Globalisation has put Christianity and Islam face to face, increasing as well as imposing the need for a mutual understanding of each other’s heritage - even more so, since religion sees its status of a political variable restored on an international level. Islam is occupying a significant place on many agendas, from security to economic relations or in numerous cultural theories. Hypotheses such as the clash of civilisations, the need to democratise Islamic countries or the upcoming Enlightenment of the Middle East are being put forward and enjoy an ever increasing attention in policy making strategiess. It is therefore significant to explore the question to which extent “the mosque” - in a more general sense - has an influence on state affairs in a country like Saudi Arabia which, in the opinion of many, excels in religiosity, as compared to a democratic Muslim state like Turkey. This paper takes a brief close-up of the Christian and Islamic heritage regarding the separation of church and state, subsequently analysing the topic in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In a historical perspective, the question whether and how the mosque has contributed to the foundation of the two states will be answered. The extent to which they resemble an Islamic state will be than shown, investigating also the independence of institutions from the mosque. Finally, it will be seen whether religious beliefs are kept out of public policies motivations, and especially whether public money are used for supporting religious establishments. The analysis should point to one of the four possible mosque-state relationships: identity, symbiosis, subordination, separation.
Table of Content
I. Introduction
II. Separation of Church and State
a) Separation of Church and State: Christianity
b) Unity of Mosque and State: Arabic Islam
III. Case Studies
a) Historical/ Political Background
b) Form of government
c) Institutions
d) Actors in political system
e) Policies
IV. Conclusion
V. Bibliography:
I. Introduction
Globalisation has put Christianity and Islam face to face, increasing as well as imposing the need for a mutual understanding of each other’s heritage - even more so, since religion sees its status of a political variable restored on an international level. Islam is occupying a significant place on many agendas, from security to economic relations or in numerous cultural theories. Hypotheses such as the clash of civilisations, the need to democratise Islamic countries or the upcoming Enlightenment of the Middle East are being put forward and enjoy an ever increasing attention in policy making strategiess. It is therefore significant to explore the question to which extent “the mosque” - in a more general sense - has an influence on state affairs in a country like Saudi Arabia which, in the opinion of many, excels in religiosity, as compared to a democratic Muslim state like Turkey.
This paper takes a brief close-up of the Christian and Islamic heritage regarding the separation of church and state, subsequently analysing the topic in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In a historical perspective, the question whether and how the mosque has contributed to the foundation of the two states will be answered. The extent to which they resemble an Islamic state will be than shown, investigating also the independence of institutions from the mosque. Finally, it will be seen whether religious beliefs are kept out of public policies motivations, and especially whether public money are used for supporting religious establishments. The analysis should point to one of the four possible mosque-state relationships: identity, symbiosis, subordination, separation.
II. Separation of Church and State
A brief overview of the conceptual framework of the church-state separation necessitates firstly the clarification of the two concepts: in a broad sense (which will be here adopted) “church” will refer to any organized religious body with own doctrines/ dogmas; “state” will be identified with state institutions, as well as state-run organisations. The separation of church and state can be read through various lenses: institutional - structures being kept apart from each other (e.g. the leader of the government is not also the leader of or holds a position in the church hierarchy); ideological - the state does not have the competence to alter dogmas, and at the same time won’t have its policies dictated or influenced by the church, and will not allow discrimination on the basis of religion (e.g. education is not mainly based on dogmas or carried out by priests; the freedom of the media is not restricted to religious messages; the affiliation to a certain church is not a condition for employment).
