This paper offers a critique of Susan Wolfs thesis that it is not desirable to be as morally good as possible. I will mainly focus on two objections that are strongly connected with each other. The first one being the notion of free will, that is, that one can only be a moral saint by choice and out of one’s own free will. The secound one is the notion that a moral saint will affect their surroundings in a way that will make up for the possible downsides of moral saintliness.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Wolf’s Position
3. Prior Objections
3.1 We Cannot Be Too Moral
3.2 What Moral Saints Look Like
3.3 The Motivation of the Moral Saint
4. The Perks ofBeing a Saint
4.1 Moral Saints AsFree Agents
4.2 Moral Saints Arelmpactful
4.3 There Are Many Ways To Well-Roundness
5. Conclusion
- Citar trabajo
- Felix Haus (Autor), 2021, Why and in what sense are our intuitons regarding 'moral saints' opposed to the conclusion Susan Wolf reaches regarding moral sainthood?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1164511
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