"The Paradox of Emigration and Decreased Homicide Rates in El Salvador" provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between President Nayib Bukele's policies in El Salvador, emigration trends, and homicide rates. It delves into the false, yet popular notion, that a decrease in homicide rates leads to lower immigration rates. In this context, the essay analyses Bukele's security measures, notably the Territorial Control Plan, aimed at combating gang violence and its influence on reducing homicide rates. The paper evaluates the effectiveness of these policies, considering both the immediate impact on public safety and the long-term consequences for human rights and social stability.
By examining the correlation between stringent law enforcement tactics and a decline in violence, the study sheds light on the paradox of improved security metrics amidst growing concerns over authoritarian practices and potential human rights abuses. It explores the broader socio-economic factors influencing emigration, arguing that while decreased violence might deter some from leaving, underlying issues such as poverty, unemployment, and political instability continue to drive migration.
The paper critically assesses the notion of the "Cobra Effect," where attempts to solve a problem might inadvertently exacerbate the situation or create new issues. Through this lens, it discusses the possible unintended consequences of Bukele's security-focused approach, including the risk of deepening the societal divides and overlooking the root causes of crime and emigration.
When State-Led Efforts to Combat Violence Simultaneously Prompt Migration - The Paradox of Emigration and Decreased Homicide Rates in El Salvador: An In-depth Analysis of Bukele's Approach to Gang Violence and Their Impact on Migration Trends
“There is still a long way to go, but we are on the way, slowly but surely, to having reverse migration, that is, more people coming than leaving.” stated Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele (serving since 2019) on September 15, 2023 (Ramón, 2023). This comment suggests an anticipated decrease of emigration in El Salvador, which has often been attributed to Bukele’s punitive policies and their effect on homicide rates (Ramón, 2023). When examining the interplay between state-led efforts to combat violence and migration trends in El Salvador, particularly under the current presidency, it becomes evident that a decrease in homicide rates does not directly translate to reduced emigration, contrary to expectations. The relationship between government negotiations with gangs, repressive measures, and their effect on emigration reveals a more complex reality and requires a nuanced understanding.
By employing Pearson's correlation method on a dataset compiling the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador and the number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border from 2012 to 2023 1 excluding 2020 as an outlier due to the COVID pandemic, reveals a weak negative correlation of approximately -0,40. While in need of more thorough statistical analyses, this finding provides a nuanced and unexpected perspective on the relationship between violence and migration from El Salvador, particularly in the context of the government's efforts to combat gang violence and its impact on migration trends.
1. Roots and Extent of Gang Violence as a Push-Factor for Migration in El Salvador
Gang violence in the Northern Triangle countries results in some of the highest levels of targeted and generalized violence world-wide, deeply affecting both internal and international migration (Villalever et al., 2022; Oscarson, 2023: 51). The pervasive gang activities, including extortion, forced recruitment, and retaliatory violence, have instilled widespread fear among local populations (Villalever et al., 2022). As a result, many individuals, increasingly unaccompanied children (UNHCR, 2016: 5), and families relocate within their countries to escape immediate threats, often finding that internal displacement offers limited safety due to the extensive reach of gangs (UNHCR, 2016: 83, 111; UNHCR, 2003: 4). Consequently, for many, international migration, especially to the United States, emerges as a more viable option to seek refuge and security (Howland, 2014: 48).
The rise of these gangs has been fueled by factors such as deportations from the U.S., state-led efforts to combatthe Maras, and socio-economic challenges (Howland, 2014: 40; 49).
2. Punitive Policies in El Salvador Before Bukele
Bukele's strategy against gangs is marked by the same approach used by former Salvadoran presidents, characterized through “penal populism”, which prioritizes electoral gains over violence's root causes (De la Torre & Álvarez, 2011; Stelmach, 2021). Based on this, the „Mano Dura“ (Iron Fist) policies, took the first steps in militarizing police forces, putting through mass arrests and worsening prison conditions (De la Torre & Álvarez, 2011). These policies were eventually withdrawn due to their ineffectiveness and human rights concerns (Stelmach, 2021; Aguilar, 2019).
Furthermore, especially between 2012 and 2015, secret government negotiations with gangs for reduced homicide rates in exchange for privileges led to temporary decreases in violence but allowed gangs to consolidate power (Stelmach, 2021; Cruz, 2019). The combination of repressive policies and the indirect funneling of gangs culminated in El Salvador becoming the world’s most violent country in 2015 (Martinez et al., 2022; Stelmach, 2022), thus, contributed to emigration rates spiking in 2016.
3. Bukele: Intensifying the Iron Grip
The incumbent President Nayib Bukele has introduced his Territorial Control Plan which compares to the Mando Dura policies, yet operates with greater intensity.
Key elements include increased defense ministry budgets, taking control of urban gang strongholds, implementing preventive measures for at-risk youth, and modernizing police and military forces (Stelmach, 2021). The plan has led to controversial practices like "daily arrest quotas," resulting in arbitrary detentions, widespread human rights abuses (Renteria, 2022; TRTworld 2024), and the mass incarceration of suspected gang members without a fair trial (Taylor, 2023). Bukele adjusts prison sanctions depending on violence levels, using penal measures as reactive tools to control crime (Stelmach, 2021: 80). Notably, the administration has also resorted to secretive negotiations with gangs and rights violations, as reported by El Faro (Martinez et al., 2022; Stelmach, 2021).
