 to answer most of the recommendations and resulted in no major changes, new proposals shall be made according to the new situation (the situation of a State with acceptable laws but poor practice), and proposals made on a comparative study are a useful alternative.
C. Proposals Based on Comparative Study
The situation in Kyrgyzstan is similar to the situation in Lebanon, since numerous cases of torture are documented in local newspapers and international human rights organizations163, torture and ill-treatment had been historically pervasive in the law enforcement sector according to the UN Special Rapporteur on torture164, complaint procedures in places of detention “are largely ineffective, non-independent and futile”, and fear of reprisals prevents their use as confirmed by the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture165. Some positive developments have been reported, such as the independent monitoring of places of detention carried out by the Ombudsman’s office with the cooperation of NGOs and civil society organizations whose work has built an excellent foundation for the NPM, a national institution, but the latter also lacks resources. However, these positive developments were not enough to end torture, and the government was called to take action to combat impunity and make procedural safeguards effective for all detainees. Applying the same in Lebanon, the NHRI will not be enough to end torture, since its impact is demonstrated to be less significant than expected in practice if not accompanied by other measures.
In Georgia, like in Lebanon, although the law has been strengthened, very few prosecutions have been brought166, and only a handful of cases have reached courts. After Georgia’s return to democracy, torture was reduced with the help of the NHRI through a combination of measures like reporting and monitoring, promoting anti-torture law and treaty ratification, and educating officials and the public. This coordinated and systematic approach helped reduce torture, where the work of NHRI was primarily responsive and complaint-driven167. Significant progress was achieved when the Public Defender’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior combined forces to reform the police service and monitor police detention through the creation of special detention centers that were not under the control of the arresting police authority, where they conduct independent investigations and could decide whether to pass a case to the Prosecutor’s Office168. However, this did not prevent torture, since even when perpetrators were tried and found guilty, sentences throughout the period have been generally light169. This leads back to the unique decision issued by Judge Al Hajjar and the proposal made by Eid. If Eid’s proposal is integrated, it would not be enough to prevent torture, according to the similar case study in Georgia. It would facilitate bringing cases before the courts, but it would not combat torture, since sentences would be light, just like Al-Hajjar’s unique judgement. This highlights the ineffectiveness of this mechanism alone.
In Nepalese, NGO Advocacy Forum developed an anti-torture project that was aimed at monitoring detention centers, documenting torture, advising detainees, preparing victims’ applications, and initiating legal proceedings on behalf of the torture victims. An evaluation conducted in this regard concluded that “there is compelling evidence to suggest that the intervention is having a substantial and, most unusually, a measurable impact on reducing torture”170. However, political issues have led to an upturn in torture and have affected such programs. The same applies to the situation in Lebanon in which politics interfere, and, due to the conflict of interests, the work of such institutions will be affected, and the mechanisms will fail to effectively apply.
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
Figure 5 Model of Factors Affecting the Incidence of Torture
Finally, in Ukraine, a nation governed by politics, a cooperation mechanism was integrated and turned out to be effective. The statistics of visits in the framework of the NPM reveal that, since its inception, the percentage of custodial visits has remained low and has not exceeded 5% of the total. Therefore, in addition to NPMs, alternative mechanisms for visiting detention centers have been created to operate in controlling and combatting torture, such as several NGOs, ministries, and departments, which proved to be a significant step towards overcoming torture in places of detention171. This diversity in activists has prevented political interference, since many sources of information gathering exist which make it hard for politics to control and affect monitoring, and, if they do, they will not affect the work of each organization due to the high collaboration and the large numbers of contributors.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this paper and after discussing the permissibility of coercive interrogation in the Chapter I, I have demonstrated that, although the use of coercive interrogation in Lebanon violates international and national law, state officials still use this technique. In Chapter 2, I have presented all of the failed attempts to resolve the situation and explained why they did not work, as well as presented proposals that were made in this regard, while explaining why some work in Lebanon, while others do not.
Good laws are necessary but not sufficient. The enforcement of coercive interrogation laws in Lebanon (law 65 criminalizing specifically coercive interrogations and law 62 establishing the NHRI) is faced with many challenges worth considering. To solve the situation in Lebanon, we shall learn from previous cases and avoid taking ineffective measures. This study has led to a very clear conclusion on which mechanisms are most effective for preventing torture in Lebanon: no single measure alone is sufficient to prevent torture. To bring concrete changes, an array of measures need to be implemented in combination with one another. I offer some conclusions with the hope that practitioners at all levels find them useful when they plan future work:
1- Legal measure is a precondition for improved practice but is not enough to prevent torture. At this moment, laws are sufficient to prevent torture, and Lebanese authorities shall work on implementing them properly.
