The purpose of this paper is to evaluate on whether the use of ‘structural investigations’ (in Syria) indicate a promising shift in the German practice of the CCAIL from a ‘no-safe-haven’ towards a ‘global-enforcer’ approach.
In order to do so, the following steps will be taken:
First, there will be an assessment of the two main legal provisions and their underlying ratio that are relevant for the practice of the CCAIL and their interplay, namely §1 CCAIL (providing genuine universal jurisdiction to German courts for International Crimes) and §153f CCP the prosecutorial discretion given in cases of pure foreign crimes traditionally frustrating §1 CCAIL.36 In a second step, cases that are exemplary for the previous approach will be examined on considerations made and reasons given by the FPG leading to decision to desist from proceeding and the restrictive ‘no-safe-haven’ practice – followed by an evaluation. In a third step, the current prosecutorial strategy – ‘structural investigations’ – and its theory as well as practice will be analysed to assess how the use of ‘structural investigations’ changes the evaluation of the reasons underlying the restrictive practice.
The aim is to answer the research question:
To what extent ‘structural investigations’ as the current German prosecutorial strategy used to investigate Crimes of International Law (in Syria) operate on the interplay between the prosecutorial discretion (§153f CCP) and the codified universal jurisdiction (§1 CCAIL) to be applied in a proactive – ‘global-enforcer’ – manner?
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Introduction
2. The German Legal Framework and Institutions for Prosecuting Crimes of International Law
2.1. The Codification of The Code of Crimes against International Law in light of the Rome Statute - Universal Jurisdiction pursuant to §1 CCAIL
2.2. Prosecutorial Framework and Discretion - §153f CCP
a. Classification and Aim
b. Specific Provisions
c. Judicial Review
2.3. Institutions
2.4. Analysis
3. ‘No-Safe-Haven’ – Prosecution Strategy and Practice
3.1. Aim and Classification
3.2. Initiation of an Individualized Investigation
3.3. Formal Individualized Investigations in Practice - Decisions to desist, Considerations and Legal Arguments
a. Missing Legitimate Link and Lack of Prospect
b. Subsidiarity
c. Anticipated Legal Assistance
d. Immunity
3.4. Evaluation
a. Missing Legitimate Link and Lack of Prospect
b. Subsidiarity
c. Anticipated Legal Assistance
d. Immunity
3.5. Analysis
4. ‘Structural Investigations' as a Prosecution Strategy - Bridge to a ‘Global-Enforcer' approach or Evidentiary Limbo?
4.1. Aim and Classification
4.2. Initiation of an Investigation against Unknown
a. Initial Suspicion
b. Relation to 153f CCP
4.3. ‘Structural Investigations' in Practice - Investigations into International Crimes in Syria
a. Current Practice - Status Quo
b. Institutions and Cooperation
4.4. Evaluation
a. Missing Legitimate Link
b. Lack of Prospect
c. Subsidiarity
d. Anticipated Legal Assistance
e. Immunity
4.5. Analysis
5. Perspectives
5.1. Perspective in the Case of Syria
5.2. Germanys Role within the International Criminal Justice System
6. Conclusion
7. Bibliography
ABBREVIATIONS
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
“A global era requires global engagement. Indeed, in a growing number of challenges facing humanity, the collective interest is the national interest.”- Kofi Annan1
1. Introduction
The subject of universal jurisdiction is of value and relevance for all humankind, as it aims at seeking justice in cases when human rights are at stake. To attain full implementation of international criminal jurisdiction, two main elements appear to be vital: First, the international criminal courts and tribunals on international level.2 However, the ‘cornerstone' principle of complementarity recognized in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘RS')3 indicates, that in reality, international prosecution by itself is not able to succeed at promoting justice. Therefore, second, a key role in ending impunity is located on national level, attributed to domestic courts.4 In this, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction represents a powerful tool as territorial states often are either ‘unwilling or unable' to investigate and prosecute gravest human rights violations.5
The principle of universal jurisdiction dates back a long time. However, in the years around 2000 its evolution was remarkably enhanced by major developments: On international level the Rome Statute was introduced in 2002 and ad hoc -tribunals were prosecuting situational mass atrocities.6 Coincidently, the concept of state sovereignty seemed to lose its sanctity hereby strengthening the principle of universal jurisdiction.7
On national level, the arrest of Pinochet and the arrest warrant against the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi8, seemed to indicate a turning point in the previously existing impunity for high-level perpetrators.9
However, the process of change seemed to have lasted only a few years until the leading countries in Europe that were applying universal jurisdiction, namely Spain and Belgium, came under heavy political pressure and subsequently restricted their principles of universal jurisdiction by codifying a legitimate link.10 On international level, the International Criminal Court (‘ICC') came under criticism for its Africa-focus, which resulted in the announcement of the first withdrawals by three African States of which two have been followed through.11 Today, the international criminal justice system finds itself in a difficult phase of consolidation, facing several ‘setbacks' that not only remain on the international level but also seep down to national levels.12 Universal jurisdiction as a tool for national states to prosecute human rights violations clashes with the two main doctrines in international law: The sovereign equality of all states as being free from intervention in national affairs by another state13 and the principle of individual criminal responsibility14 and thus is critically reviewed by its opponents as a danger to international relations15, the right of the accused16 and national reconciliation17.
As a result, a compromise such as a ‘subsidiary' or ‘mitigated' universal jurisdiction is commonly chosen, which requires a link, e.g. the presence of the suspect and respecting jurisdiction with priority either codified in national law or reflected in its practice.18 However, the consequence of such a predominantly ‘ no-safe-haven' approach is the limited "exercise [of states of] universal jurisdiction in order not to be a refuge for participants in core international crimes”19 which in light of the gravity of international crimes concerned is inappropriate.
