Self-Interest and Reciprocity. What Drives Human Behaviour?

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

List of Tables and Figures

1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement and Objective
1.2 Course of the Investigation

2 Theoretical Foundations
2.1 The Concept of Self-Interest
2.1.1 Origins
2.1.2 Critique
2.1.3 Self-Interest Revisited
2.2 The Concept of Reciprocity
2.2.1 Direct Reciprocity
2.2.2 Indirect Reciprocity
2.3 Homo Economicus versus Homo Reciprocans
2.4 Discussion

3 Allocation Decisions in a Present Context
3.1 Game Theory
3.2 Games
3.2.1 Dictator Game
3.2.2 Ultimatum Game
3.2.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
3.2.4 Helping Game
3.3 Limitations
3.4 Summary

4 Intergenerational Allocation Decisions
4.1 Distinctiveness of the Intergenerational Context
4.2 Association of Experimental Results with the Intergenerational Context
4.3 Intergenerational Discounting and Fairness Judgment

5 Suggestions for Solutions
5.1 Intergenerational Reciprocity
5.2 Legacy
5.3 Affinity and Intergenerational Identity
5.4 Moral Obligation
5.5 Reputation in the Present Generation
5.6 General Reflection

6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary and Discussion
6.2 Practical Implications
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

List of References

List of Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Underlying Motives of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity

Table 2: Decision Alternatives in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Table 3: Conditions Inducing Cooperation in Selected Experimental Games

Figure 1: Framework of Generativity

1 Introduction

The increase of the official retirement age to 67 years is currently causing a controversial public debate in Germany (“Ideologie statt Vernunft,” 2010). This plan has been initiated and enforced by politicians who are members of the federal government. Clearly, none of these politicians would have been personally affected by skyrocketing pension contribution rates – in contrast to a large number of people belonging to future generations. Nonetheless, they have opted to impose a fiercely discussed amendment, exposing themselves to harsh words of critique. When asking the questing why these actors have made this decision, that is a thorn in the flesh of a large share of the population, the answer will probably be somewhere along the lines of “Because it is the responsibility of politicians to act on behalf of future generations.” Would these actors still be in favor of this decision if they were not occupying a public role that demanded them to make responsible decision with regards to future generations? In other words – why do humans make (in)considerate decisions towards future generations, and what are the underlying drivers of human behavior in a context in which they deliberately decide about the fate of those people who will live on this planet after themselves?

1.1 Problem Statement and Objective

The aim of this work is to contribute to a better understanding of human behavior in the context of intergenerational allocation decisions. Besides the context of imposing financial burdens on future generations as mentioned in the introductory passage, many global challenges we are facing today are related to the depletion of non-renewable or only slowly renewable resources, such as fossil fuels, drinking water, or fishing grounds. The underlying issue is similar in all cases: Human beings today use natural resources in an exploitive way, so that future generations will only either have very limited or no access at all to certain resources. Furthermore, they will also be confronted with severe negative consequences resulting from today’s resource exploitation, e.g. climate change. The motive for human beings today to exploit resources is generally understood to be the desire to achieve short-term benefits which maximize their current well-being. In many cases, today’s benefits come at the cost of the next generation, creating a scenario referred to as intergenerational conflict. The greatest problem in this context arises from the fact that future generations cannot be present in today’s negotiations. As they cannot defend their interests, they are left to accept and handle the consequences that arise from decisions which have been made by another generation. The current significance of this topic is reflected by increasing public concern on global environmental developments and political attention, particularly in the context of global politics.

