It is the aim of this thesis to analyse the framework and relevant case law on requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 14 (1) ICCPR, Article 8 (1) IACHR and Article 6 (1) ECHR in relation to military courts.
One has to bear in mind that most of the judgments discussed were not solely concerned with questions of impartiality and independence, but also with other fundamental rights, thus the paper has to be read in a context and framework of rights entrenched in the respective Convention or Covenant.
Military Courts are not a new phenomenon, they were (and are) a feature of the military system and were originally intended as a tool to uphold a structure which is rooted in vertical influence, thus they have a direct nexus to the executive branch of the state which makes them relatively easy to set up and control on the other hand however, due to their proximity to other branches of the state they can blur the line of the underlying principle – separation of powers -. Several problems spring from the latter aspect[…]. Another problem, which will be also discussed below is that of scrutiny, open courts are subject to public scrutiny whereas military or even partly military courts often lack any form of control. This line of reasoning leads to two characteristical groups of cases, firstly cases involving civilians which are trialled by a military court often in relation to state security issues, the other problem is that of impunity where members of the military sit trial over comrades often resulting in an impunity verdict.
Bearing these two groups of cases in mind an approach was taken, first to set out the relevant international legal framework and principles on independence and impartiality, the next part will then, building on the former, analyse the state reports and case law. In doing so it will be shown, in how far the different controlling bodies have developed
the requirements of independence and impartiality up to the current date and have found consensus in areas i.e. trial of civilians before military courts but differ in their approach to prevent the latter.
After a first overview of the case law it became clear that the gravest interference with the fair trial right has occurred in South America, having said this, at the core of this paper is the analysis of case law before the Inter American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter American Court.
Content
Introduction
Structure
A. International Legal Framework
I. Binding Instruments
II. Non-Binding Instruments
B. Impartiality & Independence (Preliminary thoughts)
I. Introduction
II. Impartiality
III. Independence
IV. Summary
C. I. Military Tribunals –distinguished
1. ICCPR
2. IACHR / ECHR
II. ICCPR
1. Introduction
2. State reports / General Comment Nr. 13 + 32
3. Individual complaints
a. Bazzano v Uruguay
b. Little v Jamaica
c. Campos v Peru
d. Kurbanova v Tajikistan
4. Summary
III. IACHR
1. Introduction
2. State Reports / Annual Reports (Commission)
a. Uruguay
b. Colombia (first)
c. Guatemala / Chile
d. Peru
e. Columbia (second)
f. Summary
3. Individual complaints (Commission)
a. Introduction
b. Alexis Fuentes Guerro et al. v Columbia
c. Santos Mendivelso Coconubo v Columbia
d. Lindo and Concha v Peru
e Diniz Bento da Silva v Brazil
f. Summary
4. Individual complaints (Court)
a. Introduction
b. Loayza-Tamayo v Peru
c. Petruzzi et al. v Peru
d. Case of 19 merchants v Columbia
e. Lori Berenson-Mejía v Peru
f. Summary
IV ECHR
1. Introduction
2. Independence & Impartiality
a. England
aa. Findlay v The United Kingdom
bb. Steel and Morris v The United Kingdom cc. Bell v The United Kingdom
b. Turkey
aa. Introduction
bb. Incal v Turkey
cc. Çıraklar v Turkey
c. Summary
D. Conclusions & Summary
E. Primary / Secondary Literature
Introduction
It is the aim of this thesis to analyse the framework and relevant case law on requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 14 (1) ICCPR, Article 8 (1) IACHR and Article 6 (1) ECHR in relation to military courts.
One has to bear in mind that most of the judgments discussed were not solely concerned with questions of impartiality and independence, but also with other fundamental rights, thus the paper has to be read in a context and framework of rights entrenched in the respective Convention or Covenant.
Military Courts are not a new phenomenon, they were (and are) a feature of the military system and were originally intended as a tool to uphold a structure which is rooted in vertical influence, thus they have a direct nexus to the executive branch of the state which makes them relatively easy to set up and control on the other hand however, due to their proximity to other branches of the state they can blur the line of the underlying principle – separation of powers -. Several problems spring from the latter aspect, when a court is easily controlled by the executive it is under a direct influence handing down potentially biased verdicts with a detrimental effect for the accused. Another problem, which will be also discussed below is that of scrutiny, open courts are subject to public scrutiny whereas military or even partly military courts often lack any form of control. This line of reasoning leads to two characteristical groups of cases, firstly cases involving civilians which are trialled by a military court often in relation to state security issues, the other problem is that of impunity where members of the military sit trial over comrades often resulting in an impunity verdict.
