There is a common view among Western scholars, politicians, and media professionals that Russia continues to be an authoritarian state, due to its history, and that it has recently begun to stray away from democratic processes or even slide back into moderate totalitarianism. Even worse, The Freedom House report (2009) ranked Russia one of the world’s most repressive societies, putting it next to Rwanda. However, this and other reports present a distorted picture of democratic development in Russia, which reflects conflicting views between the Western and Russian understanding and measurement of democratic and non-democratic media systems, press pluralism, ownership structures, relative autonomy from the state, negative and positive control of press content, the role of ideology, and the legal frame that protects freedom of speech.
Table of Contents
SECTION I
Chapter 1 Problems in understanding of Russian development and governance. Methods of research. Statement of purpose.
1.1 Statement of purpose
1.2 Methods of research
Chapter 2 Standards on journalism Theories and reality
2.1 Western Standards on mass communications
2.2 The critique and myths of the theories
Chapter 3 Models and the path of democracy
3.1 Theories and definitions
3.2 Media and Democratic governance
SECTION II
Chapter 4 The End of the history postponed. Perestroika and Glasnost. Yeltsin’s reforms in politics. Economics, crime and politicization of the media. Putin’s democracy
4.1 From Gorbachev to Yeltsin to Putin. Premises for media transformation and ownership
4.2 Bloody democracy. Yeltsin's reforms
Chapter 5 Russia’s Mass Media at the turning point of political globalization
5.1 Managed democracy is a necessity
5.2 Reactionary West and evidence monitoring.
5.3 Questions and data on constraints of informational penetration
Chapter 6 Notes on the Western media content: to Russia with hate
6.1 Issues in the Russian-US political agenda
Chapter 7 Conclusions
Bibliography
Section I
Chapter 1: Introduction: Problems in understanding Russian Development and Governance.
There is a common view among Western scholars, politicians, and media professionals that Russia continues to be an authoritarian state, due to its history, and that it has recently begun to stray away from democratic processes or even slide back into moderate totalitarianism. Even worse, The Freedom House report (2009) ranked Russia one of the world’s most repressive societies, putting it next to Rwanda. However, this and other reports present a distorted picture of democratic development in Russia, which reflects conflicting views between the Western and Russian understanding and measurement of democratic and non-democratic media systems, press pluralism, ownership structures, relative autonomy from the state, negative and positive control of press content, the role of ideology, and the legal frame that protects freedom of speech. As this thesis argues, and will show in its analysis, improvements in political and democratic development have not been stopped or reversed since the demise of the Soviet Union.
First, the Western and some of the Russian mainstream media and press were quick to announce a decline of democracy in Russia after Mr. Putin became president of Russia; they accused the government of strict censorship, propaganda, media nationalization, and favoring attacks on or killing of journalists. However, the media on both sides of the Atlantic refused to consider the fact that the Russian government's attempts to control mass media largely related to journalistic criticism and reports associated with the issues in and around Chechnya and the Caspian Basin, as well as the areas ideologically and geopolitically important to both Russia and the United States. Because of the proximity of those territories to Russia, it makes it difficult for the United States to flex its interests in that region. The media in the United States had chosen to accuse Russia of violation of sovereignty of Chechen independency and the abuse of power by Russia. In its turn, the right wing Western media defended the Bush administration agenda on violation of other countries’ sovereignty, and supporting fueling anti-Russian sentiment and fears. The examples of contradictory positions favoring political violations by the US but condemning Russia in the media will be given in further chapters.
Second, there are tendencies in the mainstream Western and some of the Russian media to grossly isolate cause and effects. Their presentation of events is hardly objective when journalists highlight the issues entangled in Soviet mannerisms. Apparently, in accusations of Putin’s political course journalists managed to avoid emphasis on political contradictions, ambiguities, and uncertainties due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse caused the formation of sovereignty and co-operation to be created in chaotic flax of power and greed working well only for a small group of people – oligarchs. The media managed to give very little explanation of the reasons the Russian government took control over the independent media, and ousted oligarchs who appropriated a few media channels. Despite the accusations of Putin or members of his administration favoring the killing and attacking of journalists, no proof still exists that the authorities have sanctioned these actions.
Third, many non-profit groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and think tanks, together with the Russian political and economic elite, joined in the effort to demonize Putin’s plan to get Russia out of a chauvinistic state of mind, socio-economic constraints imposed by the Soviet rule ideology, and lawlessness. The plan included ‘establishing order in the country, integrity and the workability of state institutions,’ as Putin at the Russian Federation President’s eight addresses to the RF Federal Assembly and the United Russia platform on October 8th, 2007[1]. Structural adjustments required the establishment of a new form of government, enterprise, legal framework and structure along with market reforms. Yet, positive changes went unnoticed in the mainstream Western media and academia, and allowed Western analysts to avoid objectivity in evaluating democratic developments.
