This Research work discusses the Legal Concept of Locus standi. This work traces the origin of Locus Standi from the Common Law and its reception into Nigerian Jurisprudence. This work goes further to discuss locus standi through decided cases. This work reveals some other legal concepts that have become intertwined with the Concept of locus standi. This research work makes a comparative analysis of locus standi using select African jurisdictions.
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CASES
TABLE OF STATUTES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONCEPT OF LOCUS STANDI
1.2 ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE
1.2.1 HOW LOCUS STANDI IS DETERMINED
1.2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE IN NIGERIA
1.2.3 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 LOCUS STANDI THROUGH DECIDED CASES IN NIGERIA
2.2 LOCUS STANDI AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
2.2.1 LOCUS STANDI VIS- A- VIS FAIR HEARING
2.2.2 LOCUS STANDI AND THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
2.2.3 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER THREE:COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LOCUS STANDI WITH SELECT AFRICAN COUNTRIES
3.0 INTRODUCTION
3.1 LOCUS STANDI IN GHANA
3.2 LOCUS STANDI IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.3 LOCUS STANDI IN MOZAMBIQUE
3.3.1 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 INTRODUCTION
4.1 EEFECT OF LOCUS STANDI ON PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
4.1.1 EFFECT OF LOCUS STANDI ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
4.1.2 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FIVE
5.1 LAW REFORM AND LOCUS STANDI
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my Parents Mr & Mrs Adeniyi Ogundele.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My sincere gratitude goes first and foremost to Almighty God the creator of everything. To my lovely and caring parents, Mr and Mrs P.A Ogundele, for their care and ready response to my demands both psychologically and financially, I say a big thank you to the best parent on earth. I specially thank Barr Sesan Fabamise for his academic guidance.
TABLE OF CASES
NIGERIA
- Adekunle v Adelugba (2011) 16 NWLR, PT 1272 at 159
- Adediran v Inter-land transport Ltd (1991) 9 NWLR PT 214, 155 at 180
- Adefolalu v Governor of Kwara State & others (1984) 5 NCLRC 766
- Adewole & Ors v Jakande (1981) 1NCLR 290
- Ajayi & 2ors v Jolayemi 6 (NSCQR)
- Alhaji Barisu Dutse v The Governor of Kano State & ors (unreported suit No. 12/134/80)
- Archbishop Okogie and ors v Att-Gen of Lagos State (1981) 1 NCLR 218
- Attorney General Kaduna State v Mallam Hassan (1984) 5NCLR 177
- Badejo v Ministry of Education & others (1990) 4NWLR (PT 143) Pg 254
- Bello v AG. Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (PT45) 828
- Busari v Oseni (1992) 4NWLR (PT 237) 557 at 589
- Chief Isiagba v Alagbe (1981) 2 NCLR 424
- Chief Sule Balogun and ors v Att-Gen of Lagos State and ors (1981) 2NCLR 589
- Christian outreach ministries Inc. v Cobham (2006) 15 NWLR, PT 1002, 283
- ET &EC (NIG) LTD v Nevico (2004) 3 NWLR (PT865) 327
- Fawehinmi v IGP (2002) 98 NCLR 1165
- Fawehinmi v Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (PT 67) 797 SC
- Fawhinmi v Akilu (N02) (1989) 2NWLR (PT 1020) 122 (SC)
- Fawehinmi v The President (2008) 23 WRN
- Godwin Jideonwu and ors v Governor of Bendel State (1981) 2 NCLR 589
- Irene Thomas and 5 ors v The most Reverend Timothy Omotayo Olufosoye (1986) 1NWLR (PT 18) 669
- Justice F.O.M Atake v Chief Nelson Aisgboro Afejeku (1994) 4 NWLR (PT 67) 797 SC
- Kamil v Aisowieren (2010) 1NWLR (PT 1174) 125 C.A
- Keyamo v House of Assembly Lagos State (2000) 12 NWLR (A-680) 196
- NNPC v Fawehinmi (1998) 7NWLR (PT 559) at 612
- Nwankwo v Ononeze-Malu (2009) 1NWLR (PT 1123) 671 at 715-716
- Olawoyin v Attorney-General of Northern Region of Nigeria (1961) ALL NLR 269
- Owodunmi v Registered Trustees of Celestial Church & ors (2000) 10 NWLR (PT 675) 315
- Ogunmokun v Military Administrator of Osun State (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 594) 261
- PDP v Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR PT 1316 pg 95
- Senator Abraham Adesanya v The President of Nigeria & anor (1981) 2 NCLR 358
- Seismograph Services (Nig) Ltd, v Eyuafe (1976) NSCC 434
- Yusuf v Akindipe (2000) 8 NLRR (PT 609)
GHANA
- Kwakye v Attorney-General (1981) GLR 9 SC at 13
- New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (1996-97) SCGLR 729 at pp 776-780
- Okudjeto Ablakwa &Anor v Attorney-General & Obetsebi Lampty (2011) 2 SCGLR 986