Bearing these two groups of cases in mind an approach was taken, first to set out the relevant international legal framework and principles on independence and impartiality, the next part will then, building on the former, analyse the state reports and case law. In doing so it will be shown, in how far the different controlling bodies have developed
the requirements of independence and impartiality up to the current date and have found consensus in areas i.e. trial of civilians before military courts but differ in their approach to prevent the latter.
After a first overview of the case law it became clear that the gravest interference with the fair trial right has occurred in South America, having said this, at the core of this paper is the analysis of case law before the Inter American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter American Court.
Structure
The initial approach to analyse more then the two requirements contained in the articles proved fruitless at the beginning of writing this paper as the approach I had taken was to wide. I had to make a decision to further narrow down the subject and a reoccurring criticism was that of independence and impartiality, I therefore decided upon this current structure and content. On the downside, the paper lacks in parts of secondary opinion as not to much writing was done on the topic, I have compensated this aspect by contrasting the different positions in the case law and state reports. Another problem was the space requirement, to fit the paper in a 120 000 characters frame, nevertheless after some shortening this was achieved.
A. Fair Trial – International legal framework
This section is intended as an overview of the international and regional instruments which form the framework and set out the underlying principles in relation to the fair trial right.
A.I. Binding International Instruments
The underlying principles which form the framework of several trial rights are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 8 to 11[1] set out the most important principles, one of them being the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal in case of criminal charges (article 10). Due to the nature of a declaration it is not a binding instrument as such but it is understood that the principles form a broad consensus of rights in international public law. In difference to the discussed instruments does the trial right in article 10 of the Declaration only apply to criminal charges whereas i.e. article 14 of the international Covenant applies to both civil and criminal proceedings.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1966 (ICCPR) and its two optional protocols provide, compared to the Universal Declaration, for a more detailed approach to the fair trial right but the ICCPR is limited in its application to the states which are parties to the Covenant and have ratified it. Of concern for this paper is Article 14[2]. (1) (the whole article is printed here, as other secondary rights in the article are discussed below as well) discussed below and the therein contained requirement for the court to be independent and impartial, which is the underlying principle and prerequisite for other rights within the article i.e. article 14 (3) b, adequate preparation for the trial or 14 (3) c prohibition of undue delay.
Other then this international instrument provides the Inter American Convention of Human Rights (IACHR) and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in article 8 (1)[3] respectively article 6 (1)[4] for a right to be trialled by an independent, competent and impartial tribunal. Article 6 (1) makes no express reference to a competence requirement of the court but it will be shown that the case law under the ECHR developed in such way that the European Court regards the requirements of the court as a chorus of elements.
A. II. Non Binding Instruments
The Human Rights Committee attached such importance to the fair trial right that it proposed a new additional protocol to the Covenant in 1994 entitled: “Third Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, "Aiming at Guaranteeing Under All Circumstances the Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy"[5]. The draft protocol would have included a number of non-derogable rights under article 14 but never entered into force as a protocol. At the current state the Committee has published a new General Comment on article 14 the content of which will be discussed in detail in part B of this paper.
Besides this already specific instrument, which points into a direction, where trial rights would have gained an even more fundamental character then they have currently the General Assembly introduced in 1985 and 1990 three sets of principles which are intended as guidelines for states on issues relating primarily to the independence of the judiciary. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985[6] was the first set of principles which passed the GA in 1985. These principles are primarily concerned with issues surrounding the independence of the judiciary as a whole, to this end they stress that an independent judiciary must be anchored either in the constitution of a country or in a secondary legislative act. In 1990 the GA adopted the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers[7] this was done in recognition of the fact that an independent judiciary as set out in the 1985 principles also requires a notion of equality of arms on the prosecutors as well as the lawyers side. The latest development in this series of principles relates to the ethical standard of judges, the Bangalore Principles[8] aim to provide guidance for judges by regulating their judicial conduct in light of accountability for their conduct to a reviewing body.
B. Impartiality and Independence (Preliminary thoughts)
B. I. Introduction
Impartiality and independence are the corner stones of the court system to abide by the rule of law. They are the safeguards which guarantee the position of the court as third party, neutral observer to a situation, thereby allowing the judge to act free from outside interference and guaranteeing a position for the accused where his trial rights are observed. This third party position is said to be potentially interfered with from the executive branch of the state, in case of military tribunals interference could stem from within the military itself or the executive branch of the state or a mix of the two seems possible, where the military justice system is rooted so deeply in the military structure that it lacks any independence.