2- Improve and standardize data collection: this paper has presented data recorded from both NGOs and newspapers but does not completely reflect the whole situation. For the sake of credibility and to put great pressure on Lebanese authorities, several institutions shall be involved, such as human rights institutions and relevant civil society organizations, because they are independent and valuable sources of information and are uncompromising advocates of work for the same end as national preventive mechanisms. However, it will be impossible to record completely comparable torture-related data across Lebanon if the government does not have a genuine commitment to eradicate torture.
3- Improve the international monitoring mechanisms and apply important international pressure by visiting places of detention and imprisonment to inspect and raise awareness of the specific Lebanese situation and the places where torture is mostly being applied, as well as to give effective recommendations tailored to the Lebanese situation, by engaging in specific inquiries like the one engaged in 2013-14 by the Committee according to article 20 of the Convention and by appointing UN special rapporteurs to identify cases and causes of torture.
4- Monitoring places where torture is most likely to occur, not just by visiting the place twice a week but by establishing several independent and permanent committees in the detention centers, the essential work of which will be to ensure a safeguard for detainees and suspects in the initial hours or days after arrest, as well as to receive related complaints, request forensic doctors for examination, and refer the papers for the judicial.
5- Training of prosecutors and judges to effectively handle torture cases and apply appropriate sentences, of police to comply with detention safeguards and to provide awareness of the ineffectiveness of torture to extract confessions and to offer him with alternatives to effectively find the truth, and of doctors to identify signs of torture. For effective training outcomes, this shall consist of continuous tests, follow-ups, rewards, or prosecutions when deserved.
6- Conducting continuous analyses for statistics of torture cases and preventing measures’ outcomes to track the effective ones for better future plans.
Incorporating all of these measures and having this cooperation altogether in the Lebanese system is not an easy and immediate task, and years of struggles and patience will be necessary to make such a strategy effective, but with the right measures and appropriate cooperation of international organizations, national committees and organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations, academics, and practitioners, the right path will be taken towards a better Lebanon.
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10. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Julian E. Mendez, Mission to Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/61/Add.2,21 (February 2012).
11. UN Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Convention, UN Doc. A/59/324 (2004).
12. UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of Visit to Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. CAT/OP/KGZ/1 (February 28, 2014).
13. United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, Press Release ORG 1469 (July 3, 2006).
14. UNVFVT Board of Trustees, Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies (The UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, 2011).
Interviews
Unpublished Interview by Rindala Zgheib with C.K., a Lebanese public officer, Jounieh, 60 minutes, October 29, 2018.
Databases
1. Alef, Annual Report 2018 (Alef, April 2019).
2. Alef, the Right to Fair Trial in Lebanon: A Position Paper on Exceptional Courts (Alef, 2018).
3. Alkarama, Annual Report 2018 (Alkarama Foundation, April 2019).
4. Alkarama, Lebanon: Parliament Approves Law Instituting a National Human Rights Institution and a National Preventive Mechanism Against Torture (Alkarama, 2016).
5. Alkarama, Torture in Lebanon: Time to Break the Pattern (Alkarama for HRs, 2009).
6. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1995 (Amnesty, 1995).
7. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998 (Amnesty, 1998).
8. Amnesty International, Annual Reports (1995-2017),
9. Amnesty, Lebanon has a New Anti-Torture Law, June 26, 2018.
10. Bryan Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd ed. 2001).
11. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 ( U.S. Department of State).
12. CLDH, Activities Report (CLDH, 2016).
13. CLDH, Arbitrary Detention and Torture in Lebanon (Arab HR Fund, 2013).
14. CLDH, Shadow Report Submission to the CAT in Relation to its Examination of the Initial Report of Lebanon (CLDH, 2016).
15. CLDH, Victims of Torture from Syria: Staying in Lebanon and Suffering Repeated Traumatizing Experiences (CLDH, 2016).
16. CLDH, Women Behind Bars, Arbitrary Detention and Torture Lebanon (2015).
17. Dignity Debased: Forced Anal Examinations in Homosexuality Prosecutions, Human Rights watch news release, July 12 2016.
18. Fanack, New Lebanese Law against Torture a Good but Incomplete Step, December 22, 2017.
19. Haifaa Zaiter, Unbelievable Torture in Lebanon (Raseef 22, 2017).
20. Lebanese Official Gazette, Positive Reasons for Proposed New Law (50 Official Gazette, 2017).
21. Lebanon Joint Shadow Report: Report Submitted to the CAT in the Context of the Initial Review of Lebanon 14 (March 20, 2017).