Considering these two lenses, there are several possible types of state-church relationship. A secular state has no state religion and no legislation that outlaws or favours one religion over another; secularism requires a complete separation, not only institutional, but also from the policy point of view, as well as in the political discourse (France). In most European countries, church institutions are ideologically autonomous and legally independent from the state, nevertheless there are links with the state such as: they receive public money, religion is a part of the curriculum, and there is a so-called “state religion”. This is a thin line uniting the two, as the state still has nothing to say regarding what and how it is preached (unless for reasons of public security) and the church cannot determine the scholar curriculum, occupies quite a tiny bit of media products, religion is irrelevant for the legal status of citizen. A third type of relationship has prevailed during the Middle Ages and is to be found only rarely at present: there is a state religion, the leader of the state is also the head of the church, receives this authority directly from God, and government policies are strongly influenced by the majority religion. Theocracy is different to that in two respects: the administrative hierarchy of government is identical with the administrative hierarchy of the church; policies and legislation are entirely based on religious dogma.
a) Separation of Church and State: Christianity
At least in light of the New Testament, Christianity advocates the separation of the worldly from the heavenly, the latter being not only superior, but also impossible to attain by material means: "render ... unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's." Added to that, the space where Christianity developed, displays several other characteristics which would have made an attempt to completely unite church and state difficult: the Greek philosophy, which stands at the foundation of our rational Western culture, saw the leader as being a philosopher- the Philosopher King (Plato), and not a cleric. Historically, the divine right to rule has been invoked in Western Europe by both Kings and popes, without any of them obtaining a decisive victory which would have, maybe, united the political and the religious authority. As absolute monarchies collapsed, the church was also to some extent disgraced and refused any major political role. The first legal mentioning of the separation of church and state is Th. Jefferson’s “Separation Clause”, the first Amendment of the US Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof“, later on explained and expanded by judicial decision.[1]
The separation of church and state in Christian countries varies in degree and manifestation: some countries such as the United States of America, Canada or France have specific clauses in their Constitutions which are widely interpreted as forbidding the government from favouring one religion over another. France represents a special case, as it is the only state that mentions clearly secularism as principle regulating the relationship state-church. Most of the countries ensure the separation by simply not mentioning the church at all in the constitution and by guaranteeing the freedom of religion. Other democracies, such as Argentina or the United Kingdom, have a constitutionally established state religion, but are inclusive of citizens of other faiths. In countries like these, the head of government or head of state may be legally required to be a member of a given faith. However, only Vatican is a theocracy, meaning church and state administration are the same and government is based on the interpretation of religious texts.
Several arguments for the separation of church and state have been developed during the course of history: the persecution of religious minorities, the unnecessary involvement of the state in a war, the imposition of taboos in the political and social discourse, disadvantageous policies towards persons which do not comply with the teachings of the church, keeping superstition out of government, religion as individual endeavour[2], the fear that the clergy will be corrupted by worldly things.
b) Unity of Mosque and State: Arabic Islam
There are also arguments for various degrees of unification between state and church (mosque): the state should be generally infused with the ethics and values of religion so as to operate properly, but ought to encourage ethical and beneficial religious belief of all types, both inside and outside of government. The promulgation of religious beliefs is necessary because they are the basis of law and civil society, and a society which discourages the promulgation of those beliefs cannot function successfully; the Catholic Church's 1983 canon law proclaims that "Christ's faithful are to strive to secure that in the civil society the laws which regulate the formation of the young also provide a religious and moral education in the schools that is in accord with the conscience of the parents.”[3]. Another line of argument holds that the state ought to maintain an established church, a position described as antidisestablishmentarianism. Some Islamic schools hold that political life can only function properly within the context of Islamic law. To such believers, since God's law is Truth and beneficial to all people, any state law or action opposed to God's law would be harmful to the citizens, and displeasing to God. Many Muslims find the Western concept of separation of Church and State to be mere rebellion against God's law.
The unity of mosque and state is not a recent development and is not exclusively preached by the interpretations of Mohammed’s teachings. A brief overview of the Arab ancient philosophy reveals the idea that the political and the religious leader should be one and the same person. In his interpretation of Plato’s idea of Philosopher King, Al-Farabi (ca. 870-950 A.D.) draws a parallel between philosophy and religion, reaching the conclusion that the King should be a philosopher, but also a religious leader:
“Both [philosophy and religion] comprise the same subjects and both give an account of the ultimate principles of the beings. For both supply knowledge about the first principle and cause of the beings, and both give an account of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made - that is, supreme happiness - and the ultimate end of every one of the other beings. In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account based on imagination. In everything demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion… It follows, then, that the idea of Imam, Philosopher and Legislator is a single idea”[4].