B.II. Impartiality
Impartiality of the court relates in each of the three discussed instruments to the absence of a biased judge (subjective element) and to the composition of the court (objective element).
As impartiality relates directly to the objectivity of the judge the test whether impartiality was observed during proceedings must be of the same nature, asking for an objective bystander to assess the judges subjective behaviour (state of mind to the facts and parties to the case) and on the other hand the objectivity of the court itself (composition of the court, technicalities of the case).
Personal prejudice or a lack of impartiality would be difficult to prove in a case but it is still relevant and directly linked to the establishment of the court, especially in military tribunals. Thus far no unambiguous test was established by either of the three institutions to test the personal impartiality of the judge. Impartiality is presumed up to a point where proof to the contrary exists, the court in Strasbourg notes in this context in Pullar v The United Kingdom[9] “The principle that a tribunal shall be presumed to bee free of personal prejudice or partiality is long established in the case law of the court It reflects an important element of the rule of law, namely that the verdicts of a tribunal should be final and binding unless set aside by a superior court on the basis of irregularity or unfairness. This principle must apply equally to all forms of tribunal, including juries. […]”[10] Thus and underlying presumption exits that also military judges are free from bias in the European context. The position is shared by the HRC and the American Court and indeed it must be, if one would presume every court or judge is biased in one way or the other one would not have any security in any court system even though in South American Cases some doubt is justified as will be shown in the case law discussion of the American Court.
One can see that subjective partiality is notoriously hard to prove for what reason the courts concentrate on the objective facts to assess impartiality of the court (and the judge). The formula developed by the ECHR relates to an objective bystander to the case, not necessarily to the accused or his fear whether the judge is impartial or not, asking for this bystander to assess whether the court can be „seen to be impartial“ The ECHR held in Daktaras v Lithuania[11] „[...]it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude a legitimate doubt in this respect.“ a similar position was developed by the HRC in Kartumen v Finland[12] ”i mpartiality of the court implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties.”[13]
This inner viewpoint to the parties and facts of the case is one aspect of impartiality but impartiality must also be recognised, by a neutral observer to the case, to be factually seen as such. To this end the judge must function as an objective observer to the facts put before him rather then being prejudiced or biased.
B.III. Independence
Independence of a court as required by articles 14 (1) 2 ICCPR, 6 (1) ECHR and 8 (1) IACHR necessitates and independent judiciary. The foundation for an independent judiciary is the doctrine of separation of powers separating the executive, the legislative and the judicative branch of the state. This separation is of utmost importance in safeguarding the rule of law; on one hand laws are openly discussed in an assembly on the other hand a separation guarantees a position for the judge to reach a verdict without interference from other branches of the state. Furthermore the doctrine guarantees that the executive branch of the state is under surveillance from the public which fosters public critique and evaluation. In an ideal model this separation would guarantee absolute independence of the judiciary as a whole but in reality a vertical as well as a horizontal interdependence exist which can potentially influence the judiciary. Horizontal interdependence from other branches of the state could include salaries for the judges or their term of tenure. Vertical interference is not as relevant in a system where the rule of law is observed (separated powers) as in a state where the rule of power (as opposed to the rule of law) is dominant. This vertical interference is especially of importance when assessing the independence of military tribunals as vertical influence is an inherent feature of each military structure. We will later see (the Columbian cases before the American Court) which impact the latter influence can have on a court and the severe results for the accused.
One author put it bluntly, on independence of the court he notes “A judge without independence is a charade wrapped in a farce inside an oppression.”[14]
The separation of powers doctrine is nevertheless still the underlying principle in guaranteeing an independent judiciary, to this end it not only shields the different branches of the state from each other but also grants exclusive rights to each of them. For the judiciary these rights include a right to review acts by the other state branches, one must further distinguish between the power of the court to apply the law in civil proceedings and such involving another entity of the state, that is criminal proceedings against an individual or decisions which involve a branch of the state breaching the rights of an individual. Here is the point to return to the above set out impartiality of the court which can only be guaranteed when the framework of independence is prior established thus it is hard to see how independence and impartiality could exist in this context without the other.
A major step towards a formula to assess the independence of a countries judiciary was taken in 1985 by the already mentioned “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary” thereby making an overall attempt by breaking down independence into its core elements. According to these principles key aspects include objectivity in the appointment of judges, that is an objective procedure, the time of their tenure and security from removal at will. These principles, even though not binding still reflect in the verdicts of the three controlling bodies and play for the Human Rights Commission and the European Court a more crucial role then for the Inter American Commission and Court. It will be shown in how far the HRC and the European Court by using single elements of the independence criteria have developed a more detailed approach whereas the American Court and Commission point to different situations which violate the fair trial right without going into to much detail which parts of the independence criteria are in doubt.
