China's Approach to Bangladesh. Relationship Evolution or Conquest Claw?

China's Approach to Bangladesh: Relationship Evolution or Conquest Claw?

Nasif Ahmed

University of International Business and Economics Beijing (UIBE)

Abstract

China, an Asian superpower with the world's second-largest economy, is constructing the historic Silk Road through Eurasia not just to further its economic development in Asia and Europe, but also to check her two major global competitors, the United States and India. Despite China's lengthy history of strong bilateral connections with Asian countries, it has recently invested in Bangladesh's infrastructure. This fast expansion of the Sino-Bangladesh relationship has become a source of anxiety for India, a long-time ally and neighbor. It has evolved into a major research topic, at least in the realm of international relations and power politics. This debate actually raises some questions: For example, what is China's economic approach to balancing Indian power, fighting US "Asia Turn" policies, or controlling South Asia's geopolitics? China's continued investment in Bangladesh shows that China, as a development partner, is pursuing a "debt trap" strategy with Bangladesh and a "region and roads" initiative to conquer regions like Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The study provides a critical analysis of Sino-Bangladesh relations and a geopolitical study of Chinese reality.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), Debt-trap diplomacy, Maritime Silk Road, One Belt One Road (OBOR), Look East Policy, Pivot to Asia Policy

Introduction

Once the ‘Sleeping Champion' is now rated as the ‘Second Super Power' and by 2050 it is expected to become the world's largest economy. Although China is a politically communist country, it adhered to an open market policy known as "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in 1973. There is a lot of historical evidence that there is a strong connection between China and South Asia.

A country from ancient times to the present. Emerging modern South Asia is now referred to as a “big market” for China, the United States and other exporting countries. And because of its trade name, the geopolitical game spread throughout the region. Today's superpowers use various methods to control this lucrative market for their own benefit. As the world's second largest economy, China is investing heavily in infrastructure to develop South Asia. It's no secret that Beijing's move toward this emerging economy is now being realized by the "China Dream" Single District and Road Initiative (BRI), the modern version of the ancient Silk Road. BRI shows that the Geopolitical Silk Road (MSR) and the Silk Road Economic Zone (SREB) connect China, Europe and Africa by land (Deepak, 2018; Chakma, 2019).

“To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an economic belt along the Silk Road” Xi Jinping; at Nazarbayev University on 7 September 2013 (Jinping, 2014, p. 313)

Beijing has a long history of trade relations with almost all of the developing countries in South Asia. However, China's economic reforms in 1978, the region's geopolitics, and huge trade markets have strengthened this relationship more than ever. However, China does not maintain the same type of relations with all countries. Instead, her connection tendencies change regularly based on interests and circumstances. For a better understanding, see the case of Bangladesh. Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 after a bloody war with Pakistan, a longtime ally of China. Cheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of the country of Bangladesh) and his intimacy with India at that time (Bhattacharya, 2018). India's active participation and “not-so-friendly” relationship with China also played a decisive role in shaping China's skepticism of the Bangladesh Liberation War. Thus, some international documents recognize it as the Indo-Pakistani war. For this reason, relations between China and Bangladesh were not very good until 1975, when China rejected Bangladesh's membership in the United Nations. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur in 155 in 155, a new journey began on Bangladesh-Bangladesh relations on January 16, which marked the 1961 visit of then-President Ziaur Rahman to Beijing (Bhattacharya, 2018). Until the first decade, relations between Dhaka and Beijing were limited by various trade agreements.

21st century. However, the 2010s saw a particular environment in the geopolitical sector with numerous economic and transit agreements, defense purchases, foreign direct investments (FDI), loans and duty-free trade. The bilateral relationship has become an alliance with China's many investments in infrastructure development projects such as roads, bridges, railways, power plants, port construction or development in Bangladesh. Diplomats on both sides guarantee China's interests in Bangladesh only in terms of friendly bilateral trade, but experts are pessimistic about the outcome of Bangladesh's negotiations and criticize China's true future intentions.