- Sam (N02) v Attorney-General (2000) SCGLR 305
- Tuffour v Attorney-General (2000) SC GLR 305
UNITE D KINGDOM
- Arsenal Football Club v Ende (1977) 2WLR 974
- EX PARTE Sidebotham (1880) 14 CH.D 458 at 463
- R v Inland Revenue Commissioners Exparte National Federation of self-employed and small business Ltd, (1982) AC 617, 653-G-H
- R v Inspectorate of Pollution Exparte Green Peace (N0 2) (1994) 4 ALLER 328
- Re ARGENTUM Reductions (UK) Limited (1975) 1 WLR 186, PG 190
TABLE OF STATUTES
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended
Constitution of Ghana, 1992
The Constitution of South Africa, 1996
Constitution of Mozambique, 2004
Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONCEPT OF LOCUS STANDI
The word ‘ Locus ’ in Latin means a place, that is a place or position where something is done or exists. The word ‘ Standi ’ means ‘place of standing’. It denotes the right to bring an action or be heard in a given action. It is often referred to as standing to sue or standing1.
Locus Standi can be defined as the existence of a right of an individual or group of individuals to bring an action before a court of law for adjudication. For a person to possess the necessary capacity to institute a proceedings in a court of law, such a party must show that he is affected or likely to be affected or aggrieved by the proceeding in the suit, a party must be injured by the action which he is assailing as unconstitutional. The party must show that he has personal interest in the matter at hand.
The doctrine of Locus Standi or standing determines the competence of a plaintiff to assert the matter of their complaint before the court. In cases where a plaintiff seeks to establish a private right or special damage, either under the common law or administrative law, the plaintiff will have Locus Standi if he has sufficient interest in the matter, what constitute sufficient interest will depend on the facts of each case. For a person to invoke the judicial power he must show that his personal interest will be or has been adversely affected by the action complained of or that he has sustained an injury to himself (personally) which injury is over and above that of the general public.
According to Mubangizi,2 Locus Standi ‘deals with the right to approach a court of law to seek a remedy for the infringement of a right’. Standing confers on an applicant the right to be heard as distinct from the right to succeed in the action or proceeding for relief. Locus Standi denotes the legal right of any person, group of persons, statutory bodies or government, to appear before a court, or a tribunal constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality and to have grievances adjudicated upon by the court.
Distinction has been made as regard standing in public law on one hand and private litigation on the other hand. Private litigation is concerned with the determination of a dispute between two individuals in which relief will be specific such litigation will generally not directly affect people who are not parties to the litigation. In such cases, the plaintiff is both the victim of the harm and the beneficiary of the relief. For example, someone who is not a party to a contract cannot establish a cause of action for breach of contract and will have no Locus Standi to sue the defendant on the said contract.
In litigation of public nature, the relief sought is generally forward-looking and general in its application so that it may affect a wide range of people. It is said that the doctrine is necessary in order that individuals can properly be excluded from enforcing the law unless a right of their own is at stake. An erudite Judge Megarry J. opines that ‘the courts are not places for those who wish to meddle in things which are no concern of theirs, just for the pleasure of interfering or of proclaiming abroad some favourable doctrine of theirs, or of indulging a taste of forensic display3’
Locus Standi acts as a limitation to frivolous litigation, abuse of court processes and a waste of precious time of the court, in order to exclude characters that have no interest at state in a matter from meddling with it, the road to litigation has been made narrow by virtue of the legal construction of the Locus Standi principle. This construction is a contentious act of protecting a legal system from being inundated and overwhelmed by pieces of litigations half of which are superficial and artificial. Thus, the doctrine it is said has given the courts ample time to concentrate on matters of relevance and importance brought before them.