The war in Syria has so far demanded hundreds of thousands of people's lives and the crimes committed surpass every imagination: Sexual violence and enslavement, torture, enforced disappearance and use of humans as a shield, to name only a few.20 The crimes were committed by different conflict parties including the Syrian regime and the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (‘ISIS') and forced people to leave their home country.21 Except for recognizing those crimes as international crimes,22 the commonly-known, international ‘super-powers' seem to be deadlocked: The path of justice through the ICC is obstructed23 and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC') Russia and China impede any efforts of the latter to establish accountability.24 Substantial solutions to surpass this paralysation on international level in form of The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (‘CoI')25 as well as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (‘IIIM')26 have an inherent shortcoming to establish international justice. They simply lack prosecutorial power.
As such, the gravity of the atrocities in Syria combined with a ‘deadlock' on the international level demands a proactive role of national states being responsible to establish accountability and avoid impunity - a ‘global-enforcer' approach27:
Victims, witnesses and potential perpetrators entering the European States have provoked first steps towards prosecuting international crimes in Syria commonly limited to a ‘no-safehaven' approach28 resulting in an unproportionate number of low-level perpetrators prosecutions.29 In light of the involvement and accountability of high political and military individuals for the heinous crimes committed, this seems rather dissatisfying. Among the European States, Germany holds a strong position in a twofold way: Firstly, the high number of Syrians entering the country bring evidence, witnesses as well as suspects close to prosecutorial power. Secondly, the principle of genuine universal jurisdiction laid down in §1 of the Code of Crimes Against International Law (‘CCAIL')30 bears the potential of a ‘global- enforcer' approach taken by German authorities. However, the traditional ‘no-safe-haven' approach and use of discretion pursuant to §153f Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CCP')31 by the Federal Prosecutor General (‘FPG') in cases of pure foreign crimes had previously and contradictory to its ratio resulted in a non-application of §1 CCAIL. As such, at least the first 6 years after the introduction of the CCAIL were marked by the decision to dispense from proceeding in cases of foreign crimes and the first (and until 2015 the last) trial was against two leaders of Hutu militia Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (‘FDLR') that were German nationals.32
In the beginning, the ‘no-safe-haven' approach seemed to be sustained in the case of crimes in Syria as first proceedings exclusively targeted low-level perpetrators triggered by their presence.33 Only recently have indications of a ‘global-enforcer' approach appeared in use of the universal jurisdiction doctrine: The most remarkable arrest warrant for one of the highest- ranking officials, the head of the Syrian Air-Force Intelligence, that is based on a new prosecutorial strategy, the so-called ‘structural investigations'.34
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate on whether the use of ‘structural investigations' (in Syria) indicate a promising shift in the German practice of the CCAIL from a ‘no-safe-haven' towards a ‘global-enforcer' approach.35
In order to do so, the following steps will be taken:
First, there will be an assessment of the two main legal provisions and their underlying ratio that are relevant for the practice of the CCAIL and their interplay, namely §1 CCAIL (providing genuine universal jurisdiction to German courts for International Crimes) and §153f CCP the prosecutorial discretion given in cases of pure foreign crimes traditionally frustrating §1 CCAIL.36 In a second step, cases that are exemplary for the previous approach will be examined on considerations made and reasons given by the FPG leading to decision to desist from proceeding and the restrictive ‘no-safe-haven' practice - followed by an evaluation. In a third step, the current prosecutorial strategy - ‘structural investigations' - and its theory as well as practice will be analysed to assess how the use of ‘structural investigations' changes the evaluation of the reasons underlying the restrictive practice. The aim is to answer the research question:
To what extent ‘structural investigations' as the current German prosecutorial strategy used to investigate Crimes of International Law (in Syria) operate on the interplay between the prosecutorial discretion (§153f CCP) and the codified universal jurisdiction (§1 CCAIL) to be applied in a proactive - 'global-enforcer' - manner?
And, hence predict a ‘promising turn' in the German practice of the CCAIL from a ‘no-safehaven' towards a ‘global-enforcer' approach.
Related to this, the paper will point out a perspective in order to reflect upon whether this ‘promising turn' is exclusive for Syria or can be interpreted in a way that indicates a general, more proactive role of Germany within the international criminal justice system in future?
2. The German Legal Framework and Institutions for Prosecuting
Crimes of International Law
In the first part, the implementation of the relevant legal framework with its underlying ratio of the legislator will be examined. The question is, how they interrelate and therefore are decisive for a more proactive or restricted approach.