Another great philosopher, Averroes, 1126-1198 A.D held also valid the similitude between philosophy and religion. The leader should, according to him, teach and rule the masses by means of the Koran. This would be similar to Plato's city, where ordinary people are ruled by philosophers who know what is good for them better than they do themselves.
Islam takes lots of faces and is undoubtedly not reduced to the Arabic world (there are countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq or Indonesia for which the separation of church and state works perfectly). Arab countries (as well as Iran), however, have developed variations of theocracy. Here, it is asserted, state policies are managed by religious authorities or the latter influence them to a large extent, the legal system is based on (interpretations of ) the Qur’an and sometimes the mosque and the state administration are one and the same, there is little or no freedom of religion and in general, being citizen requires being Muslim.
III. Case Studies
a) Historical/ Political Background
“The revivalist Wahhabi Islamic doctrine provided the answer to the quest for an Islamic fundamentalist state system. It is a state propelled by Islamic ideology and consolidated by Saudi power through jihad (Holy war). Orthdox Wahhabi Islam has become the raison d’etre of the Saudi state, serving as a unifying force in the social and political cohesion of tribal Arabia and providing the basis for the royal family’s legitimacy. As the official ideology, it has been utilized to support the monarchy’s authority…The symbiosis between Wahhabi ideology and Saudi power remains the basis of state identity and national unity. To be sure, the process of national consolidation was greatly facilitated by the country’s homogeneity: the population is predominantly Arab and Sunni Muslim.”[5]
The Saudi state did not emerge from the concept of “national identity”. The Bedouin philosophy of family loyalty and war for material gains couldn’t have undermined it more, whereas the long stretches of desert separating settlements rendered a durable political union impossible. It was missionary Islam -Wahhabism, an interpretation of the school of Islamic jurisprudence Hanbali- that provided the spiritual bond and justified the war of unification in the Arab peninsula.
Historically, there are two instances that reflect the combination of religion and politics as precondition for the establishment of the Saudi state. In 1720 Mohammed al-Wahhab began preaching his message in the Saudi province Neijdi, at the same time criticizing the sheikhs for not enforcing the Sharia. The main points included: the proscription of “bida” or innovation- any object or action not found in the Qur’an or Hadith is forbidden; of idolatry, tobacco, dance and music- “signs of ostentatiousness hindered true believers from contemplating God”, and the missionary doctrine of takfir wa qital -fighting against apostasy-invoked to justify the jihad as means of conversion and conquest: “it was not enough for a true believer to purify his own life; he also had to reform those around him, this being the jihad or the holy war”[6]. Fleeing for his life because of making inflammatory statements against the local governor, Mohammed al-Wahhab found refuge at Mohammed bin Saud, emir of Diriyah near Riyadh. Soon emerged an alliance based on the common purpose of unifying the Arabic Peninsula, motivated by the mission of purification, respectively by power: “Bin Saud committed himself to undertaking a cleansing jihad against the non-believers while al-Wahhab recognized the chieftain as the lay leader of the movement… The preacher was an ardent follower of the teachings of Hanbali scholar Ahmad bin Taymiya, who taught that the perfect Islamic state had two centres of authority: the emir and the religious scholars. The emir’s chief duty was to see that the Shar’ia was enforced, while the ulema’s task was to counsel the emir and offer recommendations based on Shar’ia.”[7] In 1765 Abd-al-Aziz married the preacher’s daughter and in 1803 Mecca was taken and cleansed, Medina in 1807, the new state stretching from the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea and from Jordan to Yemen.