To this end, the doctrine of Locus Standi or standing to sue is an innovation of the court founded upon the public policy that mere busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers interfering in the affairs of others should be discouraged. The doctrine was developed to, in a way prevent the floodgates from opening where every Tom and Dick, take up any case and bring it before the court regardless of their interest in the matter or the outcome in a sense, the doctrine serve a gate keeping function.4 It focuses on the right of a person to be heard in the law courts. What this boils down to, is that in determining the issue of Locus Standi, the court does not examine the issues first; it seeks to find out whether the plaintiff has proved such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illustration of difficult constitutional questions It is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant has infringed the rights of someone else.
According to Aguda, ‘Locus Standi’ means no more than the court will entertain a suit only at the instance of one who has a legal capacity to institute the proceedings. For a person to be able to maintain an action, he must be able to establish that his interest is about to be adversely affected by the action taken or contemplated by the defendant 5. The above definition by Aguda brings out two factors distinctively. One denotes the existence of a right of the individual to have his case heard by the court, and the other denotes the presence of an adversary litigable issue.
1.2 ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE
In England, during the 19th Century, Courts were reluctant to allow anyone gain entry into its sanctuary unless he is a person aggrieved, and is usually has been shown that he had a specific legal right of his own which has been infringed or that his properties have been wrongfully seized or detained, to be entitled to a hearing this right must not be a right he shares with others in common, he must be a ‘’person aggrieved’’.
The doctrine of Locus Standi was laid down in the 19th century. Lord Justice James, a distinguished English Judge laid down the principle in 1880 in the EX P. SIDEBOTHAM6 case in which the Lord justice showed the meaning of the term ‘person aggrieved’ in the English Bankruptcy Act, he held that a’ person aggrieved is ‘not a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made, but a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something’
His Lordship was dealing with an appeal by the insolvent where the court had refused to act on the comptroller’s report. He observed that ‘the appellant has suffered no grievance, he had hardly sustained even a ‘damnum’’ the appellant was entitled to apply to the first court and make out his own case against the trustee but he had nothing to do with the comptroller’s report.
This decision became the Locus Classicus on Locus Standi in England. But the position was much altered under direct attacks on this restrictive approach starting from Lord Denning who challenged the doctrine of locus standi towards the end of the 20th century in England.
The wind of change swept through the shores of England in a series of cases known as the Blackburn cases7. In the 1970s, Mr, Raymond Blackburn, once a member of parliament came to the court with four successive cases with issues not of his own but involving the general public. In each of these cases, it came to be established that anyone having a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter in hand acquires locus standi. Lord Denning reacted to the Blackburn cases, by stating that:
‘If Blackburn had no sufficient interest, no other citizens had and in that event, no one would be able to bring an action for enforcing the law and transgression of the law would continue un-abated.’
Also, in Arsenal Football Club v Ende8 : the House of Lords approved the above finding of Lord Denning
The House of Lords gradually shifted away from the traditional restrictive standing doctrine, but a close look at some of the leading English decisions of the early eighties would clearly reveal that the position in England as regards the standing doctrine was somewhat confusing. The main cause of this confusion was the failure to adopt a clear view as to what the phrases ‘ person aggrieved’ or ‘sufficient interest actually meant.’’
In R. v. Felixstone 9, the court held that a journalist had the Locus to demand to know the names of magistrates on a particular matter despite the security reasons adduced as reason for not revealing such names.
The courts in England gave different meanings to those phrases depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. This led to a situation where it could not have been asserted with certainty as to which set of facts would attract which interpretation. In the case of R V Inspectorate of pollution Exparte Green Peace (N02)10, the court allowed Greenpeace (an organisation) to challenge British Nuclear Fuel’s decision to test its new Thermal oxide reprocessing plant at Sellafield, Cumbria. In doing so, the court placed particular reliance on the fact that Greenpeace was a highly respected and responsible environmental organisation which could mount a more focused challenge than an individual.
The criteria in England for fulfilling the ‘sufficient interest’ test are now more lenient and easier to be satisfied.
1.2.1 HOW LOCUS STANDI IS DETERMINED
The Locus Standi of a plaintiff is determinable from the totality of all averments in his or her statement of claim, it is the statement of claim that has to be carefully scrutinised with a view to ascertaining whether or not it has disclosed sufficient legal interest and how such interest has arisen in the subject-matter of the action.