22. Lebanon: Exonerated Actor Details Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, July 15, 2018.
23. Lebanon: Investigate Army Beatings, Death in Custody, Human Rights Watch news release, July 17, 2013.
24. Lebanon: New Law a Step to End Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, May 10, 2007.
25. Lebanon: Police Torturing Vulnerable People, Human Rights Watch news release, June 26, 2013.
26. Lebanon: Refer Torture Case to Civilian Court, Amnesty news release, April 12, 2019.
27. Lebanon: Refer Torture Case to Civilian Court, Human Rights Watch news release, April 12, 2019.
28. Lebanon: Syria Refugee’s Account of Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, December 21, 2016.
29. Sahar Mandour, Lebanon: Failure to Implement Anti-Torture Law One Year On (Amnesty International, October 25 2018).
30. Samira Alya, Collection of the Lebanese Supreme Decisions (University Foundation for Studies and Publishing, 1970).
31. SOLIDA, the Ministry of Defense Detention Center: A Major Obstacle to the Prevention of Torture. Forgotten Victims, Unpunished Executioners (CLDH, 2006).
32. Viviane Akiki, Torture in Lebanon: Normal and Widespread Use (IM Lebanon, December 23, 2016).
Books and Other Independent Publications
1. Abed El Wahhab Houmad, Detailed Commentary on Criminal Code (The New Printing Press: Damascus, 1990).
2. Ahmad Srour, Criminal Procedural Law – General Part (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya, 1974).
3. Amos N. Guiorra, Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation (Oxford University Press 2008).
4. Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against: A critique of Utilitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
5. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press: 1978).
6. Didier Rouget, Preventing Torture: International and Regional Mechanisms to Combat Torture (apt, 2000).
7. Donna el Hindi, Guilty until Proven Innocent – Report on the Causes of Arbitrary Arrest, Lengthy Pre-Trial Detention and Long Delays in Trials (Alef, 2013).
8. Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers, 2001).
9. Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Psychological Evidence of Torture: A practical Guide to the Istanbul Protocol for Psychologists (International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, 2004).
10. James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (McGrawHill, 1993).
11. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (1 Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005).
12. Mahmoud Hesni, Explaining Criminal Law - General Part (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya for Publishing and Distribution, 2016).
13. Manfred Nowak & Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A commentary (Oxford University Press, 2008).
14. Marcy S. Strauss, Torture (Loyola – LA Public Law Research Paper, 2003).
15. Mhammad-Zaki Abou Amer , Criminal Law, General Part (Al Dar Al Jamiiya, 1991).
16. Omar Al Housayni, Torturing the Accused to Confess (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya for Publishing and Distribution, 1994).
17. OSCE, National Preventive Mechanism against Torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine: Efficiency Assessment (Kharkiv Institute for Social Research, 2018).
18. Petur Hauksson, Psychological Evidence of Torture (CPT, Council of Europe, 2003).
19. Richard Carver & Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (Liverpool University Press, 2016).
20. Samir Alya, the Mediator in Explaining Criminal Law (University Foundation for Studies: Publishing and Distribution, 2010).
21. Thomas Iyan McLeod, Kelsen’s Hierarchy of Norms, in Legal Theory, Macmillan Law Masters (Palgrave London, 1999).
22. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in War and Moral Responsibility: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (Princeton University Press, 1974).
23. Toufic el Hajj, Torture and Abuse in Light of National and International Law (Modern Book Foundation, 2016).
Articles and Contributions to Edited Works
1. Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible (13 Geo Mason L. REV. 135, 2004).
2. Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What is Really Wrong with Torture? (6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 241, 2008).
3. Andreas Zimmermann, the Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and the Issue of Proportionality (11 Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law 99, 2007).
4. APT, Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why we must Say No to Torture, always (APT 2007).
5. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position (110 Harv L Rev. 815, 1997).
6. David S. Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment (29 Law & Ineq. 343, 2011).
7. David S. Weissbrodt, Review of Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, the United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention (5 Interights Bulletin 21, 1988).
8. Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights (6 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 89, 2001).
9. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? (104 MICH. L. REV. 671, 2006).
10. Henry Shue, Torture (7 Philosophy. & pub. Aff. 124, 1978).
11. Hernan Reyes, The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture (89 International Review of the Red Cross 591, 2007)
12. John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture be an Option? (63 U. Pitt. L. REV. 743, 2002).
13. Joshuwa A. Decker, Is the United States Bound by the Customary International Law of Torture? A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on Terror (Chicago Journal of International Law 803, 2006).
14. Kidus Meskele, Interpretation of Article One of the Convention in Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies ( 5 Beijing Law Review 49 , 2014) .