2.1. The Codification of The Code of Crimes against International Law in light of the Rome Statute - Universal Jurisdiction pursuant to §1 CCAIL
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘RS)37 was signed by Germany on 10th December 199838 and ratified by 11th December 2000.39 To fully embrace the degree of unlawfulness manifested in international crimes the German legislator decided to create an independent legal framework to the common Federal Criminal Code (‘FCC').40 The CCAIL entered into force on 30th July 2002.41 It codifies jurisdiction based on the universal, the active/passive personality, as well as the territoriality principle.42 Universal jurisdiction to German courts is granted for core crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.43 It also holds for torture, rape and enforced disappearance codified as specific acts of crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.44 In light of the adoption of the crime of aggression in Kampala on 11th June 201045, the CCAIL was amended to also include the crime of aggression, for which German courts have jurisdiction based on the principle of territoriality and active personality, however, not universal jurisdiction doctrine.46
Germany is one of the few countries with genuine universal jurisdiction allowing the Federal General Prosecutor (‘FPG')47 to prosecute extraterritorial international crimes independent from the territory on which they occur and the nationality of the perpetrator or victim48 as “[..] criminal jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime”49. The nature of the international crimes concerned violates universally recognized rights and therefore not only affect the territorial-, perpetrator- or victim state but rather, erga omnes 50, the International State Community and humankind as a whole.51 The infringement of fundamental common norms and universal values places their prosecution within the interest of all states for which the concerned state is prosecuting.52 Respecting fundamental human rights can no longer be considered as ‘national affairs' preventing a violation of the principle of non-intervention.53 This was also the ratio and motive of the German legislator codifying universal jurisdiction for German courts in §1 CCAIL for the core crimes laid down in the CCAIL (§§6 - 12 CCAIL)54 in affirmation with the guiding principle "that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and therefore in light of the principle of complementarity "effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level ”.55
2.2. Prosecutorial Framework and Discretion - §153f CCP
a-Classification and Aim
§153f CCP56 was introduced as a ‘corrective' on the prosecutorial level and allows the FPG to exclude cases that prima facie lack any prospect of success57 or when the German jurisdiction is subsidiary to another state.58 As such, an opportunity principle was introduced as a normative exception of the generally applying legality principle in German criminal law59, providing discretion to decide if a formal investigation shall be opened.60
§153f CCP shall take into account the fact that §1 CCAIL legally provides German courts with the power to investigate and prosecute every core crime (§6-12) based on the genuine universal jurisdiction61 and prevent potential overload for German authorities.62 The aim is to prevent “forum-shopping”63 and narrow the criminal proceedings down to adequate cases.64 Furthermore, guiding the prosecutorial discretion in cases of foreign offences shall relieve the FPG in highly political situations and a restrictive interpretation of §153f CCP shall prevent overall political influence.65 However, the aim was not to partially withdraw the doctrine of genuine universal jurisdiction in §1 CCAIL and thus §153f CCP is strictly limited to the specific circumstances codified.66 The purpose of the CCAIL, particularly of §1 CCAIL, to end impunity, remains superior.67
b-Specific Provisions
§153f (1) 1 constitutes the overall provision and requirements to be cumulatively present in order to grant the FPG discretion to dispense from criminal proceedings.68 Discretion is given when the offence was committed abroad and the suspect is neither residing in Germany nor can his/her residence be expected.69 The elements in §153f (2) 1 constitute guiding of the discretion by specifying under which circumstances in particular there is prosecutorial discretion.70
However, is a crime committed abroad with a legitimate link, i.e. either the suspect is or is expected to reside in Germany and/or he/she is a German national,71 a contrario, the legality principle applies.72
If there is a legitimate link due to the suspect's German nationality, the FPG can only decide to dispense from prosecuting if the offence is being prosecuted elsewhere, either by an international criminal court or the territorial or victim state, as the underlying ratio of the CAAIL, the aim of avoiding impunity, would still be in place.73
If there is a legitimate link due to the suspect's residence in Germany, the FPG can desist from proceeding if neither the suspect nor a victim is a German national74 and a request to transfer the suspect to an international criminal court or to extradite him/her to a state whose jurisdiction has priority has been made.75 The ratio is to give priority in prosecuting to a state that has a stronger link to the situation/offence at hand.76 However, such an abetment of action is conditioned by the admissibility and intention of extradition, allowing a criminal proceeding with priority as prosecution by German authorities would not be necessary anymore without allowing impunity.77
If there is no legitimate link at all, as neither the victim nor the perpetrator is a German national and the suspect is not present in Germany nor can his presence be anticipated any access to the suspect is highly unlikely and the FPG can decide against proceeding solely due to a lack of prospect of success.78 The negative conclusion of the current and expected presence in Germany must be based on concrete and factual information.79 In particular, such discretion is given if an international court or a state with priority is prosecuting the offence.80 However, this does not constitute a necessary condition.81
The opportunity principle represents a form of a hierarchical structure of jurisdiction as the universal jurisdiction of third states derives from the international community as a whole and is justified by institutional and capacitive deficits on the international level.82 As such, the German jurisdiction functions subsidiary in cases in which a national or an international court has primary jurisdiction due to a closer link to the criminal act (so-called forum conveniens).83 Primarily, jurisdiction is given to the perpetrator, victim, or territorial state with original jurisdiction, secondly, to the ICC or other international tribunals with jurisdiction delegated by the state parties, and thirdly, ‘subsidiary in a twofold manner', to a third, national state based on universal jurisdiction.84
However, as §153f CCP does not constitute a partial withdrawal from §1 CCAIL, the FPG may still prosecute in one of the scenarios listed in §153f (2) 1-2 CCP.85
c. Judicial Review
In its decision in 2005 the Higher Regional Court Stuttgart (‘ OLG ') ruled that any complaint to constrain charges by the FPG - as usually allowed to strengthen the legality principle - on matters within the prosecutorial discretion would be inadmissible.86 §153f CCP constitutes an intended exception by the legislator of the legality principle by the legislator.87 Judicial review is limited to whether the legal requirements of §153f (1), (2) CCP were met, the FPG did make use of the discretion given, and if it amounted to arbitrariness. The discretional decision as such, however, is not justiciable.88 In a second decision, it was refined that a past stay is insufficient and the evaluation of information potentially indicating a presence lies within the discretion of the FPG who shall and continue to be the main and only actor in cases of §153f CCP.89
2.3. Institutions
The competent courts to deal with the crimes laid down in the CCAIL are the Higher Regional Courts as courts of the first instance.90 The FPG is the competent authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecutions into crimes codified in the CCAIL.91 He is supported by a specialised ‘war crimes unit' of the Federal German Police (so-called ‘ZBKV')92 introduced in 200893 and guided by instructions of the Federal Minister of Justice94. The ‘ZBKV' retrieves specific information, evaluates international crimes, and coordinates investigations, thereby contributing to the prosecution and evidence collection relating to crimes of international law.95
2.4. Analysis
§1 CCAIL embeds Germany within the international criminal justice system when prosecuting international crimes aiming at ending impunity for human rights violations in respect of the principle of complementarity and subsidiarity.96 Herein, the principle of universal jurisdiction constitutes a conditional and subsidiary form of jurisdiction, which is taken into account by the German prosecutorial framework pursuant §153f CCP guiding the prosecutorial discretion in the case of international crimes laid down in the CCAIL.97 Hereby, the German legislator decided to create a regime, which aims at balancing the international fight against impunity of the most serious crimes, the awareness of limited national resources as well as the complexity of investigations into international crimes.98 Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity and judicial assistance to third states or international criminal courts with priority is central.99 The prosecutorial discretion in §153f CCP reveals the FPG to function as a ”gatekeeper”100 of the application of the CCAIL - §1 CCAIL.
