The Effectiveness and Functionality of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Comparative Case Study of Estonia and Ukraine

Master's Thesis , 2021 , 119 Pages

Politics - General and Theories of International Politics

Corruption as a phenomenon is broadly explored and measured through a variety of different approaches to indicators. Corrupt practices, their causes, and effects vary from country to country. Similarly, the approaches to anti-corruption reforms, their design, and implementation practice differ in different country contexts. While the causes of corruption and their effect on the quality of governance are widely explored, the mechanisms that might influence and determine the functionality and effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms remain an underexplored subject in social sciences. As a consequence, this paper will test different branches of new institutionalist theory against the empirical evidence of the comparative qualitative case study of anti-corruption policies in Ukraine and Estonia.

Given the institutional similarities at the beginning of both countries’ independent political trajectories, Ukraine and Estonia expose differences in how their anti-corruption policies are designed and how effective they are given their institutional context. By comparing the cases of anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine and Estonia, this thesis seeks to provide answers to the following research question: What factors explain the difference in the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Estonia and Ukraine?

On 13 January 2021, a corruption scandal rattled Estonia. The Estonian prime minister, his center party, and the party’s secretary-general were named as suspects in a criminal investigation. The investigation revolved around property development in Estonia’s capital Tallinn. A development project in the city’s port district had received a state loan for enterprises hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. The investigation centered on whether people associated with the government used their political influence to help the developers to receive a large donation in party funds in return. The prime minister eventually resigned over the investigation.

Table of Contents

0. German Thesis Summary

1. Introduction
1.1. Relevance of the Research Topic
1.2. Grounds for a Comparative Case Study
1.3. New Institutionalism as the Guiding Theory
1.4. Research Question
1.5. Structure

2. Corruption as a Phenomenon
2.1. Definition of Corruption
2.2. Different Types of Corruption
2.2.1. Petty Corruption
2.2.2. Grand Corruption
2.3. Conceptualization of Corruption

3. The Theory of New Institutionalism
3.1. New Institutionalism
3.2. Rational Choice Institutionalism
3.3.1. Principal-Agent Theory
3.3.2. Principal-Agent Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context
3.4.1. Collective Action Theory
3.4.2. Collective Action Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context
3.5.1. Historical Institutionalism
3.5.2. Historical Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context
3.6.1. Sociological Institutionalism
3.6.2. Sociological Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context

4. Research Design
4.1. Methodology in Anti-Corruption Studies
4.1.1. Qualitative Anti-Corruption Research
4.1.2. Y-Centered Approaches
4.1.3. Qualitative Case Studies
4.1.4. Comparative Qualitative Case Studies
4.1.5. Process-Tracing as a Method
4.2. Research Design
4.2.1. Overview
4.2.3. Case Selection
4.2.4. Comparative Case Study and Data Sources
4.2.5. Process Tracing
4.2.6. Timeframe
4.2.7. Operationalization
4.2.8. Relevance

5. Case Studies
5.2. Estonia
5.1.1. Political System
5.1.2. Democracy in Estonia
5.2. Case Study on Estonia
5.2.1. Transition into Independence
5.2.2. Transitional Elections and Institutional Changes
5.2.3. Replacement of Soviet Elites
5.2.4. Reforms after Independence
5.2.5. Citizenship Laws
5.2.6. Judicial Reform
5.2.7. Security Police
5.2.8. Administrative Reforms
5.2.9. Privatization and Economic Reforms
5.2.10. Consecutive Governments and Soviet Elites
5.2.11. EU Membership
5.2.12. Cultural Factors
5.2.13. E-Government
5.2.14. Anti-Corruption Legislation
5.2.15. Developments after 2000
5.3. Conclusion on Estonia
5.4. Ukraine
5.4.1. Political System
5.4.2. Democracy in Ukraine
5.4.3. Protest
5.5. Case Study on Ukraine
5.5.1. History of Anti-Corruption Programs and Reforms
5.5.2. Petty Corruption
5.5.3. Anti-Corruption Programs after 2010
5.5.4. Procurement Legislation
5.5.5. Anti-Corruption Legislation
5.5.6. Politicization of State Agencies
5.5.7. Anti-Corruption Reforms from 2014-2020
5.5.8. New Anti-Corruption Agencies
5.5.9. The National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC)
5.5.10. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU)
5.5.11. Obstruction of NABU Investigations
5.5.12. The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)
5.5.13. The Dysfunctionality of SAPO
5.5.14. The High Anti-Corruption Court (HAC)
5.5.15. Obstruction by the Constitutional Court
5.5.16. Deeper Institutional Issues
5.5.17. Privatization and Economic Transformation
5.5.18. The Impact of External Actors
5.5.19. Corruption of Parliamentary Groups
5.5.20. Opposition against Anti-Corruption Policies
5.6. Conclusions on Ukraine
5.6.1. Policies until 2014
5.6.2. Anti-Corruption Agencies after 2014
5.6.3. Systemic Problems

6. Analysis
6.1. Principal-Agent Theory
6.1.1. Application of the Theory
6.1.2. Country Comparison
6.1.3. Evaluation of the Theory
6.2. Collective Action Theory
6.2.1. Application of the Theory
6.2.2. Country Comparison
6.2.3. Evaluation of the Theory
6.3. Historical Institutionalism
6.3.1. Application of the Theory
6.3.2. Country Comparison
6.3.3. Evaluation of the Theory
6.4. Sociological Institutionalism
6.4.1. Application of the Theory
6.4.2. Comparison and Theory Evaluation

7. Final Conclusions
7.1. Control Mechanisms against Corruption
7.2. Universal Anti-Corruption Norms
7.3. Disruption of Historical Continuities
7.4. Effects of External Pressure
7.5. Outlook on Anti-Corruption Research

8. References

9. German Translation of the Table of Contents

0. German Thesis Summary

Die Masterarbeit untersuchte die Frage, welche Faktoren den Unterschied in der Wirksamkeit und Funktionalität von Anti-Korruptionspolitik in Estland und der Ukraine erklären. Das Forschungsziel war es, zu verstehen welche politischen Maßnahmen und Governance-Mechanismen einen schwächenden oder verstärkenden Effekt auf korrupte Praktiken in nationalstaatlichen Kontexten haben.

Um die Forschungsfrage zu beantworten, wurden in einer qualitativen, komparativen und y-zentrierten Fallstudie verschiedene Faktoren identifiziert, die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg der Anti-Korruptionsmaßnahmen in Estland und der Ukraine erklären. Für die Identifizierung der Variablen wurde die ergebnisverfolgende und theorietestende Prozessanalyse eingesetzt. Anhand der neo-institutionellen Theorie wurden die erkannten Wirkungsfaktoren geprüft. Aus den verschiedenen theoretischen Zweigen wurden Hypothesen zu Annahmen über den Erfolg von Anti-Korruptionsmaßnahmen abgeleitet. Der Untersuchungszeitraum für die Forschungsarbeit spannt sich vom Zeitpunkt der Unabhängigkeit beider Fallstudienländer 1991 bis zum Januar 2021.