15. Loran F. Nordgren, Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell & George Loewenstein, What Constitutes Torture? Psychological Impediments to an Objective Evaluation of Enhanced Interrogation Tactics (22 Psychological Science 689, 2011).
16. Mandira Sharma, Ingrid Massagé and Kathryn McDonald, Lawyers’ Intervention at Pretrial Stage Helps to Prevent Torture, Illegal Detention and Other Human Rights Violations: Experiences of Advocacy Forum – Nepal (4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 253, 2012).
17. Maria F. Blanc, Moral Permissibility and Legitimacy of the Use of Coercive Interrogations: Implications for the Intelligence Professional, Participating Health-Care Professionals, and Society (1 International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 122, 2010).
18. Mordechai Kremntizer, the Landau Commission Report: Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the “Needs” of the Security Service? (23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 1989).
19. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience (88 Minnesota L. REV. 1481, 2004).
20. Richard Carver, Central and Eastern Europe: the Ombudsman as Agent of International Law in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions ( 13 Human Rights Law 615, 2013).
21. Rita Eid, Torture Criminalization between International Law’s Aspirations and Lebanese Law’s Hesitation (Al Adel 29, 2017).
22. Seith F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War of Terror (6 Journal of Constitutional Law 278, 2003).
[...]
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR, art. 5, December 10, 1948 (UDHR hereinafter); The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR, art. 7, December 19, 1976 (ICCPR hereinafter); United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNCAT, June 26, 2018 (the Convention hereinafter); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ICERD, art. 5, January 4, 1969; Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, DEVW, art. 3, December 20, 1993; Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC, art. 37, September 2, 1990; Arab Charter on Human Rights, ACHR, art. 4, September 10, 1994; African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, ACHPR, art. 5, October 21, 1981.
2 Bryan Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd ed. 2001).
3 See id.
4 Amos N. Guiorra, Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation 86 (Oxford University Press 2008); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? 673 (104 MICH L. REV. 671, 2006).
5 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at 25 (1978).
6 Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights 94-97 (6 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 89, 2001) .
7 Loran F. Nordgren, Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell & George Loewenstein, What Constitutes Torture? Psychological Impediments to an Objective Evaluation of Enhanced Interrogation Tactics 694 (22 Psychological Science 689, 2011).
8 The Convention, supra, art.16 (“Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I”).
9 Among those practitioners are Judges, trainee Judges, lawyers, law students and Lebanese citizens.
10 APT, Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why we must Say No to Torture, always 2 (APT, 2007).
11 UDHR, supra, art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”).
12 ICCPR, supra, art. 7 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”).
13 The Convention, supra, art.1.
14 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position 832 (110 Harv L Rev. 815, 1997); Joshuwa A. Decker, Is the United States Bound by the Customary International Law of Torture? A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on Terror 821 (Chicago Journal of International Law 803, 2006); Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law 29 (Transnational Publishers, 2001).
15 The Convention, supra, art. 2 (2).
16 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties, ¶ 5, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (January 24, 2008).
17 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 315-19 (1 Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005); Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in War and Moral Responsibility: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader 17 (Princeton University Press, 1974), (“in standard cases where A sacrifices or harms B to save C, A can justify his conduct to B, but in the case of torture, no such justification is possible”); James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy 128 (McGrawHill, 1993), (“act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”).
18 Maria F. Blanc, Moral Permissibility and Legitimacy of the Use of Coercive Interrogations: Implications for the Intelligence Professional, Participating Health-Care Professionals, and Society 126 (1 International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 122, 2010).
19 Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 677.
20 APT, supra, at 7.
21 Id., at 9.
22 Id., at 8
23 Mathew Brzezinski, Bust and Boom: Six Years Before the September 11 Attacks, Philippine Police took Down on al Qaeda Cell That Had Been Plotting, Among Other Things, to Fly Explosives-Laden Planes into the Pentagon-and Possibly Some Skyscrapers, Wash Post, December 30, 2001, at W09.
24 Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience 1508-09 (88 Minnesota L. REV. 1481, 2004); Seith F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War of Terror, 321 (6 Journal of Constitutional Law 278, 2003).
25 Mordechai Kremntizer, the Landau Commission Report: Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the “Needs” of the Security Service? 261-62 (23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 1989).
26 Posner & Vermeule, supra, 689.
27 Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible 144 (13 Geo Mason L. REV. 135, 2004).
28 Thesis paper, at 10.
29 Marcy S. Strauss, Torture 227 (Loyola – LA Public Law Research Paper, 2003).
30 Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 677.
31 Id., at 674.
32 Henry Shue, Torture 127 (7 Philosophy. & pub. Aff. 124, 1978).
33 Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 678.
