Comparatively, most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are endowed with natural resources, such as bauxite, diamond, gold and oil, than other countries in the developed world.
However, in the midst of these resources potential, most of the countries are said to be poor, and fall sharply behind in the provision of essential services to improve the lives of their citizens. So, why are the services inadequately provided?
In fact, several studies have underscored that international development interventions aimed at promoting governmental and institutional structures have been the source for much of the unfolding problems affecting development in the third world (Booth 2011, Törnquist et al. 1961-2004).
On the contrary, several studies have argued that problems, such as corruption, weak institutional system, diverse population and ethnic polarisation in developing countries obscure the attainment of adequate delivery of public services. Interestingly, though both arguments hold different perceptions, they present fundamental issues affecting the creation of essential public goods in the developing countries.
Given the divergence in viewpoints, this essay will argue that even though International policy implementation may pose particular challenges, the greater part of the problems affecting the provision of public goods are inherent in the developing nations. Thus, this essay discusses the main compelling challenges, such as international development policies, corruption, imperfect communication and lack of citizens’ participation, population and ethnic division and institutional and political systems that are responsible for the under-provision of public goods in developing countries.
This article essay will first analyse the concept of public goods and collective action problem in providing and distributing public resources. In the final analysis, it will offer a concise summary of main issues discussed in this paper.
What are the challenges of providing public goods in developing countries?
Introduction
Comparatively, most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are endowed with natural resources, such as bauxite, diamond, gold and oil, than other countries in the developed world. However, in the midst of these resources potential, most of the countries are said to be poor, and fall sharply behind in the provision of essential services to improve the lives of their citizens. So, why are the services inadequately provided? In fact, several studies have underscored that international development interventions aimed at promoting governmental and institutional structures have been the source for much of the unfolding problems affecting development in the third world (Booth 2011, Törnquist et al. 1961-2004).
On the contrary, several studies have argued that problems, such as corruption, weak institutional system, diverse population and ethnic polarisation in developing countries obscure the attainment of adequate delivery of public services. Interestingly, though both arguments hold different perceptions, they present fundamental issues affecting the creation of essential public goods in the developing countries. Given the divergence in viewpoints, this essay will argue that even though International policy implementation may pose particular challenges, the greater part of the problems affecting the provision of public goods are inherent in the developing nations. Thus, this essay discusses the main compelling challenges, such as international development policies, corruption, imperfect communication and lack of citizens’ participation, population and ethnic division and institutional and political systems that are responsible for the under-provision of public goods in developing countries. This article essay will first analyse the concept of public goods and collective action problem in providing and distributing public resources. In the final analysis, it will offer a concise summary of main issues discussed in this paper.
Public goods in the simplest term are defined as services that are provided mutually by the efforts of individuals or through governmental institutions to benefit the entire community; such goods include, good roads, schools, health facilities, clean drinking water and defence (Colomer 2011, 3). Significantly, there are two key features of public goods, on the one hand, individuals cannot be denied access to enjoy the benefits, even if they refused to contribute, and at the same time, they cannot be divided amongst individual members (Colomer 2011, 3; Cowen 2008). Moreover, Colomer and Cowen claim that because of the indivisibility and non-excludable feature of common collective goods, the provision must involve the action of everyone, either willingly or by some form of inducement. Therefore, it is worth noting that since public goods cannot be shared and can be accessible by individuals’ without hindrances then people will often have the incentives not to contribute to the attainment of public goods. However, even when individuals’ have the motivation to participate, Colomer (2011) claims that the problem of collective action is bound to inhibit the provision of such services, if the group is large and apart. Thus, increases the problems of externalities, free rider, competition and tragedy. Similarly, Fukuyama (2011) posits that even if the contributors are small and closer together, individual rational self-interest will pose a collective action problem especially if they perceived that their benefit is lesser than their contributes. So, in the event that individuals' rational choice reduce the incentives to produce services to all, Olson (1971) concludes that states’ must ensure that citizens are guaranteed accessibility to such services required to foster their well-being. Therefore, one will argue that providing public goods either in the developed or the underdeveloped countries, the issues of collective action and rational choice interest of the individuals, groups or states’ may pose some challenges. For such, the subsequent paragraphs will discuss the challenges consistent hypothesis on the public goods and collective action problems.