Die Ukraine und Estland wurden als Fallstudienländer im Rahmen des „Most Similar Systems Design“ gewählt. Beide Länder sind heute Demokratien, die Anfang der 1990er Jahre unabhängig wurden und mit den politischen Institutionen der Sowjetunion beerbt wurden. Allerdings unterscheiden sich die Fallstudienländer stark in Bezug auf die Effektivität ihrer jeweiligen Korruptionsbekämpfungsmaßnahmen. Auf Indizes, welche die Effektivität von Anti-Korruptionspolitik messen, liegt Estland regelmäßig auf den vorderen Plätzen, während die Ukraine von allen post­sowjetischen Demokratien das Schlusslicht bildet.

Die empirische Analyse identifizierte in beiden Länderfällen verschiedene Faktoren, welche die Qualität der Entscheidungsfindung, des Designs und der Implementierung spezifischer Anti-Korruptionsgesetze bedingten. Nach Estlands Unabhängigkeit, reformierte seine neu gewählte, antisowjetische Regierung das politische System grundlegend. Durch die Reformen wurden die politischen sowie administrativen Eliten Estlands ausgewechselt. Mit diesem Elitenwechsel wurden sowjetische und korrupte Kontinuitäten ausgebremst und mit neuen Anti-Korruptionsnormen ersetzt. Der Privatisierungsprozess der ehemalig staatlichen Wirtschaftsbetriebe führte in Estland, anders als in der Ukraine, nicht zur Ausbildung dominanter ökonomischer Eliten, welche den Anti-Korruptionsprozess hätten blockieren können. Stattdessen wurden ökonomische Ressource durch einen größtenteils unvoreingenommenen und transparenten Prozess verteilt. Externe Anreize für effektive Anti­Korruptionsmaßnahmen wie der EU-Beitrittsprozess führten zu einer Stabilisierung des neuen politischen Systems, seinem Personal und Verfahrenspraktiken. In der Ukraine hingegen blieben durch das Fehlen eines grundlegenden Elitenwechsels in Politik und Verwaltung viele korrupte, sowjetische Institutionen erhalten. Der informelle und patrimonial-geregelte Privatisierungsprozess brachte in der Ukraine die Oligarchen als ökonomisch und politisch dominante Akteure hervor. Durch die Einflussnahme der Oligarchen auf Antikorruptionsmaßnahmen kollidieren im Policy- Prozess gegensätzliche politische Interessen. Politische Eliten und Oligarchen streben danach, korrupte Praktiken beizubehalten, während die ukrainische Öffentlichkeit und internationale Akteure zur Bekämpfung der Korruption drängen. Als Ergebnis dieser Kollision werden Anti-Korruptionsmaßnahmen im Gesetzgebungsprozess, bei ihrer Implementierung oder Umsetzung durch bestimmte politischen Akteure blockiert.

Die identifizierten Faktoren wurden mit den abgeleiteten Hypothesen verschiedener Zweige des Neo-Institutionalismus abgeglichen. Alle benutzten Theorien boten unterschiedliche, sich ergänzende Ansätze, um die Ursachen für das Scheitern oder den Erfolg von Anti-Korruptionspolitiken zu analysieren und zu erklären. Die Prinzipal­Agent-Theorie eignet sich als Rahmenwerk zur Analyse der Beziehungen verschiedener politischer Akteuren und die zwischen ihnen bestehenden Kontrollmechanismen zur Umsetzung von Anti-Korruptionsmechanismen. Die kollektive Aktionstheorie erklärt, wie der Einfluss von Normen und Werte Anreize für Individuen und Gruppen setzt, korrupte Praktiken zu unterhalten oder zu unterlassen. Der historische Institutionalismus ermöglicht die Untersuchung von zeitlich markierten Unterbrechungen oder Kontinuitäten der mit Korruption verbundenen Normen. Der soziologische Institutionalismus bietet ein Analysewerkzeug, um die potenziell konfliktschürende Wirkung externer Akteure auf Anti-Korruptionspolitik und ihrer Implementierung zu bestimmen.

Zusammengefasst erkannte die Abschlussarbeit folgenden Wirkungsmechanismus: Im nationalstaatlichen Kontext sind Maßnahmen zur Korruptionsbekämpfung dann wirksam und funktional, wenn Gesellschaft und Amtsträger gleichermaßen das Ziel verfolgen, korrupte Praktiken einzudämmen und institutionelle Mechanismen installieren, die die Rechenschaftspflicht politischer Akteure in Bezug auf Korruptionsakte durchsetzen.

1. Introduction

On 13 January 2021, a corruption scandal rattled Estonia. The Estonian prime minister, his center party, and the party’s secretary-general were named as suspects in a criminal investigation. The investigation revolved around property development in Estonia’s capital Tallinn. A development project in the city’s port district had received a state loan for enterprises hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. The investigation centered on whether people associated with the government used their political influence to help the developers to receive a large donation in party funds in return. The prime minister eventually resigned over the investigation (Milne 2021).

In another country of the former Soviet Union, a different crisis revolving around corruption erupted. On 27 October 2020, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ruled that a law on the obligatory asset declarations by public officials was unconstitutional. The legislation, adopted in 2015, was meant to address the accumulation of wealth of politicians and public servants. As a consequence, Ukraine’s asset declaration system aiming to unveil corrupt practices and penalize unlawful enrichment was abrogated. Some experts stated that the ruling of the Constitutional Court was affected by the judges’ concerns to come under investigation through the anti-corruption legislation. The Court’s rulings drove Ukraine into a political crisis as its president threatened to dissolve the Constitutional Court (Olearchyk 2020; Theise 2020).

Both anecdotal country cases capture different snapshots of the state of anti-corruption measures in Estonia and Ukraine. The Estonian anecdote could make a case that through the Estonian implementation of anti-corruption laws, state authorities hold their politicians accountable. Consequentially, Estonian politicians step down from their office and face legal prosecution. In Ukraine, the anecdote could point to a different assumption. The creation, adoption, and implementation of anti-corruption policies seem to be the root of the conflict between different political actors. These observable inter-institutional struggles might hinder the enforcement of anti-corruption mechanisms.

Anti-corruption policies are put into place to curb corrupt practices in national contexts. This thesis aims to unpack the mechanisms that are responsible for the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Ukraine and Estonia. This paper argues that anti-corruption measures are effective and functional when society and public officials equally pursue decreasing corrupt practices as their goal and install institutional mechanisms that ensure accountability regarding corrupt actions. The core argument of this thesis is derived from the adaptation of new institutionalist theory to analyze anti-corruption policies.

1.1. Relevance of the Research Topic

Corruption can be defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gains (Transparency International 2021). As a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, it can occur on different administrative and political levels. From a citizens’ perspective, corruption can function as a lubricant to make the state machinery run such as through bribery. Public officials can use it as a tool to abuse power, siphon off financial resources and advance their particular interests (Lough and Dubrovskiy 2018).

In the post-soviet context, many countries can be described to be affected by “state capture”. State capture materializes in powerful elite groups that use formal and informal networks in administrative and political institutions to influence the decision­making and thereby advance their particular interests (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003). By exercising special control over law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, power groups in a corrupt political system frequently retain impunity and protect themselves from potential political opponents (World Bank 2000). The prevalence of corrupt practices in a country can hinder the development of a political system that aims at increasing the quality of life by functioning in line with the principles of transparency, accountability, resourcefulness, and the rule of law (General Assembly of the United Nations 2003).