Fourth, it is naïve to think that a militarily and economically growing Russia would easily allow anyone to diminish its desire and capacity to play an important role in geopolitical and economic relations. Rather, it seeks to avoid exertion and attempts to find common ground in co-operation with the United States, other Western and Asian countries. Fifth, politically unengaged Westerners as well as Russians are either misinformed or completely unaware of the agreements between the United States and Russia that benefit both countries economically and culturally, and thus, tend to make wrong assumptions about the nature of relations, that in turn, fuel anti-American sentiment in Russia and fear of the “cold war again” in America.
In the current era, circumstances in Russia are in no way as dire as in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet period, as the Freedom House ranking suggests, and even not as bad as some contemporary journalists’ rights organizations assert (Becker 2004). Contrary to the common belief that democracy in Russia is on the decline, and that the media has been suffering under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the situation is in no way as dire as it was before perestroika and glasnost. This premise calls for the study of two interrelated questions. First, to what degree are Russia’s pro-Kremlin and independent mass media so biased as to impede the development of democracy in Russia? Second, is the current state of affairs in Russia so different from other countries that it can be considered undemocratic? To understand the implications of the mass media on democracy, an approach to analysis will include the set of criteria, the combination of methods, and the content of the press that will be used in defining why the tensions had been created.
1.1 Statement of purpose
This thesis seeks to answer two questions: Roughly 20 years after perestroika and glasnost, how extensive is the domination of the pro-Kremlin mass media, suppressing independent voices? How different from other developing and developed economies is Russia’s media, prompting many in the West to claim it to be authoritarian?
1.2 Methods of Research
This thesis will prove that modern Russia is neither a backward democracy nor has a propensity toward authoritarianism. Perestroika and globalization imposed on Russia a new political and economic vision incomparable to the old regime of authoritarianism under Stalin or one-party communist leadership after him. Former Russian President Putin and now Medvedev expressed strong proclivity to make decisions in domestic and foreign policies that benefit Russia without losing its national identity and, at the same time, attempt to take advantage from partnership with developed countries. Media, as a powerful tool, aimed at the dynamic of internal and external affairs development, and it is open as never before.
The comparative analysis of media and press tendencies as well as content, the institutionalization of media in the United States, Russia, and other emerging economies will be relevant. I will employ a combination of methods, including historical, theoretical, pragmatic, and contextual methods. An empirical approach, interviews, and opinions as well as content analysis will be included from Russian media, Internet sources, and academic research. The degree of censorship and propaganda as well as limitations to various media reporting on military actions during wars and crises will be also included.
First, the frame of the analysis will be based on comparative analysis of governing models, philosophy, historical background, and relations between the United States and Russia. Cataclysmic events like shock therapy under the International Monetary Fund and Washington consensus that have contributed to the current political, economic, and social situation of Russia will be included. The events will be marked by the periods of re-structuralization: glasnost and perestroika (1985-2000), and the period from 2000 to the present.
Second, the parameters of measuring democracy and media relations in the West were dramatically different from those in the former Soviet Union. In the West, they were based on the liberal traditions of interactions among media owners, government policies and state elites, while Russia’s legislative elements to regulate freedom of speech after the collapse of the Soviet Union had been based on struggle and flux between two sets of elements: for one, the one party elite had access to the resources of media production owned by the state comprised of former political elite ‘ apparatchiks,’ and second, people’s vague understanding of market and information and desire for expression of journalistic freedom. Conceptually, none of the sides really had the knowledge to how to reconcile the above by the means of laws and fair regulation.
Tools to guide this thesis’s analysis include the books Four Theories of the Press (1963) and The Imperative of Freedom (1974). Scholars use Merrill’s approach to evaluate mass media and political regimes due to controversy of the ‘ Theories.’ Controversies consist of lenient approach in justifying interference of the government into media regulations but deny the same approach in former Soviet Union. Thus, it was discredited by Merrill who contributed in observation and comprehensive analysis of media development in the United States- he had established an array of possibilities to deduce that the Western media used the principles of theories in double-standard manner. Partly, these standards used to criticize the Russian government on constraints imposed on the freedom of speech. Partly, it is used to justify systemic flaws of the Western media system. Merrill's principles of analysis also apply well to Russia’s social, democratic and political context in which the media operates. The theories are only relevant in that propaganda and social control--in one form or another—are present in all four theories. However, political philosophy, journalistic objectivity, truth-seeking and journalistic ethics fall apart when only four theories are used. A fifth theory is a game theory that is central in the analysis of geopolitical objectives due to external pressure that limits freedom of speech in any country, particularly in countries that go through transition – economic, political, or wartime crisis.