Significantly, public goods such as clean drinking water, good schools, roads, hospitals and safe environment that improve the well-being of citizens are been under provided in most developing countries. An important underlining factor affecting the production and distribution of services in the developing nations is corruption. Some studies have shown that widespread corruption at state and local levels in emerging countries is the main obstacle to the provision of adequate and sustain public services. For instance, VediHadiz [his surname] (2010) in his book “Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia” writes that increase corrupt practices in Indonesia decentralisation programmes is inhibiting the provision of vital public services to communities. According to Vedi Indonesia’s decentralisation was conceived of as a means of improving the provision of public goods through the devolution of resources and power to local authorities after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998; but by far, he said, the process has provided too little incentives for the creation of essential services in communities. For example, it is evidence that due to perceived corrupt activities amongst government servants, and local authorities, Indonesia lost an estimated 2.35 billion United States dollars in 2002 (Jakarta Post 2004, cited in Vedi 2010). Insofar, one will say here that decentralisation as a process of enhancing communities is in fact limiting their growth in the case of Indonesia.
Moreover, Milner et al. (2015) finds that bribery and illegal acquisition of resources amongst government officials in Uganda often increase more government funding for single project; hence, reduces the incentives for government to provide services in other communities. They further argue that corruption in Uganda has severely weakened state institutions to a point that citizens have linked the provisions of social services, for example, clean drinking water, education and energy supply to international organisations rather than government. At the local governance level, the problems of bribery and corruption have increased alongside the devolution of authority and resources.
Most importantly, the issue of corruption among local authorities and their cronies has often resulted in tribal conflicts and mistrust and has negatively affected the achievement of social services. For instance, empirical investigation among local chiefs in rural communities in Liberia reveals that severe corruption in the distribution of development resources limits the creation of goods and services, undermines farming activities and increases poverty among farmers (Gonne 2014). Undoubtedly, one will agree that corruption in government institutions, amongst public officials’ over the years has prevented the provision of essential services in developing countries. Citizens of several countries in the third world suffered a lot from curable diseases, starvation and poverty because they lack access to those essential services that will improve their lives.
Besides inherent corruption which is mostly the case for the under-provision of services in developing countries, certain writers have claimed that since the end of World War II and the beginning of decolonisation of countries, international institutions for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have largely been involve in creating financial, economic, and human development policies for the developing countries. The primary focus has been to promote sound economic and financial growth, reduce poverty, eradicate diseases and improve governance systems. Although much has been done in some developing nations over the years, countries including, Korea, Indonesia and Philippines whom once had authoritarian regimes, have experienced reform systems Reilly (2007), such as government of wider national inclusion, enhancement of citizens’ participation in policy decisions and a state-led leadership based on electioneering process. Broadly, such reforms in the political system are expected to boost economic productivity, reduce income inequality and promote collective action for services delivery at national and local levels to benefit every member of the communities.
However, critics of International development policies argue that development initiatives imposed in developing nations by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank over the years have presented both opportunities and challenges. Classical example by Bayat (2000) discusses the implications of the 1980 Structural Adjustment Programme introduced as a framework for global integration. In his work “From ‘Dangerous Classes’ to ‘Quiet Rebels’, Bayat highlights that since the inception of the neo-liberal policies, governments in the developing countries have experienced generally drastic reduction in their capacity to provide basic essential services to their citizens. For example the policy of market liberalisation which requires governments’ of the third world nations to remove trade barriers, financial integration and reduces spending on social welfare services has resulted in increased urban migration, informer businesses, homelessness, and civil unrest in most of the underdeveloped countries particularly in Africa. Bayat’s arguments will better mirror could well explain the high increases of illegal migrants from Africa to Europe for better services and welfare.