To understand how to improve the governance and accountability of post-soviet states, an analysis of their anti-corruption policies and their implementation is necessary. Exploring the variables that influence the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures can improve the understandings of the mechanisms that impact the (dis)functionality of post-soviet politics and institutions. The analysis of those factors can give hints of where to direct additional research. Additionally, the comprehension of institutional efficiency can inspire policy-makers to improve the policy design in post-soviet states.

1.2. Grounds for a Comparative Case Study

At the beginning of the 1990s, Ukraine and Estonia gained independence from the collapsing Soviet Union. In that transitional period, Estonia and Ukraine inherited the highly bureaucratic, corrupt, and hierarchical institutional structure of the Soviet Union state apparatus (Bowser 2002, 5). Embarking from this institutional default setting, both countries have applied different measures to combat corruption in their states. However, their efforts in applying anti-corruption policies have led to different results.

The “Corruption Perceptions Index” of the non-governmental organization Transparency International (TI) compares the prevalence of corruption using comprehensive expert evaluation. According to the 2020 data of the index, Estonia holds the 17th place among 180 countries ranked from the lowest to the highest perceived level of corruption. Ukraine ranks in the 117th position (Transparency International 2020). Both countries can be categorized as democratic systems (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). However, Ukraine has a much higher level of perceived corruption than Estonia. From all democratic post-soviet countries in the TI Index, Ukraine exposed the highest level of corruption. In comparison, Estonia ranks as the least corrupt post-soviet democracy.

The data from Transparency International’s corruption perception index underlines that Ukraine and Estonia had very different results regarding their anti-corruption reforms and policies. While corruption as a complex phenomenon is widely explored in political sciences, the political measures to decrease corrupt practices underexplored. Hence, this thesis will to qualitatively compare the political measures to curb corruption in both countries. It will trace the paths of how measures to counter corruption have been applied in Estonia and Ukraine. By doing so, this thesis will determine several factors that explain the functionality and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in both countries. It will then proceed to test them against the backdrop of a theoretical framework.

1.3. New Institutionalism as the Guiding Theory

To explore generalizable mechanisms of effective and functional anti-corruption mechanisms, different branches of “new institutionalism” will be applied as the theoretical framework. It will serve to analyze the similarities and differences in the prevalent mechanisms in both country cases.

New institutionalism is an approach in social sciences that can be utilized to investigate and analyze the interplay between political actors, organizations, and institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937). Through the lens of new institutionalism, institutions can be seen as rules of a game and political actors as the games’ players (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 311).

Different theories based on new institutionalism do not only center around formal structures. They also explore how informal rules influence the dynamics of political organizations, determine the behavior of political actors, and influence political decisions and outcomes (Koelble et al. 1995, 236). New institutional theory can serve as a tool to analyze the effect of a diversity of institutions on political organizations and actors. The theory has also found application in the field of anti-corruption studies. When utilized for the analysis of empirical cases, different branches of the new institutionalist theory can provide explanations for the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption measures.

1.4. Research Question

Corruption as a phenomenon is broadly explored and measured through a variety of different approaches to indicators. Corrupt practices, their causes, and effects vary from country to country. Similarly, the approaches to anti-corruption reforms, their design, and implementation practice differ in different country contexts. While the causes of corruption and their effect on the quality of governance are widely explored, the mechanisms that might influence and determine the functionality and effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms remain an underexplored subject in social sciences. As a consequence, this paper will test different branches of new institutionalist theory against the empirical evidence of the comparative qualitative case study of anti­corruption policies in Ukraine and Estonia.

Given the institutional similarities at the beginning of both countries’ independent political trajectories, Ukraine and Estonia expose differences in how their anti­corruption policies are designed and how effective they are given their institutional context. By comparing the cases of anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine and Estonia, this thesis seeks to provide answers to the following research question:

What factors explain the difference in the effectiveness and functionality of anti­corruption policies in Estonia and Ukraine?

1.5. Structure

This first introductory chapter gives an overview of the thesis research interest. It shortly accounts for the chosen empirical cases, the theory used in the paper, its main arguments, and the thesis’ research question.

The second chapter explores and defines corruption as a phenomenon. It explains how corruption is generally defined and what different types of corruption exist.

In the third chapter, the theory of new institutionalism is introduced. The chapter elaborates on its different branches including rational choice institutionalism, principal­agent theory, collective action theory, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. After introducing the different theoretical branches, the distinct theories are modeled to make predictions about the effectiveness and functionality of anti­corruption measures. These predictions serve to formulate the different hypotheses this paper will later analytically scrutinize.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the research design of this paper. First, the different methodologies used in the field of anti-corruption studies will be highlighted. Thereupon, the research methodology and design of this paper are be introduced.

The fifth chapter covers the empirical case studies of Estonia and Ukraine. For each case study, the country’s political and social contexts will first be introduced. Then, the effects of different anti-corruption policies in both countries are traced. Finally, different factors relating to the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption measures are identified.

The sixth chapter applies the different branches of new institutionalism to the empirical evidence of the case study. Thereupon, the different factors of the two cases are compared with each other against the backdrop of the anti-corruption theories and their hypotheses. The applicability of the theories to anti-corruption studies is likewise evaluated.

In the seventh and last chapter of this paper, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed. Finally, the chapter provides an outlook of the usefulness of this thesis’ conclusions for further anti-corruption research.

2. Corruption as a Phenomenon

This chapter offers an overview of how the concept of corruption is defined and conceptualized. It first explores different perspectives of framing the phenomenon of corruption. Thereupon, it distinguishes between different types of corruption such as “petty” and “grand” corruption. Finally, it outlines how corruption will be conceptualized for this particular paper.

2.1. Definition of Corruption

Corruption is an umbrella concept that stands for many different aspects and manifestations of the same phenomenon. The root of the word stems from its Latin origins “corrumpere” which means to break, spoil, bribe, counterfeit or seduce (Arnim and Bannenberg 2003, 283). Corruption as a concept is scrutinized through a variety of social sciences including economics, sociology and jurisprudence. When observed through the lens of political science, corruption can be defined in different ways. Hence, no universally applicable definition of corruption exists. To use the term adequately, it has to be defined in accordance with the political and social context under which the phenomenon is inspected.

Most broadly, corruption is defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 2021). Many articles about corruption use an iteration of this definition as a starting point to build their own definition. The simplicity of that definition makes it versatile and applicable to many empirical observations. However, its short form leaves conceptual gaps to be filled to precisely pinpoint the manifestations of corruption. Only when further exploring what the misuse of public power for private profit by different actors specifically means, the definition of corruption can be fully operationalized and applied to empirical contexts. Therefore, the misuse of power has to be measured against legal or normative standards of the legitimate use of public power. Also, the actors and actions connected with acts of corruption have to be closely regarded and defined. Further descriptions of corruption offer alternative ways to fill the conceptual gaps of the introduced definitions.