34 Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against: A critique of Utilitarianism 98 (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
35 John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture be an Option? 761-62 (63 U. Pitt. L. REV. 743, 2002).
36 Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 10 (Harvard University Press: 1978).
37 Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What is Really Wrong with Torture? 246-7 (6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 241, 2008).
38 Blanc, supra, at 129-30.
39 Guiorra, supra, at 86.
40 The Convention, supra, art.2 (1).
41 Thomas Iyan McLeod, Kelsen’s Hierarchy of Norms, in Legal Theory, Macmillan Law Masters 68 (Palgrave London, 1999) (Kelsen's pure theory of law presents law as a hierarchy of norms, with each norm either validating, or being validated by, the norm which succeeds or precedes it within the hierarchy).
42 Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, 90 CCP § 1 art.2 (6 October 1983).
43 The Convention, supra, art. 2 “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”.
44 Art. 401 CC was amended by the Act No 65 of 20 October 2017. It provided “anyone who inflicts violent practices not permitted by the law against another person with the intention to extract a confession of a crime or information related to it will be imprisoned from three months to three years. If the violent practices have led to sickness or caused wounds, the minimum period of imprisonment is one year”).
45 Samir Alya, the Mediator in Explaining Criminal Law 249 (University Foundation for Studies: Publishing and Distribution, 2010).
46 CLDH, Women Behind Bars, Arbitrary Detention and Torture Lebanon 21 (2015), Available at http://www.rightsobserver.org/files/Arbitrary_detention_and_torture_EN_pages.pdf.
47 Lebanon: Exonerated Actor Details Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, July 15, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/lebanon-exonerated-actor-details-torture.
48 Hernan Reyes, The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture 599 (89 International Review of the Red Cross 591, 2007); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Psychological Evidence of Torture: A practical Guide to the Istanbul Protocol for Psychologists 16-26 (International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, 2004); Petur Hauksson, Psychological Evidence of Torture 91 (CPT, Council of Europe, 2003).
49 UN Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Convention ¶ 45, UN Doc. A/59/324 (2004).
50 CAT, Report: Activities of the Committee under Art. 20 of the Convention ¶ 29-31, UN Doc. A/69/44 (2013-4).
51 G.R.B. v. Sweden, CAT Communication No 83/1997, UN Doc. A/53/44 (1998), “fear of persecution by the act of Sendeero Luminso is not attributable to public official under the meaning of art. 1 since the latter has only de facto control which does not enjoy the support of Peruvian government”; Sadik Shek Elmi v. Australia, CAT Communication No 120/1998, UN Doc. CAT/C/ 22/D/120/1998 (1998); H.M.H.I V. v. Australia, CAT Communication No 177/2001, UN Doc. CAT/C/28/D/177/2001 (2002).
52 Andreas Zimmermann, the Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and the Issue of Proportionality 110 (11 Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law 99, 2007).
53 Rita Eid, Torture Criminalization between International Law’s Aspirations and Lebanese Law’s Hesitation 36 (Al Adel 29, 2017).
54 Manfred Nowak & Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A commentary 75 (Oxford University Press, 2008); David S. Weissbrodt, Review of Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, the United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention 118 (5 Interights Bulletin 21, 1988); David S. Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment 387 (29 Law & Ineq. 343, 2011).
55 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra, ¶ 15.
56 UNVFVT Board of Trustees, Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies 4 (The UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, 2011); Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 100-20 (December 10, 1984).
57 Kidus Meskele, Interpretation of Article One of the Convention in Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies 52 ( 5 Beijing Law Review 49 , 2014) .
58 Ahmad Srour , Criminal Procedural Law – General Part 478 (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya, 1974).
59 Alya, supra, at 299.
60 Srour, supra, at 453; Mahmoud Hesni, Explaining Criminal Law - General Part 426-7 (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya for Publishing and Distribution, 2016).
61 Lebanese Criminal Code, 340 CC, art. 453, 1943, “Counterfeiting is a deliberate distortion of the truth, either in fact or in the data evidenced by an instrument or by a manuscript constituting a document, with the motive to inflict harm whether material, moral or social”.
62 Lebanese Criminal Appeal Court, decision No 6/1300, 5 (June 20, 2013), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=70534&type=list.
63 Thesis paper, at 12 - 13.
64 Alya, supra, at 476; Abed El Wahhab Houmed, Detailed Commentary on Criminal Code 669 (the New Printing Press, 1990).
65 Sole Criminal Judge, decision No 295 (26/10/2013).
66 Lebanese Military Justice Act, 24 MJA § 3, art. 152 (April 13, 1968); Alya, supra, at 458.
67 CC, supra, § 2 art. 37, “The customary penalties for felonies are: 1. Death; 2. Hard labor for life; 3. Life imprisonment; 4. Fixed-term hard labor; 5. Fixed-term extended imprisonment”. The penalties of each type crime are enumerated from the most severe to the less severe.