The environmental context also maintains a direct relationship to organizations, particularly manufacturing businesses which use (finite) natural resources at the basis of their production. The research field of sustainability with regards to business intends to analyze the nature of the relationship between organizations and their environments as much as to deduce recommendations for actions (e.g. Shrivastava, 1995). A broadly accepted definition of the concept of sustainability has been provided by the United Nations in their report from 1987, Our Common Future. According to this definition, sustainable development comprises a "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 54). For a long time, scholars have been arguing that, in order to ensure continuous profits for an organization in the long-term, it needs to exploit resources in a considerate and restricted manner (e.g. Starik & Rands, 1995; Wade-Benzoni, 1999). Thus, when examining an organization’s (lack of) environmental commitment from an intergenerational perspective, economic and environmental interests will converge. Nonetheless, decision makers often show a tendency to choose the perspective of their own, limited, tenure in an organization in order to determine what is in the best interest of the organization, instead of taking a long-term perspective (Wade-Benzoni, 1999). By pursuing the research question what drives human behavior in intergenerational allocation decisions , this paper attempts to reveal further insights into motives and intentions that underlie decisions in an intergenerational context. In doing so, the discussion of psychological themes that may encourage present actors to make decisions which are considerate of the interest of future generations represents an important contribution of this work. The illustration of potential incentives for considerate decisions in intergenerational contexts allows inferring practical implications for organizations.

In the context of this paper, human behavior will be primarily analyzed through the lens of the two concepts self-interest and reciprocity. Self-interest is understood as the pursuit of actions that are credibly expected to serve a person’s material and non-material interests (cf. Maitland, 2002). Reciprocity describes a behavioral pattern of conditional actions that aim to reward kind and punish unkind actions of others (Fehr & Gächter, 1998). Whereas direct reciprocity can be applied in repeated interactions between a fixed set of partners, indirect reciprocity represents a unique specification in the context of continuously changing partners in exchange situations (Seinen & Schram, 2006).

This paper does not claim that self-interest and reciprocity can exclusively explain human behavior, and does not intend to challenge the assumption that human behavior in general may be driven by a large body of context-dependent motives, that may exceed the scope of rational explanations (e.g. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rocha & Ghoschal, 2006). However, in the economic context of human behavior in resource allocation decisions, self-interest and reciprocity represent dominant behavioral drivers (Diekmann, 2009). In the context of intergenerational decision-making, self-interest and reciprocity have thitherto occupied critical roles in the field of intergenerational research with regards to explaining a present-actor’s behavior towards a future generation. It is generally argued that making a decision on behalf of a future generation is at odds with the pursuit of one’s self-interest, as the consideration of future generations’ interests is associated with incurring costs or foregoing benefits in the present (Wade-Benzoni, 2002). Furthermore, the concept of intergenerational reciprocity has been introduced to the intergenerational context as a decision principle in intergenerational allocation situations (Wade-Benzoni, 2002). Intergenerational reciprocity is defined as “reciprocating the behavior of previous generations forward to future others” (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009, p. 174). The authors claim that it holds strong explanatory power for intergenerational decision-making and represents a dominant behavioral motive.

This paper intends to add to the field of ongoing research seeking to explain drivers underlying human behavior in intergenerational decision situations. Part of its unique contribution can be seen in the fact that it challenges a currently dominant assumption in the research field, namely that “intergenerational beneficence” describes “the extent to which members of present generations are willing to sacrifice their own self-interest [italics added] for the benefit of future others in the absence of economic or material incentives to present actors for doing so” (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009, p. 166). A detailed discussion of the concept of self-interest and the differentiation between two forms of its manifestation, narrow- and enlightened self-interest, build the foundation for this argument. An important consequence of the claim that intergenerational considerations are not irreconcilable with an individual’s pursuit of his/her self-interest is that it opens the door to a new field of motives for intergenerational beneficence.

1.2 Course of the Investigation

The findings of this thesis are the outcome of a comprehensive literature review on theories and laboratory experiments of human behavior in allocation decisions, with a particular focus on allocation decisions between present and future generations. After a detailed presentation of the two behavioral drivers self-interest and reciprocity, a discussion investigates whether these two concepts are accordable with one another in chapter 2. The objective in chapter 3 is to portray human behavior in allocation decision that relate to the present context. After a brief introduction into the field of game theory, four experimental allocation games are introduced. Specific conditions which have experimentally shown to foster cooperation are inferred. In chapter 4, the intergenerational context and its distinctive features temporal- and interpersonal distance is introduced. It will be tested whether the necessary conditions for cooperation deduced in chapter 3 can also apply in the intergenerational context. Furthermore, three psychological barriers to objective intergenerational resource allocations are presented. Chapter 5 explores five psychological themes that may encourage intergenerational beneficence as they represent incentives for considerate intergenerational allocation decisions. The chapter ends with a reflection on the role of self-interest in the context of intergenerational decision-making. After the findings of this paper are summarized, practical and theoretical implications as well as research limitations will be discussed.

