Tension is rising in the South China Sea. What are the major issues? Is freedom of navigation at risk?

Is there a naval arms race in the Indo-Pacific region?

Essay , 2022 , 31 Pages , Grade: A

Politics - Other International Politics Topics

The growing tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) as a geopolitical “focal point for confrontation” are supported by recently published press/research articles and a qualitative literature review of 343 SCS-related sources since 2009. In sum, they allow us to identify the main issues in the employment of national power instruments that are at interplay in the SCS power arena among six regional claimant states; namely the “People’s Republic of China” (PRC), “Taiwan”, “Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam” also including non-claimant Indonesia and the U.S. as an external party. Therefore, the paper will apply the DIME-L framework as a conflict-analysis tool to cover a 'Tour d’Horizon' of key causes/drivers of the conflict as well as the attempts to deal with them.

The stipulated essay question addresses the ongoing discourse on the 'Arms Race (AR)' concept in the maritime domain of the vast Indo-Pacific theatre. For the scope of this paper, I will focus on the superpowers U.S. and China due to “numerous headlines” which recently proclaim heightened tensions between them. In particular, at “security flashpoints” like the South/East China Sea (SCS/ECS), the “Korean Peninsula and Taiwan” and with regard to the intensified development of 'Hypersonic Missile Technology (HMT)'. This calls for an update of Till’s decade ago assessment who qualified the U.S.-Chinese instance as “naval modernisation in the region” which “has not yet become a fully-fledged naval arms race” but “clearly has the potential to do so”. To derive the answer for the case study, the paper will suggest an 'Arms Dynamics (AD)' framework to better differentiate the concepts of AR versus 'Arms Competition (AC)' in chapter two and will subsequently discuss and assess the constituting criteria in chapter three.

Table of Contents

ASSIGNMENT SUBMISSION DECLARATION

QUESTION

1. Introduction

2. Elucidating the SCS “problematique”
2.1 Diplomacy
2.2 Information
2.3 Economic
2.4 Military & Law Enforcement/Para-Military

3. Assessing the risks for FON

4. Conclusion

REFERENCES

QUESTION

1. Introduction

2. The Arms Dynamics Framework

3. Does the U.S.-Chinese case constitute an AR?

4. Conclusion

REFERENCES

QUESTION

1. Introduction

The growing tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) as a geopolitical “focal point for confrontation” are supported by recently published press/research articles and a qualitative literature review of 343 SCS-related sources since 2009 (Hong Kong, 2021, pp. 5-12, Strating, 2022, Bajaj, 2022, Basu, 2022, O’Rourke, 2022, Hu, 2021, p. 485, Hamzah, 2020, p. 1, Carpio, 2021). In sum, they allow us to identify the main issues in the employment of national power instruments that are at interplay in the SCS power arena among six regional claimant states; namely the “People’s Republic of China” (PRC), “Taiwan”, “Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam” also including non-claimant Indonesia and the U.S. as an external party (Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, p. 45, Hayton, 2022, n.p., Hamzah, 2020).

Therefore, chapter two will apply the DIME-L¹ framework as a conflict-analysis tool (Pavičić et al., 2022, O’Rourke, 2022, Wade, 2020) to cover a 'Tour d’Horizon' of key causes/drivers of the conflict as well as the attempts to deal with them. Chapter three will give an overall assessment of to what extent these power-related issues ('Independent Variables') have an influence on the risk level for 'Freedom of Navigation (FON)' as a component of the maritime security concept ('Dependent Variable') (Jahn, 2022a)?

Finally, chapter four will conclude that:

a) the tensions are primarily caused/driven by legally disputed territorial/overlapping economic claims and the claimant’s undiplomatic negotiation styles (“D”), the assertive Chinese information warfare (“I”), the contested access to stock/flow resources (“E”), Chinese military forward deployment on land claimed islands as well as enforcement operations by coast guard/paramilitary ships (“M-L”),
b) risk for impeded FON rights is high for Non-Chinese vessels in the vicinity of disputed areas containing rich fishing grounds and oil/gas fields. Whereas the risk to ultimately conducting U.S. military exercises/operations for preserving FON provisions of UNCLOS is considerably low, despite being irregularly challenged through close encounters by Chinese navy vessels/aircraft.