One line of definitions of corruption stresses the legal conditionality for corruption. This definition underlines that engaging in corrupt activities requires illegal methods. Thus, a breach in legislation has to occur to qualify certain actions as the misuse of public office for private gains (Jain 2001, 73). In line with this definition, the role actors concerned with corruption are closer defined as public officials, bureaucrats, legislators and politicians. These actors use the power delegated to them by the public to further their own or other private economic interests at the expense of the public welfare.

Other definitions explore further angles of how to characterize the misuse of power. In the political science branch of corruption literature, the misuse of power is commonly decoded “as a holder of public office violating the impartiality principle in order to achieve a private gain” (Kurer 2005, 230). This addition to the standard definition requires further exploration of impartiality in a political context. Acting impartially entails disregarding special relationships and personal preferences as an individual holding public office (Rothstein 2011, 230). Actors in a position of power act impartially when their intentions and actions are untouched by particular and personal interests. Political impartiality requires institutional independence meaning the political actors’ and organizations’ ability to exercise their authority without being influenced by external particular interests (Gregory 2015, 129).

Corruption can also be conceptualized through a negative definition. It then describes acts and practices that deviate from certain legal and social norms regarded as central for democratic governance. In a much-cited definition, Joseph Nye defines corruption as “behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private­regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967, 419). According to this definition, corruption encompasses behavior that diverges from the ideal duties of public office to private interests. It also refers to breaches of laws and regulations that address corruption directly.

Nye furthermore explains that corruption can manifest in different types of behavior termed bribery, nepotism and misappropriation. Bribery is defined as a reward to change the judgment of a person in a position of trust. Nepotism is seen as an award of patronage because of personal and attributed relationships rather than merit. The term misappropriation is coined as an illegal appropriation of public resources for private uses (Nye 1967, 419). All of these different types of corruption help to distinguish more specific and different categories of corrupt behavior within the broader context of corruption definitions.

To correctly conceptualize and operationalize the term corruption, discerning it from other terms related to criminal offenses is necessary. Illegal acts such as fraud, money laundering, drug trading and black markets cannot be defined as acts of corruption if they do not involve the use and abuse of public power. However, when these activities implicate public officials engaging in criminal activities they inherently constitute acts of corruption since public power is abused for illegal ends. Many illegal operations cannot survive sustainably without the support of public officials. Therefore, corruption can serve as an enabler for different forms of criminal activity (Jain 2001, 73). Drawing from this line of arguments, acts of corruption have to be clearly distinguished from other criminal activities to correctly categorize and analyze corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

2.2. Different Types of Corruption

Corruption can look differently and also occur in different fields of administrative or governmental activity. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between “petty” and “grand corruption”. Both terms describe activities where public power is abused for private gain. However, there are significant differences in the level of authority, the forms of corruption, the involved actors, the abilities to measure these different forms of corruption and the approaches to combat the diversity of corrupt practices that come from them.

2.2.1. Petty Corruption

The term “petty corruption” is used to describe the engagement of private citizens in dealing with low-level government bureaucrats. Petty corruption can take many forms and occur in different spaces and contexts. Usually, acts of petty corruption can be characterized as small bribes that are paid in return for specific privileges or services provided by the government (Mashali 2012, 777). Petty corruption occurs where citizens and public servants interact. The term “pettiness“ refers to the size of each transaction made and not the total impact of the corrupt actions on government income or policies (Scott 1972, 66).

Even though the term “petty corruption” might suggest that petty corruption could be a less significant problem than grand corruption, there is different evidence that it can equally harm the quality of governance in different countries (Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasiritousi 2009). When exploring the causes of petty corruption, the direct incentives for bureaucrats to take bribes and engage in corruption are analyzed. Petty corruption is simpler to identify since it becomes visible and measurable through the perceptions and experiences of countries' population in their everyday lives.

2.2.2. Grand Corruption

“Grand corruption” refers to a different type of corruption. The most distinguishable difference are the actors that engage in political or grand corruption. Usually, they take the positions of mid- or high-level public officials. Thus, grand corruption takes place at the upper echelons of the political system and refers to political decision-makers that create and enforce laws. When engaging in grand corruption, politicians and high-level officials utilize different schemes to sustain and increase their power, status and financial assets (Amundsen, 3).

In contrast to petty corruption, the private benefit in grand corruption is not derived from an illicit transaction from an individual to a state servant. Political corruption encompasses the illegitimate conversion from collective goods into private payoffs of public sector actors (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002, 6). When committing an act of grand corruption, public officials deviate from their role as policy makers that serve the interest of the public. Instead, they either create or implement policies that benefit their own private gains. At the same time, these officials pay little attention to the needs of the public living with the consequences of their policy choices (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997, 519).

In terms of the legislation passed by public officials, corruption can also be challenging to identify and prove. Without direct evidence of private interests, it is hard to draw the line between political mismanagement and policies that are directed by corrupt intentions. In broader terms, looking at grand corruption it is more challenging to identify and measure corruption. Many corruption schemes are hidden from the public eye. Investigative journalism and legal investigations can unveil corrupt practices (Mashali 2012, 778). However, political corruption is more difficult to perceive and measure than petty corruption, since a smaller group of people interested in discretion is involved.

Regardless of the empirical observations, political corruption can affect how decisions are made. Furthermore, it can lead to the obstruction of political organizations and their rules of procedure. These processes can leave damage to the political system and cause institutional decay. Different than bureaucratic corruption, political corruption does not constitutive the disregard of formal legal norms and institutionalized processes. Rather “grant corruption” can lead to the disregard of laws and regulations abusing the political system to tailor it to individual interests (Amundsen, 3f.).

Therefore, political corruption can be defined as a deviation from the rational-legal principles of statehood supported by weak accountability between public officials and the general public.

An extreme form of misuse of public office, the state apparatus or government is defined as “state capture”. State capture describes a state in which politicians and public servants collaborate to use the state and its resources for their private income and benefits (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003). State capture and grand corruption require coordination between policy makers and administrators. Different political and administrative actors develop common practices to engage in corruption schemes. Therefore, many authors in the corruption literature argue that personal ties between different groups of administrators and politicians, increase the likeliness of corruption. Contrarily, isolating administrators and decision-makers is a strategy suggested to obstruct the creation of corruption networks resulting in state capture (Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012).

2.3. Conceptualization of Corruption

This thesis regards corruption as the misuse of public power by public officials for private gains. Corruption is seen as the misuse of power by political actors will be defined as the violation of the impartiality principle to achieve private benefits by putting personal preferences and special relationships over public duties. Furthermore, given the corresponding anti-corruption legislation, corruption is seen as a deviation from legal and political norms inscribed in laws and regulations. Corruption has to be distinguished from other forms of criminal activities. Thus, the differentiation between “petty” and “grand corruption” will be utilized to specify the level and type of actors involved in corruption. While “petty corruption” involves low officials and mostly occurs at the intersection of private and public sector interactions, “grand corruption” involves high-level public officials such as politicians and administrators abusing their public office by writing legislation or using funds for their private interests. Both concepts are employed to distinguish between the visibility of corrupt practices and to determine how these specific forms of corruption affect citizens.