3. ‘No-Safe-Haven' - Prosecution Strategy and Practice
To analyse the current ‘structural-investigations' strategy and its prospect, the existing underlying reasons and considerations that led the FPG to decide against proceeding in cases in which discretion pursuant to §153f CCP was given - hereby frustrating the proactive ratio underlying §1 CCAIL need to be analysed first. In order to do this, aim and initiation of investigations within a ‘no-safe-haven' strategy will be examined and evaluated firstly. And secondly, exemplary cases for deciding against initiation will be discussed.
3.1. Aim and Classification
Traditionally, the primary aim of the legal regime including the prosecutorial discretion lies in conducting appropriate and necessary investigation to prevent Germany from being a ‘safe- haven'101 for war criminals without acting as ‘global police' trying to balance potential deficits or demonstrating how prosecution of international crimes is allegedly supposed to look like.102 Consequently, a formal investigation is primarily opened if the suspect continuously resides in Germany in order to maintain the states reputation and the inner rule of law.103 Whereas in cases of a temporary residence this only holds if evidence suffice to establish a “strong suspicion”104 justifying an arrest . 105 The primary aim of an individualized formal procedure lies within the investigation of the facts to ultimately compel public charges or terminate the procedure.106
3.2. Initiation of an Individualized Investigation
The general duty of the FPG to investigate is triggered by an initial suspicion in form of “sufficient factual indications”107 that indicate the fulfilment of the material elements of a crime - offence-related suspicion.108 However, a suspect-related suspicion is not necessarily required.109 In order to establish an initial suspicion preliminary investigations (so-called ‘monitoring processes')110 - despite their lack of codification - are commonly used in practice.111
§153f CCP applies by analogy to preliminary investigations.112 As the initial suspicion constitutes a precondition of opening a formal investigation and justifies more intrusive investigative measures,113 only measures such as the analysis of open source data, informal questioning of persons, and requesting available data from other state authorities.114 If an initial suspicion of the commitment of a crime codified in the CCAIL exists, and procedural as well as substantial pre-requirements are met, the FPG can initiate an investigation on his/her own motion.115 In the case of a legitimate link, i.e. either the victim or the suspect of the crime is a German national or the suspect is present within the German territory, the FPG generally is obliged to proceed. However, if a legitimate link is missing, the previously examined discretion applies.116 Therefore, if no factual indications can be concluded the FPG may close the preliminary investigation and decide against an investigation. Otherwise, his/her option would be to introduce the information into an already existing investigation against a specific individual or open a new suspect-related investigation.117 The former was predominantly decided by the FPG during the first years and resulted - contrary to the intention of the legislator - in a de facto inapplicability and insignificance of the CCAIL.118 By 30th August 2006, 58 criminal complaints had been filed. In 57 cases the FPG refused to initiate an investigation based on different legal reasons.119
3.3. Formal Individualized Investigations in Practice - Decisions to desist, Considerations and Legal Arguments
In this section, the existing underlying reasons and considerations that led the FPG to decide to dispense from proceeding pursuant to §153f CCP will be analysed in exemplary cases: Jiang Zemin et al. (Peoples Republic of China), Zakirjan Almatov and Rustam Raulovich Inoyatov et al. (Republic of Uzbekistan), Donald Rumsfeld et al. (involving allegations of mistreatment in the Abu Ghraib prison in the Republic of Iraq).120 The analysis serves to examine the underlying reasons and considerations of the decisions to dispense from proceeding, which then will be evaluated considering suspect-related investigations - and considering ‘structural investigations' in Chapter 4.
[...]
1 Kofi Annan, ‘Secretary - General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly- Meetings Coverage and Press Releases' (20 September 1999) <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html> accessed 31 December 2018.
2 Stephen Macedo and Mary Robinson, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton University ed, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University 2001) 15.
3 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998.
4 Macedo and Robinson (n 2) 16.
5 ibid.
6 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR') and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY'); David Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice' (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 505, 506; Macedo and Robinson (n 2) 1618; For a graphical overview see Maximo Langer, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Is Not Disappearing: The Shift from “Global Enforcer” to “No Safe Haven” Universal Jurisdiction' Journal of International Criminal Justice 13 (2015), 249 (Rochester, NY, 18 February 2015) 249 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2567036> accessed 23 November 2018.