2. Elucidating the SCS “problematique”

2.1 Diplomacy

The diplomatic lens covers the legal contestation of the UNCLOS regime and characteristics of the claimant’s negotiation style as main causes/drivers of the tensions (Wade, 2020, p. 1-4).²

China’s “core interest” is to claim territorial “sovereignty” over all maritime “offshore features” (“Spratley”/“Paracel Islands”, “Scarborough Shoal”) within its historical “Nine-Dashed Line” and challenge overlaying “Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” claims of all other parties concerned (Basu, 2022, p. 5, Beckman, 2017, p. 53, O’Rourke, 2022, pp. 7, 19, Figure 1).

Figure 1: Contested Claims in the SCS

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: DG (2022, n.p.), modified from Zhang (2021, n.p.)

This claim entails:

a) the sovereignty rights to control/enforce provisions of “innocent passage” in the “territorial waters” (TWs, 12 nm), “straits”, and “archipelagic sea lanes” incl. requiring “prior permission or notification” (Hu, 2021, p. 488, UNCLOS, 1982, Art 2, 3, Parts II-IV),
b) the sovereign rights over the “exploitation” of the “EEZ” (200 nm) and the right to “take necessary punitive measure to ensure compliance” (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 56, 73, Busa, 2022, p. 9),
c) the “norm contestation” of high sea rights of “other states to conduct military exercises” […] within the EEZ” without prior notification/approval (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 58, Art. 88-115, Strating, 2022, p. 4, Hong, 2017, p. 15, Melchiorre & Plėta, 2018, Galdorisi & Kaufman, 2002).

In 2016 the “Permanent Court of Arbitration” (PCA) ruled against China because approximately 75% of the Spratley Islands’ do not meet “the definition of an island” as a prerequisite to enjoying sovereignty/sovereign rights (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 121, Basu, 2022, p. 6, Beckman, 2017, p. 53, Strating, 2022). Hence, these areas still enjoy the status of the high sea. Based on the ruling, other claimants disputed Chinese claims with “diplomatic notes” (Nguyen, 2020, n.p.). However, China defied the verdict (though legally bound by it) and continues to undertake “coercive steps to augment its claims” (e.g., “gunboat diplomacy”) (see 2.4, Lai, 2017, pp. 332-333, Busa, 2022, p. 6, CSIS, 2020, Strating, 2022).

Concerning negotiation aspects, Beckman (2017, pp. 51-53) identifies “one of the major sources of tension” rooted in geographically “inconsistent” claims not aligned with the requirements of relevant UNCLOS provisions (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 74, 75). Furthermore, due to China’s uncooperative approach of stipulating claims “unilaterally”, the chances of reaching a mutually respectful/considerate agreement remain low. Particularly, given the stalled negotiation works on an, at best, “legally binding” “Code of Conduct” (Nasir et al., 2020, p. 6, Siow, 2022, n.p., Ibarra, 2021, p. 2, Strating, 2022).

2.2 Information

This section considers the Chinese employment of “Public Affairs” (mass media to domestic/foreign people) and “Public Diplomacy” as conflict drivers (government to foreign people) (Wade, 2020, p. 1-4, Aufderheide & Clark, 2008, Krajnc, 2005, n.p.).

These two have to be analyzed regarding China’s “’information warfare’ (IW)”, whose purpose is to serve as an “instrument of deterrence” to curb its rival’s resolve to start any initiatives which are directed against Chinese national interests (Clarke, 2019, p. 208).

Within the public affairs domain, the “Central Foreign Propaganda Office” orchestrates state-controlled campaigns to manipulate “information systems and resources (hardware, software, and wetware)” to “confuse or subvert a society” (Clarke, 2019, pp. 187-189, Lee, 2014, p. 211). Mainly, print/online/research articles and TV documentation are launched covering:

a) “the ‘loss of the SCS during the ‘100 years of humiliation,’”
b) “discrediting ‘international law’ as a tool of […] ‘hegemonic’ powers”,
c) the condemnation of “foreign ships’ military activities” in China’s EEZ (Clarke, 2019, p. 199, Lee, 2014, pp. 198, Macaraig & Fenton, 2021).

Even fake-news tactics were applied by a “state-run” newspaper reporting about a U.S. Navy ship impeding freedoms of Chinese fisher boats (Echols, 2022, n.p.).