Outgoing Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina has spoken out in support of China, especially after the controversy over the January 5, 2015 general election. Professor Imtiaz Ahmed of Dhaka University says Beijing is a "predictable destination" For Hasina and that her stint in Jinping's government was not just for business, but also for the United States and the European Union (Chowdhury, 201). Gradually, Bangladesh lost much of its financial support to the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other infrastructure development projects, while China took advantage of Dhaka's ruthless exploits to gain access to the local economy.

China's plans to conquer or influence South Asia were motivated by competition, strategic partnerships, and the Cold War of 1962 (Huanxin, 2005). The territory of Bangladesh may therefore play the most important role in balancing India's political and military influence in the region among other South Asian countries (Sakhuja, 200). Since the territory of Bangladesh is the easiest way to access South Asian geopolitics and Indian markets, all efforts of China to influence the region, including securitization, facilities for investment and trade liberalization (Chakma, 2019; Shikha, 2014). All of the actions taken by the Beijing government appear to be in line with China'sforeignpolicy goals. 2

Preventive measures against US policies, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or Pivot to Asia Diversification of the Economic System, General Security, and Accounting for Indian Defense (Deepak, 2018; Anwar, 2019)

India has proven to be Bangladesh's permanent ally and proven neighbor, but China's attitude towards Bangladesh has been criticized by most Indian scholars. 2011). Experts fear that growing Sino-Bangladeshi relations could destabilize Indo-Bangladesh's mutual confidence economically and politically, despite Bangladeshi diplomats undermining Dhaka's neutral and neutral stance between New Delhi and Beijing. Michael Kugelman, deputy director of Asia programs at the Wilson Center, said growing relations between China and Bangladesh have intensified Indochinese geopolitical competition in recent years and could hurt Dhaka'srelationship.

Defense Ties

China is Bangladesh's biggest arms supplier. Bangladesh signs 'China-Bangladesh Defense' 'Agreement' in 2002 to cover military needs. Bangladesh from 2009 to 2014 82% of Chinese weapons are in the form of credit and soft loans (Shikha, 2014). In the current situation, the Bangladesh Defense Force has Chinese weapons, including warplanes, tanks, submarines, missile launchers and various weapons systems. Bangladesh has purchased two Chinese Ming-class submarines. China spent more than $200 million in a new contract signed on 20 June 2018 to deliver Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) to Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) 23 Hongdu K-8W intermediate trainers. (Mushtaq, 2018).

Defense relations are not only related to the import and export of weapons. China provides training for Bangladesh Army officers with joint Chinese and Bangladeshi army training (Bhattacharjee, 2018). The Sino-Bangladesh defense relationship is so strong that the Chinese and Bangladeshi soldiers of both countries train at each other's Defense Academy, and the Bangladeshi army is more comfortable. ).

The IPSC study argues that China's growing defense proposal for Bangladesh is nothing more than a "ghost war" against the United States and the United States in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by upgrading Bangladesh's naval infrastructure. Researchers in India believe that China does not have sufficient access to the IOR through the deal with Bangladesh. China is known to be more interested in access than base construction, making Bangladesh more important to China (Shikha, 2014).

“China has port facilities [Hambantota] in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and port facilities in Myanmar [Khauk Pyu], which makes India feel surrounded by China. This is the military dimension that India is concerned about,” said Siegfried O. Wolf, research director at SADF (Ahmed, 2019).

Some believe that China has just seized the opportunity to enter the Bay of Bengal on behalf of development partner Bangladesh, citing cheap labor, untapped natural gas reserves and a vast market. India, a common neighbor of China and Bangladesh, has enjoyed hostile relations with China through multiple wars on its border for decades, proving to be a "proven defense ally" of Bangladesh's ruling party, the Awami League. Date of birth in Bangladesh (Anwar, 2019). The moving bilateral relationship between China and Bangladesh has been a major c3 ncern for India. On the other hand, Delhi requested a 25-year defense cooperation agreement, and Dhaka said in February 2017, "Now is not the time to sign a long-term agreement. However, when Bangladesh proposed two important defense agreements, all these debates and demands were erased from Bangladesh's neutral position among international and regional geopolitical panels.

Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) and General Security of Military Information (GSOMIA agreement) mid-2019 (Bhuiyan, 2019).

When questions were raised about China (Bangladesh's biggest arms supplier) opposing the proposed deal with the United States, Bangladesh officially said it would decide where to buy weapons for its army. At the same time, while India's discontent has come to the attention of diplomats, Dhaka agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MOU), not a long-term defense cooperation agreement, to strike the right balance between India and China. , 2017).

Economic Deals towards Development

Economic relations between Bangladesh and China have gone through two different stages: before and after the launch of Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" project. From 1977 to 2010, Sino's total investment in Bangladesh was only $ 250 million (Ramachandran, 2019). However, with the rise of China Dream BRI, China has become the largest trading partner and investor in Bangladesh. Between 2010 and 2030, Chinese investors began to increase investment transactions and trade through two major contracts to build a telecommunications network system and a fertilizer plant at an interest rate of 2% to% 0 million (Byron, 2010). Critics believe that China's sudden move in Bangladesh is a bridge to Beijing to enter the Indian market and dominate through Chinese products (Chakma, 2019; Bhattacharya, 2018). However, Bangladesh is currently the second largest Chinese supplier in South Asia after Pakistan.

Since 2011, bilateral trade and investment have grown rapidly to $ 200 million, finally reaching 12 12 billion over the next three years (Ramachandran, 2019). Xi Jinping'svisit 2016 marked the beginning of a new era of Sino-Bangladeshi economic friendship in 2016, when Bangladesh officially announced its support for the BRI project. As a result, China has supported Dhaka in virtually all infrastructure development projects, including airports, roads, bridges, railways, and power generation buildings. In Bangladesh, Beijing has built eight friendly bridges, invested 1 billion in digital connectivity improvement projects and 3.7 billion in road and rail construction from Bangladesh in the “Padma Bridge Construction” project (Ramachandran, 2019). During Xi's visit, Beijing signed 27 joint agreements (Bhattacharya, 2018; Ramchandra, 2019).

According to the report of Bangladesh Bank, the bilateral trade between Dhaka and Beijing was 12.4 billion dollars in the fiscal year 2011-18-1 and Bangladesh received 60,000 million dollars from China in the financial year 201-20-201. (CIDIC, 2019). In the middle of the mid-2011 China joint venture about 1.6. invested billions upon billions of dollars. The net worth of Chinese investment in Bangladesh exceeded 38 38 billion in 2019 and this figure makes China the largest investor in Bangladesh (Ramachandran, 2019). Bangladesh imports a large numb 4 of Chinese products every year and the entry graph of Chinese products in the Bangladeshi market is increasing dramatically. The graphic below reflects a scenario of this event.

Exports of Chinese products to Bangladesh from 2014 to 2019 averaged $ 1,251,664.49, where in February 2014 it recorded its lowest value of 400,768 and in April 2018 it reached a high of $ 1,761,662 (Trading Economics, 2019).

This is not the end of trade between the two countries. As Bangladesh is one of the fastest growing economies in Asia, Bangladesh is working on several mega infrastructure development projects and is also working to establish 100 economic zones within its territory. China has expressed its willingness to financially support the construction of this economic zone (Zuo, 2018). If this continues, China's direct investment in Bangladesh is projected to exceed $ 30 billion by 2021 (Ramachandran, 2019). Furthermore, China only holds 2.9% of Bangladesh's external debt, while Japan holds 9.2% and other multilateral creditors such as ADB (Asian Development Bank), WB (World Bank) have nearly 60% together ( Fairman, 2019).

Economists believe bilateral ties could be stronger if the trade deficit between Bangladesh and China could be reduced. Two countries are already working on it and have entered into different agreements such as the free trade agreement, APTA, etc. Under the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), China has removed tariff barriers on Bangladesh's main exports (linen and textiles) with 82 types of goods imported from Bangladesh to China (Islam, 2019). Experts from both countries believe that an FTA (Free Trade Agreement) between Dhaka and Beijing will solve the trade deficit problem. Speaking at a conference on September 8, 2019 in Dhaka, Cheng Min said: "China-Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement can bring more Bangladeshi products under tax exemptions; effectively mitigate the bilateral trade deficit between Bangladesh and China. "(Hasib, 2019).