The second act takes place subsequent to the occupation by the Ottoman Empire[8], in 1902 when Abd-al-Aziz bin Saud (the “Lion of Najd”) allied again with the al-Sheikh (new name for al-Wahhabi clan) and took over Riyadh from the rival clan al-Rashid: the second chance to achieve unification using the same recipe. In order to induce Wahhabism as a higher link than tribal ones, Abd-al-Aziz called himself the protector of Islam /Unitarianism[9] and settled the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) nomadic Bedouin in religious-military-agricultural “hijar” with an imam to teach Unitarianism (especially the interdiction of ostentatiousness and conviction the most glorious death is for the cause of Islam) and the submission to al-Saud, later using them for supplies and soldiers. By 1924, the province of Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) was under his control and in 1932 the Saudi state was founded.
The foundation of the Saudi state is therefore built on the mutual legitimization of mosque and state, more concretely on the relationship of three actors- the clergy/ulema, the King and the Islamic fanatics/ Ikhwan. According to the Hanbali Islam[10], the State should be ordered according to the Qur’an and Shar’ia- the only and absolute law of the state, the main duty of the latter being to implement it: “The Saudis are entrusted with upholding the doctrine and establishing the rule or God in Saudi Arabia.”[11] It follows that the ulema needs the protection of the State to be able to impose itself as religion (and not others), whilst the State legitimizes itself through the role of sole guardian and enforcer of this religion- basis for national unity; the Ikhwan proved extremely useful as “army”.
A short note on why religion had to be used as identity glue: the societal type of organisation in the peninsula was tribal at the time of the first and second unification; blood relationships, loyalty to the own tribe only and often conflicts between the various tribes created division in the area. On the other hand, the Bedouin type of life supposed among others a “material” loyalty: “Much of the culture of Saudi Arabia is based on a Bedouin philosophy. These people do not acknowledge a loyalty to anyone. They only recognize a loyalty based on material values.”[12] Another line of division was along religion: the Nejd province, never colonised, reproached the colonized Hejaz that their form of Islam had been diluted by contact to foreigners. Modernisation drew additional lines of separation: Hejaz was already in possession of an advanced legal, banking system and commodities, so that it was at the beginning the only one providing the state with civil servants, also serving as location of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the SA Monetary Agency in Jeddah (after the death of Faisal in 1975 all institutions moved to Riyadh and all servants stemmed Nejd[13] ). The eastern province was also not in tune with the traditional Nejd, as it stroke by its liberalism, supported by the significant oil revenues and the many expatriate employees. Last but not least, the racial division- the province of Asir consisted largely of Yemeni population[14].
The modern era brings about a disequilibrium among the three pillars of the Saudi state, firstly, because the common enemy was defeated (Ottomas/ non-believers) and the common goal was achieved- unification of a Wahhabian peninsula; secondly, because a fourth actor- modernisation- inevitably stepped in, setting up the terrible condition of adaptation or extinction. The first one to decrease in power is the Ikhwan. Settled in 1912 as a source of soldiers for the future conquest of Mecca and Medina (1924 & 1925) they were given land, seeds, instructions for agriculture, arms and teachers of Wahhabism, in an attempt to supersede tribal ties. Soon, their fundamentalist interpretation of the religious teaching, which previously provided the motivation to wage the wars of conquest, lead to stark opposition to the modernized monarchy. In a 1926 conference the King was accused of sending sons to infidel countries, using cars, telephone radios and telegraphs, allowing tribes from Iraq and Transjordan to graze flocks in the lands of the Muslims and of not converting the Shia. The King was declared by ulema nevertheless as “faithful servant of Islamic law”; by a fatwa, the only supported the Ikhwan in the conversion of the Shia, the non-Islamic taxes and grazing issues, as for the jihad, it was a matter for the King to decide; technology was also o.k. since there was no reference to it in the Islamic law. Starting with this moment the alliance ulema-King starts to crystallize as opposition to the fundamentalist element. With the conquest of Hejaz, Abd-al-Aziz was faced with a disadvantageous alternative: either allow the Ikhwad to purify the province and risk the revolt of the international Arab community, at the same time losing the income generated by pilgrims and the more efficient modern institutions; or to risk an upraise of the Ikhwan. Forbidden to wage the jihad in Hejaz, Ikhwan raided in Iraq, Transjordan and even on the Saudi territory. The final decision drawing the separation line between the old allies happened in 1928, when, subsequent to a bribed rejection of the King’s abdication, ulema gave the indirect approval of the Ikhwan’s destruction which happened at the 30 minute battle of Sabillah.