In determining Locus Standi of a party, the entire statement of a party should be looked into and not merely part of it. At that stage, only the statement of claim should be considered. Thus, in Christian Outreach Ministries Inc. v Cobham11, it was held by the court of Appeal that the trial court acted hastily in dealing with the issue of the locus standi of the 3rd Appellant without the benefit of the statement of claim. Also, in the case of Adekunle v Adelugba 12 the court held that it is the statement of claim that determines a plaintiff’s locus standi to sue. The plaintiff must disclose sufficient interest or threat of injury in the statement of claim to enable him to invoke judicial process. The court is expected to meticulously examine the statement of claim to see if it discloses a reasonable cause of action vested in the plaintiff. The averments in the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff’s cause of action must disclose in clear terms the rights and obligations or interest of the plaintiff which has been or are about to be violated.
Locus Standi, it should be noted is unquestionably a threshold issue which goes to the root of the whole decision and ought to be decided at the earliest stage in order to save legal expense and time and before the merits are considered. Thus, in ET &EC (NIG) LTD V Nevico13 the court held that where the Locus Standi of a plaintiff is challenged at the trail stages of a case, the determination of whether or not the plaintiff has the necessary Locus Standi is dependent only on the statement of claim.
Furthermore, in Yusuf V Akindipe14 the court held that in determining whether or not a plaintiff has Locus Standi to institute the action, the nature of the claim and cause of action must be ascertained.
1.2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE IN NIGERIA
A Constitution is not a mere or common legal document. It is essentially a document relating to and regulating the affairs of a nation and stating the functions and powers of the different apparatus of the government as well as regulating the relationship between the citizens and the State. It makes provisions for the rights of the Citizens within the compass of the State.15
The Supreme Court of Nigeria laid down the Constitutional basis of Locus Standi in the case regarded as the Locus Classicus case of Locus Standi in Nigeria in the case of Senator Abraham Adesanya’ v The President of Nigeria & anor 16 it will be apposite to give the facts of the case:
In exercise of his power under section 141 of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria17, the then president Alhaji Sheu Shagari appointed Hon. Mr Justice Ovie-Whiskey the then chief judge of Bendel State as chairman of the federal Electoral commission which appointment was subject to the confirmation of the senate.
Senator Abraham Adesanya the plaintiff during the proceedings in the senate vehemently opposed the appointment which was nevertheless made. Dis-satisfied, Senator Adesanya sought a declaration in court that the appointment made by the president was un-constitutional. The court of first instance had no difficulty in nullifying the appointment the defendants appealed, when the appeal came up for argument the court of appeal invited counsel to both sides to address the court whether or not the plaintiff had Locus Standi. The issue of Locus Standi was never raised or pleaded as a defence by any of the defendants, neither was it raised at any stage in the High court, it was not made a ground of appeal either. The issue of Locus Standi was then referred to the Supreme Court since the court of Appeal opinion was that the plaintiff had no Locus Standi to bring the action since he participated in the deliberations of the senate
At the Supreme Court, counsel to the plaintiff contended that he had Locus Standi in the case and has sufficient interest to institute the action, he further submitted that any appointment made by the president of the federal Republic of Nigeria is made subject to the provisions of the constitution which both the plaintiff and Mr president have sworn to preserve, protect, and defend and that if Mr president acted contrary to the provisions of that constitution, the plaintiff is entitled to come to court and ask for the appropriate declaration and that being a member of the senate, the plaintiff has a function, a duty and an obligation to perform under the constitution.
Learned Attorney-General of the federation in his reply referred to the section 6 (6) (b) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria which is in pari-material with 1999 constitution18. The section reads thus:
“The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.”
Bello JSC in Adesanya’s case held at pages 385-386 that:
“it seems to me that upon the construction of the subsection, it is only when the civil rights and obligations of the person who invokes the jurisdiction of the court, are in issue for determination that the judicial powers of the court may be invoked. In other words, standing will only be accorded to a Plaintiff who shows that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected by the act complained of.”
All the seven Justices of the Supreme Court who decided the case were in agreement that Adesanya did not have locus standi to bring the action but they all have different reasons for their opinion. The Supreme Court justices were not unanimous in holding that section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution laid a test for Locus Standi in Nigeria. Justice Uwais who could have resolved the deadlock took the view that the interpretation to be given to section 6 (6) (b) will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and that no hard and fast rule should be set-up. Justices Nnamani and Idigbe were in agreement with Justice Bello that section 6 (6) (b) of the constitution is the Constitutional basis of Locus Standi but Justices Obaseki and Sowemimo did not hold this view.
