The Conflict in Mali. Causes and Approaches to the Crisis

Seminar Paper , 2021 , 13 Pages , Grade: A

Politics - Region: Africa

Despite massive international engagement by the EU, USA, and various other actors, the conflicts in the Sahel region of Africa do not seem to boil down in the near future. This paper explores the root causes of the conflict, shedding light on the historical background of the Tuareg rebellions and the marginalization of the north of Mali. It proceeds to the current stage of the conflict while examining some drivers of instability. The main focus of this work is on the failed solutions the Malian government has introduced to control the conflict, most of them falling prey to internal corruption, militarization, and power disputes. It is argued that any long-term solution needs to take institutional aspects and the neglect of the north of Mali into account, including negotiations with the most important stakeholders.

I. Introduction

The west-African state of Mali, with a population of about 20 million, has experienced a series of rebellions and unrests since its independence from France in 1960, leading to a situation most observers would label a security crisis. This insecurity continues to the present day; in May 2021, interim President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar were detained in a coup carried out by the Malian military.¹ In spite of several counterterrorism forces and internationally backed operations that are active in Mali, the conflict lingers on, and the instability in Mali poses serious security concerns for the broader region.

Given the bleak outlook for any alleviation of the conflict, this paper asks the questions of what historical developments have led to the current insecurity in Mali; what contributes to the ongoing crisis; and why several approaches undertaken by the state were not able to rectify the instability in (northern) Mali. Weak state capacity in the north, the lack of economic prospect for young people bundled with the attractive offers by armed groups to join their ranks, distrust between the northern (and central) population and the state, and atrocities committed by Malian security forces are crucial catalysts for the current crisis. Following an institutionalist approach, I argue that the Malian state, and international powers active in Mali, should channel more recourses and effort in development initiatives that strengthen civil institutions and infrastructure in northern Mali, increase transparency and state-accountability, and provide economic development and opportunities. Solely military-based solutions, the main remedy utilized by the Malian government to deal with the uprisings and insecurity since independence, often ignore the nuances of the conflict and multiple facets of the conflict; therefore, they are not suitable in themselves to establish long-term peace.

This paper mainly focuses on the northern regions of Mali (Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal), where only around 10 percent of the population lives.² The first chapter outlines the relevant historical developments in Mali since its independence in 1960, precisely the four Tuareg rebellions. Chapter two lays out certain causes and facilitators of the conflict, namely low state capacity in the north, a lack of economic opportunity, and distrust between the population and the state. The final chapter dives into two selected approaches by the Malian government to the conflict - the development initiative PSPSDN and administrative decentralization - examining why they have failed to improve the situation.

II. Historical Background: The Tuareg Rebellions and the Marginalization of the North

In order to understand the current conflict and insecurity in Mali, it is necessary to dive into the history of the former French colony. This chapter provides an overview of the four Tuareg rebellions that occurred since Mali's independence in 1960, laying the foundation for a deeper analysis of the causes of the present security crisis.

The history of Mali since independence, and under French colonial rule, has been shaped by the constant marginalization of the northern regions.³ The political elites in the south have repeatedly ignored the north's aspirations for economic development and political representation, and at times even exploited the community divisions to strengthen their power.⁴ The post-independence state's authority was highly centralized as exemplified in Mali's first constitution, which was inspired by France's 1958 constitution, perpetuating the secular, authoritarian, and sometimes brutal style of governance under French colonialism.⁵

Following years of neglect and insufficient political representation by the south, the first Tuareg rebellion broke out in 1963. The Tuareg are a nomadic group that is dispersed along the borders of several northern and western African countries. They make up around 10 percent of Mali's population.⁶ Instead of addressing the root causes of the rebellion, like political recognition, the Malian authorities chose to militarily quash the uprising, a recurring theme in Bamako's dealing with political unrest.⁷

A second wave of uprisings erupted in 1990, lasting until 1996, with Tuareg and Arab exiles as the main participants, demanding better living conditions and the recognition of a northern political identity.⁸ Once again the Malian government, this time under General Moussa Traoré, trampled on the needs of the rebellion, contributing to its radicalization. Both peace agreements that were signed to end the unrest - the Tamanrasset peace agreement and the Pact National, entailing principles such as greater territorial political autonomy for the north, and the integration of a number of Tuareg fighters in the Malian army - fell short of their expectations and could not resolve the political unrest.⁹ The second rebellion also happened during a time where the Malian state introduced reforms to decentralize authority in the northern regions. Although a seemingly well-suited policy to reduce the spatial distance between the people and the government, it could not bring an end to the political and economic grievances of the northern populations. The reasons for that will be discussed below in the chapter on decentralization.

After a period of relative calm, a third rebellion was launched in 2006, leading to the Algiers Peace Agreement. However, it was not accepted by several political parties and Tuareg leaders.¹⁰ This situation is quintessential for the various peace agreements that have been signed between the Malian government and the rebel groups. The lack of representation of northern Mali's diverse population in the negotiation processes was one reason why the various peace accords never fully succeeded.¹¹

Failed attempts to soothe the tensions between the central state and the northern populations precipitated a fourth Tuareg rebellion in January 2012, leading to a military coup against president Amadou Toumani Touré.¹² Following the coup, the state lost vast territory to the Tuareg separatists, and militant Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).¹³ The international community (under the UN mission MINUSMA), and France in particular, intervened militarily to bring the offense by the militias to a halt.¹⁴

Since all of these efforts did not put an end to the boiling conflict, the following chapter will dive deeper into some specific causes of the current insecurity in Mali.