68 Id., § 2, art. 179/1, “An offence is defined as a felony, misdemeanor or contravention if it is accordingly punishable by a penalty for a felony, a misdemeanor or a contravention”.
69 Id., § 2 art. 39, “The customary penalties for misdemeanors are: 1. Imprisonment with labor; 2. Ordinary imprisonment; 3. A fine”.
70 Id., § 2 art. 37, “The customary penalties for felonies are: 1. Death; 2. Hard labor for life; 3. Life imprisonment; 4. Fixed-term hard labor; 5. Fixed-term extended imprisonment”.
71 Hesni, supra, at 334.
72 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 355, 2 (October 21, 2014), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=70128&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 107, 4 (April 14, 2005), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=71577&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 103, 3 (May 8, 1997), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=68043&type=list.
73 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 108 (March 5, 1964) in Alya’s encyclopedia No 1037, 275.
74 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 46, 3 (February 17, 2014). Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=83667&type=list.
75 Omar Al Housayni, Torturing the Accused to Confess 161-62 (Dar Al Nahda Al Arabiya for Publishing and Distribution, 1994).
76 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 113, 4 (March 20, 2014), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=72105&type=list.
77 Eid, supra, at 37.
78 Hesni, supra, at 555-547; Mhammad-Zaki Abou Amer , Criminal Law, General Part 285-89 (Al Dar Al Jamiiya, 1991).
79 CC, supra, art. 218 /2-3-4.
80 General Assembly, Report of the CAT 270, UN Doc. A/69/44 (2013-4).
81 Amnesty International, Annual Reports (1995-2017), Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/search/?q=annual+reports; See also, Haifaa Zaiter, Unbelievable Torture in Lebanon (Raseef 22, 2017), Available at http://www.cldh-lebanon.org/.
82 SOLIDA, the Ministry of Defense Detention Center: A Major Obstacle to the Prevention of Torture. Forgotten Victims, Unpunished Executioners 11 (CLDH, 2006)
83 Zaiter, supra; Lebanon: New Law a Step to End Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, Ocotber 28, 2016, Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/28/lebanon-new-law-step-end-torture; Lebanon: Exonerated Actor Details Torture, supra.
84 CLDH, Victims of Torture from Syria: Staying in Lebanon and Suffering Repeated Traumatizing Experiences 11 (CLDH, 2016); CLDH, Arbitrary Detention and Torture in Lebanon 22-3 (Arab HR Fund, 2013); Alkarama, Torture in Lebanon: Time to Break the Pattern 18 (Alkarama for HRs, 2009).
85 CLDH, Arbitrary Detention and Torture in Lebanon, supra, at 21.
86 Id., at 22.
87 CAT, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Initial Reports of State Parties due in 2001, Lebanon, UN Doc. CAT/C/LBN/1 (14 April 2016), (State Report hereinafter).
88 Lebanon: Investigate Army Beatings, Death in Custody, Human Rights Watch news release, July 17, 2013, Availbale at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/17/lebanon-investigate-army-beatings-death-custody, “his family told Human Rights Watch that Military Intelligence instructed them to pick up Bayoumi’s body, which was heavily bruised, from the military hospital three days after he disappeared on June 23; Lebanon: Syria Refugee’s Account of Torture, Human Rights Watch news release, December 21, 2016, Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/21/lebanon-syrian-refugees-account-torture, “Shadi said that he asked to call a friend or a lawyer, but was refused”; Lebanon: Exonerated Actor Details Torture, supra, Itani said “I was not able to speak with my lawyer or family before the first court, and after that only through a door in the presence of military personnel”.
89 Interview by Rindala Zgheib with C.K., a public officer, Jounieh, 60 minutes, October 29, 2018.
90 Donna el Hindi, Guilty until Proven Innocent – Report on the Causes of Arbitrary Arrest, Lengthy Pre-Trial Detention and Long Delays in Trials 63-65 (Alef, 2013).
91 CLDH, Shadow Report Submission to the CAT in Relation to its Examination of the Initial Report of Lebanon 22 (CLDH, 2016), (Shadow Report hereinafter).
92 Lebanon: Exonerated Actor Details Torture, supra.
93 State Report, supra, at 70.
94 Shadow Report, supra, at 26.
95 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 256, 3 (June 14, 2016), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=124695&type=list.
96 Shadow Report, supra, at 35.
97 Toufic el Hajj, Torture and Abuse in Light of National and International Law 62 (Modern Book Foundation, 2016).
98 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 11 (February 21, 2005) in Badaoui Hanna, Evidence 81-2 (4 Zein Al Houkoukiyya Publications, 2015).