As of 2023, Bukele’s approach has led to a historically low homicide rate, with a rate of 2.4 murders per 100,000 people (Gonzalez Zorrilla, 2022). However, the administration has seen spikes in crime such as in March 2022, when 62 murders where registered in a single day, making it the most deaths in a day since the civil war (Renteria, 2022). These might be a similar cobra-effect as the one in 2015, which could show that not the government, but rather the gangs continue to have the upper hand when it comes to violence levels (Stelmach, 2021; Pappier 2022), as suggested by the fluctuation of monthly murder rates.
During Bukele’s administration emigration rates have reached record highs (see figure) even amidst higher detention rates of potential emigrants (Ramón, 2023). This phenomenon may be attributed to a multitude of factors, the precise nature of which remains indeterminate within the current scope of analysis. Possibly, Bukele’s punitive policies may not have reduced generalized violence, despite lower homicide rates, conceivably due to homicides from gangs being replaced by increased aggressions from police forces. Additionally, focusing predominantly on public security may have led to the neglect of other policy sectors. As a consequence, this has accentuated factors such as economic instability, limited opportunities, and broader forms of insecurity, which continue to drive Salvadorans to leave the country.
4. The Paradox ofEmigration and Lower Homicide Rates in El Salvador
The cyclical pattern of negotiations between the Maras and the government have been effective in the short-term, until violence from gangs resurges in spikes, akin to a cobra-effect, as witnessed in 2015 and in March of2022, resulting in high levels of fear and insecurity in the populace. This paradox shows that, contrary to claims from the administration (Ramón, 2023), Bukele’s approach to gangs has contributed to higher emigration rates.
The slight negative correlation of -0.40 between the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador and the number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border, further suggests that as the homicide rate increases, there is a modest tendency for the number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border to decrease. This correlation suggests a complex dynamic where heightened violence might dissuade individuals from attempting to migrate due to increased danger or tighter security measures. Conversely, when homicide rates decrease, mostly due to short-term negotiations, it might motivate more Salvadorans to attempt migration, believing the journey to be safer or more feasible. This might hint to a delayed effect of punctual cobra-effects, which are, in turn, caused by Bukele’s approach to negotiate the Maras.
Additionally, while homicide rates from El Salvador are commonly used as an indicator for crime rates and security levels, it is essential to recognize their limitations, as these may not accurately represent the complete picture of criminal activities and public safety in the country. Homicides constitute just one aspect of criminal activity, and their reliability as an indicator can be influenced by various factors, including the specific and multi-faced dynamics of generalized and targeted violence. However, the modest strength of this correlation also implies that factors other than homicide rates significantly influence migration decisions. These might include economic instability, and quality of life concerns, which are not directly addressed by short-term anti-gang measures, suggesting their limited long-term effectiveness in reducing overall violence and emigration from El Salvador.
In light of President Nayib Bukele’s optimistic vision of achieving "reverse migration“ (Ramón, 2023) in El Salvador, it is clear that a multifaceted, long-term and potentially less repressive approach addressing both security and socioeconomic factors is essential to move closer to this goal.
Figure: Trends in Homicide Rates and Absolute Number of Salvadorans Intercepted at U.S. Border 2012-2023.
Trends in Homicide Rates and Number of Salvadorans Intercepted at U.S. Border 2012-2023
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Figure. Trends in Homicide Rates and Number of Salvadorans Intercepted at U.S. Border. The graph displays the annual homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (left y-axis) and the number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border, as an indicator for emigrant trends (right y- axis) 2012-2023. Data were analyzed using Python (Villalva Gándara, 2024).
Homicide rate based on Aguilar (2019), Statista (2023, 2022) and Gonzalez Zorrilla, G. (2022). Number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border based on data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2012-2023) and El Salvador Perspectives (2023).
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Villalva Gándara, I. (2024). Trends in Homicide Rates and Number ofSalvadorans Intercepted at U.S. Border, 2012-2023. Created using Python. Homicide rate based on Aguilar (2019), Statista (2023; 2022) and Gonzalez Zorrilla, G. (2022). Number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border based on data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2012-2023) and El Salvador Perspectives (2023).
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1 The use of the number of Salvadorans intercepted at the U.S. border as an indicator for Salvadoran emigration rates from 2012 to 2023 is due to the absence of comprehensive data on actual emigration rates. This functions as a practical alternative, as it provides a measure of the flow of Salvadorans attempting to enter the U.S., which is a major destination for migrants from El Salvador. Evidently, border interceptions are often closely correlated with emigration trends, as increases in the number of people trying to cross the border typically reflect higher emigration pressures in the home country. Furthermore, U.S. border data is generally reliable and consistently recorded, offering a viable data set for analysis.
- Citation du texte
- Inés Gándara (Auteur), 2024, The Paradox of Emigration and Decreased Homicide Rates in El Salvador, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1452636