7 Some mayor events were: The introduction of the ‘Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction' introduced to clarify the concept of universal jurisdiction, its reasonableness and responsibility to national courts to encourage the end of impunity see Macedo and Robinson (n 2) 12; The Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P') drafts were developed obliging each state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and secondly the international community as a whole see para 138.,139. The drafts were signed on the World Summit 2005 and reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 see Luban (n 6) 6; And the speech of Kofi Annan in favour of redefining the definition of sovereignty see Annan (n 1).
8 Arrest Warrant Case of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] International Court of Justice (ICJ) ICJ GL No 121. As even though the Court ruled that Belgium violated its obligation towards the Congo to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs (see paras. 70, 71), it also noted that under certain conditions, e.g. termination of the period of office, immunity does not bar criminal jurisdiction of an international court or another “a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State” (para. 61).
9 Luban (n 6) 506.
10 Langer (n 6) 246; In Spain two amendments (in 2009 and 2014) introduced limitations as demanding a link in form of the perpetrators or the victims nationality or another affirmed link due to rather vague factors such as culture or history to be decided on a case-by-case basis see Dr Rosa Ana Alija Fernandez, ‘The 2014 Reform of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain From All to Nothing' [2014] Zeitschrift Fur Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 717, 717; In Belgium jurisdiction of courts was legally conditioned by a link in form of either the nationality or residence of the accused or the victim see Human Rights Watch, ‘Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed' (Human Rights Watch, 1 August 2003) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal- jurisdiction-law-repealed> accessed 10 January 2019.
11 Margaret M deGuzman, ‘Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately? A Moral, Legal, and Sociological Assessment' (2018) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3136470> accessed 10 January 2019; F Jeßberger and J Geneuss, ‘Down the Drain or Down to Earth? International Criminal Justice under Pressure' (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 501; Withdrawing from the RS is regulated by article 127 and becomes effective one year after the notice of withdrawal was deposited to the United Nations Secretary General. Burundi and South Africa did leave the RS while Gambia finally remained see ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute' <https://asp.icc- cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.asp x#S> accessed 10 January 2019.
12 Florian Jeßberger, ‘Schriftliche Zusammenfassung Meiner Stellungnahme Vor Dem Rechtsausschuss Des Deutschen Bundestages Am 25. April 2016 - Drucksache 18/6341' 3; Jeßberger and Geneuss (n 11) 501f.
13 As codified in Article 2 (1) Charta of the United Nations "[.] the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” and further specified in para. (4) and (7).
14 For an ‘historical' overview see Eduardo Greppi, ‘The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law' [1999] International Review of the Red Cross.
15 Antonio Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality - A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction Editorial Comments on Universality' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589, 595.
16 Especially the right to be prevented from double jeopardy see George P Fletcher, ‘Against Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 580, 582; See Henry A Kissinger, ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction' (2001) 80 Foreign Affairs 86, 86 Arguing that UJ deprives the accused of his right to due process.
17 "The instinct to punish must be related, as in every constitutional democratic political structure, to a system of checks and balances that includes other elements critical to the survival and expansion of democracy” see Kissinger (n 16) 91.
18 Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality - A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction Editorial Comments on Universality' (n 15) 595; Macedo and Robinson (n 2) 32; see Hill Moodrick-Even Khen, ‘Revisiting Univeral Jurisdiction: The Application of the Complementary Principle by National Courts and Implications for Ex-Post Justice in the Syrian Civil War' (2015) 30 Emory International Law Review 261, 276-296 who describes the principle of complementarity of Article 17 RS as well as providing an overview of national jurisdiction and their implementation of the doctrine revealing that most countries do condition their exercise of UJ by considerations such as the other state being ‘unable' or ‘unwilling' e.g. Spain see p.292; For codification of link in form of the suspects present see Article 6.1bis - Belgium, Articles 689-611 Code de Procedure Penale - France, Article 23.4(a) Ley Organica del Poder - Spain, Article 51 and 68 - ICC Act 2001 - England and for an example for a link considered in practice see - besides Germany as examined in this paper in more detail - see Human Rights Watch, The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in the Netherlands (2014), 4.
19 Langer (n 6) 247.
20 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2018 - Events of 2017' (2018) 525-535 <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf>.
21 ibid 520f.; Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (ed), ‘They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2'.
22 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, ‘HRC Res. S-16/1'; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Council, ‘UN Doc. A/HRC/18/53'.
23 As Syria signed but never ratified the Rome Statute and thus the ICC lacks jurisdiction see Article 13 (a),(b) RS see ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute' (n 11).
24 Akira Tomlinson, ‘UN Security Council Rejects Three Proposed Resolutions on the Crisis in Syria' <https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/04/un-security-council-rejects-three-proposed-resolutions-on-the-crisis- in-syria/> accessed 10 January 2019; United Nations Security Council, ‘UN Doc. S/2014/348',.blocking a referral of the situation to the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b) RS.
25 Established on 22 August 2011 by the Human Rights Council aiming at “investigating and documenting human rights violations of all parties involved in the Syrian conflict” see Human Rights Council, ‘HRC Res. S- 17/1'.
26 United Nations General Assembly, ‘UN Doc. A/RES/71/248'.
27 See for an examination of both concepts and a description of the ,global-enforcer‘ approach Langer (n 6) 247, 249, 255, 256.
28 For efforts taken by Sweden and Germany see Human Rights Watch, ‘“These Are the Crimes We Are Fleeing” Justice for Syria in Swedish and German Courts' (Human Rights Watch, 3 October 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-we-are-fleeing/justice-syria-swedish-and-german- courts> accessed 30 September 2018.
29 ibid 33-35.
30 In German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB)- Code of Crimes Against International Law('CCAIL'), for an English version see https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=758.
31 For an English version https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/; Strafprozessordnung 1879; ‘Neufassung Der Strafprozeßordnung' [1987] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 1074.; last amended 21.12.2002.
