The Federal Joint Committee in the German health system. Political accountability deficit caused by a decoupled government institution?

Dossier / Travail de Séminaire , 2014 , 13 Pages , Note: 1.7

Politique - Système politique de l'Allemagne

The leading question in this paper is if one specific structural reform output in the German health system, concrete the institutionalization of the Federal Joint Committee according to the SHI Modernization Act (GKV- Modernisierungsgesetz/GMG) in the beginning of 2004, is an example for building a quasi-governmental institution with limited external political accountability relations which causes an political accountability deficit.

This paper is grounded on the content and theoretical focus of the seminar Accountability, democracy and management in the welfare state, which I attended at the University Potsdam in summer semester 2014. It deals with the issue of using a couple of premises from the academic field of accountability to analyze one specific output of a reform in the German health care system in relation to the founding and the work of the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesauschuss/ G-BA) since 2004.

Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)

• Introduction
  • Relevance
  • Approach
• Public Accountability as analytical framework in health system
  • Framework for analysing political accountability
  • Indicators for accountability deficits
• The Federal Joint Committee in the German health care system
  • Legal status & effects on accountability relations
  • Insufficient Interest Representation & Intransparency
  • Conclusion-an example for weak political accountability and an accountability deficit?

Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)

This paper examines the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) in the German health care system, focusing on whether its structure leads to a political accountability deficit. The paper investigates the concept of accountability and its various forms, particularly political accountability, as a framework for analyzing the G-BA's role and impact.

• The concept of political accountability and its relevance to democratic institutions
• The institutional structure and decision-making power of the Federal Joint Committee
• The potential for accountability deficits in quasi-governmental institutions like the G-BA
• The role of transparency and interest representation in ensuring accountability
• The impact of the G-BA's decisions on the German health care system and its stakeholders

Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)

The paper begins by introducing the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) and its significance in the German health care system. It then explores the theoretical framework of political accountability, outlining its key elements and potential deficits. The third chapter delves into the G-BA's legal status, its decision-making processes, and its accountability relations. This chapter examines the potential for accountability deficits arising from the G-BA's structure and operations.

Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)

This paper focuses on the key concepts of political accountability, accountability deficits, quasi-governmental institutions, and the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) in the German health care system. It examines the relationship between these concepts and their implications for democratic governance and the effective functioning of public institutions.

• Université: University of Potsdam (Lehrstuhl für Verwaltung und Organisation I)
• Cours: Accountability, democracy, and management in the welfare state
• Note: 1.7
• Auteur: Malte Jannik Jacobs (Auteur)
• Année de publication: 2014
• Pages: 13
• N° de catalogue: V313546
• ISBN (ebook): 9783668124592
• ISBN (Livre): 9783668124608
• Langue: anglais
• mots-clé: German health system, Policy Analysis, Accountability