In this Case Study Report, the author examines the U.S.-Iran negotiations on a nuclear agreement, which serve as an empirical example of the Two-Level Games model the political scientist Robert Putnam introduced in 1988.
At first, this paper provides a brief overview of the complex relationship between the USA and Iran, Putnam’s Theory and its suitability for this case. Secondly, it introduces the relevant actors, their goals and the respective domestic factors of both countries which had influenced the negotiations that finally led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Since then president Donald Trump withdrew from this nuclear agreement in 2018, it will examine the chances for a return to the deal/a new deal under the new Biden administration. In a short conclusion, the author sums up the results and comes to a final assessment of the current situation.
Introduction/Abstract
In this Case Study Report I examine the U.S.-Iran negotiations on a nuclear agreement, which serve as an empirical example of the Two-Level Games model the political scientist Robert Putnam introduced in 1988. At first, I provide a brief overview of the complex relationship between the USA and Iran, Putnam’s Theory and its suitability for this case. Secondly, I introduce the relevant actors, their goals and the respective domestic factors of both countries which had influenced the negotiations that finally led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 . Since then President Donald Trump withdrew from this nuclear agreement in 2018, I examine the chances for a return to the deal/a new deal under the new Biden administration. In a short conclusion I sum up the results and come to a final assessment of the current situation.
(Historical) background, Putnam’s model of Two-Level Games and case selection
The relationship between the USA and Iran goes back to the 19 th century and is characterized by different phases and many complications. A major turning point occurred in 1953 when the Americans intervened in Iranian politics by supporting an inside coup of politicians, officers and clerics who removed the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from office. Afterwards the pro-U.S. shah regained power and especially during the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the relationship between the U.S. and Iran were cooperative, not least since the U.S. strongly profited from the Iranian oil industry (cf. Latschan [2017]). The Iranian revolution in 1979 blindsided the USA and led to the removal of the shah, who later fled to the U.S. where he got medical care. This provoked many protests in Iran and a group of radical supporters of the religious leader Ruhollah Khomeini got into the U.S. embassy and kidnapped 52 American diplomates. This event clearly marked the end of their friendly relations since the hostage crisis lasted 444 days and ended only after the death of the shah and some American concessions to Iran (cf. National Archives [2017]). Since then both countries have not sent ambassadors to the respective other country and for a long time no diplomatic talks took place. Nevertheless, the USA still had political and economic interests in the Middle East and suspected in 2002 that Iran had secret nuclear facilities which violated the conditions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the Iran had signed in 1968 (cf. Topa [2020]).
The following years were marked by conflicts about the Iranian nuclear program but also by negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran.
Those so called 5+1-negotiations are well-suited to illustrate Putnam’s model of Two-Level Games, which states that every international agreement must be approved on two Levels: The chief negotiators, mostly the national executives, negotiate on the first, international Level; afterwards their treaty draft must be ratified by the national parliaments on Level II to come into force. Besides the national legislatives, other political and societal actors play important roles since they can influence the negotiations on Level I by supporting or criticizing the positions of their national chief negotiator. The agreement can only be ratified on both Levels if the win-sets of the negotiating countries overlap, in other words if both actors preferred the new agreement in comparison to the status quo (cf Putnam 1[988]: 4[33]-[452]). The negotiations between the USA and Iran from 2002 to 2015 can be seen as a Two-Level Game in which the national leader’s scope at Level I were constrained and influenced by different domestic actors and institutions (cf. Hurst [545]f.). Consequently, the JPOA only became possible because domestic
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US-Iran negotiations on a nuclear deal as a Two-Level Game (own illustration according to Putnam 1988 and Hurst 2016).
Negotiations leading to JCPOA : Actors, goals, and domestic factors of the USA
The U.S. wanted to prevent Iran from developing an own nuclear bomb and because of that the Iranian nuclear program should be constrained and observed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, U.S. enterprises with huge market power and influence on the U.S. government had strong economic interests in Iran which should not be disturbed by political conflicts between both countries. The security of Israel, a close ally of the U.S., had to be considered too, since the regional neighbor wanted to prevent the “Iranian bomb” by all means and was supported by an influential pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. Two more relevant actors were the American public and the media. Since the hostage crisis in 1979, hostility and distrust have been the basic trends that characterized the American view of Iran which is also reflected by media coverage about all topics regarding the Middle East. This negative attitude was strengthened by the widespread American sympathy towards Israel, and pro-Israel organizations like the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) tried to put pressure on the U.S. government to enforce hard sanctions against Iran when new information about uranium enrichment came to light (cf. Hurst: [546]f., [556]f.). Besides from those actors, Putnam mentioned the relevance of the institutional context (cf. Putnam [1988]: [442]) which promotes in the case of the USA a small win-set. Since a “divided government”, meaning that Congress and White House are dominated by different parties, is a frequent phenomenon, the president’s scope in foreign policy decisions is constrained by the “power of the purse” carried out by Congress. For instance, in 2010 a majority voted for sanctions against Iran which ended President Obama’s attempts to launch new negotiations. Obama, who functioned as chief negotiator on Level II, was confronted with many opponents on Level I: Influential people like Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Dennis Ross, a special adviser on the National Security Council (NSC), supported a much stricter course which was not only led by rational arguments but also by personal interest like electoral campaigning (cf. Hurst [2016]: [551]). Whereas Obama’s rejection of the Teheran declaration was strongly influenced by domestic political considerations, the failure of the Geneva agreement and the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015 had its roots partially in the personal assessment of Obama: He wanted to prevent a worse outcome as he was sure that American sanctions would not stop Teheran from advancing uranium enrichment to a higher level than the NPT allowed. If a military intervention would become necessary and the Americans would reject to take part, Israel would probably act independently with all bad outcomes for the stability in the Middle East. On the domestic level, 49% of the American public disapproved the deal in 2015 (cf. Pew Research Center [2015]), but since Obama did not plan to run for president again, his room for maneuver was much wider than before the previous elections in 2012. In addition, there were some other factors which differentiated the situation in 2015 significantly from former decision situations: A change of personnel had taken place and Obama’s new most important advisors supported the agreement. Furthermore, he was determined to successfully impose a deal which could be seen as part of his political legacy and therefore, he was willing to make further concessions than in 2009 and 2010. Additionally, he was supported by the majority of the democratic party (cf. Parlapiano [2015]). The republicans indeed had the majority of both the Senate and the House, but a positive circumstance for all advocates of the deal was that the Congress did not need to vote for it. Instead, its critics had to gather a three-quarter majority against it which they did not manage (cf. Hurst [2016]: [556]) and therefore, Obama could approve the deal and lift the sanctions using an Executive Order (cf. The White House [2016]).
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- Ariatani Wolff (Autor), 2021, Two-Level Diplomacy and U.S.-Iran Policy. A Case Study Report, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1127701
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