32 As both were German nationals no discretion was given (§§153f (1) 1, 152 (2), 172(1) CCP).After 5 years of trial one was found guilty as an accessory for war crimes as laid down in the CCAIL see ‘Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf: Nr. 30/2014 Haftstrafen Wegen Mitgliedschaft Bzw. Unterstützung Der "Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda (FDLR)”' <http://www.olg- duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/archiv/Pressemitteilungen_aus_2014/20141206_PM_FDLR_Urteil/index. php> accessed 13 January 2019; ‘OLG Düsseldorf, 05.12.2014 - III-6a StS 1/13'; Patrick Kroker, ‘Weltrecht in Deutschland? Der Kongo- Kriegsverbrecherprozess: Erstes Verfahren Nach Dem Völkerstrafgesetzbuch' (2006) 52-67 who describes the trial as well as the judgement.For an overview of decisions made by the FPG since 2002 https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/aktuell.php.
33 Wolfgang Kaleck and Patrick Kroker, ‘Syrian Torture Investigations in Germany and BeyondBreathing New Life into Universal Jurisdiction in Europe?' (2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 165, 176-181.
34 Human Rights Watch, ‘"These Are the Crimes We Are Fleeing” Justice for Syria in Swedish and German Courts' (n 28) 33-35.
35 It shall be noted that ‘global-enforcer' as well as ‘no-safe-haven' approach represent two extremes within which states practice commonly finds itself in and include factors such as statutes, practice but also rationales and perception of the authorities involved see Langer (n 6) 250.
36 To keep the extent of analysis manageable, an analysis in more depth of the legal provisions of the CCAIL will be limited to the provisions important to this paper: §1 CCAIL interrelated with §153f f Criminal Code of Procedure (‘CCP').
37 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm.
38 ‘Gesetz Zum Römischen Statut Des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs Vom 17. Juli 1998 (IStGH-Statutgesetz)' [2000] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II 1393; ‘Bekanntmachung Über Das Inkrafttreten Des Römischen Statuts Des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs' [2003] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II 293.
39 Deutscher Bundestag (ed), ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' 13.
40 Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘Anhörung Im Ausschuss Für Recht Und Verbraucherschutz Des Deutschen Bundestages „Keine Straflosigkeit Bei Kriegsverbrechen - Völkerstrafprozesse in Deutschland Voranbringen" Am 25.4.2016 - Drucksache 18/6341'' 1; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 1.
41 ‘Gesetz Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches' [2002] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 2254.Art.8.
42 CCAIL, § 1 and 2 in conjunction with § 3-5, § 6, No. 9 and § 7 Federal Criminal Code.
43 See CCAIL, part II, chap. 1, § 6-8.
44 See for example §7 (1) No.5 CCAIL for torture and §8 (1) No.4 CCAIL for rape. If the contextual elements are not met, the crimes may still be prosecuted under the Federal Criminal Code (‘FCC') see for an English version https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/.
45 United Nations General Assembly, ‘The Crime of Aggression, UN. Doc. RC/RES.6'.
46 See §1 S.2 in conjunction with §13 CCAIL; ‘Gesetz Zur Änderung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches' [2016] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 3150. The amendment entered into force the 1st January 2017 see Article 1 introducing a new Section 13 into the CCAIL.
47 In German Generalbundesanwaltschaft.
48 See §1 CCAIL; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39); Kai Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht - Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, Europäisches Strafrecht (1st edn, CH Beck 2006) 52.
49 “Without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising jurisdiction” Principle 1 (1) see Macedo and Robinson (n 2) 28.
50 The term refers to legal obligations as well as rights towards all see ‘Erga Omnes Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.' <https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/erga-omnes/> accessed 14 January 2019.
51 Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht - Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, Europäisches Strafrecht (n 48) 52; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice' (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81, 81 f. who, however, doubts the principle universal jurisdiction executed by national states due to a lack of states practice.
52 Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht - Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, Europäisches Strafrecht (n 48) 52, 62; Michael E Kurth, ‘Zum Verfolgungsermessen Des Generalbundesanwaltes Nach § 153f StPO' (2006) 2 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 81, 81 comparing the state with a ‘fiduciary'; Under substitutional jurisdiction one state prosecutes instead and in the interest of the other state whereas under universal jurisdiction the state prosecutes in the interest of the international community as a whole see Uwe Murmann, Grundkurs Strafrecht (2nd edn, CHBeck 2013) para 11.
53 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 14; Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht - Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, Europäisches Strafrecht (n 48) 52-53; Gerhard Werle and Florian Jeßberger, Völkerstrafrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2007) 186.
54 Coherent with the position of the German delegation at the Rome Conference see UN Doc A/AC . 249/1998 / DP, 23 March 1998; Sascha Rolf Lüder and Thomas Vormbaum, Materialien zum Völkerstrafgesetzbuch: Dokumentation des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens (LIT Verlag Münster 2003) 26.
55 See Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The International Criminal Court (‘ICC') can only prosecute a small number of all perpetrators responsible for and involved in the commitment of crimes of international and thus, national courts are demanded to complementarily engage in fighting impunity by prosecuting the one's responsible for the most heinous crimes if the home state is unable or unwilling Kaleck, ‘Anhörung Im Ausschuss Für Recht Und Verbraucherschutz Des Deutschen Bundestages „Keine Straflosigkeit Bei Kriegsverbrechen - Völkerstrafprozesse in Deutschland Voranbringen" Am 25.4.2016 - Drucksache 18/6341'' (n 40) 6.
56 The German Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) is available online in English at https://www.gesetze-im- internet.de/englisch_stpo/.