99 Lebanese Criminal Procedural Code, 131 CPC, art. 60, 1948.
100 First Military Investigative Judge, June 2015 in State Report, supra, 70.
101 Lebanese Investigative Judge in Bekaa (May 2, 2009), in Al Adel 1398, V. 2, 2010.
102 State Report, supra.
103 Military Courts are considered exceptional courts in Lebanon allowing for a judiciary that is separate and inexpedient. Although the Military Court is a judicial organ, it is part of the Ministry of Defense rather than the Ministry of Justice, which places it outside the scope of ordinary law and in violation of the principle of separation of powers, the hierarchy of norms, and the preamble of the Lebanese Constitution.
104 MJA, supra, § 2, art. 24.
105 Id. § 2, art. 27.
106 Lebanese Legislative Decree, No 110, art.5, June 30, 1977.
107 State Report, supra, at 60.
108 Alef, the Right to Fair Trial in Lebanon: A Position Paper on Exceptional Courts 8 (Alef, 2018).
109 Lebanese Indictment Chamber, decision No 354 (1995); Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 108 (May 11, 1964) in Samira Alya, Collection of the Lebanese Supreme Decisions 200 (University Foundation for Studies and Publishing, 1970) ; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 149, 5 (October 30, 1999), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=61728&type=list.
110 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 11, supra.; Lebanese Supreme Court ,decision No 25, 8 (February 19, 2009), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=78686&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 168, 8 (March 4, 2007), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=75412&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 119, 14 (October 5, 2007), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=72499&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 114, 6 (May 31, 2007), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=72165&type=list.
111 Shadow Report, supra, at 51.
112 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 23, 10-12 (February 12, 2009), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=78053&type=list.
113 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 40, 5 (March 5, 1997), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=65855&type=list; Investigative Judge in Beqaa, supra, at 1396.
114 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 283, 15 (October 23, 2015), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=111570&type=list; Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 285, 4 (October 2, 2014), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=79769&type=list.
115 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 229, 4 (June 24, 2016), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=123854&type=list.
116 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 183, 3 (June 20, 2013), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=76114&type=list.
117 Lebanese Supreme Court, decision No 38, 3 (March 29, 2004), Available at http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/RulingFile.aspx?RuliID=82209&type=list.
118 See Courts Decisions in Alya, Collection of the Lebanese Jurisprudence, supra, No 1817 at 482-485 & V4 No 731 at 301-305.
119 The verdict was issued before the amendment of 2017 and therefore the penalty was 1 year imprisonment, check also supra note 44 for the old article.
120 Al Hajj, supra, at 64-5.
121 Fanack, New Lebanese Law against Torture a Good but Incomplete Step, December 22, 2017, Available at https://fanack.com/lebanon/human-rights/anti-torture-law/; Amnesty, Lebanon has a New Anti-Torture Law, June 26, 2018, Available at https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2018/06/lebanon-new-anti-torture-law/.
122 Id.
123 Sahar Mandour, Lebanon: Failure to Implement Anti-Torture Law One Year On (Amnesty International, October 25 2018), Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/10/lebanon-failure-to-implement-anti-torture-law-one-year-on/.
124 Lebanese Official Gazette, Positive Reasons for Proposed New Law 3775-77 (50 Official Gazette, 2017).
125 MJA, supra, arts. 36 & 37. However, under article 15 of CPC, the Public Prosecutor may initiate proceedings against individuals who are acting as judicial police officers without prior approval.
126 CPC, supra, art. 60, the statute of limitations of 3 to 10 years begins to run “upon the victim’s release from detention or custody”.
127 CAT, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Lebanon 3, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1509 (May 2017), “It should also establish that there shall be no statute of limitations for the offence of torture”.
128 Thesis paper, at 17 - 31.
129 Haifaa Zaiter, Unbelievable Torture in Lebanon, supra; Viviane Akiki, Torture in Lebanon: Normal and Widespread Use (IM Lebanon, December 23, 2016).
130 Dignity Debased: Forced Anal Examinations in Homosexuality Prosecutions, Human Rights Watch news release, July 12, 2016, Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/12/dignity-debased/forced-anal-examinations-homosexuality-prosecutions; Lebanon: Police Torturing Vulnerable People, Human Rights Watch news release, June 26, 2013, Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/26/lebanon-police-torturing-vulnerable; Lebanon: Syrian Refugee’s Account of Torture, supra.
131 Check https://alefliban.org/publications/.
132 Check https://www.alkarama.org/en/reports.
133 Check http://www.rightsobserver.org/publication.
134 Check https://www.amnesty.org/en/search/?q=annual+reports.
135 Akhbar Al Arab, Torture in Lebanon by Army Intelligence, Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajbDEbeaj0k; Check also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaHaIkqhrTA.