The study shows that controlled media is barely a problem of Russia but rather a reflection of foreign policies of the governments that use their power to withhold information under certain conditions that will be discussed in this thesis. A third part of the methodology will include evidence, interviews, observations and collection of the content channeled by the Russian and Western mass media, including the press, Internet and radio, where available
Conclusions will be drawn regarding media biases and democratic development. These conclusions will be based on coverage in the United States and Russia of critical issues such as elections and economic crises.
Chapter 2: Standards and Controversies of Journalism
2.1 Western Standards on mass communications
The mass media does not exist in a vacuum. The voices of media, its content, and its operation cannot be understood without comprehension of how political and economic development and free press relate to each other and to democracy as a whole. The first attempt to clarify the link between political society and the press was introduced in Four Theories of the Press. By “press,” that book’s authors meant all the means of mass communication, including television, radio, and newspapers.[2] The purpose of the book was to explain that the press always takes the form and coloration of the structure within which the media operates. According to the authors, the reaction of the audience, socio-economic development, time, geopolitics, self-determination, cultural, or communicative characteristics meant little. Instead, they define the press by the types of ideology under which it functions. The theories are relevant for a starting point in the debate about how freedom of speech and overall democracy develop in Russia, compared with other countries, and how Siebert’s theoretical application fails because information is distorted, ignored, hidden, misunderstood, or manipulated in both the United States and Russia. Siebert et al narrowed the topic to exclusively authoritarian and libertarian models with sophisticated branching into the Soviet Communist Theory, which is authoritarian, and the Social Responsibility Theory, which is presented as the most virtuous variation of libertarianism. For a more convenient reference, the theories will be labeled with letters: Authoritarian (A), Libertarian (LT), The Soviet Theory (ST), and Social Responsibility (SR). The theories cause serious contradictions discussed in this chapter.
Authoritarian Theory postulates that the state is the agent of the people in institutionalized form. It supersedes individuals, providing them with the means to fulfill their potential as parts of society. Thus, the state cannot be as fallible in its pursuit of a stable and harmonious life. The definition, which is associated with totalitarianism, fascism, and dictatorial regimes, also includes a modified authoritarian concept in the shape of later-developed communism. The theory’s roots come from the Renaissance period, and are based on the works of Machiavelli, Hobbs, Hegel, and Treitschke, who justify the acceptance of authority. At that time, the means of communication appeared to serve the state in order to preserve the rule of monarchy and hierarchy, and thus controlling the media from the top on down was a necessity.
In response to the questions on the basic principles of philosophical problems in men’s mind about knowledge and truth acquired through the application of mental effort, the authoritarian theory emphasizes that men differ in their abilities, but the full potential is attainable by being part of society where maintaining order and peace is sovereign and directed by the governing administration. Individually, however, “the one” is helpless. (Siebert et al, p. 11) Therefore, “wise men” capable of analyzing and synthesizing should become leaders in organized society or at least become advisors to the leaders. Acquired knowledge becomes the standard for all members, and establishes an omnipotent “aura of absolute,” which makes change undesirable and stability or continuity a virtue itself (Sieibert et al p. 11) Mass communications support the state and the government in power, so the society may advance, and the state maybe viable and attain its objectives. However, to authoritarians, maintaining order and sovereignty of the state could be justified by the means of control, and thus proves the right to impose full conformance with the state propaganda and content censorship. A basic assumption for journalists’ engagement into the communication system is a privilege granted by the national leadership, and therefore it is a channel used by the state and powerful elite to exercise social control. The mass media under authoritarian rule has as much freedom as the leadership is willing to permit (Merill 1974, p.34).
The Libertarian press concept is traced back to England and the American colonies of the 17th Century. Taking the opposite view, Milton, Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jefferson advocated trusting the people to make intelligent decisions if a climate for free expression existed.[3] Criticizing the government and policies was encouraged, for it advances democracy. Therefore, journalists ought to be free from intellectual manacles, external constraints, and abuses of liberties. Moreover, there should be no restrictions on the import or export of press messages across national frontiers. So the libertarian press splinters into the pluralism of voices becoming a “fourth branch of government,” supplementing the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.[4] Libertarianism’s main principle is that a free press ought to work in a laissez faire environment of unfettered autonomy, free from external powers or special interests.