To continue this warm bilateral relationship and reduce the trade deficit, the two countries are now working on creating a free trade zone between China and Bangladesh. This move is expected to reduce Bangladesh's trade deficit with China by about $ 15 billion (Singh, 2019). Questions have been raised about what the future state of Bangladesh's economy will be if it relies too much on one country's investment. Bangladesh economists argue that Bangladesh is not in this dire situation as the risk of debt pressure continues to diminish. Furthermore, with an eight-year grace period, Bangladesh has around 31 years to pay off its external debt and Bangladesh will be able to pay off the debt on time even if the annual GDP growth rate drops to 5.0% ( Fairman, 2019). However, the whole scenario reflects China's debt trap diplomacy, in which Chinese state projects increase the host country's dependence on China, which benefits Beijing more than pearls.

Diplomatic Strategic Relation: From Geopolitics Perspective

In cross-border relationships, altruism can only exist when strategic interests come into play from behind. But in Sino-Bangladeshi relations, the two stakeholders claim their relationship only as business partners and that'sthedebate!

Bangladesh and China, two Asian countries with different political and financial status quo, are surrounded by the same powerful nation, India, which has opposing relations with the two countries. According to Kautilya, "Arthashastra", or "friend of friend" or "enemy of enemy" can only be considered as friend. A friend of the person with whom you have a severe hostile relationship can never be your friend, and you cannot befriend if you are not interested. So it is very clear that China cannot offer selfless and relentless support to India's trusted ally if China does not aim for a specific target. Thus, to identify the concrete objects of this relationship, it is first necessary to seek the interests of the two countries and to consider them in terms of cost-benefit surveys.

So, count the interests of Bangladesh first. It is natural for Bangladesh that the developing economy of Southeast Asia, which is struggling with many social and economic problems such as poor infrastructure development, large population, unemployment and poverty , etc., accepts all the opportunities and investments offered to develop it. site. Bangladesh gets this smooth ease from China. But that doesn't mean that Bangladesh has agreed not to submit to all the blindfolded dictatorships by not agreeing to China's terms for the construction of the deepwater port of Sonadia in 2014 (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

China's friendly approach to Bangladesh has the most controversial aspect of the "Rohingya genocide" issue. Immediately after the "August genocide" of 2017, China said it was leading a "unified humanitarian mission" and agreed to "do whatever is necessary" to help refugees in Chittagong with the cooperation of Bangladesh ( Zhou, 2017). Also on July 5, after a visit to Beijing, Hasina shared her belief in obtaining the full cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party to resolve the Rohingya crisis as quickly as possible. During the visit, the Hasina government signed five agreements, three memorandum of understanding and a letter of exchange. Under the agreement, China will provide 2,500 tonnes of rice to help Rohingya refugees (Ramachandran,2019). But paradoxically, China has never taken active diplomatic and political action to definitively resolve this crisis (Islam, Ailian & Jie, 2018). Critics believe that China will not harm its political relations with its Myanmar counterpart, although it will likely increase its aid to Bangladesh (Zhou, 2017). In addition, China will not harm its relations with Myanmar as many Beijing projects, including the Chinese dream BRI project, are underway in the Burmese region. It also demonstrates China's diplomatic policy towards Bangladesh's interests, at least not as Bangladesh's development partner. So the question arises, why hasn't China stopped investing in Bangladeshi projects? What is China's goal? The answer can be found in the discussion below.

China has become one of the most powerful countries in world politics since the turn of the century; China should create a geopolitical bloc to support it. Since there are many underdeveloped and developing countries in South Asia, it will be easier to control multiple countries at once by playing a debt trap policy. But we must not ignore the fact that the interests of China are totally at odds with the interests of India, the regional superpower, and China is undoubtedly well aware of this. Therefore, China chose to gain its political advantage by joining the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an obs6 rver by convincing Dhaka (Bhattacharjee, 2018). Pakistan's and Sri Lanka's current dependence on China due to over-acceptance of investment loans has given China influence in a broader version where the "observer" position of SAARC could be sustainable.