2 Theoretical Foundations

This chapter presents the concepts of self-interest and reciprocity in detail, and thereby builds the foundation to the following analysis. After presenting both concepts individually, I will analyze whether these concepts are truly distinct from one another and discuss in how far they overlap.

2.1 The Concept of Self-Interest

2.1.1 Origins

Self-interest has traditionally been the foundation of economic principles (e.g. Diekmann, 2009; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2001). Adam Smith is often referred to as the ‘founding father’ of modern economics (cf. Rae, 1895; Hoaas & Madigan, 1999; Pressman, 1999) who states in The Wealth of Nations (WON) from 1776 that individuals should pursue their self-interest, particularly with regards to business they engage in. He clearly illustrates his reasoning in the famous quote arguing that

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address our selves, not to their humanity but to their own interest.” (p. 17).

He further argues that, if everyone acts in accordance with his/her self-interest, an invisible hand will lead the overall market outcome to be positive for society at large. The underlying reasoning is that if producers and suppliers are looking to maximize their self-interest and sell their goods, they need to produce those goods that consumers desire most, for a price that these are willing to pay. The principle of competition will ensure that only those producers that can satisfy consumers’ needs at the best price-performance ratio will be the ones that will remain in the market in the long-term.

According to Persky (1995), John Stuart Mill can be ascribed to have developed the Homo economicus in the late nineteenth century, although the exact wording only developed throughout further discussions of his work. Homo economicus is the theoretical model of an economic decision maker. It is characterized by three features: the striving to maximize personal utility, i.e. the pursuit of one’s self-interest, complete rationality, and consistent preferences over time (Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, 2010). Besides Mill, David Hume (1742/1987) represents another early supporter of the moral concept of self-interest and stated two-and-a-half centuries ago, that “every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all of his actions, than his private interest” (p. 13). A more recent advocate of the principle is Milton Friedman (1970), who triggered much controversy with his statement that “the social responsibility of the firm is to increase its profits” (p. 32). The underlying assumption of Friedman’s argumentation is that the pursuit of profit is beneficial to society, as argued by Smith before. From a broader perspective, an individual’s consequent pursuit of his or her self-interest has been the key assumption in economic theory, as reflected particularly in game theory and principal agent theory.

2.1.2 Critique

Self-interest has been criticized many times and throughout many disciplines. Moralists in particular have a rather low opinion of the concept. The strongest prevailing arguments include that, following the Hobbesian world view, the pursuit of self-interest will lead a society to decay and foster aggression and greed (Hausken, 1996). In particular, a common point of critique is that the focus on oneself would crowd out concerns for others who may be (negatively) affected by one’s self-interested actions (Schmidtz, 1997). The concern for others is generally seen as virtuous, with self-interest representing its vicious and non-moral opposite (Maitland, 2002). Public choice literature depicts a similar image of the concept of self-interest, arguing that individuals will engage in rent-seeking activities to enhance their private wealth and thereby impoverish the rest of society (Paganelli, 2008). Pursuit of self-interest is often equated with the sole pursuit of wealth and monetary rewards (Maitland, 2002). It is then argued that self-interest must be constraint in order not to foster a society in which individuals strive to accumulate wealth by all means, including the potential harm of others and the environment. A further train of criticism is targeted directly at the characteristics of Homo economicus, which is often referred to with a negative connotation, such as “an approach that simply assumes a crude egoistic actor” (Wilson & Dixon, 2008, p. 66).