Two subsequent events will later show that the isolation of fundamentalists does not automatically open the way to modernisation, or at least not in a quick, radical way. Since the Saudi state is founded on an ascetic interpretation of Islam, introducing elements which stand in opposition to the teachings would determine the degradation of the monarchy’s legitimacy.
King Faisal’s reforms in the 60s (women’s schools, television) determined fundamentalist attacks, plots in the army and eventually his assassination by a deranged nephew, Faysal Bin-Musa'id Bin-Abd-al-Aziz in 1975. As a consequence of that, the reforms were reversed. Petrodollars and Western decay (drinking, gambling, television, and photos) gave way to the rise of Juhaiman al-Utaibi, whose father died at Sabillah, ardent critic of corruption, spiritual decline and materialism on the House of Saud and of the ulema’s allegedly false interpretation of Wahhabism. In November 20th 1979 he took control of the Mecca Mosque with the intention of establishing an Islamic republic (the Iranian model). Retribution is hard: 250 dead and the public beheading of the rebels, but at the same time the influence of the West is curtailed: videos are censored, the rights of women reduced and the mutawaeen (the religious police) are given free reign. Added to that, propaganda about the religiosity of the royal family showed the urgent need for the monarchy to improve its Islamic credentials.
[...]
[1] The United States Supreme Court held in Lemon v. Kurtzman that state action must have a secular purpose, which neither advances nor inhibits religion: "The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any law 'respecting an establishment of religion.' The Court has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).
[2] Thomas Jefferson reflected this same religious basis for belief in the separation of church and state: "Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ." (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=330&page=1#12)
[3] http://www.ourladyswarriors.org/canon/c0793-0821.htm#par1677
[4] R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy (JA82.L4) from Al-Farabi's 'Book of Agreement between the ideas of the two philosophers, the divine Plato and Aristotle', p. 77
[5] Mahmud. A. Faksh, The Future of Islam in the Middle East, p. 98-90
[6] Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham: „Saudi Arabia, the Coming Storm“, p.16
[7] Faksh, p. 90
[8] The territory was taken by the son of Egypt’s Mohammed Ali on the orders of the Ottoman Empire.
[9] Wahhabism
[10] Orthodox Sunni Islam school (the other three: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I, all four christalized in the middle of the tenth century) requires strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunna (prophetic traditions), piety, austerity, egalitarianism like in the times of the prophet; revivalist-fundamentalist-puritanical interpretation of Islam, return to the religion as practiced by the al-salaf-ancestors at the dawn of the Islam- literal meaning and application of the original sources, no outside influences and innovations.
[11] Faksh, p. 90
[12] Michael Field, „Merchants and Rulers of Saudi Arabia“, Euromoney, July 1981 p. 30
[13] Wilson and Graham, p 19
[14] There were some attempts to overcome the first two division causes, but none rising to the efficiency of a spiritual bond: the sheikhs were made nominal employees of the Ministry of the Interior, guests at majlis of local governors, were allowed to handle local problems according to the custom and had the obligation to supply a levy of men in case of war (nevertheless it was common practice in the army to disobey the superior if from another tribe). The Bedouin were in 1925 deprived of exclusive use and management of grazing areas and in 1968 awarded the right to obtain property after farming it for three years.
-
-
-
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
-
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X.