This essay addresses why Belarusian youth protest against the regime. Since 2006, several protests have broken out as a response to the presidential elections, and youth have been at the forefront of these protests. This paper examines the roots and causes of the protests from an emancipatory perspective, following Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition.
Several explanations for why these protests have occurred are weighed. In doing so, the author argues that the youth want to liberate themselves from the authoritarian-paternalistic system of the state. The liberation is driven by a disregard of recognition experienced by youth. The paper diagnoses a chronic problem within the Belarusian society and offers new perspective on the study of post-Soviet states.
- ABSTRACT: This essay addresses why Belarusian youth protest against the regime. Since 2006, several protests broke out as a response to the presidential elections, and youth have been at the forefront of these protests. This paper examines the root causes of the protests from an emancipatory perspective following Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. Several explanations for why these protests have occurred are weighed. In doing so, I argue that the youth want to liberate themselves from the authoritarianpaternalist system of the state. The liberation is driven by a disregard of recognition experienced by youth. The paper diagnoses a chronic problem within the Belarusian society and offers new perspective on the study of post-Soviet states.
- KEYWORDS: Belarus, protest movement, anti-government youth, emancipation of the youth, struggle for recognition
While other parts of the world are struggling to cope with the covid-19 pandemic, Belarus saw the largest upsurge in protests in its history. It is unanimously understood that the protests are a reaction to the public manipulation of the official election results1 2 and the use of force by security forces against peaceful protesters in the first days after the election ( cf. Sahm 2020: 18). At the same time, it is questionable whether just these two factors explain the protest movement or if this is only the tip of the iceberg.
The media calls these young people the drivers of the protests (Brzozowski 2020) or that a large number of young people could be seen during the protests (cf. German Federal Council). The remarkable thing is that Belarusian youth participated not only in the mass protests3 in 2020, but also in smaller protests around the presidential elections in 2006 or 2010. In this regard, the youth is not characterized by following the masses, but by active participation, because they are also involved in the organization of protest events. In addition, the youth oppose the system not only in Belarus, but also in other authoritarian states. For example, in neighboring Ukraine in 2004 or 2013, the youth played an important role in advocating for Westernization. The Arab Spring was also strongly influenced by youth from 2010 onward, who revolted against their autocratic rulers (cf. Petz 2013: 121-124).
With the current events and newly added research articles,4 Belarus offers a good opportunity to examine the social fabric more closely, as the focus of many scholars, politicians and media so far has mostly been on Lukashenko's repressive rule. Thus, Belarus has inherited the labels such as “remaining real dictatorship in the heart of Europe” or “last dictatorship of Europe.” This has deprived society of its active role:
“Under this view, its population [is] cowed and passive - at best dominated, at worst slaughtered by a succession of brutal rulers, domestic and foreign” (Ackermann et al. 2017: 1). This categorization seems incomprehensible with the scale of the protest movement, which has developed many creative methods and strategies.5 The scale of the protests often signals that society, especially the youth, is politically engaged. It even implies that the protesters are the opposite of cowed and passive.
In my opinion, the challenge starts only after recognizing that the youth of the protesters is a relevant factor. With the help of youth, it is possible to capture other factors that may have been overlooked for decades in post-Soviet states. Moreover, it can already be said that it will influence the political course of Belarus in the future at least.
In this essay, I will explore the question of why young people protest against the Lukashenko regime. I will look at the psychological, political-legal, and socioeconomic backgrounds attributed to these youths, specifically within the period between 2006 and 2020. My focus will reveal the underlying conditions that spurred these protests against the presidential elections. In each chapter, I will contrast and discuss different positions that attempts to explain the protests. My essay will draw on Honneth's Theory of Recognition, which will make it easier to look at the many factors in the period between 2006 and 2020 because the theory allows us to capture many details.
For youths, protesting is an emancipatory process of liberating oneself from the authoritarianpaternalist system. The emancipatory process is thereby driven by a sense of being disregarded by the state.
In the next sections, I will present the theoretical framework of the essay. This is followed by three chapters, each of which discusses two different positions in relation to the research question. The conclusion presents my outlook on future research and further discussions.
Emancipatory Process within the Framework of Honneth's Theory of Recognition
To learn more about the youth protests, one must look at it from an emancipatory perspective. In general, emancipation refers to the liberation of an entity from “control, dependence, restraint, confinement, restriction, repression, slavery, or domination.” Entities are understood to be human actors who can free themselves from repressive forms of power and control (cf. Susen 2015: 1025).