57 ‘OLG Stuttgart, 13.09.2005 - 5 Ws 109/05' para 35.
58 Tobias Singelnstein and Peer Stolle, ‘Völkerstrafrecht Und Legalitätsprinzip - Klageerzwingungsverfahren Bei Opportunitätseinstellungen Und Auslegung Des § 153f StPO' [2005] Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 118, 119.
59 As generally obliging the prosecutor to proceed in cases of an initial suspicion and the fulfilment of the process requirements (§§152 (2), 170 (1) CCP).
60 Werner Beulke and others, Die Strafprozeßordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz: Großkommentare der Praxis Einleitung, §§ 1-47 (26., neu bearb Aufl /, De Gruyter Recht 2008) para 42f. §152 CCP; Regarding the opportunity principle see further Julia Geneuss, Völkerrechtsverbrechen und Verfolgungsermessen: § 153f StPO im System völkerrechtlicher Strafrechtspflege (Nomos-Verlag-Ges 2013) 51.
61 Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119.
62 Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 60; OLG Stuttgart (ed), ‘Beschluss Vom 13.09.2005' para 35 <https://openjur.de/u/182689.html> accessed 18 November 2018.
63 The term refers to the danger of complainants to choose the state to file a complaint solely based on the legal advantages despite any existing link see Kurth (n 52) 83.
64 Kai Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code: A Commentary on the Decisions of the Federal Prosecutor General and the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court in the Abu Ghraib /Rumsfeld Case' (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 43, 47.
65 A foreign offence pursuant to §§153c (2) No.1, 2, 3 in conjunction with §153f CCP in cases of crimes under the CCAIL; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 37.
66 Deutscher Bundestag (ed), ‘Drucksache 14/8892' 6; Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119.
67 Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 60.
68 Pursuant to the common view (herrschende Ansicht) Beulke and others (n 60) 235 §25; Geneuss (n 60) 230.
69 §§ 153f c (1) No.1. and 2.CCP in conjunction with §153f (1) 1 CCP.
70 Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 120; Geneuss (n 60) 233.
71 §153f (1) 1, 2 CCP.
72 Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119; Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 47.
73 §153f (1) 2 CCP; Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 60.
74 §153f (2) 2 in conjunction with §153f (2) 1 No .2 CCP.
75 The provision extends the discretion constituting an independent opportunity to desist from prosecuting see Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119; Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 48.
76 Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119; Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 60.
77 §153f (2) 1 No.4, (2) 2 CCP; And as such release from the FPG from the codified universal jurisdiction (§1 CCAIL) and its superior aim of avoiding impunity see Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 119,120; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 38.
78 153f (2) No.1, 2, 3 CCP due to a lack of prospect solely on §153f (1) 1 CCP; Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 48; Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 120.
79 Singelnstein and Stolle (n 58) 121.
80 §153f (2) No.4.) CCP; Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 48.
81 Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 61; Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 48.
82 Geneuss (n 60) 334.
83 Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 48; Lüder and Vormbaum (n 54) 61.
84 Rolf Hannich, ‘Justice in the Name of All - Die Praktische Anwendung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuchs Aus Der Sicht Des Generalbundesanwalts Beim Bundesgerichtshof' 13 Zeitschrift Fur Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 507, 12; Geneuss (n 60) 333,334; Beulke and others (n 60) 230; The principle of subsidiarity as 'horizontal complementarity', vis-a-vis national states, contrary to ‘vertical complementarity' (Preamble, Article 1 (2) RS) between the ICC and its states parties see Jeßberger (n 12) 7.
85 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Drucksache 14/8892' (n 66) 6; Geneuss (n 60) 236 who further argues that the principle of subsidiarity must be respected as potentially barring proceedings by German courts in cases in which a state with priority is proceeding and therefore proposes a reform of the provision see p. 266.
86 See § 172 (2) 3 CCP; OLG Stuttgart (n 62) para 1; Dieter Hummel and Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘Strafanzeige Vom 14. November 2006, Fall Abu Ghraib II / Guantanamo' 20.
87 Usually (to strengthen the legality principle) the victim/ applicant is allowed to file a motion to compel proceedings (§158 CCP) to allow judicial review of the prosecutor's decision to terminate investigations (§170 (2) CCP) hereby strengthening the legality principle laid down in §§152 (2), §172 (1) CCP; Hummel and Kaleck (n 86) 19; OLG Stuttgart (n 62) para 20; OLG Stuttgart, ‘OLG Stuttgart 5 Ws 1/07, 27. März 2008.' pt 2.
88 OLG Stuttgart (n 62) para 32.
89 OLG Stuttgart (n 87) pt 2.
90 See §120 (1) No.8 Courts Constitution Act (‘CCA') (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz); With either three or five judges bench §122(2) CCA; For an English Version see http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gvg/.
91 Article 96 No.1 - 4 German Constitution §§ 142 a (11), 120 (1) No.8 CCA (exceptions see §142 a (2) No.2 CCA).
92 In German Zentralstelle für die Bekämpfung von Kriegsverbrechen (,ZBKV‘) https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Aufgabenbereiche/Zentralstellen/ZBKV/zbkv_node.html; Matthias Neuner, ‘German Preliminary Examinations of International Crimes' Quality Control in the Preliminary Examinations of Civil Society Submissions 127, 129.
93 The unit was increased twice: From three to nine public prosecutors in 2018 and since October 2018 an additional unit for international criminal at the Federal Court, S6, with a total number of 11 public prosecutors was established see Christian Ritscher, ‘Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Der Strafverfolgung Des Generalbundesanwalts Auf Dem Gebiet Des Völkerstrafrechts' [2018] Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 543, 543.