Additionally, Stiglitz (2002) further argues that developing countries are trapped in interest repayments to international financial institutions and the IMF. He states that due to IMF conditionalities of reforms and trade liberalisation in developing nations, countries, for instance, Kenya and Zambia are incapable of providing essential services to their citizens, largely due to high interest repayments over the years. The idea that countries will benefit from rapid economic development through market liberalisation and financial integration as conjured by the IMF and the World Bank has exacerbated incidences of poverty and income inequality in most countries. For instance, countries in Africa and Latin America for example, Argentina with weak economic infrastructure, information and their lack of prudent financial capacity to compete in market have seen shortfalls in export of their local commodities (Vinod and Dupont( 2011), and subsequently exposed their fragile economies to capital flight and free-riding by multinational organisations. The problems of free market policy have further increased poverty, civil unrest, insecurity, and intermittent political crises since the 1980s.
Furthermore, the concept of decentralisation of power and resources has also been a source of governments’ lack of incentives to provide public goods in developing countries. Decentralisation in countries where technological, communication and information systems are effective, such as in the developed world, devolving power to lower levels will improve the provision of public goods and services for the well-being of citizens. According to Grossman (2015) decentralisation in developing countries, such as the sub-Saharan Africa with larger population, multiple ethnic groups and fragile economy, fragmenting authorities has led to elites and autocrats seeking rational self-interest rather that promoting the provision of common goods. Though the idea of decentralisation of power and resources was to enhance local communities’ services delivery, local authorities’ and politicians have used the process to enrich themselves rather than the common goal of all. Hence, most observers have concluded that decentralisation has only increased the already existing poverty gap and reduces the incentives for the public supply of goods and services.
Besides the fact that corruption and international policies that are inhibiting the attainment of public goods, the lack of transparent information and inadequate civil participation in development and local policies setting posed serious challenges in developing nations .
According to Haigh’s (2012, 62) effective policies and sound governance system are the fundamental instruments that guaranteed transparency in communication and active citizens’ participation in programmes that affect their well-being. Therefore, one will expect that in countries particularly in the developed world with effective economic and social policies, services are provided for the benefits of citizens; and in turn citizens will have the rational interest to monitor, corporate and voluntarily contribute towards the creation of such services to better themselves. On the contrast, significant evidence indicates that the lack of transparent information on governments’ performance and limited citizens’ involvement in policymaking decisions provide little motivation for rational collective action in the developing countries. Keefer and Khemani (2004) and Kolstad and Wiig (2009) observe that countries in which weak governance and distorted communication systems prevail, citizens are frequently deprived of the benefits of social services, simply because policymakers attempt to maximise their interest against legitimate needs of their citizens. For example Keefer and Khemani provide practical case study from Uttar Pradesh and Kerala in India, they note that because the electorates in Kerala have better orientation on how their states functions, they enjoy greater delivery of public services than those in Uttar Pradesh with relatively limited information and exposure. At the same time, the absence of adequate and robust political competition coupled with citizen’s inability to make informed electoral decision undermines the incentives for governments to increase the production of public goods (Mani and Mukand 2007).
However, Reid (2008, 35-36) concludes that even when citizens either individually or in a form of an organised civil society groups are given space in policy decision and governance, their focus on creating community goods will be short-lived, because they will be motivated by rational choice interest rather than the common benefits of community members. For example Reid findings on civil society organisations shows that civil society actors in Philippines, after 1986 started merging and crossing allegiances to political parties, and soon became political actors themselves; which rendered most of the advocacy organisations incapable of pursuing collective action . Thus, individual conflict of interests as in Colomer’s collective action problem is practically at play in the Philippine case. Since civil society actors have identified their rational self-interest of political appointment, the pursuant of collective goods for the greater members’ interest is abandoned. Hence, a negative external effect on the organisations and members of the community that depended on such body for creating political space.
Most importantly, the issues of population and ethnic division in the underdeveloped countries have been identified as a source of severe poverty, civil war, diseases and sexually related offences. According Colomer’s (2011, 18) a fundamental aspects of creating a collective good is the contribution of all members of the community and not the amount involve in providing the public service. The idea of individual contribution explains that public goods either created by private or states are effectively attainable when the number of persons or communities involves are organised, small and be identified as possessing mutual interest. In fact, one will conclude that since developing countries have larger population and multitude of ethnic groups, provision of public goods will be hampered by this very factor. According to Keefer and Khemani (2004,5) decision making in respect of collective public good provision often disadvantages larger and fragmented groups, due to their geographical proximity, low level of education and inadequate information systems. In such instances, especially where corruption weakens states institutions, ethnic polarity determines electoral outcomes, provision of services will be undermined by this very reason and provides a perfect opportunity for politicians to free ride. For instance, Basu (ed.2004) finds that limited accessibility to resources and services such as schools, good roads, and electricity in most remote districts in India is generally a problem of population, ethnic divide, geographical locations, class systems, conflicts and cultural dynamics.
