The Take-or-Pay Clause in Long-Term Natural Gas Contracts. Strategic Intention or Opportunistic Behavior?

Dossier / Travail , 2019 , 8 Pages , Note: 1,0

Economie politique - Economie Industrielle

"The energy market is not just built by straightforward supply-and-demand mechanisms". Various environmental and legal factors shape and influence the overall interplay within this industry, resulting in direct or indirect consequences for all market players. Especially, in the context of contract theories, possible opportunistic behavior of any market player might appear and subsequently, create a market imbalance. The initial legal framework for the natural gas market was developed on short notice to protect the strategic intentions of energy suppliers. However, nowadays, the environment changed significantly, resulting in a possible shift of opportunistic behavior.

Power markets are highly complex. Energy sources, such as oil, coal or natural gas, are the fuel for the world economy. Many market players depend on and try to influence the development of future energy prices, output volumes or distribution infrastructure. To ensure a fair interaction in this industry, trade aspects and related issues are contractually governed. However, while coal and crude oil are well-developed energy sources since centuries, natural gas was considered as possible energy alternative, only several decades ago. Within a very short period, a legal framework for the natural gas market had to be set-up, resulting nowadays in the revision and adjustment of this traditional contract model.

• Université: Saint-Petersburg State University of Economics
• Note: 1,0
• Auteur: Marco Berschneider (Auteur)
• Année de publication: 2019
• Pages: 8
• N° de catalogue: V1416356
• ISBN (PDF): 9783346965981
• Langue: anglais
• mots-clé: take-or-pay, clause, long-term, natural, contracts, strategic, intention, opportunistic, behavior