Public diplomacy augments the power instrument diplomacy in an indirect approach. Government officials influence the “foreign policy of a target country” by manipulating public/elite opinions first (Krajnc, 2005, n.p.). For instance, since 2019, China employs a “wolf warrior” approach to confront “any external criticism of China on social media” or during “press conferences” with a “hostile”/”insulting” “style of rhetoric”, which also undermines the trust in existing multilateral “confidence-building measures” (Kraska, 2017, p. 269, Yaoyao & Luwei, 2022, pp. 253, 254, 264). Along with this “realist” “’dare-to-fight’ spirit”, a “revisionist” narrative is spread advocating a “narrow” UNCLOS interpretation. It argues for allowing the FON only for “commercial ships” (excluding “military ships”/”aircraft”) and that “customary international law”/“domestic jurisdiction” prevails over UNCLOS (Strating, 2022, p. 6, Clarke, 2019, p. 198, pp. 260, O’Rourke, 2022, pp. 4, 6, Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, p. 48, McLaughlin, 2022).

2.3 Economic

The economic perspective reflects mechanisms to manage “exclusive” vs. “free access to […] resources” as a primary cause (Wade, 2020, p. 1-5, Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, p. 53).

The SCS contains a richness of “stock” (12% of global “fish catch”, “oil”, “gas”, “minerals”, “hydrocarbons”) and “flow” resources (sea lanes carrying 33% of annual sea-based trade and 50% of commercial shipping traffic) to satisfy not only regional and global demands but also enable growth worldwide, in particular for China and the U.S. (Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, pp. 46, 53, Till, 2018, pp. 19, 315, Nasir et al., 2020, p. 2, O’Rourke, 2022, Figure 1, Figure 2). These attributes, in combination with the contested legal status, make the SCS a bone of contention, lacking coherent resource management frameworks recognized by all claimants (Till, 2018).

Figure 2: Oil & Gas Resources in the SCS

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: modified from DW (2017, n.p.)

On the one hand, this is obvious when considering “irresponsible” and environment “threatening” exploitation methods on the ground, especially by approx. 1,6 million “fishing boats” operating in the SCS, leading to a decline by 70% of “catch rates” since 2000 (Till, 2018, p. 311, Harrington, 2022, n.p.). Hence, as of 1999, China did “unilaterally” announce yearly “fishing bans” from Mai till August and enforced them with growing 'Coast Guard (CG)' capabilities (Maulaya, 2022, n.p., Strangio, 2022). Despite these efforts, China leads the “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Index” (IUU FI, 2021).

On the other hand, China pursues a “carrot” approach about bilateral joint explorations of gas/oil (e.g., Brunei), “deals on fishing rights”, in combination with the prospect of “development aid” and investments to integrate partner countries into their “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative (Peng & Ngeow, 2022, Kuo, 2018, n.p., Damayanti, 2016, pp. 2, Jennings, 2017, 2021 n.p., Macaraig & Fenton, 2021). Main condition is that other SCS claimants do not challenge China’s sovereignty/sovereign rights within the 'Nine-Dashed Line'. Suppose the candidate chooses to defy Chinese interests, then this can stop negotiations (e.g., Philippines) or even lead to the utilization of the “stick” method to deter claimants like Vietnam to refrain from unilateral exploration efforts with “the strongest armed forces” in the region (Nikkei Asia, 2022, Kuo, 2018, n.p., Jennings, 2021, n.p.). If the Indonesian “minilateralism” counter initiative could tame China’s approach has still to be proven (Sang, 2022, n.p.).

2.4 Military & Law Enforcement/Para-Military

Within this dual power instrument lens, military forward deployments (incl. “land reclamation”), “paramilitary, and “law enforcement” operations are discussed as “critical” drivers (Wade, 2020, p. 1-4, O’Rourke, 2022, p. 28, Zhang, 2022, p. 3, Strating, 2022, p. 9).

The building of “artificial structures” on occupied features is practiced by most SCS claimants like China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Zhang, 2022, Zhang, 2021, Yan, 2021, Rapp-Hooper. 2015). These projects serve an interwoven double purpose of supporting national economic development, and military protection of territorial (EEZ) claims (ibid.). Since 2014, the Chinese effort has stood for a hegemonic showcase. Though it “logistically facilitates China’s oil exploration” and its “deep-sea fishing fleet”, it is mainly associated with the military protection and power projection rationale of “naval and air deterrence” (Zhang, 2022, pp. 13-14, 25-26, Till, 2018, Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, Figure 3).