136 ILoubnan, CLDH calling for establishment of Legal Cadre for Refugees Status in Lebanon, November 14, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/2u4t26n; NNA, May 30, 2018/2016, available at http://bit.ly/2u5v3Rf; The Daily Star, November 4, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/2uvgIPg & December 16th, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/2tBwvaI; L’orient le jour, May 3, 2019, available at http://bit.ly/2uyCh0R.
137 CLDH, Activities Report 26 (CLDH, 2016).
138 Thesis paper, at 38.
139 Lebanon: Refer Torture Case to Civilian Court, Human Rights Watch news release, April 12, 2019, Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/12/lebanon-refer-torture-case-civilian-court; Lebanon: Refer Torture Case to Civilian Court, Amnesty news release, April 12, 2019, Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/lebanon-refer-torture-case-to-civilian-court/.
140 Thesis paper, at 18.
141 See Figures 2& 3 in the paper, at 32.
142 The department was created by the Legislative decree No 755 (November 3, 2008).
143 The Committee was created by the Service Note No 204/1030 ch.2, (June 28, 2014).
144 El Hajj, supra, at 80.
145 Lebanon Joint Shadow Report: Report Submitted to the CAT in the Context of the Initial Review of Lebanon 14 (March 20, 2017) Available at https://alefliban.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NGO-coalition_CAT_LEB_ShadowReport_Final_20170320_EN.pdf.
146 Id.
147 The Committee was established by the Law No 62, 3303-3310 (52 Official Gazette, 2016).
148 Lebanon: New Law a Step to End Torture, supra; Alkarama, Lebanon: Parliament Approves Law Instituting a National Human Rights Institution and a National Preventive Mechanism Against Torture, (Alkarama, 2016), Available at https://www.alkarama.org/en/articles/lebanon-parliament-approves-law-instituting-national-human-rights-institution-and-national.
149 Sahar Mandour, Lebanon: Failure to Implement Anti-torture Law one Year on, supra.
150 Alef, Annual Report 2018, 36 (Alef, April 2019), Available at https://alefliban.org/publications/annual-report-2018/.
151 Alkarama, Annual Report 2018, 30 (Alkarama Foundation, April 2019), Available at https://www.alkarama.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/AnnualReport_2018_English.pdf.
152 Thesis paper, at 3.
153 CAT, Report of the CAT 276, UN Doc. A/69/44, Supplement No 44 (UN, 2014).
154 Thesis paper, at 49.
155 United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, Press Release ORG 1469 (July 3, 2006), “Lebanon’s date of admission is October 24, 1945”, Available at https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html.
156 Didier Rouget, Preventing Torture: International and Regional Mechanisms to Combat Torture 32 (apt, 2000).
157 Id., at 33-34.
158 See all recommendations in CAT, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Lebanon, supra.
159 Id. at 4.
160 Alef – Act for Human Rights; Alkarama for Research and Studies; Ajem – Association of Justice and Mercy; Insan Association; Khiam Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture and Proud Lebanon Restart Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture.
161 Lebanon: Joint Shadow Report, supra.
162 Eid, supra, at 51.
163 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 ( U.S. Department of State) ; Amnesty International, Annual Report 1995, 189 (Amnesty, 1995); Amnesty International, Annual Report 1998, 229 (Amnesty, 1998).
164 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Julian E. Mendez, Mission to Kyrgyzstan ¶ 37, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/61/Add.2,21 (February 2012).
165 UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of Visit to Kyrgyzstan, ¶ 28 UN Doc. CAT/OP/KGZ/1 (February 28, 2014).
166 Richard Carver & Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? 407 (Liverpool University Press, 2016).
167 Richard Carver, Central and Eastern Europe: the Ombudsman as Agent of International Law in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions 617 ( 13 Human Rights Law 615, 2013).
168 Richard Carver & Lisa Handley, supra, at 405.
169 Id., at 409.
170 Mandira Sharma, Ingrid Massagé and Kathryn McDonald, Lawyers’ Intervention at Pretrial Stage Helps to Prevent Torture, Illegal Detention and Other Human Rights Violations: Experiences of Advocacy Forum – Nepal 271 (4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 253, 2012).
171 OSCE, National Preventive Mechanism against Torture and ill-treatment in Ukraine: Efficiency Assessment 76 (Kharkiv Institute for Social Research, 2018).
- Quote paper
- Rindala Zgheib (Author), 2019, Coercive interrogations in Lebanon. Major causes and effective mechanisms to fight torture, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/535718
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