3. The Theory of New Institutionalism

In social sciences, “new institutionalism” is an approach to investigate political organizations and analyze the interplay between political actors and institutions.

Different theoretical schools of thought within the sphere of new institutionalism allow to develop and test different explanatory approaches for political organizations, their dynamics and actions. The different streams of the theory enable explaining political institutions and organizations from individual, collective, historical, sociological perspectives. The different streams of new institutionalism will be used to explain the dynamics and effects of political organizations on political actors and individuals in the context of anti-corruption policies. Against the backdrop of the qualitative comparative case study, the different branches of new institutionalism theory are going to be tested for explanatory power. These branches include:

- Rational choice institutionalism to explain mechanisms for corrupt behavior in individuals;
- Principal-agent theory as a sub-theory of rational choice theory explaining the dynamics amid different actors and the conditions for their pursuit or abstention from corrupt actions;
- Collective action theory as another branch of rational choice theory that covers the presence or absence of collective accountability regarding corrupt actions;
- Historical institutionalism to explain the conditions for reforms and changes in regard to the development of organizations and the institutions aiming to decrease corrupt practices;
- Sociological institutionalism providing a norm-oriented and values-based framework to understand the effects of external influences on institutions in an anti-corruption context.

In the research field of corruption and anti-corruption studies, the various approaches in new institutionalism have been utilized to provide explanatory power to the phenomenon of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Therefore, this theoretical chapter will introduce both, the general theoretical frameworks and their specific iterations adapted to the evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Later on in this paper, the method of process tracing will be utilized to test these theories against both of the case studies to identify similarities and differences within the explanatory power they can provide. Whether the different branches of new institutionalism deem to apply to both case studies will determine their explanatory power. Eventually, the different theories will help to evaluate the causes and effects that determine the efficacy of anti-corruption policies in the scrutinized cases.

This thesis seeks to answer the research question: What factors explain the difference in the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Estonia and Ukraine? Using the assumptions of new institutionalist theory, the research question could also be: Which formal and informal institutions influenced the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Estonia and Ukraine?

This chapter will introduce different theories of new institutionalism. First of all, the general theory and its history will be described. Thereupon, the three abovementioned main schools and their sub-theories of new institutionalist theory will be described. In each of the sections, the theoretical branches will first be explained. Thereupon, a modified version of the theory will be introduced to provide an explanatory framework for the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption measures. From the modified theories, different hypotheses will be derived. In the latter analytical part of the thesis, these hypotheses will be tested against the factors found in the empirical case studies. There, the theories will be tested against the explanatory variables derived from process tracing the effectiveness and functionality of anti-corruption policies in Ukraine and Estonia.

3.1. New Institutionalism

A significant branch of social sciences focuses on investigating institutions and organizations. The so-called “old institutionalism” focuses on formal rules, administrative activities, and characteristics of organizations (Stinchcombe 1997, 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, behavioral approaches in social sciences changed how institutions were perceived regarding their influences on social and political effects (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937). As a result, new forms of institutionalist theories emerged and focused on new and different aspects of institutional dynamics.

In the context of new institutionalism, the term” institution” is not understood in its colloquial sense as “a large and important organization such as a university or bank” (Cambridge Dictionary 2021). Instead, institutions are defined as specific rules guiding and organizing political behavior and processes (Steinmo 2001, 560). Drawing on that definition, institutions are norms that create actions and behavior binding to their respective recipient actors (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 203).

New institutionalist theories do not only regard formal structures of organizations but also focus on how informal rules influence the dynamics of political organizations, the behavior of political actors and their decisions. The theory assumes that institutions inform the preferences and goals of political actors. Furthermore, their decisions and behavior are influenced by the distribution of power among them and therefore shape the outcomes of political processes (Koelble et al. 1995, 236). In the context of new institutionalism, organizations are no longer perceived as efficient, rational and utility­maximizing structures, but also as a product of their societal, social and cultural environments (Bentele and Sandhu 2012, 75). New institutionalism holds the notion that institutions enable and restrict the activity of political or administrative actors, without completely determining it (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 304).

New institutional theory can serve as a tool to analyze the effect of different institutions on political actors and organizations. Metaphorically speaking, institutions be seen as rules of a game and political actors can be viewed as the game’s players (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 311). In this context, the game and the players’ behavior is determined by formal rules such as constitutions and laws as well as informal institutions such as values, norms, routines, social structures and perception patterns. In this understanding, the shape institutions take can be determined by normative, legal, regulative, social and cultural elements.

In the context of new institutionalism, corruption can be described as an informal institution that guides the expectations and behavior among different individuals and political actors. Corruption can be seen as a deviation from the formal rules, but it also can be regarded as an informal system of institutions. Setting the rules of an informal game, corruption serves as an organizational framework that structures the relationships and behavior between political actions (Teorell 2007, 2). New institutionalism can highlight the dynamics between different sets of formal and informal rules. Even though different forms of rules or institutions can sometimes directly contradict each other, actors in the political system consider them when deciding on how to inform their behavior. As a result, new institutionalism can help to explore how corruption disrupts and organizes societies and how anti-corruption measures seek to change the institutions that lead to corrupt practices.

3.2. Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism originated from the academic intersection between economics and sociology. The theory understands individuals, their decisions and behavior through the model of the “homo economicus”. This concept assumes that human beings act rationally and narrowly self-interested. The “homo economicus” seeks to maximize its benefits to reach its subjectively defined goals, while minimizing the costs to do so. Accordingly, individuals act in congruence to their individual and strategic interests (Wiechmann 2019, 169).

Rational choice theory uses the individualist model of the “homo economicus” to explain socio-political outcomes as the aggregation of individual decisions. The theory aims to establish explanations for societal and political consequences of individuals pursuing their particular goals (Cairney 2020, 79). Thus, rational choice institutionalism is built on the assumption that individual actors strive to align their behavior to a set of preferences that serves their self-interests. Individuals act to maximize the attainment of these preferences strategically through the calculation of the different options guided by institutions (Goodin and Tilly 2006, 172). Putting individual behavior into a larger perspective, rational choice theorists see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas. By striving to maximize the attainment of their personal preferences, individuals produce collective outcomes that deviate from the ideal set of outcomes of their societies. (Hall and Taylor 1996, 944f.). Therefore, the individual pursuit of interests collides with the attainment of larger societal or political goals.

Rational choice institutionalism seeks to explain the role of institutions as mechanisms to manage conflict between individual and collective behavior and goals. According to the model, institutions provide structuring boundaries that are taken into account by individuals when pursuing their rational and preference-optimizing goals (Wiechmann 2019, 169). As a structural framework of formal rule systems, institutions guide and structure the behavior of individual actors. They can provide incentives for specific behavioral avenues according to the goal an institution seeks to attain. The violation of certain rules can be sanctioned. However, actors might be emboldened to breach institutional rules and deviate from formal norms through informal practices and gaps in institutional surveillance systems (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 307). At the core of rational institutionalism lies the assumption that behavioral choices made by individuals can be influenced by the institutional framework surrounding them. Institutions create limiting conditions on the behavior of individuals when they act in pursuit of their preferences and to maximize the utility of their own actions.