More theoretically, emancipation can be described as a social process in which oppressed groups initially feel that existing conditions are unfair because they block the satisfaction of legitimate needs. The oppressed group questions the hegemonic interpretation of established norms, and over time, the group develops a common emancipatory interest that the existing norms must be reinterpreted in their favor (cf. Honneth 2017: 917). In summary, groups that have experienced exclusion or discrimination based on hegemonic interpretations of norms start to rebel against existing social systems (cf. Honneth 2017: 914).
The process of social struggle brings about emancipation (cf. Honneth 2017: 918). The social struggle can be understood as a process in which oppressed groups aim to gain recognition because their interests were neglected by the hegemonic interpretation of norms (cf. Honneth 2017: 914 f.).
An emancipatory process6 without the struggle for recognition is difficult to imagine: in his theory of recognition, Honneth builds on the approaches of Hegel and Mead. He says people need to be affirmed or acknowledged in three different ways. They need to be affirmed with love, rights, and solidarity (cf. Honneth 1996: 92 f.). These three forms can develop in different ways and take different forms of struggle (cf. Honneth 1996: 169 f.). By love, Honneth understands all primary relationships based on the model of erotic two-way relationships, friendships and parent-child relationships based on strong emotional ties between a few people. The subjects mutually desire emotional attention and recognize each other as needy beings (cf. Honneth 1996: 95). Law is the form of mutual recognition in which the bearers of rights recognize each other as legal entities with certain claims (cf. Honneth 1996: 107 f.). Solidarity is understood to mean the symmetrical appreciation of the skills and characteristics of the other, so that these can appear to be significant and valuable for common practice (cf. Honneth 1996: 129).
In this context, motives for social resistance and rebellion7 arise when deeply rooted expectations of recognition are violated. The injury creates an experience of disregard for recognition. This is accompanied by negative feelings, which can motivate collective resistance when people articulate their negative experiences intersubjectively. This means that social movements8 can come out of personal disappointment when it affects not only the individual but also a group of many other people (cf. Honneth 1996: 163 f.).
Going into more detail, Honneth distinguishes between three forms of disrespect9: abuse, denial of rights, and denigration. They all result in a motive for political resistance. The first form is the experience of physical abuse, which destroys a person's elementary self-confidence. The second form is the structural exclusion of an individual from possessing certain rights within society. The third form is more complex compared to the first two. It occurs when individual or collective ways of life are denigrated. This means that individual ways of life and beliefs are downgraded as inferior or deficient. Individual characteristics and abilities of persons or groups are thus classified as worthless for society (cf. Honneth 1996: 133 f.).
In this argumentative essay, I will consider the Belarusian protest movement as an Eastern European social movement. Following this, Jocobsson/Saxonberg (cf. 2013: 1) define social movements as collective actions in that groups of people seek to achieve their goals by influencing policies, identities, or the views of their supporters. Through this broad definition, accordingly, it should be possible to consider the protest movement in the context of the emancipatory process of youth throughout this essay.
The Abuse and Denial of Rights
Before starting this chapter, it is important to define the term youth. In terms of age, the Belarusian government defines youths as those between the ages of 14 to 31 (cf. Salikau 2017: 3). However, if we look at youth from a sociological perspective, the issue becomes more complex.
Following the youth movements in Eastern Europe, Nikolayenko (cf. 2017: 82) conceptualizes youth as follows: Youth is the phase of life between adolescence and adulthood. This phase is primarily characterized by the time of experimentation and dramatic changes in different areas of life. In this essay, I will follow Nikolayenko's concept and refer to youth as those young women and men who participated in anti-government10 protest movements.
In the following, I will show why the first two forms of disregard, abuse, and denial of rights, are two important motives for political resistance. In doing so, I distance myself from the literature on the post-Soviet geographic zone, which explains the protests from a Eurocentric perspective11 and thus overlooks deeper, psychological causes.
Research on youth in post-Soviet countries explains how several external factors affect the movement: the Color Revolution12 that occurred in post-Soviet countries in the early 2000s, produced a kind of new pro-European generation that sought to overcome the Soviet legacy (cf. cf. Krawatzek 2016: 177). In doing so, the youth sought out a connection to the civilized world of Western nations, a market-oriented economy, and a democratic political system. To do so, they fought against the unwillingness and inability of their rulers to become more Western- oriented (cf. cf. Cheterian 2009: 143). A glance at neighboring Ukraine shows that this movement was only able to act politically because it was supported by Western-sponsored organizations (cf. cf. Lane 2009: 129).