B. IV. Summary
In relation to impartiality and independence it is important to regard them as interdependent requirements safeguarding the rulee of law as opposed to the rule of power. On impartiality the important point to note at this point is that the inner viewpoint of the judge is a hard to prove fact, for this reason the controlling bodies have focused on the objective criteria, that is technicalities of the case and composition of the court. On independence the crucial point is that interference can exist as well vertically as well as horizontally whereas the vertical influence is of more importance to military courts as vertical influence is one of the inherent features in every military system.
C. Military tribunals distinguished
Military tribunals or military courts are a special branch of courts within and sometimes out of the legal framework in a country. Neither of the three discussed regional and international instruments contains a legal definition one could build on, thus it is important to understand what the different controlling bodies mean when speaking of a military court.
C. III. 1. ICCPR
The current position of the Human Rights Committee is to be found in its new General Comment Nr. 32 where it states “the provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals, whether ordinary or specialised”[15].Also, the new General Comment provides expressly for military courts to be included, whereas the previous comment[16] did not mention them explicitly. This, however, does not define the scope of what constitutes a court respectively a military court and where to distinguish between the two. The lack of definition could stem from the fact that the Committee did not intend to limit the application of trial guarantees to a special branch of courts as the definitions and names for courts vary from country to country. In its state reports the Committee did, in non of the state reports analysed for this paper doubt the capacity of the respective court to qualify as such. In doing so the Committee points to the common denominator which in each case is the capacity of the court to issue a binding decision regardless of its name.
The Committee in providing a flexible approach as to what constitutes a court also provides for a framework for future institutions that could qualify as a court, as the names under which such a body exists seems generic.
The word “court” and “tribunal” are used synonymously.
As to military courts or tribunals no definition is provided, from the state reports and individual complaints below it would result that at least one of the judges must have a military background respectively the court must be rooted within the military structure.
C. III. 2. IACHR / ECHR
The Inter American Commission and the Court do not provide for a definition as to what constitutes a court either, nevertheless the capacity of the court to be recognised as such was never in doubt, only the requirements of impartiality and independence were criticised, but neither the Commission nor the Court ruled that a court would loose its capacity as court for being partial and not independent. The only exception to this is the below discussed state report on Columbia (second), where the Commission notes such a strong link between the military justice system and executive that it is doubtful whether the courts qualify as such, the Commission notes: “[…] the military justice system may not even be properly referred to as a true judicial forum. The military justice system does not form part of the judicial branch of the state”[17] Having said this the Commission and the Court in the Columbian cases still treat the military courts as within the ambit of the Convention.
Further, Commission and Court seem to accept the wording “military court” without distinguishing between civil and military as long as the court has a decision making capacity which reflects also a wide and functional approach.
The European Court has also developed a functional approach to the meaning of tribunal or court, in Belios v Switzerland [18] it emphacises “a tribunal […] is characterised by its judicial function, that is to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law […]. [19]
C. II. 1. Introduction
Having set out the framework on independence and impartiality of the judiciary the next part of this paper will analyse the relevant case law resulting from each of the controlling bodies under ICCPR, AMCR and ECHR in relation to military courts. Each controlling body has developed mainly through their case law but also through general comments and opinions a catalogue to assess impartiality and independence of a court this part will address these catalogues separately from each other. Starting point is the ICCPR as it is the only instrument which has international application.
C. II. 2. State reports / General Comments Nr. 13 and 32
The Human Rights Committee in its capacity for safeguarding the rights entrenched in the ICCPR and its Optional Protocols has developed a differentiated picture under Article 14 (1). For the purpose of this paper state reports as a monitoring tool, general comments and case law resulting from complaints under the optional protocol are dealt with in the same breath as the former are part of the consideration for verdicts. Surely state reports have different function then individual cases and general comments are intended as guidelines for states to adhere to in their state reports and its implementation but their foundation is nevertheless the ICCPR.