3.3.1. Principal-Agent Theory

Principal-agent theory grew out of the theoretical foundations and main assumptions of rational choice institutionalism. It emerged from interdisciplinary approaches between economics and institutional theory (Braun and Guston 2003, 302f.). The principal-agent model describes how relationships between different actors are shaped by their hierarchical position and information asymmetries.

Within this model, the principal holds decision-making power and delegates the execution of certain tasks to the agent. Thus, the principal makes decisions and passes on tasks, resources and power to act to the agent. The agent receives instructions from the principal and is responsible for carrying them out. Consequently, the agent is contracted by the principal and is supposed to act as the principal’s proxy. The actions of the agent are bound to the rules and instructions that are handed down by the principal (Waterman and Meier 1998, 173). However, due to the agent’s role in carrying out the tasks, the agent also possesses more information about the process than the principal. As a result, agents can select which information is disclosed to the principal and which is withheld. Therefore, the relationship between the principal and agent is shaped by information asymmetries (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013, 4).

When the interests of the principal and the agent diverge conflicts between their interests can arise. An agent can decide to deviate from the principal’s instructions and act differently when its interest does not align with the principal’s. In that situation, the agent can withhold information from the principal. Thus, the principal might delegate tasks to the agent but never learn that the agent does not act accordingly. The information asymmetries produced through these dynamics lead to difficulties in holding agents accountable for their actions. When the principal is not able to fully monitor the actions of the agent, the agent gains venues to pursue its own interest. Accountability for the agent’s actions can be created by providing institutional venues to incentivize rule conformity of the agent. However, the creation of mechanisms for sanctions and incentives might also be hindered by the principal’s relative lack of information about the deviating behavior of the agents (Cairney 2020, 134).

3.3.2. Principal-Agent Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context

Corruption and its practices are commonly viewed through the lens of the principal­agent model (Aidt 2003; Teorell 2007). In the context of the principal-agent framework, corruption can occur when an agent betrays the principal’s interests and delegated tasks in pursuit of her or his self-interest. The agent can deceive the principal and deviate from the delegated tasks through the lack of accountability created by information asymmetries.

There are two main approaches to conceptualize the principal-agent model in the context of corruption. In the first instance, political decision-makers take the position of principals. As politicians, they task and monitor the actions of public servants or bureaucrats that act as agents. However, they often lack the mechanisms to monitor the agents’ actions. As a result, public servants use their power over resources to extract rents when given the chance of maximizing their benefits (Marquette and Peiffer 2015, 3). This approach is attributed to the type of “petty corruption” since in this case corruption occurs in the process of carrying out administrative tasks.

The second conceptualization of the model offers a different attribution of the positions of principals and agents. Here, the general public is characterized as the principal while public officials such as politicians and bureaucrats take on the role of the agents. As agents, public servants have to put interests and demands of the general public into political actions. Yet, being the agents of the public will, public officials are able to abuse their office. For instance, they can use their access to public resources to secure private benefits. On the other side, the public is unable to monitor and hold public officials accountable due to a potential lack of information on their corrupt conduct (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013, 4f.). This model can be characterized as “political corruption” since in this iteration corruption occurs within the political elites that hold decision-making power.

Anti-Corruption models within the context of the principal-agent approach focus on increasing sanctions for corrupt conduct. These measures intend to increase the decrease in incentives to engage in corrupt actions. Also, they aim to lower the preference for benefit-maximizing greed leading to the abuse of office (Rothstein 2011, 231). Institutional control mechanisms can serve as instruments to reduce the agents’ incentives to engage in corrupt actions and to decrease their level of discretion. Mainly this would include limitations to the power and resource monopoly of agents and increasing their level of accountability in the system (Klitgaard 2009). Concrete policy measures to decrease corruption include mechanisms to monitor, increase accountability, promote governmental and administrative transparency, improving sanctions on corruption offenses and supporting civil society groups acting as watchdogs to corruption (Marquette and Peiffer 2015, 3). All of these suggested measures have the goal to increase the alignment of the actions of agents with their respective principal.

When putting principal-agent theory in the context of analyzing anti-corruption measures, the following hypothesis for the effectiveness of corruption measures can be derived:

H1: Opportunities for corrupt practices decrease when principals introduce mechanisms that limit the agents’ monopoly over power, information flows, and the allocation of resources. Corrupt practices decrease when principals ensure the accountability of agents by monitoring their actions with transparency mechanisms, and by introducing sanctions against corruption offenses.

3.4.1. Collective Action Theory

Collective action theory is rooted in rational choice institutionalism. It is based on the model of the “homo economicus” who maximizes personal use and reduces the costs of her or his actions. Collective action theory was developed by Mancur Olson in “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965). Its main assumption stems from the deviation of individual behavior from common goals. It assumes that the existence of common interests within groups of rational individuals does not guarantee the realization of their collective interests. Collective action theory argues that rational behavior by individuals cannot ensure the achievement of group objectives (Olson 1965, 1f.). Even if a collective of individuals would benefit from achieving their common interest, group members do not necessarily act in line with these interests. Instead, they prioritize their individual interests and therefore limit or completely hinder any contribution to collective goals. The theory argues that the rational, selfish and opportunistic behavior of individuals prevents the feasibility of achieving collective goals.

Other important concepts associated with collective action theory are public goods and the free ride problem. Public goods are defined as resources that are non-excludable meaning no one can be excluded from enjoying their benefits. A typical example of non-excludable goods would be public roads (Cairney 2020, 134). To be accessible public good must be produced and provided for through organizations. All members of a group have access to a collective good, even if they do not contribute to its provision. This results in the “free rider” problem. The “free ride” phenomenon describes individuals taking advantage of collective goods without individually carrying the costs of them. Given this behavioral model, individuals increase their benefits of using goods while minimizing their costs of use by their lack of contribution of its production maintenance (Runge 1984).

Collective action theory argues that in larger groups the incentives to contribute towards the production or maintenance of collective goods are reduced when individuals anticipate that others will free ride on their efforts. Equally, individuals will opt to free ride when their participation or abstention from the production of collective goods will not affect their ability to benefit from it (Marquette and Peiffer 2015, 3). Different from principal-agent theory, collective action theory assumes that all actors - regardless of their role as principals or agents - strive to maximize their self-interest. In terms of collection action theory, rationality is founded on the dependent and shared expectations about the actions of other individuals and society as a whole (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013, 5).

Collective action theory seeks to explain the effects of accumulated individual actions on society and governance. While isolated individual actions make little difference to the functioning of state systems and governance, the sum of rational individual behavior produces effects that might cause difficulties to the production of public goods. Although a group of people might share a common goal, this shared interest does not ensure collective action towards its achievement. The absence of incentives to contribute to collective action decreases the probability of the production of public goods and inhibits acting for collective group interests (Olson 1965, 51). Therefore, collective action problems are used as justification for governmental intervention through the provision of collectively binding institutional pathways in the form of laws and regulations. Providing institutional solutions for collective action problems can bring about their own, inherent challenges. Rather than crafting institutional systems that work towards collective goals, governments and civil servants might likewise act in their personal interests (Cairney 2020, 134). These interests might often diverge from the common goals of the general public exposed to the policies and laws of decision-makers.