In Belarus, too, the conditions for a Color Revolution were in place in March 2006. Protests against the regime took place both on the day itself and the day after the presidential elections, but there was no mass mobilization (cf. Korosteleva 2012: 38). In contrast, the most recent Belarusian protests from 2020 appear much larger than the previous ones, which could lead one to conclude that a catch-up revolution 13 is taking place (cf. Sapper/Weichsel 2020: 5). Thus, in the latest phase of protests, one could assume that the same external factors play a role as in the beginning of the Color Revolutions of the 2000s. This would mean that young people are still striving for a Western orientation.
To explain protest motivation, external factors capture only the tip of the iceberg. It is not wrong to claim that desires to become Westernized14 plays a significant role, but the deeper interest15 behind it must be deciphered. Only in this way it can be fully understood why the orientation towards the West plays an important role. Moreover, it can also become clearer why the young protesters are so determined and persistent to participate in the protests again and again.
The hidden part of the iceberg can be captured by the disregard forms of recognition. The first form is the experience of physical abuse, which destroys a person's sense of self (cf. Honneth 1996: 133). Regarding this form, according to Honneth's logic, one could assume that the political resistance of Belarusian youth is a direct reaction to the experience of physical abuse. Meaning, after experiencing violence, they wait for the first possible moment to protest. The demonstrations after the presidential elections could provide a good opportunity to do so. However, the data is currently very weak and cannot confirm this assumption. All that can be observed is that youth actively participate in public protest rallies and experience violence after. At the same time, however, there is a lack of data to verify the extent to which youth experience violence outside of protest events. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that physical abuse experienced during protests is at least a motivating factor for participation in future protests.
In what follows, I will briefly explain why the violence is perceived negatively to conclude that it creates a motive to continue political resistance over time. In Belarus, it is common knowledge that since Lukashenko took office in 1994, a security apparatus has been set up in the Soviet tradition to dominate and control the political space. The apparatus is also intended to deter young people who are critical of the government from engaging in civil unrest. To this end, it uses various repressive measures, one of the most important of which is violence (cf. Petz 2013: 121-128).
Violence against young people was particularly noticeable during the protests in 2020. For example, statistics show that the younger the protesters, the more often they experienced violence. 39.3% of protesters between the ages of 18 and 24 have experienced violence and those under the age of 18, about 45.8% (cf. Osteuropa 2020b: 164).
The young people reported that the intense use of violence started only after they were arrested. For example, one young man reports that he was beaten by the OMON16 police unit both in the prisoner transport vehicle and in the remand prison (cf. Viasna 2020). These young people have to live with these experiences of violence, while the regime cannot be held accountable.
In this way, the regime has caused negative emotional reactions that go hand in hand with not feeling seen, and this can become a motive for political resistance (cf. Honneth 1996: 138). For example, on the day after the presidential election in 2010, the psychosocial consequences of the political escalation17 were felt. Young Belarusians wrote on Facebook18 that they were disillusioned, empty, sad, angry, and afraid (cf. Petz 2010: 33).
Moreover, police violence in post-Soviet states often sparks larger scale civil struggle. For example, during the Euromaidan protests in 2013, excessive police violence against students triggered mass protests the day after (cf. Malygina 2013: 2). Regarding the Belarusian protest in 2020, according to a survey19, 98% of respondents said that violence and political repression were the main motives for participating in the protest. The motive “against Lukashenko” was only the second most popular option (cf. The Center for New Ideas 2020).
Police violence mobilizes both young people and other groups of people who were not involved in the protests from the beginning. This is probably because police violence is perceived as very unjust and people grow tired of constantly being disrespected. This means that individuals who have experienced human rights abuses are likely to show solidarity with those who have experienced physical abuse. The reason for this could be that the emerging protest movement consists of individuals with different experiences of neglect but with the same emancipatory interest, as I will elaborate in the last chapter.
In summary, it is very likely that physical abuse directly or indirectly causes the oppressed youth to rebel for recognition. This form of disregard can thus be an explanation for why youth want to belong to a civilized world20 (cf. Cheterian 2009: 143). This desire is also sought by the youth without Western-sponsored organizations being promoted, as Lane (cf. Lane 129) portrays it.
