This paper will analyse one aspect of corruption that has been very present in the corruption literature after mid-1990s: the effect of wages on corruption. Van Rijckeghem’s and Weder’s model of the fair wage hypothesis will be first explained in this paper and then used on a cross-sectional study of 29 countries and on data from within Russia between the years 2001 – 2005. In doing so, Occam’s Razor will be applied by only analysing the effects of wages on corruption, ignoring all historic and institutional aspects of a particular country. The results do not prove the fair wage hypothesis beyond doubt, although some evidence point that satisfactory wages will reduce corruption.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Endemic corruption
1.2 How to fight corruption: the fair-wage hypothesis
2 Literature review
2.1 Maximising vs. Satisficing
2.2 Empirical Evidence
2.3 Literature on Corruption in Russia
3 Theoretical Model
3.1 Building the model
3.2 Empirical Evidence
3.2.1 Perceived corruption: International Country Risk Guide
3.2.2 Approximating actual levels of corruption: Enterprise Surveys
4 Methodolgy
5 Results
5.1 Critique
6 Evidence for the fair wage hypothesis in Russia?
7 Concluding remarks
8 Bibliography
List of Tables and Figures:
Table 1: CPI 2000 - 2001
Table 2: Enterprise Survey Indicators
Table 3: Data mismatch
Figure 1: Scatterplot
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