3.4.2. Collective Action Theory in an Anti-Corruption Context

Collection action theory underlines the significance of individual behavior concerning group dynamics, trust in other individuals and the social expectations towards their behavior. Using collective action theory as a framework to understand corruption, corrupt behavior can be regarded as an act of free-riding (Marquette and Peiffer 2015, 3). In terms of corruption, free-riding can be seen as the engagement in corrupt behavior to use and abuse the resources provided by holding public office for private gain. Therefore, corrupt actors put private interests ahead of larger societal objectives. Good governance as a collective benefit is diminished through corrupt behavior.

Corruption thrives in an institutional environment that cannot provide accountability due to a lack of transparency as well as legal and social mechanisms to halt corrupt practices. If corruption is seen as the expected behavior by all individuals of a group or society, few actors will be willing to take on the role of controlling corruption or holding corrupt actors accountable. Effective anti-corruption reforms aim to install institutional frameworks that incentivize behavior beneficial to society as a whole (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013, 5f.). Laws, regulations and political institutions aiming to inhibit corruption seek to make individual behavior universally accountable and provide incentives to act in accordance with collective, societal goals.

The hypothesis deduced from collective action theory in an anti-corruption context reads as follows:

H2: When measures that install transparency as well as legal and social accountability are introduced, corruption decreases. To be effective and functional, these policies have to create universally applicable and socially expected anti-corruption norms that incentivize their pursuit for individuals and societal groups.

3.5.1. Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is a branch of new institutionalism that focuses on how the timing of collectively binding decisions shapes institutions. The theory also concentrates on how these decisions influence change and continuity in human behavior (Voeten 2019, 155). Contrary from rational choice theory that focuses on the effects of individual behavior on society at large, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of moments in history where the introduction of different institutional alternatives is possible. In these moments the outcome of a situation is open, while the institutional choices made at that point have significant and consequential effects that are hard to reverse (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343). Historical institutionalism views institutions as formal rules established at historic moments in time that continuously structure behavior, outcomes and conflict. The main concepts covered by the theory include “historical contingency”, “critical junctures”, and “path dependence”.

“Historical contingency” refers to the degree to which past decisions and events shape the institutions that influence present practices. In hindsight, decisions made in past moments often seem to be deterministic. The concept of historical contingency highlights that various, sometimes unpredictable causes might impact the way that historic events unroll and institutions are established. In this frame, the historic course of events does not necessarily have to be determined by systemic and generalizable mechanisms, but also by unexplainable, random events and chance (Immergut 2006, 246).

The concept of “critical junctures” refers to the moment in time when structural indeterminacy leaves several options for institutional innovation open. At the point of structural indeterminacy, certain decisions or events have a significant effect on the development and solidification of specific institutional designs and paths. As a consequence, the emergence of institutions in critical junctures can leave long-lasting legacies in shaping individual and collective behavior (Capoccia 2016, 104).

The term “path dependence” stands for the process in which an institution or structure prevails permanently after a specific decision in time forms the successive trajectory of events. As already established institutions shape the behavioral patterns of individuals and organizations, the likeliness for alternative or competing institutional designs and patterns decreases. Even if alternative institutions show the prospect of being more efficient than the established ones, they are less likely to succeed due to institutional habituation leading to the continuation of established customs and practices (Fioretos 2011, 376). Though choosing a different path is not impossible, it becomes increasingly costly to do so. As an effect, regardless of their efficiency of introducing alternative institutions, they are more likely to remain stable and unchangeable for long periods of time (Cairney 2020, 76).

According to the concept of path dependence, institutions influence the practices of individual and collective actors. Therefore, the course that is set throughout critical junctures determines the development of institutions and their effects on actors. The establishment of institutional frameworks and informal practices such as established routines guided by social norms lead to the repetition and strengthening of certain practices. When confronted with problems and crises, societal and political actors tend to rely on established solutions and strategies. Thus, in historical institutionalism, institutions are structures that sustainably guide preferences and behavioral trajectories for actors.

3.5.2. Historical Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context

Historical institutionalism is a useful framework to analyze the institution of corruption and the political efforts to combat it. These efforts manifest in the implementation of reforms or the creation of political organizations at the point of critical junctures. These political measures can have long-lasting effects through the mechanism of path dependence. Historical institutionalism can be utilized to analyze institutional continuity, contingence and disruption regarding institutions and political organizations put into place to combat corruption. Through its different concepts and assumptions, historical institutionalism can help to scrutinize the emergence or absence of effective anti-corruption institutions in the face of already established, path-dependent institutions that produce corrupt practices and ensure their continuity. Furthermore, it can help understand why certain reform efforts that occurred at critical junctures of the development of political systems caused the decrease or increase of corruption in the later trajectory of the countries’ institutional development (Di Mascio, Maggetti, and Natalini 2020; Hellmann 2017; Rothstein 2011).

Drawing from the theory of historical institutionalism the following hypotheses can be derived:

H3.1: During the point of a critical juncture such as a country’s transition to independence, the established corrupt institutional systems, paths and structures have to be disrupted and replaced to set up effective and functional anti-corruption institutions.

H3.2: If, after experiencing a critical juncture, the decision-makers of a corrupt political system rely on continuities relating to its structures, public servants and political institutions, corrupt practices will be maintained or accelerated.

3.6.1. Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is a product of organization theory in social sciences. March and Olsen shaped the notion that not only rational and formal rules but also norms and values within organizations influence individual and collective behavior (1983). Unlike rational choice theory, sociological institutionalism rejects the notion that political behavior is explicable through the preferences and choices of individuals and their societal effects (March and Olsen 1983, 739). Rather, the theory argues that the process of socialization shapes and informs the thoughts, preferences and decisions of individuals and organizations. Socialization is defined as the internalization of norms and ideologies in an external environment assuring cultural continuity within societies (Macionis 2014, 126).

The focus of sociological institutionalism is organizations and institutions as collective actors instead of individual behavior. It, therefore, defines political structures as collections of „institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, building, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals” (March and Olsen 1983, 741). These structures are determined by different rules and act as orientation points for political actors. Socialization serves as the mechanism that transmits the “rules of appropriateness” associated to different institutions. These rules are followed because they are perceived as socially expected, rightful and legitimate (March and Olsen 1983, 739).

In the perspective of sociological institutionalism, rational thought and action is socially constructed and determined by external norms. The recognition of problems and suggestions for solutions is shaped by subjective perceptions and different socialization patterns of political actors (Hall and Taylor 1996, 949). Through the lens of sociological institutionalism, developments in institutions are not rational and efficient or determined by the change of the external environment. They are determined by political actors that make collectively binding decisions with limited rationality driven by subjective views.

Sociological institutionalism does not define institutional change as a rational problem­solving process that sets goals and measures results. Institutional transformations are regarded as the incremental development of adaptation to change in external conditions. Change in institutions is therefore determined by the unclear and varying intentions of different actors that are subject to change (Zuber and Kaiser 2016, 311). Throughout the process of change, different approaches are explored by institutional actors as multiple paths for collective action are available.