Beijing has started working with Dhaka as part of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). During Hasina's visit to China in mid -2019, Beijing assured that it would further share Chinese projects in Dhaka as part of the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative (Ramachandran, 2019). Bangladesh is a gateway for China to enter the unstable region of India, including Arunachal Pradesh (Niaz, 2014). Although Bangladesh has shown a neutral diplomatic stance towards China, the United States, India and other superpowers, China is relentlessly attempting to enter South Asia with its immense power of influence by offering so much attractive deals, investments and loans. Here is the question. What is the guarantee against Bangladesh's collapse in the debt cycle? Moreover, how long will Bangladesh remain immune from the same fate of Sri Lanka and Pakistan?

Critical Dissertation

China has managed to give a politically neutral image to the perception of Bangladesh by not meddling and providing advice on the internal political and social problems of Bangladesh. Although China's inactive attitude towards the Myanmar government on the Rohingya issue has raised a question about the Jinping government's neutral stance, China has successfully portrayed this inaction as its impartiality and foreign policy of non-interference with the world community. China's strategy has played an important role in driving the growth of China-Bangladesh relations (Bhattacharjee, 2018). Four sub-projects China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) (CPEC). The Transhimalayan Corridor is a long, winding road that runs across the Himalayas Cooperation in the 21st Century Maritime Maritime Industry with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives] (Islam, Ailian, & Jie, 2018) is constituted by the BRI, in which Bangladesh is a significant participant owing to its geographic location to execute subprojects. Bangladesh is also a significant marine gateway for China, since it connects landlocked areas in southern China, such as Yunnan, to the Indian Ocean through Bangladesh (Singh, 2019; Anwar, 2019). Therefore, involving Bangladesh in the implementation of the China Dream is so crucial that Beijing is investing more and more in the Dhaka projects.

Another significant Chinese interest in Bangladesh is market access, not just to the Indian market (Singh, 2019), but also to Bangladesh's massive population of 170 million people. Due to the continuing expansion of manufacturing sectors, China confronts a significant problem in identifying all of these businesses and establishing sufficient worker rights and frameworks to prevent them from becoming failing industries (Nahreen, 2017). Since Bangladesh offers cheap labor, China can seize this opportunity to outsource its declining industries and relocate to Bangladesh.

The energy supply industry largely builds the Chinese economy, and for this, China relies primarily on the Straits of Malacca (Bhattacharjee, 2018) (Bhattacharjee, 2018). If China can manage the BCIM project under the BRI, it will be easier to access the sea port for power supply via Bangladesh fro 7 China's Yunnan province. In an April 2019 composition, the Indian news agency ANI (Asian News International) advised that the ocean harborage of Payra in southern Bangladesh may come part of China's" plum choker"and fall into Beijing's hands (Fairman, 2019). ANI has argued that the seaport of Payra, valued at roughly $ 15 billion according to the BRI, will be built by two Chinese state-owned companies, namely China State Engineering and Construction Company (CSCEC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC). These two companies also collaborated on the construction of the Gwadar port in Pakistan and the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka according to a similar recipe and method from China. This means that after the BRI is executed, Bangladesh will have to allow China to use its seaports, which could potentially reduce Bangladesh's control over its ports.

However, the Bangladeshi authority is confident enough not to fall into the debt trap by presenting various arguments showing the situation of Bangladesh in a so far more sustainable and neutral state. Hasina's government claims that Dhaka's strategy will only lead to Bangladesh's economic and infrastructure development and will not create debt traps because Dhaka has a long-term plan to repay interest-bearing loans to China on time and Dhaka's economy it is quite capable of doing. that. Bangladesh has started to reduce its dependence on development credit from India and the West with its "Look East" policy and has formed various political and economic alliances in the Asian region since 2003 (Islam, 2019). Although former Prime Minister of Bangladesh Khaleda Zia said (Rahman, 2003) "The doors are open for us to the West, East, North and South." to do with political alliances or the regional strategy of checks and balances. The common thread of Bangladesh's foreign policy is "friendship with all, malevolence towards no one". Therefore, Bangladesh does not intend to damage its old bilateral and multilateral relations with the United States, India or any other country and cannot avoid China because of the old allies. The government of Bangladesh considers itself.

