Disaster and the role of techno-scientific expertise. The case of the earthquake in L’Aquila

Akademische Arbeit , 2017 , 11 Seiten , Note: 1

Soziologie - Sonstiges

The outline of the events surrounding the earthquake show, that at the heart of the L’Aquila case lies the notion of expertise. This paper will first formulate a research question that seeks to understand the conceptualizations of normative and non-normative approaches to expertise. Subsequently both lines of thought will be discussed in detail. The following chapter will then reflect on what both approaches will allow us to see in the case of the L'Aquila earthquake. Finally, the last chapter will summarize the findings, providing further context and contrast to both lines of thought.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Research Question

3. Basic Assumption of Expertise in Key STS Literature
3.1 Misunderstood Misunderstanding
3.2 The Study of Expertise and Experience

4. Expertise and the L'Aquila Case
4.1 Conflict of Social Identity and the Importance of Historical Context
4.2 Contributing and Interacting During Techno-Scientific Uncertainty

5. Normative and Non-Normative Conceptualizations of Expertise

6. Literature

1. Introduction

The night of April 6, 2009 saw a 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the heart of the Italian peninsula. The small town of L'Aquila was located near the epicenter of the seismic shock. More than three hundred people perished, many were injured, numerous buildings collapsed and more than 60.000 residents were temporarily displaced (Alexander, 2012). This was first and foremost a human tragedy, but the aftermath of the event sparked a controversy that went far beyond the small town of L’Aquila. A series of small clustering of earthquakes, called seismic swarms, began occurring five months prior to the main quake. These clustering of small earthquakes facilitated a growing concern amongst the public about the potential for the occurrence of a larger earthquake in the region. Adding to the tension, the hobby scientist and technician Gioacchino Giampaolo Giuliani made a ‘prediction’ of an impending earthquake 70 km southeast of L'Aquila on March 29, 2009. His predictions were based on non-scientific methods and not accepted by the scientific community (Yeo, 2012). After statements of Giuliani falsely led to the evacuation of a small town, which caused great public unrest, the prediction concerned with L'Aquila was met with great aversion by the local government and public officials.

On March 30 the Director of Civil Defence, Guido Bertolaso, accused Giuliani of unnecessarily disturbing the public peace and blocked him from giving public announcements and publishing internet data regarding the earthquake predictions (Prats, 2012). On March 31 the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) and the Department of Civil Protection (DCP) called for a meeting with top scientists in order to discredit Giuliani and reassure the public that there is no evidence for an upcoming earthquake. Three hours before the central seismic event occurred, a smaller foreshow brought the situation to a head as L’Aquila residents were faced with the decision whether or not it was safe to return to their homes (Alexander, 2012). When the L’Aquila earthquake struck the scientists came under scrutiny by the public and in 2010 by the Italian legal system. Prosecution saw a link between the reassuring advice given by officials and the death of many L’Aquila citizens, who took the advice the commission brought before the public. The L’Aquila Seven ¹ were tried for involuntary manslaughter due to “inexact, incomplete and contradictory information" (Ouadfeul, Tourchine and Aliouane, 2013, p. 492). In 2012 the judge Marco Billi convicted the defendants to six years in prison on the basis of negligence of institutional responsibility, arguing “the generic, approximate and ineffective” discussion of risk relative “to the duties of risk assessment, forecasting, and prevention imposed by law” (Billi as cited in Yeo, 2014, p. 408) directly lead to the death of 26 L'Aquila residents. Yet, the defendants appealed the verdict and, in 2014, a higher court overturned their sentences. The scientists were acquitted and only the government official De Bernadinis received a reduced sentence (Cartlidge, 2015). However, the fact that the judicial system tried to convict scientists based on ‘false’ predictions sparked outrage across the scientific community and elevated the event from a local disaster to a global controversy about science-society relations.

This outline of the events surrounding the earthquake show, that at the heart of the L’Aquila case lies the notion of expertise. This paper will first formulate a research question that seeks to understand the conceptualizations of normative and non-normative approaches to expertise. Subsequently both lines of thought will be discussed in detail. The following chapter will then reflect on what both approaches will allow us to see in the case of the L'Aquila earthquake. Finally, the last chapter will summarize the findings, providing further context and contrast to both lines of thought.