Similarly, Easterly and Levine (1997, 1213-1230) in their study of “Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions” states that “Political instability, rent-creating economic policies, and poor public goods may reflect a more fundamental country characteristic: ethnic divisions; … and ethnically fragmented economies may find it difficult to agree on public goods and good policies”. Therefore, it will be argue that even though population and ethnic division affect the provision of public goods in developing nations, but as Haigh’s (2012, 62) note, where effective policies and good governance exist, such as in the developed countries, no matter how large the population, citizens will benefit from services delivery. In essence, most developing countries, besides demographic and ethnic factors, they lack coherent institutions and competitive political system to offer services to their citizens.
Finally, several researchers have found that institutional and political factors play a vital role in creating public goods and ensuring public safety. One such study by Haigh (2012, 62) points out that effective interactions amongst individuals, the creation and distribution of essential social services for their survival depend largely on policy and governance structures. She claims that efficient policy setting informs state on citizen’s aspiration and provides directions through which government responses to the attainment of citizens’ needs. Similarly, Olson (1971) writes that the primary function of political institutions is to guarantee community members’ access to services required to foster their well-being. Therefore, it is worth noting that countries such as Sweden, Japan and the United States in the developed world are economically viable, efficient and able to provide essential public goods to their people, because they maintain coherent institutions, such as electoral system, accountability, judiciary and civic organisations. As Fukuyama (2011) cites, developed countries have well established and functional system, each of which is managed separately, with a unique administrative mandate, and largely independent of the others. What is very significant of Fukuyama’s argument is the concept of transparency and separation of powers in the developed world, yet overlapping functions in developing countries.
However, studies in most developing countries suggest that institutions are narrowly constructed, with weak governance systems and bureaucratic in nature. Such a system, as argued by Fukuyama, will undermine equal distribution of resources, economic development and the provision of collective goods. Practically, while technological advancement, trade and economic activities have boosted most countries in the world, countries in Asia and particularly Africa have not benefited much from such transactions, simply because of ineffective institutional behaviour and clientelism over the years (Booth 2011). Moreover, Besley and Coate (2003) highlights that policy decisions on the provisions of public good in a centralised system of government often hinges on a wider country context, with less consideration of rational individual choices, and typically leads to collective action problems. For instance, Selway (2011) argue that the electoral law system in Thailand before 1997 which provided for simple majority representation undermined the provision of some essential services and delays development; particularly when state functions and policy marking-decisions were left in the hands of individual political actors. He claims that due to such political environment, individual political leaders only have the motivation to campaign on narrow policies that guaranteed their stay in power, and fewer incentives to maximise specific policy outcomes. Such as health care system in this case. However, with the inception of new reform programmes after 1997, and the introduction of majoritarian political system and other changes, much has been done to enhance the electorates’ ability to campaign for improved representation and quality service delivery policies Reilly (2006-2007, Selway 2011).
Conclusion
This essay has discussed the challenges affecting the adequate provision of essential public services, such as educational institutions, enhanced medical facilities, clean drinking water, affordable power supply and good roads for the well-being of citizens in the underdeveloped countries. It further examined the creation of public good and its significance for individuals’ perfect existence and survival. The analyses revealed that some factors both at local and international levels are the main challenges of the under-provision of essential public services in developing countries. This paper concludes that foreign policies, such as decentralisation, institutional reforms and trade liberalisation are perfectly coined to promote economic development and adequate services delivery. But due to the lack of effective monitoring mechanisms in ensuring that people receive the proposed benefit, such policies also pose challenges to development. However, corruption, the lack of transparency, limited citizens’ participation, diverse population and ethnic polarity, weak and ineffective political systems characteristics of emerging nations are the main challenges preventing the provision of essential public goods.
References
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- Abu Bakarr Kaikai (Author), 2015, What are the challenges of providing public goods in developing countries? Developing countries and the problems of service delivery, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/307228
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