The idea that institutions have evolved to represent the most efficient way of problem­solving is rejected within sociological institutionalism. Institutions are perceived to be partially autonomous to changes in external surroundings. Sociological institutionalism suggests that political institutions can adapt to new, external dynamics and changes, whereas they maintain an internal culture as shared attitudes or values determine their development (Hall and Taylor 1996, 947).

3.6.2. Sociological Institutionalism in an Anti-Corruption Context

In the context of corruption, sociological institutionalism is utile to explain why corrupt practices are not necessarily diminished through changes in the external environment and the formal functions of institutions. Sociological institutionalism can explain cases where anti-corruption reforms failed or succeeded due to cultural continuity or disruption within political institutions. The theory can help to trace cultural continuities or disruptions in processes of change and reform of political organizations and institutions. Therefore, the theory can provide a framework to analyze the relationship between culture and the efficiency or failure of anti-corruption reforms and policies. In societies where corruption is nurtured as socially acceptable behavior, externally driven reforms to challenge the status quo might be more difficult to enforce (Johannsen and Pedersen 2012, 132). The theory can explain how attitudes towards norms such as the practice of corruption prevalent in post-soviet countries can determine the degree of effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms.

The hypothesis derived from sociological institutionalism states:

H4: Anti-corruption reforms will be inefficient and dysfunctional if their implementation and design are mainly driven by external pressures that contradict the internalized norms of organizations, public servants and political decision-makers.

4. Research Design

This chapter will introduce the research design and the methodology for the empirical part of the thesis. It will further explain why this particular methodological approach was chosen to answer the research question. To do so, it will first give a short overview of the employment of qualitative research in anti-corruption studies. The chapter will then proceed to explain the concepts of qualitative research, y-centered research designs, comparative case studies and process tracing. In its second part, the research design for this paper will be outlined, explained and justified.

4.1. Methodology in Anti-Corruption Studies

This part will give an overview of the research methods and approaches that will be employed in this paper. It will introduce the utilized methods and their expediency to anti-corruption research.

4.1.1. Qualitative Anti-Corruption Research

Qualitative analyses on anti-corruption reforms usually contain case studies of specific countries. These studies often trace the process of anti-corruption measures and what determined their functionality, success, and effectiveness. Many of these studies examine individual countries or a set of countries with similar institutional contexts or reform measures (Doig and Riley 1998; Jong-Sung You 2017; Patricio Navia, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, and Maira Martini 2017). Qualitative studies in the field of anti­corruption research focus on tracing the factors that might have determined the process of curbing corruption in certain cases. They specifically examine countries that have evolved from corrupt to good governance. The qualitative studies then investigate how the level of corrupt practices has been lowered through different policy measures or political and societal changes.

Most qualitative case studies focus on individual cases. Nevertheless, some studies also qualitatively compare nations that can be grouped together due to similar characteristics (Quah 1999). Through process tracing, the variables affecting the success or failures of different anti-corruption measures are identified in relation to the individual countries in the group. In the consecutive step, the studies compare the prevalence or absence of the identified country-specific variables impacting the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Sometimes, different variables are tested against theories and their hypothetical assumptions. In other cases, theories and new hypotheses are generated from the identification of specific factors determining the success or failure of anti-corruption reforms. Process tracing allows recognizing the contextual and processual differences and similarities within the process to derive conclusions about the mechanisms responsible for the success of anti-corruption measures (Doig and Riley 1998; Jong-Sung You 2017; Patricio Navia, Alina Mungiu- Pippidi, and Maira Martini 2017).

4.1.2. Y-Centered Approaches

This thesis will employ a y-centered research design as a method to test its hypotheses against the empirical cases of anti-corruption policies. Y-centered research designs try to decipher a phenomenon as completely as possible. They do so by identifying any causes that may cause the scrutinized phenomenon or impact the variance of the phenomena across different observations or points in time. Y-centered designs are thus focused on their dependent variable and look for their determining factors. Thus, the goal of y-centered approach is to identify the independent variables affecting the dependent variable scrutinized (Blatter, Langer, and Wagemann 2018, 241).

4.1.3. Qualitative Case Studies

Case studies are defined as an intense study of single cases that aim to investigate or detect generalizable causal mechanisms. Case studies are chosen as a research strategy when internal validity is preferred over the external validity of the scrutinized phenomenon. In this instance, the focus would be on gathering evidence that supports claims about causes and effects within the context of the case study. However, the identified mechanisms would not be applied outside the context of the conducted case study. Thus, in case studies, instead of solely looking at causal effects. causal mechanisms are the center of the research focus (John Gerring 2009, 24). Due to the low number of cases, an in-depth study of single cases is possible comparing the different elements that affected the dependent variable (Jahn 2013, 166).

4.1.4. Comparative Qualitative Case Studies

Comparative qualitative research enables testing the utilized theory against different empirical cases. The method is employed to verify or falsify whether the theory utilized could potentially be generalizable and applicable to the examined cases. Comparing similarities and differences in case studies tests established explanatory models or theories. The comparative method is useful to determine the applicability of theories to empirical cases (Jahn 2013, 167). Potentially, upon the empirical application, the theories have to be further modified to provide mechanisms providing valid and generalizable explanations for the scrutinized phenomenon.

The most similar systems design is a “method of testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables based on the same logic that guides the statistical method, but in which the cases are selected in such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables” (Lijphart 1975, 164). In other words, the most similar systems design intends to compare cases that ideally hold similar characteristics and only differ in the dependent variable. The assumption behind this approach is to thus be able to find the independent variables that explain the variation in regard to the dependent variable.

The most similar systems design is an ideal model. When applied to research in political science, there rarely are cases where the exact same conditions can be found and compared. Despite the potential similarities, countries and their political systems are never completely identical in relation to their institutional composition. Thus to employ the most similar systems design, it is necessary to provide a cogent argument for the selection of cases for the comparative study (Jahn 2013, 248).

The smallest common denominator between countries can be seen as them having political systems composed of institutions and political elites that make political decisions. Thus, it is possible to draw comparisons between all of these countries. However, in the process of selecting the cases, it is important to consider other factors and justify which cases are the most suitable to generate verifiable and reproducible conclusions on the examined matter.

One strategy to control for external variance is to compare “natural groups” of countries. This approach assumes that different countries can be put into categories as “families of nations”. This grouping of a selection of countries is done according to similar social, political, economic, and historic experiences and due to substantial similarities in their framework of political and social institutions (Obinger and Wagschal 2001).

4.1.5. Process-Tracing as a Method

Process tracing is a method applied in case studies in social sciences. It is central to qualitative social science research. One of the earliest explicit definitions of process­tracing was provided by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett in “Case studies and theory development in the social sciences“ (2004). The authors defined it as a method of within-case analysis to evaluate causal processes. Furthermore, the process tracing method aims to find causal mechanisms in a single case research design and evaluate existing theories.

[...]

• Author: Maximilian Fichter (Author)
• Publication Year: 2021
• Pages: 119
• Catalog Number: V1369784
• ISBN (PDF): 9783346902825
• ISBN (Book): 9783346902832
• Language: English
• Tags: effectiveness, functionality, anti-corruption, policies, comparative, case, study, estonia, ukraine