2. Research Question

Understanding the dynamics of expertise is central to the L'Aquila case. Being an expert is usually connected to a certification process like an academic degree. Yet, the technician who caused controversy in L'Aquila did not meet the usual criteria of an expert but was still eager to contribute to the general debate about the likelihood of an earthquake. This created the antagonistic dynamic between certified experts and the lay-scientist. The topic of expertise has been a central issue in the study of science-technology relations over the past decades. L'Aquila can be seen as a prime example for two streams of thought that frame the current STS understanding of expertise. STS has shown that normative, simplistic conceptions of certified expertise do not hold up when tested in various case studies. Lay-expertise and traditional expertise have to be considered both as able contributors in the creation of knowledge. Yet other STS scholars have proposed a theoretical framework which acknowledges the shortcomings of fixed definitions of certified expertise but tries to instate new categories, which can depict and demarcate expertise in a new way. L'Aquila shows potential to apply both conceptions of experts and may further help to broaden the understanding of notions of expertise. Therefore, the overarching research question of this paper will be: How do normative and non-normative approaches for the understanding of expertise conceptualize the L’Aquila controversy?

To answer this question the next chapter will explore the landmark case study from Brian Wynne (1992) about Cumbrian sheep farmers and contrast this with the notion of expertise and experience developed by Collins and Evans (2002).

3. Basic Assumption of Expertise in Key STS Literature

This chapter will explore the theoretical background of Wynnes as well as Collins and Evans approach to expertise. Both notions have specific assumptions and concepts with which they build their argument in order to illuminate the underlying dynamics of expertise. This will serve as the baseline for further discussion and application to the L'Aquila case.

3.1 Misunderstood Misunderstanding

Brian Wynnes (1992) case study Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of science was published in the context of various literature assessing wide spread assumptions about the public understanding of science. The case focuses on responses of Cumbrian sheep farmers to scientific advice about the restrictions introduced after radioactive cesium, fallen on their land after the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, contaminated their grazing land. Wynne identifies several elements that lead to a deep mistrust towards the scientists and therefore, a lack of credibility of the experts. He reveals that the scientists discounted the knowledge of the local lay-men even though they had valuable information about the radioactive contamination. Furthermore, the scientists do not communicate with the sheep farmers on a clear and eye-to-eye basis. At first they deny any effects from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster but, nonetheless, a ban on the sheep was instated by the government. The scientists claimed that the radiation would quickly disperse which was based on wrong assumptions, again, creating more distance between the farmers and the scientists.

Wynne identifies the reason behind the distrust as a gradually escalating conflict between the scientists and the farmers due to both the scientists’ rejection of the well-established lay-knowledge of the farmers and a historical context of previous, unresolved incidents with ‘scientific experts’ experienced by the farmers. Wynne argues that the conflict was not due to a lack of scientific education but rather a lack of trust and credibility based on a wide range of factors from past and present actions. Wynne (1992) concludes that “laypeople [are] capable of extensive informal reflection upon their social relationships towards scientific experts, and on the epistemological status of their own ‘local’ knowledge to ‘outside’ knowledge” (p. 281). So, if we want to analyze a case through the lens of Wynne´s Misunderstood Misunderstanding we have to consider laypersons as fully fledged actors, that are able to reflect on and address the issue of concern. They cannot just be regarded as a persons and their statements have to be considered with the same amount of rigor as those of certified experts. Wynne´s case study helps to illuminate a conflict between social identities, in which both parties have their identity threatened by the other, e.g. the sheep farmers by the scientists and vice versa. This dynamic shows that the real issue is often the process of interaction between knowledge systems not the value of one knowledge system over the other.

Furthermore, the notion of trust and credibility are not static concepts that have a singular genesis. Rather ‘‘we can see trust and credibility more as contingent variables, influencing the uptake of knowledge, but dependent upon the nature of these evolving relationships and identities’’ (Wynne 1992, p. 282). These concepts are mutually constructed and maintained between the conflicting parties. If we want utilize Wynne’s ideas, we have to take the history of the controversy into account as the trust relationship will have developed over time and is influenced by more than one variable. Misunderstood Misunderstanding provides a convincing counter argument to the normative view of unknowledgeable lay-men that need to be taught by educated certified expert-scientists. This dynamic of trust and credibility between lay-men, scientists and the public is at the heart of the L'Aquila case. Misunderstandings between scientists, lay-scientists and government officials were the catalyst for the crucial statements made by the DPC that led to the international debate about what science can do and where the boundary between science and non-science ends. Even though Wynne’s paper is considered STS canon by many, other scholars have tried to develop different approaches to understanding expertise. The next chapter will outline a paper by Collins and Evans (2002) that stirred up great debate, as it provides a more normative framework to study expertise.