Professor Nwabueze noted ‘surely a senator by reasoning of his oath has a greater interest than an ordinary citizen in the preservation of the Constitution’ 19
Tunde Ogowewo in his article20 posits that:
‘A close study of the case will reveal that the Adesanya Court was in fact divided on this issue with no discernable majority. It will be apparent by now that there were two aspects to the CJN‘s construction of section 6 (6) (b): first he saw the provision as creating an action popularis in non-chapter IV constitutional litigation: secondly, he did not see the provision as laying down a standing requirement’’
In the case of F.A.T.B V EZEBGU 21 Ayoola JCA (as he then was) stated thus:
‘I do not think section 6 (6) (b) of the constitution is relevant to the question of locus standi. If it is, we could as well remove any mention of locus standi from our law book. Section 6 (6) (b) deals with judicial powers and with individual rights. Locus standi deals with the rights of a party to sue, it must be noted that standing to sue is relative to a cause of action’’
Four years after the dictum of Ayoola in the above case, in a judgement that attracted the concurring opinion of the other justices that heard the case, Ayoola once again properly put in perspective section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution of Nigeria when he held in NNPC V FAWEHINMI22
‘In most written Constitutions, there is a delimitation of the power of the three independent organs of government namely the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Section 6 of the Constitution which vests judicial powers of the federation and the States in the courts and defines the nature and extent of such judicial powers does not directly deal with the right of access of the individual to the court. The main objective of section 6 is to leave no doubt as to the definition and delimitation of the boundaries of the separation of powers between the judiciary on the one hand and the other organs of government on the other, in other to obviate any claim of the other organs of government, or even attempt by them, to share judicial powers with the courts. Section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution is primarily and basically designed to describe the nature and extent of judicial powers vested in the courts. It is not intended to be a catch-all, all-purpose provision to be pressed into service for the determination, questions ranging from locus standi to the most uncontroversial question of jurisdiction’.
Deciding on Section 6 (6) (b), in Owodunmi v Registered Trustees of Celestial Church & ors23, the Supreme Court held that section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution does not prescribe the Locus Standi of a person wanting to invoke the jurisdiction and powers of the court the subsection prescribes the extent of the judicial powers of the courts.
A learned Justice Ogundare JSC (as he then was) sitting in the case said:
‘ A word or two on the Adesanya V President of the federal Republic of Nigeria, it appears that the general belief is that this court laid down in that case that the law on locus standi is now derived from section 6 (6) (b) of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (re-enacted in section 6 (6) (b) of the 1999 constitution)… I am not sure that this general belief represents the correct position of the seven Justices that sat on that case only 2 (Bello and Nnamani JSC) expressed view to that effect’’
He further held in the judgement that:
‘from the extracts of their lordships judgements I have quoted above one can clearly see that there was not majority of the court in favour of Bello JSC interpretation of section 6 subsection (6) (b) of the constitution
On the interpretation of the section, the learned Justice continued that: ‘in my respectful view, I think Ayoola JSC (as he then was) correctly set out the scope of section 6 (6) (b) of the constitution … in NNPC V FAWEHINMI
Also, Fawehinmi v IGP24, the court held that the section does not confer locus standi on any litigant but merely allows the court to determine any question as to his civil rights and obligations.
It has however been contended that subsequent decisions of the court, including those of the supreme Court that treated Adesanya’s case as deciding that section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution laid down the test for Locus Standi in Nigeria betray a misapprehension of the decision and the concept of Locus Standi as there was a clear lack of consensus in the case.25
Judging from the various opinions coming from the court concerning section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution, the essence of the provision is that a person shall not be prevented from pursuing in the court for its determination any issue or question concerning the civil rights and obligations of that person. And that right remains inviolate notwithstanding the fact that the action was against any government or authority or any person in Nigeria.
In other words, the courts due to some anachronistic rules or obscure procedural requirements are not close to a person who needs to have determined in the courts questions concerning his civil rights and obligations. However, that is not to say that the person should not observe and obey the procedural rules enacted by the courts and or the constitution of the land.
The Constitutions of many countries are explicit in their locus standi provisions, for example, in Colombia, the 1991 constitution explicitly states that anyone who has a collective right can sue to protect it. Likewise section 18 (1) of the Botswana Constitution allows any person who alleges a violation of the Constitution to apply to a court for redress.
The entire gamut of section 6 deals with judicial powers from which sub-section (6) (b) was coined as determinant for Locus Standi in Nigeria. The term judicial power denotes the authority vested in the courts to hear and decide cases and to make binding judgements. It is the power to construe and apply the law.
