The view of the United States of America concerning Italy after Benito Mussolini’s “March on Rome” was important for the whole of Europe. The political course of the fascist country also affected the surrounding European states. In the primary phase of the fascist regime, the U.S. government was in the position to alter parts of Italy’s policy course, by applying political pressure. Thus America’s foreign policy towards Italy did not only concern this one country. It also had consequences for the rest of Europe, and the start of the Second World War.
This work is concerned with the view of the successive American administrations towards Italy after Mussolini’s ascension to power. Questions being answered are:
How did the U.S. government react after the fascist ruler took over Italy? Did the administration valuate Mussolini as a positive or a negative change for the European country? Was a thread visible in the U.S. attitude concerning Italy? What were the government’s reactions to Italy’s cooperation with Hitler? And: Could a different American political strategy concerning Italy have hindered Hitler’s war efforts?
To answer those questions, the work is structured along three main parts. The first part is addressed with the U.S. government’s position after Benito Mussolini’s soaring to power. This part is divided into a description of America’s characterization of the new leader and an account of the first times the U.S. questioned their view on Italy. Following this evaluation, the second part deals with the American view in the times of The Great Depression. The third part is concerned with the administrations view after Hitler’s rise to power. Finally the conclusion marks the end of this work.
Mainly four books were used: David F Schmitz’ “The United States and fascist Italy, 1922 – 1940” gives a well structured and informative overview of the American – Italian relations from Mussolini’s ascension to power, until the begin of The Second World War. Another useful book, in the first parts handling this topic, is H. Stuart Hughes’ “The United States and Italy”1. John P. Diggins’ work “ Mussolini and Fascism: The view from America”2 is mainly concerned with the public opinion in the U.S. toward Italy and very informative. Another well written and informative book dealing with America’s foreign policy is William L. Langer’s and S. Everett Gleason’s book “The challenge to isolation: The world crisis of 1937 – 1940 and American foreign policy”.
Inhalt
Introduction
Main part
A. The US government’s view on the rise of Mussolini
A.1 The characterization of the new leader
A.2 The view being questioned
B. The US governments view in times of the great depression
C. The U.S. governments view after Hitler’s rise to power
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
The view of the United States of America concerning Italy after Benito Mussolini’s “March on Rome” was important for the whole of Europe. The political course of the fascist country also affected the surrounding European states. In the primary phase of the fascist regime, the U.S. government was in the position to alter parts of Italy’s policy course, by applying political pressure. Thus America’s foreign policy towards Italy did not only concern this one country. It also had consequences for the rest of Europe, and the start of the Second World War.
This work is concerned with the view of the successive American administrations towards Italy after Mussolini’s ascension to power. Questions being answered are:
How did the U.S. government react after the fascist ruler took over Italy? Did the administration valuate Mussolini as a positive or a negative change for the European country? Was a thread visible in the U.S. attitude concerning Italy? What were the government’s reactions to Italy’s cooperation with Hitler? And: Could a different American political strategy concerning Italy have hindered Hitler’s war efforts?
To answer those questions, the work is structured along three main parts. The first part is addressed with the U.S. government’s position after Benito Mussolini’s soaring to power. This part is divided into a description of America’s characterization of the new leader and an account of the first times the U.S. questioned their view on Italy. Following this evaluation, the second part deals with the American view in the times of The Great Depression. The third part is concerned with the administrations view after Hitler’s rise to power. Finally the conclusion marks the end of this work.
Mainly four books were used: David F Schmitz’ “The United States and fascist Italy, 1922 – 1940”[1] gives a well structured and informative overview of the American – Italian relations from Mussolini’s ascension to power, until the begin of The Second World War. Another useful book, in the first parts handling this topic, is H. Stuart Hughes’ “The United States and Italy”[2]. John P. Diggins’ work “ Mussolini and Fascism: The view from America”[3] is mainly concerned with the public opinion in the U.S. toward Italy and very informative. Another well written and informative book dealing with America’s foreign policy is William L. Langer’s and S. Everett Gleason’s book “The challenge to isolation: The world crisis of 1937 – 1940 and American foreign policy”[4].
Main part
A. The US government’s view on the rise of Mussolini
A.1 The characterization of the new leader
After Benito Mussolini’s “March on Rome” on the 28th of October 1922, the US government’s view of Italy was formed by two corresponding main points: Primary, a major threat was seen in a possible communist revolution in Italy[5]. Thus, as a second point, the American export market, which was vital for the US economy, seemed endangered.
