This paper presents my intention of providing you with an overlook of the knowledge that I have gained during the course of subject titled Communication and Negotiation skills. Through commenting on negotiation over Ukraine Crisis which I found as a most suitable model for the course knowledge application, you will get an insight into my understanding of the practical application of concepts acquired through this course. In addition, you will find the interpretation of the negotiation and communication concepts through my personal application and self-evaluation.
Table of Contents
1. The Negotiation over the Ukraine Crisis as a Model for the Knowledge Application
1.1 The Introductory Information on the Ukraine Crisis
1.2 The Distributive Aspect of the Peace Negotiation in Minsk
1.3 The Failure of a Multiparty Integrative Initiative in the Peace Negotiation in Minsk
1.4 The lack of Ukraine’s well developed BATNA
2. Application of Communication and Negotiation Concepts in Real Life
2.1 Theoretical and Practical Reflection on My Negotiation Mindset
Bibliography
Abstract
This paper presents my intention of providing you with an overlook of the knowledge that I have gained during the course of subject titled Communication and Negotiation skills. Through commenting on negotiation over Ukraine Crisis which I found as a most suitable model for the course knowledge application, you will get an insight in my understanding of practical application of concepts acquired through this course. In addition, you will find the interpretation of the negotiation and communication concepts through my personal application and self-evaluation.
1. The Negotiation over the Ukraine Crisis as a Model for the Knowledge Application
The negotiation over Ukraine crisis will be used for the purposes of this reflective learning journal as a model to which the knowledge's main aspects gained in the course of a subject titled Communication and Negotiation Skills can be applied. The process of negotiation over Ukraine crises from its very beginning consists of different approaches and multiparty negotiations that already last for several years. Since it is an issue behind which a number of complex negotiation parties’ interests are hidden, this negotiation example, in my opinion, presents a model where the main Communication and Negotiation course’s aspects and approaches can be elaborated and further expended. In this regard, in next few chapters, I will provide you with an overview of the genesis of the Ukraine Crises, incorporating the negotiation process's invested efforts aiming at resolving the crisis and accomplishing a sustainable peace and the state functioning in Ukraine.
1.1 The Introductory Information on the Ukraine Crisis
After Viktor Yanukovych, the president of Ukraine at the time, on 21st of November 2013 decided to suspend his decisions to sign a political and trade agreement with European Union, thousands of protesters flooded the streets, opposing this president’s decision.[1] Following this event, the protests have been occurring for several months, ending up with an eruption of a street fight between protesters and the police.[2] Finally, on 22nd of February 2014 the president Yanukovych flees Kyev.[3] All these events were followed by a rebellion of pro-Russian separatist who declared the independence of eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.[4] Soon after the internationally unrecognized referendum has been conducted in these parts of Ukraine, thus pronouncing their independence, the Ukrainian military forces have tried to regain their authority over its eastern parts of the state by fighting against the rebels who secretly and constantly have been armed by Russia.[5]
1.2 The Distributive Aspect of the Peace Negotiation in Minsk
The first attempt of establishing a long term peace in eastern Ukraine was signed in Minsk, the capital city of Belarus, on 5th of September 2014.[6] This peace agreement was result of a trilateral contact group consultation aiming at cessation of fire and it was titled Memorandum of Minsk. Basically, at that time, almost all the countries directly or indirectly involved in signing of this peace agreement believed that the door was opened to final peace talks that would lead to final peaceful resolution of conflict in Ukraine. It seems that at that time nobody was aware of the fact that the negotiating parties' positions, interests and preferences on the issue of the peace talks were extremely non-negotiable in order that a real peace agreement would be achieved, aiming at resulting in further political consolidation of Ukraine. It is more than obvious that since the beginning of the Minsk negotiation Russia have had the strongest position with regard to the Minsk negotiation process. This is partly because Russia enabled its negotiating position by its strong military influence on the war in eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. In that way it secured its anchor in the negotiation process by sending a clear message to Kiev that the full reintegration of the two mentioned regions in the Ukraine sovereignty is an issue that is of the table when we talk about the starting points of the negotiation. In addition, Russia did not want that the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk become parts of its own territory, rather to stay as parts of Ukraine but with strong decision making competences in order to secure the Russian influence on all important political decisions that eventually would have been made in Ukraine in future.[7] On the other side, Ukraine was aware of the privilege negotiation position of Russia, but it had to show to the world, especially to the western world from which it expects a help, that Ukraine is ready to take some steps with the aim of settling down the issue of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. One thing which seems unimportant but it shows another fact proving the strong position of Russia in the negotiations over Ukrainian crisis is the fact that the negotiation took the place in Minsk, the capital of Belarus whit which Russia created the supranational Union state and a close military connection. Whit this in mind we can conclude that the negotiation table was placed in the Russian garden and that the implementation of the reached Memorandum of Minsk will be a very difficult task because it did not offer a strong integrative basis, especially considering the interests of Ukraine party in negotiation. Although Memorandum of Minsk foreseen the cease of fire in the combating zones, it has never been implemented in practice. Since the military positions of both sides, the rebellions and the Ukraine government forces, after some time of combat, were substantially unchanged, under a strong intermediation of Germany and France, Ukraine decided once again to enter into a new negotiation with the representatives of rebellions that took the place in Minsk.[8] Following this negotiation process a new agreement was introduced, specifying the foundations for the establishment of peace and a new political structure of Ukraine. Although the agreement itself was officially presented as an agreement made by two warring parties, it is more than obvious that it was an outcome of multiparty negotiation process.