Soviet Communist Theory initially drew heavily from Hegel and Marx, and later mutated under Lenin and Stalin. Mass media and its organizations were not intended to be privately owned but were to serve the working class and proletariat. The perpetuation of a socialist system is a major principle, and, thus, criticism of its basic ideology is forbidden. The masses were considered too fickle and unconcerned, and, thus, for them to delve into information about governmental activities of its leaders seemed unnecessary. As instruments of government, mass media in Soviet theory are determined to do anything for the protection of the growth of communism and for setting high moral examples in order to transmit social policies.
Social Responsibility Theory became a product of the libertarian concept altered in the 20th Century rationale developed after World War II. This theory became parallel in importance to libertarianism after 1947. The U.S. Commission on Freedom of the Press, known as the Hutchins Commission and led by Robert Hutchins, composed of 13 active members (none from academia), put constraints on mass media in the final report published in 1947[5]: press freedom is limited by a social responsibility to report facts accurately and in a meaningful context.[6] The Commission said newspapers should redefine themselves as "common carriers of public discussion" by providing:
- a truthful, comprehensive account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning.
- a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism.
- a means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in a society to one another.
- a way of reaching every member of the society by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies.[7]
Freedom of expression under SR is not an absolute right, as under pure libertarian theory.[8] It sheds doubt on the virtual nature of man. The SR concept denies that man is innately motivated to search the truth and accept it as his guide. Rather, a man is viewed not so much as irrational as lethargic; that means he is capable of using his reason, but he is unwilling to do so.[9] Because of man’s sloth, mental faculties stall and are in danger of atrophy, which puts him into a free fall of unthinkable conformity. Thus, people become easy prey to advertising pitchmen and others who want to manipulate them for selfish ends. Implicit moral duties exhibited in LT, become explicit in SR theory. “If a man is to remain free, he must live by his reason instead of blindly accepting what he sees, hears, and feels.”[10]
Ironically, Siebert did not mention in SR theory how the urge and the clash of ideas stimulate the debate. According to Siebert, SR theory has basically the same functions as those under libertarian theory: 1) servicing the political system by providing information, discussion, and debate on public affairs; 2) enlightening the public to make it capable of self-government; 3) safeguarding the rights of the individual by servicing the economic system, primarily by bringing together the buyers and sellers of goods and services through the medium of advertising; 5) providing entertainment; and 6)maintaining its own financial self-efficiency to be free from the pressure of special interests.[11] Nevertheless, Siebert used in his elaboration of SR the idea that media was not aware of its own responsibilities, and thus the government’s intervention was inevitable, and thus justifiable. The Commission, cites Siebert, clearly stated that “the notion of rights, costless, unconditional, conferred by the Creator at birth, was a marvelous fighting principle against arbitrary governments and had its historical work to do. But in the context of an achieved political freedom the need of limitation becomes evident” (Siebert, 1963).
2.2 The critique and myths of the theories
Numerous studies evaluate the four media systems in order to highlight its utmost usefulness outside of academic walls (Merrill, 1974; Lowenstein, 1990; Griffin, 1991; McLeod & Blumler, 1989; Hallin, 2006). None of the studies found the theories valid for application to actual political systems and society in connection with the media and the public in a domestic and global sense. Siebert first observes the political atmosphere then supplies a press theory according to known conditions, showing that his starting point is political, not communicative. If SR theory imposes responsibility, does it mean other theories are irresponsible? Supposedly, the ideal SR theory example is applicable to “liberal” U.S. mass communications. But it does not demonstrate even remotely all-inclusive elements of democracy—for example, how during the Bush administration many journalists’ voices had been quietly shut down, and one of the most radical right-wing TV networks, Fox News, was turned into the puppet of the Bush Administration.
The next challenge is of the audience being invisible in the theories. One argument against the theories claims that a good theory should be reflective enough not to be constrained by the period of time and correspond to actual political systems. If not, the usefulness of such theories would be low (Griffin, 1991). In support of the time issue, other academics stated that the theory cannot be expected to be general enough to fit both communications of the ancient Roman Empire and the computer technology of NASA (McLeod and Blumler,1989). In other words, a good theory will always trade generalities for specifics, and technological development in the name of criteria, time endurance, and geopolitical interests. Following empirical premises, one may think that the authoritarian system is the same as the totalitarian or fascist systems, or libertarianism and SR theories are the ultimate model of the autonomous media. In reality, the most important controversy takes into account a normative approach.