Furthermore, the validity of the concept of self-interest is rejected by some critics who argue that it does not hold true as the dominant motive that guides human behavior in reality. An important field of research in this context is the field of reciprocity, which will be further discussed in section 2.2. Reciprocal forms of behavior have been consistently observed in experimental studies, and it is argued that this concept is inconsolable with the concept of self-interest (e.g. Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Besides, Rocha and Ghoshal (2006) object to the concept’s exclusivity. Their critique comprises three successive arguments. Firstly, besides self-interest, other motivators including duty and sentimental love are argued to have a noteworthy effect on human behavior. Secondly, the resulting inner conflict between different motives will lead to non-stable preferences. Thirdly, individuals strive to balance multiple motives instead of focusing on maximizing their interests.

2.1.3 Self-Interest Revisited

Among those scholars who believe that self-interest is the underlying model that truly predicts human behavior, there are many who have responded to the critique outlined in the previous paragraph (e.g. Schmidtz, 1997; Harvey & Rassekh, 2000; Maitland, 2002). The majority of their works argue that the criticism is either not justified or not appropriate because it is based on false assumptions or a misunderstanding of the original concepts (e.g. Maitland, 2002, Harvey & Rassekh, 2000).

In this regard, Smith receives a significant amount of scholarly attention. The Adam Smith problem describes the perceived inconsistency of the description of self-interest in Smith’s works WON and A Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) (Paganelli, 2008; Suttle, 1987). In the context of self-interest, WON is traditionally considered to be the more important work (Paganelli, 2008). However, some scholars argue that TMS needs to be considered for a truthful and encompassing understanding of Smith’s conception of self-interest as it presents the concept in a different light (Paganelli, 2008; James & Rassekh, 2000; Hausken, 1996). In the opening passage of TMS, Smith (1759/1984) writes: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, even though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” (p. 1). He furthermore argues that, besides a striving to satisfy one’s self-interest, human beings maintain the capacity to constrain their passions when it would harm others. Furthermore, Smith differentiates between self-interest and selfishness. The former includes a notion of other-regard which commands individuals to moderate their actions if others are negatively affected (James & Rassekh, 2000; Hausken, 1996). Besides Smith, also Hume (1740/1978) provides a manifold description of the concept. He fully believes that self-interest is the strongest individual motivator for human behavior, yet he moderates this belief by mentioning that “all the kind of affections, taken together do not over-balance all the selfish” (p. 487). This quote represents a good example for the fact that even the early advocates of the concept accounted for the existence of multiple motives, and their discovery and empirical support should thus not be seen as a groundbreaking victory for its critics today.

The critical nuances within the model of self-interest have been encapsulated in the terms narrow- and enlightened self-interest (Rocha & Goshal, 2006). Narrow self-interest has a similar meaning as selfishness and rules out the consideration of interests of others (Mansbridge, 1990). Enlightened self-interest describes a broader view on self-interest, that incorporates the consideration of others’ interests which can be regarded as means to achieve personal benefits in the long-run (Rocha & Goshal, 2006). The benefit received from cooperating with others is also reflected in Maitland’s (2002) statement that “It is in a person`s self-interest to moderate her self-interest” (p. 3).

In defense of Homo economicus, scholars put forward that first and foremost, the economic man serves as a simplified, theoretical model and is not to be taken too literally (Maitland, 2002; Perskey, 1995). Maitland (2002) furthermore urges his readers to keep in mind that abstract models and empirical research results need not be confounded, and that “empirical self-interest is much more benign than abstract self-interest” (p. 4).

