Humanitarian Intervention: "Why do states intervene in some humanitarian crises and not others?"

Essai , 2007 , 13 Pages , Note: Distinction

Politique - Sujet: Paix et Conflits, Sécurité

This paper will argue, that the decision to intervene or not, depends on political will to do so, which itself derives from a correlation between anticipated costs and benefits. Intervention will occur only when, under consideration of all factors, the benefits outweigh the costs. After a brief review of cold war conditions, this essay will concentrate on key factors, which influence political will for humanitarian intervention in the post cold war era. All factors will be considered by supportive cases compared to Rwanda as an example for lacking political will.

Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)

• Why do states intervene in some humanitarian crises and not others?
• Cold War Conditions
• Post Cold War Conditions
• Reasonable Outlook of Success
• Timeframe and Size of Operations
• Relationship and Self-Conception of States
• Perception of Crisis as a Humanitarian Disaster

Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)

This paper explores the factors influencing states' decisions to intervene in humanitarian crises, particularly in the post-Cold War era. It aims to understand why states choose to intervene in some situations and not others, arguing that the decision hinges on a careful calculation of anticipated costs and benefits.

• The role of political will in humanitarian intervention
• The impact of cost-benefit analysis on intervention decisions
• The influence of historical memory and previous experiences on states' willingness to intervene
• The significance of UN authorization and the perception of a crisis as a humanitarian disaster
• The changing dynamics of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era

Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)

• Why do states intervene in some humanitarian crises and not others?: This introductory section sets the stage by discussing the concept of sovereignty and non-intervention in international relations. It highlights the shift towards humanitarian intervention, particularly by Western nations, and introduces the central argument that political will, driven by cost-benefit calculations, dictates intervention decisions.
• Cold War Conditions: This section examines the decision-making process during the Cold War, demonstrating how geo-strategic considerations and power dynamics between the USSR and the USA often overshadowed humanitarian concerns. Examples like the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda illustrate this point.
• Post Cold War Conditions: This section delves into key factors that influence political will for humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. It explores the impact of a reasonable outlook of success, the timeframe and size of operations, the relationship and self-conception of states, and the perception of a crisis as a humanitarian disaster.
• Reasonable Outlook of Success: This subsection analyzes how the perceived probability of success influences intervention decisions. Cases like the establishment of safe havens for Kurds in northern Iraq and the intervention in Haiti are presented as examples of interventions where a perceived low risk of failure facilitated action. Conversely, the Rwandan genocide is cited as a case where a high probability of failure deterred intervention.
• Timeframe and Size of Operations: This subsection examines the influence of the expected duration and costs of operations on intervention decisions. The interventions in Somalia and Haiti are used to illustrate how shorter, more limited operations with clear exit dates tend to be favored. The Rwandan genocide is again highlighted as an example where the prospect of a lengthy and costly intervention deterred action.
• Relationship and Self-Conception of States: This subsection explores the impact of historical memory and previous experiences on states' willingness to intervene. It argues that states with a positive self-image and successful intervention history are more likely to intervene. However, negative experiences can also deter intervention, as exemplified by the US reluctance to intervene in Rwanda following the Somalia debacle.
• Perception of Crisis as a Humanitarian Disaster: This subsection examines the role of the UN in declaring a crisis as a humanitarian disaster and authorizing intervention. It emphasizes the importance of UN authorization as a prerequisite for intervention and highlights the UN's reluctance to intervene when an existing government opposes it.

Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)

The central keywords and focus topics of this paper include humanitarian intervention, political will, cost-benefit analysis, sovereignty, non-intervention, Cold War, post-Cold War, success, timeframe, relationship, self-conception, UN authorization, and the perception of crisis as a humanitarian disaster. These terms represent the core concepts and research foci explored within the text.

• Université: Macquarie University
• Cours: IRPG 840 The International System
• Note: Distinction
• Auteur: MIR, MA Sebastian Plappert (Auteur)
• Année de publication: 2007
• Pages: 13
• N° de catalogue: V153935
• ISBN (ebook): 9783640664658
• ISBN (Livre): 9783640664207
• Langue: anglais
• mots-clé: Intervention, Cases, humanitarian crisis, international relations