This paper critically assesses Robert Michels' famous "Iron Law of Oligarchy". After a summary of Robert Michels' argument, it challenges his assumption that this law of oligarchy is "iron" by giving counter-examples for egalitarian societies in Africa. As these egalitarian societies come along with serious disadvantages, the Athenian model of democracy by lot is presented as a more viable alternative to the law of oligarchy. The conclusion applies this model of democracy by lot to Robert Michels’ starting point: the political party.
Yes, there is a law of oligarchy. But this law of oligarchy is not "iron", it is man-made. By calling it "iron" Robert Michels commits the cardinal fault of the bourgeois social scientist: he reifies and naturalizes societal processes.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Law of Oligarchy
- Egalitarian Societies
- Immediate-Return Systems vs. Delayed-Return Systems
- More democratic democracy
Objectives and Key Themes
This paper critically examines Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy," challenging its deterministic nature. It aims to demonstrate that oligarchy isn't an inevitable consequence of social organization, but rather a product of specific societal structures and choices. The paper explores alternative models of democracy to mitigate the influence of oligarchy.
- Critique of Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"
- Analysis of egalitarian societies as counter-examples
- Examination of the role of organizational structure in fostering oligarchy
- Proposal of Athenian democracy by lot as a more democratic alternative
- Implications for contemporary democratic systems and political parties
Chapter Summaries
Introduction: This introduction sets the stage by establishing that while a law of oligarchy exists, it's not inevitable ("iron") as Michels suggests. It critiques Michels' reification of societal processes and outlines the essay's three-part structure: outlining Michels' argument, presenting egalitarian societies as counterexamples, and proposing the Athenian model of democracy by lot as a more viable alternative. The introduction lays out a framework for challenging a core tenet of Michels' work and suggesting a more democratic path.
The Law of Oligarchy: This chapter summarizes Michels' argument for the "iron law of oligarchy," emphasizing its derivation from the hierarchical organization of society. It explains Michels' assertion that democracy is often merely a legal principle rather than a true reflection of power distribution, highlighting the "dominion of the elected over the electors." The chapter also discusses contributing factors such as the need for a skilled elite and the psychological needs of the masses for leadership, while acknowledging criticisms of Michels' insufficient consideration of interest representation in democracy. It concludes by reiterating Michels' core claim ("Who says organization, says oligarchy") and questioning the "iron" nature of this law, setting the stage for subsequent chapters to challenge this premise.
Egalitarian Societies: This chapter challenges Michels' assumption of the necessity of leadership by presenting anthropological evidence of egalitarian societies like the !Kung Bushmen and the Hadza. It differentiates between immediate-return and delayed-return hunter-gatherer societies, arguing that immediate-return systems, characterized by readily available resources and communal sharing, prevent the accumulation of power and the emergence of oligarchy. The chapter details three key characteristics of immediate-return societies that prevent power accumulation: equal access to food, freedom of movement, and a strong ideology of sharing. However, it acknowledges the practical limitations of these models in the context of contemporary, organized societies.
More democratic democracy: This section proposes democracy by lot, inspired by the Athenian model, as a less oligarchic alternative. It argues against direct democracy due to its susceptibility to demagoguery and explores the Athenian system, where most offices were filled by lot, with accountability mechanisms in place. The chapter contrasts the socioeconomic background of officials selected by election versus lot, demonstrating the greater inclusivity of the latter. It addresses potential criticisms regarding the legitimacy of rule by chance, emphasizing the equal opportunity for participation and the greater representation achieved compared to systems where power is concentrated in an elite.
Keywords
Robert Michels, Iron Law of Oligarchy, egalitarian societies, democracy by lot, Athenian democracy, hierarchy, organization, leadership, power, elites, political parties, interest representation.
Frequently Asked Questions: A Critical Examination of Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy
What is the main focus of this paper?
This paper critically examines Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy," arguing against its deterministic nature. It explores alternative models of democracy that aim to mitigate the influence of oligarchy and proposes a more democratic approach.
What is Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"?
Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" posits that the hierarchical organization of society inevitably leads to oligarchy – rule by a select few. It argues that democracy often exists only in principle, not in practice, due to the dominance of the elected over the electors.
How does the paper critique Michels' theory?
The paper challenges the deterministic and "iron" nature of Michels' law. It argues that oligarchy is not an inevitable consequence of social organization, but rather a product of specific societal structures and choices. It also critiques Michels' insufficient consideration of interest representation in democracy.
What are the key themes explored in the paper?
Key themes include a critique of Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy," analysis of egalitarian societies as counterexamples, the role of organizational structure in fostering oligarchy, the proposal of Athenian democracy by lot as a more democratic alternative, and the implications for contemporary democratic systems and political parties.
What are egalitarian societies, and how are they relevant to the discussion?
The paper examines egalitarian societies, such as the !Kung Bushmen and the Hadza, as counter-examples to Michels' theory. These societies, particularly immediate-return hunter-gatherer societies, demonstrate that power accumulation and oligarchy are not inevitable, due to factors like equal access to resources and a strong ideology of sharing.
What is the proposed alternative to traditional forms of democracy?
The paper proposes democracy by lot, inspired by the Athenian model, as a less oligarchic alternative. This system, where offices are filled by lot, aims to increase inclusivity and representation, reducing the concentration of power in an elite.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of democracy by lot?
The paper argues that democracy by lot offers greater inclusivity and representation compared to systems based on election. However, it acknowledges potential criticisms regarding the legitimacy of rule by chance, and addresses these concerns by emphasizing equal opportunity for participation.
What are the chapter summaries?
The paper includes summaries for an introduction, a chapter on Michels' Law of Oligarchy, a chapter on egalitarian societies, and a final chapter proposing a more democratic approach. These summaries provide an overview of the main arguments and findings in each section.
What are the key takeaways from this paper?
The key takeaways are that oligarchy is not inevitable, egalitarian societies offer alternative models of social organization, and democracy by lot presents a potentially less oligarchic approach to governance. The paper challenges established theories and proposes new pathways toward more inclusive democratic systems.
What are the keywords associated with this research?
Keywords include Robert Michels, Iron Law of Oligarchy, egalitarian societies, democracy by lot, Athenian democracy, hierarchy, organization, leadership, power, elites, political parties, and interest representation.
- Quote paper
- Maximilian Konrad (Author), 2013, Robert Michels reconsidered. Is there an "Iron Law of Oligarchy"?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/506798