This is the authority which the court exercises in interpreting the law and pronouncing on the competing rights and obligations of disputing parties. This primary authority of the courts is an essential constituent of the rule of law, particularly in a constitutional democracy.
In Nigeria, there is a specific investment of judicial powers in the courts by the constitution. Accordingly, the judicial powers of the federation vest in the courts established for the federation while that of a state vest in the courts established for a State.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule in particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
However enormous the powers of the courts are to control and redress administrative actions there are a number of factors which must be taken into consideration in an attempt to invoke the exercise of judicial powers.
In Adediran v Inter-land Transport Ltd26 the Supreme Court hinted that it was ready to open up access to Courts by virtue of Section 6(6) (b) of the 1979 Constitution. KARIBI WHYTE, JSC, held at Page 180 that:
"The Constitution has vested the Court with the power for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations between Government or authority and any person in Nigeria. See Section 6(6) (b). Accordingly, where the determination of civil rights and obligations of a person is in issue, any Law which imposes conditions that is inconsistent with the free and unrestrained exercise of that right is void to the extent of that inconsistency... I think the high Constitutional policy involved in Section 6(6)(b) is the removal of the obstacles erected by Common Law requirements against individuals bringing actions before the Court against the Government and its institutions.’’
Commentators are almost ad idem in expressing concern over the problem occasioned by divergent judicial approaches to the requirement of standing. Dr. Yardley describes it as a ‘confusion of thought’. Dr. I. Zamir says that ‘no clear answer can possibly be given which would suit all cases and be certain not to exclude persons who should be let into court… (The courts) have preferred a general, vague and flexible expression which leaves them a wide discretion. And Dr. Rubinstein claims that ‘the problem of Locus Standi is shrouded in a mist of scattered and contradictory judicial utterances. To Professors Benjafield and Whitmore, ‘there is frequently an air of unreality in the approach of the courts to this question of standing27
The Locus Standi principle is apparently a principle designed to narrow the sieve of litigation so that the courts do not get overwhelmed by the plethora of cases coming their way. If this view is sustained, then it sends the signal that the courts are shying away from their Constitutional responsibility28
[...]
1 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/locus-standi (accessed on 24th April 2014)
2 Mubangizi J.C The protection of human rights in South Africa : A legal and practical guide (Juta and Company Ltd, Lansdowne) (2004) pg 60
3 Re Argentum Reductions (UK) Limited 1975 1 WLR 186, at pg 190
4 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners Exparte National Federation of Self-employed and small business Ltd, (1982) AC 617, 653 G-H
5 Aguda A, ‘’Locus Standi.’’ Lecture delivered at R.U.S.T. Port Harcourt Law Week, Nigerian Tide, Saturday. 11th February, 1984.
6 [1880] 14 CH D 458 at 463
7 R V Commissioner of Police, exparte Blackburn, (1968) 2 QB 118; Blackburn V attorney-General (1971) 1WLR 1037; R V Police Commissioner, exparte Blackburn, (1973) QB 241; R V GLC, exparte Blackburn, (1976) 1WLR 550
8 (1977) 2WLR 974
9 (1987) QB 583
10 (1994) 4 ALL ER 328
11 [2006] 15 NWLR, PT 1002 , 283
12 [2011] 16 NWLR PT 1272 at 159
13 [2004] 3NWLR (PT 866) 327
14 [2000] 8 NLRR (PT 609)
15 Abaribe v. The Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly [2000] FWLR (Pt.9) 1560.
16 (1981) 2NCLR 358
17 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979
18 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended
19 Nwabueze, B.O., Federalism in Nigeria under the presidential constitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell) 1983 P. 343
20 Ogowewo T, ‘The problem with standing to sue in Nigeria’ Vol. 39, N0 1 at pg 9 (1995) Journal of African law
21 (1994) 9NWLR 149, 236
22 (1998) 7NWLR (PT 559) at 612
23 (2000) 10 NWLR (PT 675) 315
24 (2002) 98 LRCN 1165
25 See ‘Administration of Justice And Good Governance In Nigeria’: Essays In Honour of Hon. Justice A.I. Katsina-Alu, GCON, Chief Justice of Nigeria, published by Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies , pg 304
26 (1991) 9 NWLR PART 214, 155 AT 180
27 Eka, B.U., Judicial Control Of Administrative Process In Nigeria (Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd) 2001 P.441
28 http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v6n3p209 (accessed on 19th March 2014)
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Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X. -
Téléchargez vos propres textes! Gagnez de l'argent et un iPhone X.