Accordingly, it is also possible that peaceful protests may turn violent in the future, because according to Honneth, groups have an uncontrollable potential for aggression due to previous experiences of disregard (cf. Honneth 2010: 278). Thus, warning slogans have been present at recent protests in 2020, where the trauma of the protesters can be identified. People chant: “We will not forget. We will not forgive” (Shchyttsova 2020: 60).
By the second form of disrespect, it can be observed that youth experience it both inside and outside protest events. However, it must be noted that Belarus is not a constitutional state (cf. Karbalevich 2020: 152). In an international comparison, Belarus ranks the lowest in terms of political rights. Overall, the people in the country are not considered to be politically free (cf. Freedom House 2021).
Following the logic of Honneth, one could argue that the youth experience only a weak legal underprivilege 21 because disregard presupposes the experience of legal recognition, that must previously made (cf. Honneth 1996: 119-121), but, however, has not yet been made. Additionally, one could assume that the experience of legal recognition cannot be made at all, because there are no possibilities for it. At least in terms of experience with political rights. However, experiences with legal rights cannot be limited to political activities because youth are active in many non-political areas. These include, for example, cultural and welfare events (cf. Vidanava 2013: 129). Moreover, youth can experience freedom regarding legal rights especially when they place little value on political freedom. For example, a young man shares that he feels free because he can do whatever he wants outside of the political realm (cf. Petz 2013: 130). In this regard, it means that youth may very well have an experience with legal recognition, but only outside of the political sphere. Therefore, it can still be assumed that Belarusian youth may experience denial of rights.
[...]
1 Maxim Motruk (1995), B.A., Master student of Political Science with focus on Political Economy at the Philipps-University of Marburg, Germany
2 The official election results show that the incumbent Lukashenko won the election with 80.1 %. The EU, Great Britain, Norway, Switzerland, the USA, and Canada do not recognize the election result (cf. Gotz 2020: 420).
3 On many Sundays, up to 200,000 participants took part in the protests. There were also explicit student protests involving over 1000 participants. (cf. Belarus-Analysen 2020a: 6).
4 In 2020, German Association for the Study of Eastern Europe, (DGO) published an anthology with numerous articles on the current political situation in Belarus. Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen has also published some new articles on Belarus (Lander-Analysen).
5 Different forms of protest marches (cf. Gotz 2020: 422-424), numerous initiatives to cancel the election results or cultural events with contests or prominent figures that contributed to an optimistic protest mood (cf. Sahm 2020: 21 f.).
6 By the emancipatory process I mean that the goals have not yet been achieved and that an exact stage of the process is currently unclear. It is only clear that emancipation is taking place.
7 By resistance and rebellion Honneth understands reinterpretation of social norms. Therefore, these two activities can be considered as forms of the emancipatory process.
8 "In contemporary political theory, it is generally accepted that modern discourses of emancipation cannot be separated from the emergence of social movements'"” (Susen 2015: 1034).
9 In the chapter “Patterns of Intersubjective Recognition: Love, Rights, and Solidarity” Honneth presents on page 129 a tabular overview of the three forms of recognition with their forms of disrespect.
10 Accordingly, I will categorize the youth as anti-governmental.
11 Pershai (cf. 2010: 379) recognizes that intellectual and public debates about post-socialist states usually aim to assess how mature the post-Soviet states are for the European community. This includes social, political, and cultural factors in Belarus.
12 "A mass protest or an unarmed uprising aimed at replacing, through elections, the sitting government that represents a semi/quasi-democratic regime” (Baev 2011: 5).
13 “It picks up where 1989 left off. The protest movement is trying to free itself from the authoritarian leadership that has ruledfor two and a half decades’” (Sapper/Weichsel 2020: 5).
14 An orientation in terms of democratization and liberalization following the example of the EU states.
15 A psychological-emancipatory interest following Honneth's theory of recognition.
16 Translated as Special Purpose Police Detachment.
17 Security forces brutally cracked down on protesters and many were injured (cf. Petz 2013: 33).
18 Compared to the Soviet-influenced generation, the youth is characterized by its affinity for the Internet. Accordingly, the Internet can serve to trigger and accelerate protest mobilization.
19 A non-representative survey by a Belarusian think tank.
20 With market-based economy and a democratic political system (Cheterian 2009: 143).
21 Experience of denial of rights.
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