The models should be suitable even if the actual political conditions change, but it seemed not the case in Siebert’s elegant presentation. He omitted the fact that there’s always a temptation by authorities in any country to withhold—and bury—unwanted or unfavorable information from the media. Although the media in Russia do not have a long history of pluralism and an open, unregulated market in legal terms, the Russian government had been criticized for controlling the media more than the U.S. government was. Also, it has been demonstrated throughout the course of the history that threats to freedom of the press, especially during periods of tension and crisis, are far from being solely a Russian problem. Censorship and propaganda is particularly enforced in wartime, when manipulation, distortion, or concealment of facts surface.
For instance, as reported in the Washington Journalism Review (January 1991) after the Gulf War broke out, American reporters were required to run battlefield stories past censors before they could be dispatched.[12] Walter Brasch, an American social issues journalist, constantly challenged Bush-Cheney claims about Iraq. In the Atlantic Free Press online of February 2009, he reported that president of the Associated Press (AP), Tom Curley, told journalism students that the Bush administration had turned the Department of Defense into a propaganda machine. “An AP [Associated Press], investigation just revealed that the Pentagon Budget for “influence operations” this fiscal year is at least $4.8 billion, with 27,000 civilian and military personnel assigned to information dissemination.”[13] The penalty for failing to agree to the Pentagon’s terms of reporting, said Curley, was told by top commanders, that “if I stood and the AP stood by journalistic principles, the AP and I would be ruined.” When the Bush-Cheney administration made sure that retired military officers, favorable to the Administration, got choice TV network assignments, hardly anyone protested until it became so obvious that the commentaries were skewed to Bush-Cheney policies.[14] The assessment of the truth from censored information can be hardly detected unless the information surfaced in independent press channels or other countries.
The myths of LT and SR validity were dismantled by the Professor Emeritus at the Missouri School of Journalism, John Calhoun Merrill, in his book The Imperative of Freedom, published in 1974. All four theories also fall out once the criteria of communications media is applied to its direct function--to contribute into (a) people’s awareness of potentialities, (b) dissatisfaction and desire to change, (c)awakening of national consciousness, spirit, and concerted action in order to benefit the development and well-being of the people. If, according to Libertarian and SR theories, mass media has the freedom of expression, should it not be applied to media autonomy as being free from government control?
In 1968, Robert McNamara, U.S. secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, asserted that the American people “have both the need and the right to be thoroughly informed” on government decisions.[15] In Britain, by contrast, it seemed that the public and the press alike rejected any concept of a right to know what their government representatives were doing because most of them failed to see where they got such a right. In the United States, the right to the freedom of press is written in the First Amendment, but the “people’s right to know” is absent. So, why, it is argued, should the press any more than other private or commercial institutions, be saddled with the responsibility of providing government information to the people? If such a right presumably exists, why should not the government--having the responsibility to let the people know, instead of private and commercial institutions--actually go into the mass communications business. The argument takes upon the obligation to a subject–people themselves.
The government has no right competing with private media because if the people really have the right to know, it should be enforced by the government to the point of disciplining uncooperative and irresponsible journalists and government officials.[16] Logically, in the presence of such a right, the government is responsible for overseeing wrongdoings. It is obvious that in the United States such oversight hardly happens with channels like Fox News or MSNBC pondering over “socialist” President Obama or The Economist, which still believes that Russia is a snarling bear ready to tear apart the American president.
[...]
[1] See PBS.org. The channel had presented a program “Russia: Putin’s Plan,” which also refers to the agitation brochure exposed on the United Russia Party (UR) website. The original document of Putin’s plan for development of the country can be found on official website of the UR Party: www.edinoros.ru.
[2] Altschull, J. Herbert. (1984) Agents of Power: The role of the News Media in Human Affairs. New York: Longman.
[3] Ibid.
[4] p.35
[5] F. Blevins(1997) The Hutchins Commission Turns 50: Recurring Themes in Today's Public and Civic Journalism. Retrieved from http://mtprof.msun.edu/Fall1997/Blevins.html
[6] Fred Blevins(1997) The Hutchins Commission Turns 50: Recurring Themes in Today's Public and Civic Journalism. Retrieved from http://mtprof.msun.edu/Fall1997/Blevins.html, Nov. 1st,2010.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Siebert, p.97
[9] Siebert, p.100
[10] ibid
[11] Ibid, p.74
[12] Jeff Kamen. "CNN's Breakthrough in Baghdad: Live by Satellite (Censored)."Washington Journalism Review March 1991: pp. 26-29
[13] Retrieved from http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/8039--toothless-the-watchdog-press-that-became-the-governments-lapdog-.html, Feb.14,2009
[14] Ibid.
[15] John Merrill (1974) “The Imperative of freedom. A philosophy of journalistic autonomy,” New York, p.100
[16] Merrill, p.107
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