III. Weak Institutions and the Security Crisis in Northern Mali

With the history of the Tuareg rebellions and the persistent marginalization of the northern regions in mind, this chapter will focus on how low state capacity, little economic prospect, and distrust between the population and the state exacerbate the crisis.

The conflict in Mali follows the recent trend in political unrest in Africa, fought on the periphery of the state (the north) with militarily relatively weak and factionalized insurgents.¹⁵ Mali has been labeled by Jeffrey Herbst as a "hinterland country,"¹⁶ with a vast hinterland where only few people live. He argues that it is almost impossible for a central government to establish effective control over the enormous hinterland. Indeed, the northern regions make up two-thirds of Mali's territory and are only sparsely populated as 90 percent of the population lives in the south.¹⁷

Due to the lack of formal security actors, people often turn to armed militias for protection. Malian soldiers, mostly poorly equipped, badly trained, and irregularly paid, have always resented fighting in the north, far away from their homes.¹⁸ In their study on the relationship between the people and the state in central Mali, SIPRI found out that populations in central Mali perceive non-state security actors, for instance armed groups, as more effective than state ones.¹⁹ They are often closer to a specific community, contributing to trust-building, while national security forces are deemed external to the local contexts.²⁰ This lack of legitimacy also extends to other parts of the state, such as its legal institutions.²¹

Armed groups in Mali's remote regions not only provide some form of security but also offer a prospect of social mobility for young people. SIPRI found out that people in central Mali are mostly dissatisfied with the provision of social services by the state.²² They lament a lack of and poor accessibility to many essential public services in their regions, such as police and military, and roads. There has also been little progress in the economic sense for rural populations in northern Mali, where poverty poses a major problem. The lack of opportunity for young people likely contributes to their recruitment by armed militias.²³ Additionally, drug trafficking has provided social mobility for many disillusioned young people.²⁴ For numerous marginalized people joining the ranks of Islamist movements like MUJAO, the attractive salaries they pay - MUJAO pays its members salaries ranging from 100, sometimes up to 400 dollars per month - are the main reason they decide to follow their lead.²⁵ Armed groups in northern Mali are not some alien force that has descended upon the area; they are relatively well integrated in local communities and politics.²⁶

[...]

---

¹ Global Conflict Tracker, “Destabilization of Mali,”, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict- tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali (accessed November 11, 2021).

² Stéphanie Pézard and Michael R. Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 32.

³ Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, “The Roots of Mali's Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis,” (Clingendael, March 2015), 17.

⁴ Ibid., 30.

⁵ Bruce Whitehouse, “Mali: Collapse and Instability,” in The Oxford handbook of the African Sahel, ed. Leonardo A. Villalon, 127-45, Oxford handbooks series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 129.

⁶ Lawrence E. Cline, “Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 617.

⁷ Morten B0âs and Liv E. Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 7 (2013): 1282.

⁸ Chauzal and Damme, “The roots of Mali's conflict,”, 31.

⁹ Ibid., 32.

¹⁰ Pézard and Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, 41.

¹¹ Ibid., 48.

¹² Chauzal and Damme, “The roots of Mali's conflict,”, 10.

¹³ Susanna D. Wind, “Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict,” (United States Institute of Peace, May 2013), 2.

¹⁴ Vanessa Gauthier Vela, “MINUSMA and the Militarization of UN Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping 28, no. 5 (2021): 847.

¹⁵ S. Straus, “Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012): 181.

¹⁶ Jeffrey I. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 152-53.

¹⁷ Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali,” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 252.

¹⁸ Chauzal and Damme, “The roots of Mali's conflict,”, 12.

¹⁹ Mamadou Bodian and Aurélien Tobie and Myriam Marending, “The Challenges of Governance, Development and Security in the Central Regions of Mali,” (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, March 2020), 15.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Robert Pringle, Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work (United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 24.

²² Mamadou Bodian and Aurélien Tobie and Myriam Marending, “The Challenges of Governance, Development and Security in the Central Regions of Mali,”, 5.

²³ Gerti Hesseling and Dijk van Han, “Administrative Decentralization and Political Conflict in Mali,” in Is Violence Inevitable in Africa?, ed. Patrick Chabal, Ulf Engel and Anna-Maria Gentili, 171-92 (Boston: Brill, 2005), 177-78.

²⁴ Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali,”: 257.

²⁵ Ibid., 263.

²⁶ B0âs and Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali—corruption, collusion, resistance,”: 1290.

• Course: Contemporary African Politics
• Grade: A
• Author: Philipp Striegl (Author)
• Publication Year: 2021
• Pages: 13
• Catalog Number: V1274822
• ISBN (PDF): 9783346724496
• ISBN (Book): 9783346724502
• Language: English
• Tags: Africa, Mali, Conflict, Institutions