Until the failure of the workers factory occupation in 1920, Italy was in a revolutionary crisis[6]. Even though the evident radical movement ceased to be present, the European country was still seen as unstable. The different administrations before Mussolini did not seem able to stabilize the nation. None of them stayed in power long enough to help the country with a constant policy. As early as 1917 a member of the US state department noted: “The Italians are like children. They must be lead and assisted more than any other nation.”[7] Instead of successive weak governments the US hoped for a strong administration, which would guide the people and stabilize the political climate. Furthermore the Warren G. Harding administration saw a much larger hazard in a communist overthrow than in a fascist regime. It was believed once Italy became a communist country, the other European nations would also adopt this political course[8].
This unstable situation in Italy evoked the fear of a loss of market for America. The European economy, which had just recovered from the war, needed to follow a stable course. Otherwise the expansion of the US export market in Europe, which was vital for domestic prosperity in America, was not guaranteed[9].
Those fears and needs led the Harding administration to view Mussolini’s ascension to power as a positive change for Italy. He was believed to be the leader who would make an end to weak Italian governments and would reinstate the economy of his country. The American ambassador in Italy, Richard Washburn Child, called the “march on Rome” a “fine young revolution”[10], and the American president himself sent a congratulatory message to Mussolini[11].
Nonetheless did some doubts about the new fascist regime exist. Child saw one danger in the foreign strategy of the new European ruler: He might want to distract from his failures done at home with a blatant supranational policy. Still this uncertainty did not make the US government reevaluate its view. By dividing the fascist party in an “extreme” and a “moderate” part, the “extremists” could be blamed for the seen perils. The ambassador first gave this characterization of Mussolini and his party, which divided the fascists in “extremists” and “moderates”. The extremists were believed to be the violent, untamed part of the fascists, who had the capacity to cause political disruption. The moderates, on the other hand, purportedly represented the tamed part. They were believed to oppose violence, and be willing to bring Italy back on a stable political course. Benito Mussolini was classified as a “moderate”[12]. This characterization of the fascist party was also adopted by the successive American administrations.
A.2 The view being questioned
The US government’s view towards Italy was being seriously questioned when the first domestic crisis for the Italian regime erupted. It occurred after the assassination of Giacomo Matteotti. The moderate socialist deputy had openly deplored the terror, which had helped the fascists to achieve their electoral victory. In June 1924 Matteotti disappeared and was later found dead. He was murdered. It was partly proven that the order to assassinate the deputy came from a governmental level.[13] This news caused uproar in the whole of Italy, and Mussolini’s position seemed seriously endangered. The US government was afraid that if the European leader should loose his office, either an “extremist” fascist leader would replace him, or a communist follower would fill the vacuum. Italy would fall back in an unstable position and the benefits, purportedly guaranteed by Mussolini, would be lost. Thus the Calvin Coolidge administration, after initial doubts, stood by Mussolini and shared the view of him not being involved in the assassination[14].
[...]
[1] Schmitz, David F.: The United States and fascist Italy, 1922 – 1940, Chapel Hill and London 1988, (In the future quoted as: Schmitz: The US and Italy)
[2] Hughes, H. Stuart: The United States and Italy, London 1979, (In the future quoted as: Hughes: The US and Italy).
[3] Diggins, John P.: Mussolini and Fascism: The view from America, Princeton 1972, (In the future quoted as: Diggins: Mussolini and Fascism).
[4] Langer, William L., and Gleason, S. Everett: The challenge to isolation: The world crisis of 1937 – 1940 and American foreign policy, New York 1964, (In the future quoted as: Langer and Gleason: Challenge to isolation).
[5] Schmitz: The US and Italy, p. 36.
[6] Ibid., p. 10.
[7] Quoted in: Ibid., p. 14.
[8] Ibid., p. 36.
[9] Michael J. Hogan: Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-America Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928, Missouri 1977, p. 39.
[10] Quoted in: Schmitz: The US and Italy, p. 36.
[11] Ibid., p. 54.
[12] Ibid., p. 61.
[13] Hughes: The US and Italy, p. 99.
[14] Schmitz: The US and Italy, p. 74.
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