The Human Rights Committee to date has developed a set of questions to assess the independence and impartiality of a court, these are to be found mainly in their state reports and general comments.[20] These questions relate to the appointment of judges, tenure and dismissal as well as education and financial aspects. These test questions were developed over a period of time and relate in their core (even though more detailed and bolstered with case law) to the General Principles for the Judiciary from 1985. Other points of concern to the HRC are judges which are chosen arbitrarily or judges who are directly elected, the committee notes in its Concluding Observations on Sudan “The Committee is concerned that in appearance as well as in fact the judiciary is not truly independent, that many judges have not been selected primarily on the basis of their legal qualification.”[21] As to vertical influence on the judges the committee is concerned about the influence from the executive branch of the state as well as in some countries the removal of judges, in its Concluding Observations on Algeria the Committee notes “The Committee is concerned that the proposals made by the Constitutional Review Committee in regard to the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court by the President after their retirement and the removal of Supreme Court Judges by the President, subject only to ratification by the National Assembly without any safeguard or inquiry by an independent judicial tribunal, are incompatible with the independence of the judiciary and run contrary to article 14 of the Covenant”[22] In its first General Comment on article 14[23], the committee notes that the provisions of article 14 apply to all tribunals and courts whether ordinary or specialized (military tribunals included). A derogation from article 14 is in the view of the committee only allowed under very special circumstances i.e. declared public emergencies and must be kept to a minimum subject to respect the conditions of impartiality and independence. Thus in 1984 a derogation from article 14 was not per se contrary to the scope of the ICCPR a position which has changed since. In its latest General Comment[24] on the article the committee stresses that independence and impartiality are absolute rights in the sense of the covenant and can not be derogated from even in times of public emergency[25]. The committee also explains, following case Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea[26], where the competencies are of the different state branches are to interdependent the independence requirement cannot be safeguarded as a matter of situation. Further it affirmed in the comment in clear words that the impartiality requirement relates directly to the position of the judge and his capacity as an observer to the case, in the words of the committee: “must not [be] influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them”[27] A new aspect which was not mentioned in the former General Comment on the article is the requirement for the court to appear to a third party observer as being impartial which sets an objective standard for the court. In relation to military courts the committee does not specifically emphasise any criteria which have to be adhered to except the once already set out above but notes with concern that some countries have resorted to what the committee describes as “faceless judges”[28]. Faceless is meant in a way that the identity of the judge is not known to the accused. Both, the impartiality and independence requirement can in such cases not be adhered to as court and the person of the judge are the addressees of the requirements. In countries where these tribunals exist often secondary i.e. communications with the lawyer which are hindered[29] or no adequate preparation for trial proceedings[30] requirements resulting from the article are also infringed as will be later described in the individual complaints procedure under the optional protocol.
[...]
[1] Article 8.Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.Article 11.(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
[2] All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent , independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; (c ) To be tried without undue delay (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation. 5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. 6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
[3] Article 8 (1) Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a c ompetent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.
[4] Article 6 (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
[5] cited in Bassiouni p. 169
[6] The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985 Accessed on www.unodc.org
[7] Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 1990 Accessed on www.unodc.org
[8] The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002. Accessed on www.unodc.org
[9] Pullar v United Kigndom judgment of 10.06.1996
[10] Pullar v United Kigndom judgment of 10.06.1996 para. 32
[11] Daktaras v Lithuania judgment of 10.10.2000 para..30
[12] Arvo O. Karttumen v Finland, Communication No. 387/1989, UN doc. A/48/40
[13] Arvo O. Karttumen v Finland, Communication No. 387/1989, UN doc. A/48/40 para. 7.2
[14] in Kirby, p. 392
[15] CCPR/C/GC/32 para. 22
[16] CCPR/C/GC/13 para. 4
[17] OEA/Ser.L/V/II.84 Doc. 39 rev. CHAPTER V FINAL OBSERVATIONS para. 20 cited in Bucherer p. 32
[18] Belios v Switzerland (1988) E.C.H.R. Sr. A 132
[19] Belios v Switzerland (1988) E.C.H.R. Sr. A 132 para. 64 cited in Bucherer p. 28
[20] CCPR/C/79 Add. 79 para. 18
[21] CCPR/C/79 Add. 85 para. 21
[22] CCPR/C/79 Add. 62 para. 16
[23] CCPR /C/GC/ Add. 32 para. 4
[24] CCPR /C/GC/ Add. 32 (2007)
[25] Communication No. 263/1987, Gonzalez del Rio v Peru, para. 5.2
[26] Communication No. 468/1991, para. 5.2
[27] CCPR /C/GC/ Add. 32 para. 22
[28] CCPR /C/GC/ Add. 32 para. 23
[29] Communication No. 577/1994 Gutiérrez Vivanco v Peru, para. 7.1
[30] Communication No. 1125/2002, Quispe Roque v Peru, para. 7.3
- Arbeit zitieren
- Volker Schleiff (Autor:in), 2008, The right to a fair trial - Requirements of impartiality and independence under Articles 14 (1) ICCPR, 8 (1) IACHR and 6 (1) ECHR in relation to military courts, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/118534
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