Rather than fearing for India or seeing China's approach only as an antidote to America's "pivot to Asia" policy or a debt trap for Bangladesh under the "policy of" China's checkbook ', China's investments are many productive opportunities to develop Bangladesh. This is not just because of Dhaka's trade neutrality or the desire to establish a relationship with China, but because of the decline in the number of creditors in Bangladesh projects in recent years. Citing high-level corruption, the World Bank recently canceled a $ 1.2 billion loan for the “Padma Multipurpose Bridge” project. In addition, showing environmental causes, many creditors such as the Norwegian government's sovereign wealth fund have refused to sponsor the Rampal coal-fired power plant in Bangladesh (Ramachandran, 2019). As a result, a developing country with a rapidly growing economy under many forward-looking development plans such as Bangladesh has no choice but to accept BRI projects as an opportunity for its development.

All this does not mean that Bangladesh is so happy to do business with China. Execute agreements signed In 2016, China alone disbursed less than 5% ($ 981.36 million) of the funding and Bangladesh is very upset by this slow repayment from China. Additionally, China has only released $ 194.81 million in the Karnaphuli River Tunnel Project, up from $ 689.35 million so far (Ramachandran, 2019). China has shown loan delays in development projects that are not directly related to BRI projects. It could also indicate that China has little interest 8 expanding its trade relationship with Bangladesh rather than the BRI, which could secure China's influence over Southeast Asia or subjugate developing countries in the region thereafter.

Concluding Remarks

Bangladesh is important to China because of its deltaic physical configuration, since it connects the landlocked state of Yunnan to the Indian Ocean and is a participant in the Silk Road economic belt and the Maritime Silk Road 21. (Islam, Ailian & Jie, 2018; Siddique, 2019). After the implementation of the BRI project, South and East Asia will be directly connected by an integrated waterway where Bangladesh's Chittagong will act as a transoceanic bridge. This will significantly reduce transaction costs and benefit investment and trade in the region (Deepak, 2018). Undoubtedly, almost all Asian nations, including Bangladesh, will benefit financially from the implementation of the Chinese Dream BRI project; China will certainly make the most of it. Here the debate is not about the expansion of trade but about the control mechanism of the regional economy and the submission to the economy of the weak by the powerful. China's shift in focus to struggling developing country Bangladesh seems like a real headache. Two of Bangladesh's neighbors, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, have already become victims of the Chinese debt trap in many ways, with some believing that China's approach to Bangladesh today is much the same. Furthermore, the growing relationship between China and Bangladesh has become an eyesore for Dhaka's old friend New Delhi, who holds the same position as China's watchdog in the region (Singh, 2019).

The current Sino-Bangladeshi relationship runs the risk not only of falling into the debt trap, although the Hasina government continually rejects this fact, but also of losing its old friend in times of need (Anwar, 2019). Even if Bangladesh succeeds to preserve the power balance between China and India, it would be trapped in an Indian or Chinese-driven growth for many years, making it difficult to reap the benefits of surrounding giants (Bodetti, 2019). Even if Bangladesh is able to handle all of these dangers, it is always possible that it will lose control of the seaports built with Chinese financing from Chinese firms as part of the Chinese Dream project. Now the question arises: how long can a developing country like Bangladesh play the balance of power game against the two most powerful economies in Asia - India and China for the sake of their interests? And how will Bangladesh free its economy from Chinese subjugation by developing its infrastructure with Chinese investments? International relations experts believe that Japanese investment, collaboration and less conditional development loans could be the answer or alternative to counter China's aggressive economic slavery for political purposes..

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