Figure 3: China’s Artificial Island Building

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: modified from O’Rourke (2022, p. 12)

In particular, there are concerns about the development of “anti access/area denial” capabilities suited for building up dominance over U.S. forces within the perimeter of the “first island chain” (Strating, 2022, p. 2, Macaraig & Fenton, 2021, Figure 4).

Figure 4: Chinese Naval Power Spheres

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: RANE (2018, n.p.)

In response, SCS claimants are power balancing “against unpredictable Chinese strategic behaviour” by engaging in a multilateral arms competition with China and “soliciting intervention from non-resident powers in the region” (Lai, 2017, p. 321, Jahn, 2022b). Since 2015 the U.S. Navy has engaged in FON Operations inside the 12 nm zone of “Chinese-claimed” features to “reinforce internationally-recognized rights and freedoms” and contribute to “norm preservation through ‘routinisation’” (Freund, 2017, pp. 19, 26, Strating, 2022, pp. 14-15). In turn, China responds with intimidating military close encounter maneuvers risking maritime safety and security (Jahn, 2022a, Pickrell, 2020).

Lastly, China is enforcing its claims and undermining the UNCLOS regime by employing “grey zone” tactics through its paramilitary “armed fishing vessels” and domestic law enforcement assets harassing/chasing foreign fishing, CG/oil/gas/drill/research vessels. However, other claimant states reciprocate these tactics on a lower level (McLaughlin, 2022, p. 1, Chew, 2021, Sang, 2022, n.p., CSIS, 2020, n.p., TST, 2022).

3. Assessing the risks for FON

The assessment rests on the UNCLOS interpretation that all merchant/military ships principally enjoy FON “beyond” TWs of coastal states (majority position) (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 4, Hu, 2021, O’Rourke, 2022). The maritime security related questions focus on to what extent the “deliberate” DIME-L employment leaves a “potential for unwanted events” (Edgerton, 2021, p. 636, Eski, 2021, p. 650) which harmfully impact ships and their rights:

a) to exploit stock/flow resources within the contested TW/EEZ claims,
b) to conduct military exercises in the by China unlawfully claimed TW/EEZ?

About “a)”, the analysis showed that “M-L” power instruments already curbed FON for all kinds of the claimant’s vessels (especially Non-Chinese) in the vicinity of rich fishing grounds and oil/gas fields of the disputed areas. Yet, it seems that an exemption exists for passenger/merchant ships that only perform world trade related transits through the SCS and therefore act in the interests of all claimants.

The further increase of the risks for these present FON threats depends on the future conflict resolution strategy between the parties concerned regarding the “D”/”I”/”E” power lenses. On the one hand, a cooperative “compliance” strategy (Schaub, 2004, p. 389) towards China would lead to a significantly lower physical risk level for ships/crews and even an increase of the FON in terms of the opportunity to jointly exploit fish/gas/oil, though on the sole terms of China (e.g., Brunei, Putra, 2021). On the other hand, a continuation of the confrontational “defiance” strategy (ibid.) would potentially prolong the already high risk level.

Moreover, though the Chinese “D”/”I”/”E” power instruments are principally suited to undermine the UNCLOS regime and FON provisions by also gaining support from equally revisionist-minded states for the “Mare Clausum” doctrine (Hong, 2017, p. 1), this will not have a decisive effect on defending the majority situation in the foreseeable future.

Addressing b), there are no indications whatsoever that the U.S. Navy would consider any time soon to refrain from conducting exercises or FON Operations due to several close encounter incidents with Chinese Navy vessels/aircraft in the past; of course, well aware that these “could escalate into a crisis” (O’Rourke, 2022, p. 45). Hence, the risk level is negligible, though FON on the ground may be occasionally impeded by the need for evasive maneuvers!

[...]

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¹ “Acronym for Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic” enhanced by “Law Enforcement”/”Para-Military” (Pavičić et al., 2022, p. 225, O’Rourke, 2022, p. 8).

² Lai (2017, p. 321)

• College: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University (SAF-NTU Academy)
• Course: Maritime Security Studies
• Grade: A
• Author: Dr. phil. Mathias Jahn (Author)
• Publication Year: 2022
• Pages: 31
• Catalog Number: V1291685
• ISBN (PDF): 9783346755117
• Language: English
• Tags: South China Sea, Arms Race, Arms Competition, Arms Dynamics, DIME