1.3 The Failure of a Multiparty Integrative Initiative in the Peace Negotiation in Minsk
Since the so-called Minsk II agreement should have been seen as a two-party negotiation process, it is more than visible that this process was a product of discussing of interests of various countries. The involvement of France and Germany should have given additional guarantees that Minsk negotiation will be constructed by offering to both negotiation parties an integrative element, assuming that with this a broader compromise will be created among the negotiation participants. Instead of this, it seems that France and Germany took the place in the negotiation just to protect and further develop their own interest especially with regard to their future relations with Russia. Namely, when the Minsk II agreement was signed, foreseeing, among other things, the obligation of Ukraine to carry out theconstitutional reform in Ukraine by envisaging ̏ decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these area ̋ (Memorandum of Minsk, 2015, p.4) the interest of Russia to have a constant influence on the Ukrainian political decision making process have been completely satisfied. This agreement even today presents the starting point of political solution for the Ukrainian crisis, emphasizing once again a great position of Russia in the negotiation process. Although the western countries supported imposing economic sanctions to Russia expressing their disagreement with Russian annexation of Crimea and its involvement in Ukraine crisis, we have to be aware that some of these countries share different political and economic interests with Russia. Beside the fact that the leadership of France is under constant pressure of business circles oriented in cooperation with Russia, Germany has also its own economic interest in fast stabilization of Ukraine crisis in order to facilitate the extension of good German-Russian business relations.[9] The fact that goes in favor of this statement
̏ is . Nikita Dmitrievich Khoroshun, 2015, p.1) .
Today it is more than obvious that Ukraine does not have the capacity to implement Minsk agreement. Firstly, President Petro Poroshenko does not have the political power neither in Ukraine exists a border consensus about the implementation of Minsk agreement, especially in its part which prescribes the obligation for Ukraine to restructure its constitution by envisaging a high level of autonomy for the mentioned regions under control of rebels. Also we should not completely exclude the United States’ interest in this crisis, which can make an additional burden on reaching a solution for Ukraine. For example, one of the reason why the US should be invited to the process of solving the Ukraine crisis is the fact that from 1990 it invested over 10 billion dollars in reform processes in Ukraine[10] From this fact it is obvious that US will be influencing the whole process of finding the final solution for the Ukraine crisis. In that regard, the US should never be avoided as a negotiation influencer as it was the case during the Minsk negotiation because it always, at least secretly, finds its way to negotiate its own interests. Such a powerful state should always be at the main negotiation table. If we take into consideration the explained position of all actors in the negotiation, it is obvious why Russia is not so upset about that fact if or when the Minsk agreement will be implemented. Firstly, from the very beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia plays a zero-sum game and it is aware of the fact that there are two scenarios and that in both of them, Russia is a winner. Namely, Russia has already succeeded in stopping Ukraine to develop and make stronger relations with western countries by destabilizing it. In case Ukraine agrees to implement the Minsk agreement it will be a great outcome for Russia because then Ukraine will be decentralized country in which political Kiev will never be in position to autonomously making decisions without a broader consent reached in all its constitutionally decentralized parts of the state. Also, if Ukraine does not decide to implement the Minsk agreement, Russia de facto will be in same position by controlling the two mentioned self-proclaimed republics through which Russian interests and influences will be secured not only in Ukraine but in the whole Europe. The mechanism of controlling the two mentioned self-proclaimed republics Russia will always have the power to threat peace and security in Ukraine and, always, achieve the great influence on Ukraine domestic and foreign policy. The only thing in the second scenario that can put Russia in an unpleasant situation is the fact that the economic sanctions imposed by European Union and United States will be prolonged and, maybe, increased influence of domestic opposition on Russian foreign matters. I think that Russia, as a proven skilled actor in global politics, took into account all possible risk preferences deriving from the both scenarios of (non)implementation of Minsk agreement.
[...]
[1] The facts on happenings in Ukraine from the date when President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign a trade agreement with European Union were presented by Cable News Network's (CNN) news titled "Ukraine: Everything you need to know about how we got here" in 2017 (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/10/europe/ukraine-war-how-we-got-here/index.html).
[2] ibid.
[3] ibid.
[4] ibid.
[5] ibid.
[6] The exact date of signing the peace agreement titled Memorandum of Minsk was presented by Voltairenet in 2014 (http://www.voltairenet.org/article186862.html).
[7] According to the 2017 Minsk agreements-an attempt to analyse approaches and intentions of the participants of the process, published by online magazine titled US Position, Russia does not want to accept independence of Ukraine regions Donetsk and Luhansk with their eventual accession to Russia neither the full integration of mentioned regions into the centralized Ukraine.
[8] The exact date of Minsk Agreements was provided by the online magazine Russia Beyond (https://www.rbth.com/international/2016/09/05/the-minsk-agreements-2-years-2-deals-but-no-peace-in-ukraine_627177).
[9] According to 2015 France-Russia: Balancing on the Edge of Political and Economic Interests and International Commitments, published by an independent analytical centre for geopolitical studies named Borysfen Intel, the France and Germany’s standpoints in negotiation process in Ukraine crisis is covered by their intention to maintain good relationships with Russia because of their valuable economic interests.
[10] According to the 2015 Five reasons why supporting Ukraine is in the USA's interests, published by EuromaidenIPress, the USA invested 10 billion dollars in reform process in Ukraine.
- Quote paper
- Peđa Đurasović (Author), 2017, Negotiation Concepts in the Ukraine Crisis, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/505439
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