2.2 The Concept of Reciprocity

2.2.1 Direct Reciprocity

Reciprocity illustrates the principle of give-and-take, reflected in such sayings as ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’, ‘a Roland for an Oliver’, or ‘an eye for an eye’. These proverbs indicate that reciprocal actions can be triggered through both friendly and hostile actions, causing individuals to engage in either positive or negative reciprocity. Reciprocity has been recognized as a pattern underlying human interaction for ages; “it is older than markets and trade” (Nowak & Sigmund, 2000, p. 13). Charles Darwin is known to be amongst the early supporters when in 1871, he accounts humans to dispose of “social instincts” that lead them to “give and receive help” from others (p.103). Gouldner (1960) describes reciprocity as a strong social norm. He explains its functioning through the “shadow of indebtedness” (p. 174), which he considers an intrinsically rooted obligation to return favors. His theory has been famously supported by Regan’s (1971) psychological experiment, which is set up in the following way: Two research participants are sitting in a waiting room. One of them, actually an instructor in disguise, offers the participant a bottle of coke. Afterwards, he asks the participant whether (s)he would like to buy some raffle tickets from him. In comparison to the control group in which no coke is offered, participants buy about twice as many raffle tickets. It is concluded that they feel obligated to return the favor of receiving a free coke.

There are two basic viewpoints on reciprocity: one defines it as a social norm which triggers a pattern of conditional behavior, rewarding kind behavior of others while punishing unkind behavior (e.g. Gouldner, 1960; Diekmann, 2004). The second definition regards the ends rather than the means of reciprocity and concludes that reciprocal behavior, particularly its positive side, is guided by the intention to receive benefits as reward for a good deed done to someone else (e.g. Tullberg, 2004). The second form is often referred to as strategic reciprocity or reciprocal altruism and was introduced by Robert Trivers in 1971. Its basic assumption is that a ‘donor’ may help a ‘recipient’ only if the recipient is likely to subsequently return the favor (Trivers, 1971; Nowak & Sigmund, 2000). According to Falk and Fischbacher (2006), the distinct feature of reciprocal altruism is the willingness to reciprocate actions only if future rewards can be expected to arise. I will discuss in the next section whether these two forms of reciprocity can truly be distinguished.

The majority of empirical studies assume that both positive and negative reciprocity can be measured in one single parameter (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004). However, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) show that, based on a large survey they conducted amongst German citizens, positive and negative reciprocity can clearly be differentiated as two individual traits which are only weakly correlated. They suggest that in order to achieve more accurate results, two separate parameters should be used. To this date, their advice does not seem to have been adhered to yet. The validity of this claim should be explored in future studies.

2.2.2 Indirect Reciprocity

In contrast to direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity can be observed in contexts where individuals cannot interact repeatedly with a fixed ‘partner’. In this case, the individual whose action is reciprocated will not be the recipient of the according reward or punishment (Alexander, 1987). Empirical studies regarding indirect reciprocity remain small in number compared to the amount of literature that investigates the concept of direct reciprocity. However, the results of these studies are congruent: indirect reciprocity has been repeatedly observed across different set-ups (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Greiner & Levati, 2005; Seinen & Schram, 2006; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Stanca, 2009). However, it has also been suggested that the application of indirect reciprocity is limited to small and mid-sized groups (Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Greiner & Levati, 2005).

Similar to the concept of direct reciprocity, scholars also differentiate between two models of indirect reciprocity. The first one reads A helps B if B helps C, the second one A helps B only if A receives help from D. In other words, model one states that one’s decision to be (un)kind to others is based on whether those others have been (un)kind to a third-party before. The second model suggests that individuals base this decision on whether they themselves have been treated (un)kindly by third parties before (Greiner & Levati, 2005). In alignment with Stanca’s (2009) definitions, I will refer to the first model as generalized indirect reciprocity and to the second model as social indirect reciprocity. With regards to the two models of direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity resembles the social norm that leads people to reward kind actions observed in others, while social indirect reciprocity implies a strategic motivation that focuses on one’s own personal gain (see Table 1).