3.2 The Study of Expertise and Experience

Wynne (1992) as well as other prominent researchers like Jasanoff (1990), Epstein (1995) and Gieryn (1983) show the elitist position of science, which grants authority through the superior ethos of science (Merton, 1973), is not justified. They demonstrate that scientific knowledge is similar or identical to other forms of knowledge – as it is constructed through the social network, in which it is embedded. Therefore, scientific knowledge has no exceptional access to the truth. This line of thought is entitled as the second wave of science studies (2-wave) by Collins and Evans (2002). They argue the relativistic approach of the 2-wave is only descriptive, in the sense that it can only decide who had ‘real’ expertise in hindsight. However, decisions in the public and political sphere operate on a faster timetable than scientific consensus forming. Therefore, decision-makers have to prescribe expertise to certain people before the judgements of history have been made. Collins and Evans (2002) see a need for a third wave (3-wave), which would answer how scientific decisions could be made before an absolute scientific consensus is reached, thus being prescriptive not descriptive. Collins´ and Evans´ (2002) answer is the Study of Expertise and Experience (SEE).

They claim that what makes scientists special is not their authority by virtue, but rather the appropriate balance of contributory and interactional expertise, that demarcates core-set scientists from the general public. Contributing expertise means the expertise needed to contribute fully to all aspects of a domain. It differs from interactional expertise, which just allows one to interact with relevant participants but not do practical work. The dynamics of these kinds of expertise are complex, yet non-hierarchical. This entails that there is no clear boundary between wider scientific community and citizenry, but that only core-set specialists have distinctly more political legitimacy than other groups. In respect to Wynn’s case study Collins and Evans (2002) propose that the sheep farmers would have had contributory expertise but the lack of interactional expertise led to scientists not recognizing their knowledge. Therefore, mediating instances that ‘speak the language’ of both parties should help to guarantee successful interaction and bilateral knowledge transfer.

This approach allows to locate experts not just in hindsight but also when political decisions have to be made. However, in order to do this a more normative standpoint has to be taken. Even though Collins and Evans do not draw a boundary between the wider citizenry and scientists in general, they do create new distinctions between contributory and non-contributory experts or interactional and non-interactional expertise. To answer the question how such an approach can be compared to a less normative viewpoint, the next section will reflect on both lines of thought in regards to the L'Aquila case.

4. Expertise and the L'Aquila Case

Following the outline of both concepts, this section will reflect on what both approaches will allow us to see in the L'Aquila case. Both ideas have specific strengths and weaknesses that open doors and close others, which will have significant impact on the questions one is able to answer.

4.1 Conflict of Social Identity and the Importance of Historical Context

Looking at the L’Aquila case through the lenses of Brian Wynne’s (1992) landmark study Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of science, two dimensions become the focus of attention. First the interaction between scientist and layman. The L'Aquila story is centered around the distrust of the established scientists towards the layman technician Giuliani. The central idea framing the meeting of government officials and seismic experts was to discredit Giuliani. The head of the Italian Civil Protection, Guido Bertolaso, was even recorded stating: “I will send them there mostly as a media move” (Guido Bertolaso as cited in Nosengo, 2012, p. 1). Neither the government nor the scientists recognized Giuliani as a relevant part of the discussion. They even went as far as trying to legally prohibit him from making any further public statements about the earthquake (Yeo, 2014). This is an even more severe conflict between social identities than in the case of the sheep farmers. The government felt like the warnings of Giuliani impinged on their prerogative of informing citizens and securing public safety. The scientists were threatened by the statements made by non-consensus methodology, as they undermined scientific authority about the topic. Giuliani on the other hand was not taken seriously and started an online campaign and made various TV appearances in order to create a sense of credibility and influence (Yeo, 2014). This shows that the interaction between the two knowledge systems did not work at all. The scientists assumed that the technician could not possibly have valuable knowledge. Furthermore, they assumed that the public is not able to assess the credibility of information. There are staking similarities to the case described in Misunderstood Misunderstanding, as in both controversies knowledge systems are at odds and identities are threatened.

[...]

---

¹ Alexander (2014) framed this term for the seven defendants of the L’Aquila earthquake trail: Enzo Boschi Professor and Director of the INGV, Franco Barberi Professor of Volcanology, Gian Michele Calvi Professor of Seismic Engineering, Mauro Dolce Professor of Construction Techniques, Claudio Eva Professor of Terrestrial Physic s, Dr. Bernardo De Bernadinis Deputy Director of the DCP, and Dr Giulio Selvaggi D irector of the Italian National Earthquake Monitoring Centre.

• Hochschule: Universität Wien
• Note: 1
• Autor: B.A. Stefan Raß (Autor:in)
• Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
• Seiten: 11
• Katalognummer: V1001844
• ISBN (eBook): 9783346377432
• Sprache: Englisch
• Schlagworte: STS, Science and Technology Studies, Merton, Collins, Jasanoff, Wynne