94 §147(1) CCA.
95 On the State Bureau of Investigation (‘LKA') specialised units guarantee the prevention of potential evidence lost see Christian Ritscher, ‘Antrag Der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN- Stellungnahme Für Die Öffentliche Anhörung in Der 96. Sitzung Des Ausschusses Für Recht Und Verbraucherschutz Am 25. April 2016 -Drucksache 18/6341' 13; Ritscher (n 93) 512; Hannich (n 84) 512.
96 Christoph Safferling, ‘Die Ermittlungstätigkeit des Generalbundesanwalts zum Völkerstrafrecht: Herausforderungen und Chancen' in Stefan Kirsch and Christian Ritscher (eds), Völkerstrafrechtspolitik: Praxis des Völkerstrafrechts (Springer-Verlag 2013) 224.
97 Ambos, ‘International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code' (n 64) 46.
98 As they commonly require cross border, foreign investigations into complex structures as well as depend on international legal assistance in order to provide prospect of success see Safferling (n 96) 225.
99 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 38; Neuner (n 92) 131; Safferling (n 96) 225.
100 Geneuss (n 60) 263.
101 Safferling (n 96) 225; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Drucksache 16/11271' 3 question 7.
102 Safferling (n 96) 225.
103 Geneuss (n 60) 239, 289; Thomas Beck, ‘Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch in Der Praktischen Anwendung - Ein Kommentar Zum Beitrag von Rainer Keller', Zehn Jahre Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2013) 162.
104 "[...] accused [to be] strongly suspected of the offence” §112 (1) CCP.
105 Beck (n 103) 162; Geneuss (n 60) 239.
106 §§160, 170 CCP; Geneuss (n 60) 249, 338 §30; Jeßberger (n 12) 6.
107 §152 (2) CCP.
108 Beulke and others (n 60) paras 21f., § 152 StPO; Geneuss (n 60) 48.
109 Beulke and others (n 60) para 23 §153 StPO; Günter Haas, Vorermittlungen und Anfangsverdacht. (1st edn, Duncker & Humblot 2003) 16.
110 Thomas Beck and Christian Ritscher, ‘Do Criminal Complaints Make Sense in (German) International Criminal Law? A Prosecutor's Perspective' (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 229, 233.
111 Matthias Jahn, ‘Der Verdachtsbegriff Im Präventiv Orientierten Strafprozess, Intitativ- , Vor- Und Strukturermittlungen Der Staatsanwaltschaft Und Ihre Rechtstaatliche Gerichtliche Kontrolle' in Institut für Kriminalwissenschaften und Rechtsphilosophie (ed), Jenseits des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts (Peter Lang 2006) 557f.; Geneuss (n 60) 49; Specific objectives of preliminary investigations into crimes codified in the CCAIL lack and thus the prosecutor is primarily governed by the general legality principle to "to take action in relation to all prosecutable criminal offences, provided there are sufficient factual indications”(§152 (2) CCP) see Neuner (n 92) 132.
112 Although the provision literally exclusively relates to closing a formal opened investigation as otherwise the FPG would be required to first open a formal investigation in order to subsequently close it and thus be greatly impracticability see Neuner (n 92) 134; As well as Beulke and others (n 60) 232 §14; Denis Basak, ‘Der Fall Rumsfeld - Ein Begräbnis Dritter Klasse Für Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch?' (2007) 90 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (KritV) 333, 33,354; This is further supported by the OLG Stuttgart (n 87) para 2c. stating that "The FPG shall be and continue to be the main and only actor in cases of §153f CCP beyond the formal opening of an investigation”.
113 Martin Böse, ‘Aufsichtsrechtliche Vorermittlungen in Der Grauzone Zwischen Strafverfolgung Und Gefahrenabwehr' (2008) 119 Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 848, 849,850; Neuner (n 92) 137; Beulke and others (n 60) 378.
114 Open source data analysis includes the collection of reports from nongovernmental organizations (‘NGOs') or the analysis of press and media coverage to obtain an insight into existing international conflicts see Safferling (n 96) 226; Neuner (n 92) 138,139; Measures that as do not constitute sovereign acts are regarded admissible see Geneuss (n 60) 49.
115 Due to the serious nature of international crimes laid down in the CAAIL they are categorized as offences requiring absolute public prosecution meaning that no official criminal complaint to start an investigation is required under the CCAIL see Beck and Ritscher (n 110) 230.
116 See Chapter 2 part 2.2.b., §§ 152(2), 170(1) CCP; Kaleck and Kroker (n 33) 178; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Gesetzentwurf Der Bundesregierung Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Einführung Des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches - Drucksache 14/8524' (n 39) 37.
117 Resulting in either an indictment or closing the investigation see §170 (1), §153f (1), (2) CCP.
118 Basak (n 112) 333; Wolfgang Kaleck and Antje Wiener, ‘Umstrittene Normen in Der Staatengesellschaft: Das Deutsche Völkerstrafrecht Und Die Debatte Um Die Völkerrechtsreform' (2007) 16.
119 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Drucksache 16/2692' 11.
120 The examination of the practice of the FPG (applying §153f CCP) is conducted limited to the information published by the FPG, potential courts involved as well as complainants or other documents - however, due to rather restrictive transparency of the FPGs action, full comprehensiveness cannot be assured. Nevertheless, the documents available allow gaining an insight into the crucial aspects.
- Citar trabajo
- Franca Langlet (Autor), 2019, Germany's efforts in prosecuting international crimes in Syria. A promising shift from a "No-Safe-Haven" towards a "Global-Enforcer" approach?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1333790
-
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X. -
¡Carge sus propios textos! Gane dinero y un iPhone X.