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Table 1: Underlying Motivation of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity

The majority of empirical studies regarding indirect reciprocity have focused on generalized indirect reciprocity (e.g. Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Seinen & Schram, 2004; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 2000). In order to enable an individual to apply generalized indirect reciprocity and to appropriately punish or reward a partner, (s)he needs to have access to information about this person’s previous behavior towards others. To account for this prerequisite, individuals are assigned a so-called social image factor in experiments. This factor increases every time the individual helps somebody and it is ensured that other actors have full information about its value before they choose (not) to help someone (Novak & Sigmund, 2000; see Engelmann & Fischbacher (2009) for an exception). By helping others, a person increases his/her image factor which thereby increases the chances to receive help from others. This correlation however makes it difficult to differentiate between generalized indirect reciprocity and social indirect reciprocity as underlying motivators for cooperation. A player who helps another player may do so in response to the other player’s image score and thereby reciprocate previous actions, or a player may only help others in order to increase his or her own image score. In both cases, outcomes in from of perceived helping rates are identical.

Unfortunately, this problem has thitherto received hardly any scholarly attention. According to their own claim, Engelmann & Fischbacher (2009) have been the first researchers who have attempted to separate the two motives in an experiment. They incorporated both public and private image scores into their approach and assigned participants to both conditions successively. They conclude that “pure” (p. 407), i.e. generalized indirect reciprocity exists, as the average helping rate of donors with non-public scores amounted to 30%. They also found that 80% of players responded to strategic incentives and thus applied social indirect reciprocity, as they helped others more often when their own image score was public instead of private. Among these, 25% never helped when assigned a non-public score and it can be concluded that these players exclusively engage in social indirect reciprocity.

2.3 Homo Economicus versus Homo Reciprocans

The reciprocal behavior that human beings apply seems to be inconsistent with the characteristics of the concept of Homo economicus. The most prominent findings include that in the context of bargaining games, individuals are willing to forego benefits in order to punish others for unfair behavior (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer & Thaler, 1995), and in gift-exchange games, individuals make voluntary transfers to others although their partners are not (formally) obligated to pay for the transfer by transferring back (different) resources (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993; Fehr & Gächter, 1998). Referring to the model of Homo economicus, scholars argue that “selfishness dictates that nobody makes a transfer” (Fehr & Gächter, 1998, p. 846), and it follows that, given the fact that individuals transfer resources nonetheless, it cannot be self-interest that motivates them.

Since its invention and incorporation in economic theory, the concept of Homo economicus has been criticized in works such as Beyond Economic Man (Leibenstein, 1976). In response to an increasing amount of both empirical and theoretical proof for reciprocity as a major driver of human behavior, a model called Homo reciprocans has been recently developed and represents a suggestion for an alternative model (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Wilson & Dixon, 2008; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). Instead of self-interest, Homo reciprocans’ behavior is guided by reciprocity, in other words, he is the personification of the social norm of reciprocity

Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) claim that “Homo economicus would never engage in reciprocal behavior, where it does not advance material self-interest” (p. 592). While I agree with the authors, I believe that the case they describe is not at frequent one. In reference to recent research advancements, I want to show in the following discussion that engaging in reciprocal behavior will generally advance (even material) self-interest in the long-term.

2.4 Discussion

As outlined on the previous section, advances in the field of reciprocity are generally presented as challenges to the assumption that self-interest is the dominant human motivator. I argue that this perspective is neither consistent with the rationale of behavioral models of reciprocity, nor with current research findings. Hence, I will show that the concept of self-interest is not irreconcilable with the concept of reciprocity.

As outlined before, both direct and indirect reciprocity have been linked to two different motivational sources, one describing reciprocal behavior as adherence to a social norm, the other describing reciprocity as a strategic action that has the maximization of personal utility as its end (see Table 1). In the following, I will refer to the first model as ‘norm model’ and the second one as ‘strategic model’. For the strategic model, the bridge to self-interest can be built rather easily. Its definition entails that help is only offered in situations where future pay-backs can be expected (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). This implies that an individual engaging in this form of reciprocity has conducted a rational weighting beforehand in order to determine whether the expected future benefits will outweigh the costs of helping. In other words, denying help or taking advantage of help from others needs to be contrasted with a potentially damaged reputation that will result in limited chances to benefit from cooperation in exchange situations in future (cf. Frank, 1988).

[...]